Shaffer v. Commissioner

9 B.T.A. 504, 1927 BTA LEXIS 2566
United States Board of Tax Appeals·Decided December 9, 1927·No. Docket No. 1072.·Published·Cited by 1 cases

Opinion

[509] OPINION.

Thammell :

Petitioner filed his original petition herein on December 13, 1924, asserting as error the refusal of respondent to allow a deduction for certain alleged bad debts. By leave of the Board, petitioner filed an amended petition on December 5, 1925, wherein [510] no. reference was made to, nor claim asserted in respect of, any deduction for bad debts, but in which it was alleged as error that respondent had failed and refused to determine the proper March 1, ■ 1913, value of a certain leasehold of elevator properties and had failed and refused to allow petitioner a proper deduction for exhaustion of its leasehold for each of the years involved. On motion ■granted by the Board on January 15, 1927, petitioner amended paragraph 5 of his amended petition, but did not materially change the allegations contained therein. At the hearing, counsel for petitioner stated in substanco that the issues tendered in the original petition .were abandoned, and that proof would be offered only on the issue contained‘in the amended petition. No evidence was offered touching the question of bad debts. The determination of the respondent in that respect is therefore approved.

In his amended petition, petitioner alleges that the value of his leasehold on March 1, 1913, was not less than $500,000, and that he is entitled to an annual deduction for exhaustion in the amount of $15,555.55. Respondent avers that said leasehold had no value at March 1, 1913, and that therefore petitioner is not entitled to any deduction for exhaustion. A- single, clear-cut issue of fact is thus presented.

If petitioner’s leasehold had any value at March 1, 1913, having been acquired prior to that date; he is entitled to a deduction for exhaustion in an amount equal to an aliquot portion of such value for each of the years 1918 and 1919. Appeal of Grosvenor Atterbury, 1 B. T. A. 169. The respondent raises no issue on this point, but contends that petitioner is not entitled to any deduction on account of exhaustion solely for the reason that his leasehold had no value as of March 1, 1913. With this contention, we are unable to agree. The evidence of record clearly and conclusively establishes that the leasehold in question had a very substantial value on that date. , However, the problem of determining with reasonable accuracy the definite amount of such value is not so easily solved.

This lease enabled the petitioner to operate his grain business at an average annual profit of more than $125,000, upon a capital investment of approximately half a million dollars, and without the leasehold such business could not have been operated profitably.

In the process of determining the value of the leasehold in question, an element of vital importance is the life expectancy of the lease contract or the remaining length of time it had to run from March 1,1913. The value of the leasehold depends largely on the term over which it was to run.

The evidence discloses that it was intended by the parties that the term- of the lease should be coextensive with the term of the contract [511] under which petitioner sold the property to the-railway company, and that the lease should cease and terminate at the same time that-said contract by its terms should cease and terminate. ■ To ascertain the life of the lease, we must, therefore, look to the terms of the sale contract. -Under that contract, the railway company agreed to pay the purchase price of $1,000,000 in monthly installments equal to , 2 cents per 100 pounds on the grain delivered by it to- the- elevators, together with the interest, but further agreed to pay during each year an amount equal to all interest and in- addition at least $50,000 on the principal sum.

The bonds in the principal sum of $1,000,000,- representing the purchase price to be paid by the railway company, were payable at-and matured on October 1, 1924, but contained the provision that they should be redeemable on any interest-paying date at par and accrued interest. In other words, the term of the lease was 20 years unless the happening of a contingency shortened it. The lease provided that the term should be the time provided in the contract of-purchase of the leased premises. The railway company was to pay ithe purchase price from freight receipts. In each year, beginning October 1, 1904, the railway company was to pay 2 cents on each 100 pounds of grain shipped into the elevators over its railway from points west of Joliet, Ill., or carried by it 40 miles or more, except that at least $50,000 and interest should'be paid each year. During the period from 1904 up to 1913, under the terms of this contract, judging by conditions then existing and the amount of freight so handled, it would have .required more than 20 years to complete, the payments out of the freight receipts alone. The railway, company was primarily interested in profits to be derived from the transportation of grain. The operation of the elevators was only incidental to and as an aid in securing freight business for the railway company: - In 1913, the date as of which the value of the-leasehold-is to be determined, more than eight years had run, during which time the railway company had carried out the provisions of the lease contract by making the minimum annual payments set out therein. During that period, no question or controversy had arisen with respect to the redemption of the, bonds prior to their maturity at the end of the 20-year period. The railway company, during that period, had. not redeemed the bonds, and the lease actually ran -for 20 years. • Upon consideration of all the evidence in-the case, we believe it-was-the intention of the parties in 1913, as in 1904, that the-lease should run until 1924.

In determining the value of this leasehold,, another element for consideration is the restrictions imposed by the contract on the lessee. [512] These related mainly to the giving of preference to the Rock Island Railway in the shipment of grain into and out of the elevators, and the requirement that at least 5,000,000 bushels per year should be delivered by the railway company to the elevators. However, the lessee was not required to ship its grain over the lines of this railway unless its rates were as favorable and its service as efficient as those of other r'ailroads. Bearing in mind the fact that these elevators were located directly on the Rock Island Lines in Chicago, which enabled that company to render an expedited service, particularly important in the grain business, and which also eliminated an onerous switching charge imposed by other lines, the preference restrictions do not appear to have been unfavorable to the lessee, nor to have materially detracted from the value of the leasehold. Also, considering the capacity of the elevators, the quantity of grain handled by them annually, and the other pertinent facts, the stipulation that 5,000,000 bushels of grain should be delivered by the Rock Island Railway each year does not appear to have been burdensome. From 1904 to the beginning of 1913, an average amount in excess of the minimum had in fact been so delivered, and no forfeiture had been exacted of the lessee. From the facts and conditions known or reasonably based on experience, it was not contemplated that any forfeiture would likely be exacted in the future.

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Shaffer v. Commissioner, 9 B.T.A. 504, 1927 BTA LEXIS 2566 (bta 1927).

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Shaffer v. Commissioner
9 B.T.A. 504 (Board of Tax Appeals, 1927)