Sevelitte v. The Guardian Life Insurance Company of America

• Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
• Decided: December 12, 2024
• Docket: 24-1154
• Status: Published

Opinion

United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit

No. 24-1154

RENEE SEVELITTE,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

THE GUARDIAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA,

Defendant,

ROBYN A. CAPLIS-SEVELITTE, personal representative of the Estate of Joseph F. Sevelitte,

Third Party Defendant, Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Leo T. Sorokin, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Gelpí, Lynch, and Montecalvo, Circuit Judges.

William K. Fitzgerald, with whom the Law Office of W. Kevin Fitzgerald was on brief, for appellant. Joshua N. Garick, with whom the Law Offices of Joshua N. Garick P.C. was on brief, for appellee.

December 12, 2024 MONTECALVO, Circuit Judge. Appellant Renee Sevelitte

appeals from the district court's decision granting summary

judgment to the Estate of Joseph F. Sevelitte, Renee's former

husband ("the Estate"). Renee and the Estate have long disputed

who is entitled to the proceeds of a life insurance policy that

Joseph bought during his marriage to Renee. At the heart of the

dispute is a Massachusetts law that automatically revokes a

spouse's beneficiary status at the time of divorce. See Mass.

Gen. Laws ch. 190B, § 2-804(b) ("section 2-804(b)"). The relevant

portion of section 2-804(b) provides:

Except as provided by the express terms of a governing instrument, a court order, or a contract relating to the division of the marital estate made between the divorced individuals before or after the marriage, divorce, or annulment, the divorce or annulment of a marriage: (1) revokes any revocable (i) disposition or appointment of property made by a divorced individual to the individual's former spouse in a governing instrument . . . .

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 190B, § 2-804(b).

As we explained when this case was last before us,

section 2-804(b) contains three exceptions:

First, under the "express terms" exception, the "express terms of a governing instrument" (such as a life insurance policy) can "provide that the beneficiary designation is not revoked by divorce or words to that effect." Second, a court order may maintain the divorced spouse's beneficiary status. Third, the "contract exception" provides that the

- 2 - divorcing spouses can retain the beneficiary designation via a "contract relating to the division of the marital estate" (such as a divorce agreement).

Sevelitte v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 55 F.4th 71, 76 (1st

Cir. 2022) (quoting Am. Fam. Life Assurance Co. of Columbus v.

Parker, 178 N.E.3d 859, 866-67, 867 n.8, 869 (Mass. 2022)).

"Unless one of the statute's express exceptions applies, the

beneficiary designation to . . . the divorced spouse[] [is]

revoked as a matter of law." Parker, 178 N.E.3d at 866.

All parties agree that section 2-804(b) applies to the

life insurance policy, which designates Renee as the beneficiary.

They disagree, however, whether one of the exceptions "saves"

Renee's status as beneficiary despite her divorce from Joseph.

Below, the district court determined that Renee could not establish

that any of the exceptions applied and thus granted summary

judgment to the Estate. We now consider Renee's arguments that

this was in error and affirm the district court's decision.

I. Background

A. Facts

Renee married Joseph in 1986. A year later, the two had

a son. In 1996, Joseph purchased a life insurance policy,

described in the policy as an "ordinary life policy," from The

- 3 - Guardian Life Insurance Company of America ("Guardian")1 with a

death benefit of $75,000, naming Renee as the sole beneficiary

("Guardian Policy"). The Guardian Policy also provides that if no

beneficiary survived Joseph, proceeds would be paid to his estate.

The Guardian Policy does not address the effect of divorce on

beneficiary status. At no point did Joseph amend the beneficiary

designation.

In 2013, Renee and Joseph executed a divorce agreement

(the "Divorce Agreement"), which the probate court approved. The

Divorce Agreement includes a section titled "Life Insurance."

Three paragraphs within that section are relevant here. First,

Paragraph 1 provides:

In order to secure his obligations contained in this Agreement against the eventuality of his death, [Joseph] agrees that until the termination of his support obligations hereunder, [he] shall obtain and/or maintain life insurance policies with a death benefit of not less than One Hundred Thousand ($100,000) Dollars. The life insurance policy shall name [Renee] as Trustee for [their son] as the beneficiary.

Thus, Paragraph 1 secured Joseph's child-support obligations.

Second, Paragraph 5 provides: "[t]he Parties acknowledge

that the Mortgage Insurance/Life Insurance policy on the marital

home shall stay in full force and effect." The beneficiary of the

1 Formerly, and at the time of purchase, Berkshire Life Insurance Company ("Berkshire").

- 4 - mortgage insurance/life insurance policy was the mortgage lender,

ensuring that the mortgage would be paid off in the event of

Joseph's death.

Third, Paragraph 6 provides:

The Parties acknowledge that the current Whole Life Insurance Policy shall remain in full force and effect and ownership of said policy is with [Joseph]. The Parties acknowledge that should [Joseph] elect to cash in said policy that [Renee] shall be entitled to one half of the value of said policy at the time of the cashing in of said policy.

The Divorce Agreement does not include any definition, description

of, or other reference to "the current Whole Life Insurance

Policy."

In 2015, Renee and Joseph executed a modification of the

Divorce Agreement (the "Modification"). The original agreement

did not provide for any alimony, but per the Modification Joseph

began weekly alimony payments. The Modification also provides

that "[s]o long as Joseph is required to pay alimony, he shall

maintain his current life insurance policy on his life that he has

through his employer, American Fruit, with a death benefit of

$50,000 with Renee as the beneficiary." This secured his alimony

obligations.

In 2016, Joseph married Robyn Caplis-Sevelitte. In

early 2020, Joseph executed a will, naming Robyn as the personal

- 5 - representative of the Estate. In December of the same year, Joseph

passed away.

In January 2021, Renee submitted a claim on the Guardian

Policy, listing herself as Joseph's "spouse." As part of the claim

process, she provided Guardian with the Divorce Agreement and the

Modification. In February, Guardian sent Renee a letter explaining

that there was "nothing in the documents provided that would negate

the impact of Massachusetts' revocation statute." The letter

specifically noted that Paragraph 6 of the Divorce Agreement did

not mention Guardian or Berkshire specifically and, further,

assuming the "Whole Life Insurance Policy" referred to the Guardian

Policy, it did not state that Renee "should be or remain the

beneficiary."

"Because Guardian deemed it possible that Renee's

beneficiary status was revoked, and because Joseph named no

contingent beneficiaries, Guardian concluded that the Estate had

a competing claim to the proceeds from the Policy." Sevelitte, 55

F.4th at 77. Thus, in March of 2021, "Guardian contacted Robyn,

who eventually filed a competing claim on behalf of the Estate."

Id.

B. Procedural History

Given the nature of Renee's claims, we set forth the

procedural history of this case in detail, including our decision

in Renee's earlier appeal.

- 6 - 1. Pleadings and Early Motions

Before Robyn submitted her claim on behalf of the Estate,

Renee sued Guardian, asserting various claims, all based on

Guardian's failure to pay her the proceeds from the Guardian

Policy. In answering, Guardian explained that Renee and the Estate

had "competing claims" to the Guardian Policy and that therefore

it could not make payment on the Guardian Policy. Thus, it sought

to interplead Robyn as the personal representative of the Estate

and asked that the court "determine to whom said benefits should

be paid."

Guardian then sought judgment on the pleadings on

Renee's claims under Rule 12(c). The Estate also sought judgment

on the pleadings, asserting that it was entitled to the proceeds

of the Guardian Policy.2

The district court addressed the two motions for

judgment on the pleadings in a single order: it granted Guardian's

motion, concluding that Guardian was not liable to Renee, and

2 Once brought into the case, the Estate filed several crossclaims against Renee, arguing that, among other things, the Estate was entitled to the Guardian Policy proceeds. In response, Renee filed her own counterclaims against both Robyn and the Estate, including claims under the Divorce Agreement and claims that Robyn had tortiously interfered with Renee's contract claims. The Estate moved to dismiss these claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court granted the motion and dismissed Renee's counter-claims without prejudice.

- 7 - granted the Estate's motion solely on the question of who was

entitled to the Guardian Policy proceeds.

In addressing section 2-804(b), the district court

looked at the express terms exception, found that the Divorce

Agreement was a "governing" document under the statute, and held

that the Divorce Agreement lacked the express terms necessary to

prevent automatic revocation. In turn, the district court

concluded that the Estate, rather than Renee, was entitled to the

funds, discharged Guardian from the action, and awarded the

Guardian Policy proceeds to the Estate. Renee appealed, arguing

that the district court erred in awarding the Estate the Guardian

Policy proceeds on a Rule 12(c) motion.

2. First Appeal

On review, we "vacate[d] and remand[ed] for further

proceedings to determine who [was] entitled to the death benefit."3

Sevelitte, 55 F.4th at 75. We first noted that a divorce agreement

was not a governing instrument because "a 'governing instrument'

is the document that creates the 'disposition or appointment of

[the] property' arguably being revoked by divorce" (e.g., "an

'insurance or annuity policy'") and "must be 'executed by the

divorced individual before the divorce or annulment.'" Id. at

3 Renee also appealed the district court's discharge of Guardian, and we affirmed. Sevelitte v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 55 F.4th 71, 75 (1st Cir. 2022).

- 8 - 82-83 (first quoting Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 190B, § 2-804(b)(1)(i),

then quoting id. § 1-201(19), and then quoting id. § 2-804(a)(4)

(alteration in original)). We then explained that the first of

the three exceptions -- the express terms exception -- "[wa]s not

implicated" because the governing document, the Guardian Policy,

lacked any language (explicit or otherwise) that would maintain

Renee's beneficiary designation post-divorce. Id. at 83.

We then turned to the contract exception and considered

whether the Divorce Agreement "save[d] Renee's beneficiary status

from revocation." Id. There, we concluded that "Renee ha[d]

plausibly alleged that Paragraph 6 [of the Divorce Agreement --

which stated that the policy shall remain in full force and effect

--] satisfie[d] the contract exception." Id.

Because of the case's procedural posture, we assumed as

true Renee's allegation that the term "Whole Life Insurance Policy"

referred to the Guardian Policy. Id. at 77 n.1. Next, we explained

that Paragraph 6 was "at least ambiguous" and that both Renee and

the Estate had presented plausible interpretations of the meaning

of "full force and effect" -- Renee argued that "the reference in

Paragraph 6 is only there for the purpose of preventing revocation

on divorce," while "the Estate posited that Paragraph 6 aims only

to 'maintain the asset value' of the [Whole Life Insurance] Policy

and provide that 'if the [Whole Life Insurance] Policy is sold,

then Renee is entitled to half.'" Id. at 83 (cleaned up).

- 9 - In considering Renee's argument, we addressed

Massachusetts law on the meaning of the phrase "full force and

effect," noting that the term is common "in contracts to specify

that no changes may be made to the referenced document" and that

"Massachusetts courts have recognized as much with respect to

beneficiary designations, albeit typically with respect to

contracts containing clearer language than that contained in

Paragraph 6." Id. (first citing Foster v. Hurley, 826 N.E.2d 719,

721, 725-26 (Mass. 2005) (concluding that separation agreement in

which ex-wife agreed to maintain unnamed insurance policies in

"full force and effect" with ex-husband "as primary beneficiary"

maintained beneficiary designation), and then citing Metro. Life

Ins. Co. (MetLife Grp.) v. Garron, No. 2018-00001, 2019 WL 7708852,

at *1-2, *5 (Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 8, 2019) (holding, where

ex-husband agreed to maintain life insurance in "full force and

effect" with ex-wife as beneficiary, that ex-husband could not

later unilaterally change the beneficiary designation)).

Thus, we concluded that, though "Paragraph 6 fails to

explicitly name Renee as the continuing beneficiary," we could not

"say, at the Rule 12(c) stage, that the phrase 'full force and

effect' cannot plausibly have been intended to retain the

beneficiary designation." Id. at 84. We also explained that even

if we read Paragraph 6 as the Estate wished:

- 10 - [I]t would nonetheless be plausible that the agreement could be construed as evidencing an intent that Renee retain an enduring interest in the [Whole Life Insurance] Policy after the divorce -- including, potentially, as a beneficiary. It would make little sense, after all, for Renee to negotiate the maintenance and potential division of an asset to which she would have no claim.

Accordingly, we vacated the district court's

determination that the Estate was entitled to the Guardian Policy

proceeds and returned the case to district court.

3. Discovery and Summary Judgment

After our mandate issued, the district court entered a

discovery and dispositive motion scheduling order. Days later,

Renee filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that

this court had "affirm[ed] [her] rights to the [Guardian Policy]

proceeds" and that the district court had to award her those

proceeds. The district court denied the motion. Several days

later, Renee filed a purported motion for summary judgment, again

arguing that our decision in Sevelitte dictated that she was

entitled to the proceeds. The district court denied her motion

and noted that, in its view, the matter "require[d] discovery and

then resolution on a summary judgment motion or at trial." The

district court then explained that Renee would be permitted to

refile her motion immediately (but then file no more dispositive

motions without showing good cause as to the need for multiple

- 11 - dispositive motions) or wait until the close of discovery.

Notwithstanding the district court's direction, over the following

months, Renee proceeded to file various motions (for judgment on

partial findings, for summary judgment, and for judgment on the

pleadings), all asserting that Sevelitte mandated her victory.

The district court denied all Renee's motions either for violating

its earlier order or for failing to follow the Local Rules.

The Estate proceeded to conduct discovery, serving

discovery requests and deposing Renee. Renee did not conduct

discovery. Instead, she stated that she "did not wish to spend

resources frivolously" and "[t]he documents and decisions of the

Courts in this matter speak for themselves." At the close of

discovery, per the scheduling order, the Estate moved for summary

judgment. Renee opposed the motion but did not, in any way,

respond to the Estate's "Statement of Undisputed Facts"; she

provided limited argument and virtually no factual or legal support

for her position.

In its summary judgment motion, the Estate argued that

the Divorce Agreement did not satisfy the contract exception,

pointing to evidence to support its contention that Renee and

Joseph did not intend to retain Renee's beneficiary status

post-divorce. Along with the relevant documents already

discussed, the Estate submitted the affidavit of Valerie Ross, the

attorney who represented Joseph in his divorce from Renee (in both

- 12 - the initial divorce proceedings and the later modification

proceedings), and a report from Susan DeMatteo, an expert in

Massachusetts matrimonial and divorce law, specializing in

marriage separation agreements.

Ross averred that she and Renee's attorney knew that

they needed to expressly name Renee as a continued beneficiary in

Paragraph 6 for her to remain as the beneficiary post-divorce,

pointing out that the Divorce Agreement expressly designated Renee

as the beneficiary under the policy described in Paragraph 1. She

also explained that the Divorce Agreement did not expressly name

Renee as continued beneficiary in Paragraph 6 because the Whole

Life Insurance Policy was listed for its asset value only -- if

Joseph elected to cash in that policy, then Renee would get half.

Ross also referenced the divorce negotiations as they

related to Paragraph 6, explaining that Renee initially sought the

addition of Paragraph 6, proposing language that would give her

ownership of the Whole Life Insurance Policy and the ability to

"obtain the cash surrender value of the whole life policy, not the

death benefits." Ross explained, however, that the negotiations

ultimately retained Joseph as owner and gave him the discretion to

cash in the Whole Life Insurance Policy early, with Renee entitled

to a portion of that value if he so elected. Ross also pointed to

the life insurance provision in the Modification as an example of

how she and Renee's attorney understood that they had to "expressly

- 13 - name[] Renee as the beneficiary" to maintain her status as

beneficiary.

In DeMatteo's report, she explained that, without

payment of any death benefit to Renee from any life insurance

policy, the Divorce Agreement allocated sixty percent of the

marital assets to Renee and that "it [was] unlikely that an

agreement requiring the payment of additional life insurance death

benefits, over and beyond the disproportionate division of assets

called for in the Divorce Agreement, would have obtained judicial

approval." She added that, in her expert opinion, "Renee was only

entitled to receive a portion of the cash surrender value [of the

policy described in Paragraph 6] if cashed in by Joseph." She

went on to explain that divorce judgments generally designate

spouses as beneficiaries of insurance policies to secure pending

financial obligations (e.g., child support or alimony), pointing

to Paragraph 1 of the Divorce Agreement and the Modification as

examples because both described insurance policies to secure

Joseph's child support and alimony obligations, respectively.

Finally, DeMatteo explained that the term "full force and effect,"

as used in Paragraph 6, "means only that the policy will not be

terminated and did not mean that Renee's beneficiary status was

retained."

- 14 - In opposing the Estate's motion, Renee mainly contended

that this court, in Sevelitte, had determined that the Divorce

Agreement entitled her to the Guardian Policy proceeds.

The district court granted summary judgment to the

Estate. It explained that only the Estate had presented evidence

to support its argument as to the meaning of Paragraph 64 and that

Renee did not introduce any contrary evidence. Thus, the district

court concluded that she had failed to demonstrate there was a

genuine dispute as to the intended meaning of Paragraph 6. The

district court therefore entered judgment for the Estate on its

claim that it was entitled to the proceeds of the Guardian Policy

and awarded those proceeds to the Estate. Renee timely appealed.

II. Standard of Review

We review the district court's grant of summary judgment

de novo. Mullane v. U.S. Dep't of Just., 113 F.4th 123, 130 (1st

Cir. 2024). In so doing, "we must construe the evidence 'in the

light most congenial to the nonmovant,' and will affirm the grant

of summary judgment where the record 'presents no genuine issue as

to any material fact and reflects the movant's entitlement to

4 The Estate also argued that Renee could not establish that the term "Whole Life Insurance Policy," as used in Paragraph 6, referred to the Guardian Policy. The court did not decide that issue and, instead, assumed that Paragraph 6 did refer to the Guardian Policy but expressed doubt that Renee "would be able to prove [that] at a trial."

- 15 - judgment as a matter of law.'" Id. (quoting McKenney v. Mangino,

873 F.3d 75, 80 (1st Cir. 2017)).

III. Discussion

Renee continues to maintain on appeal, as she did in the

district court, that Sevelitte held that the Divorce Agreement

satisfies section 2-804(b)'s contract exception. At its core, her

position is that it has been established as a matter of law that

Paragraph 6 of the Divorce Agreement prevents section 2-804(b)'s

automatic revocation.5

Renee's arguments demonstrate a fundamental

misunderstanding of our decision in Sevelitte and her obligations

as a plaintiff. First, our decision did not determine that the

Divorce Agreement satisfied section 2-804(b)'s contract exception.

It merely determined that it was plausible that Renee and Joseph

intended Paragraph 6 to prevent automatic revocation (and thus

that it was plausible that the contract exception applied) and

that it was also plausible that Paragraph 6 was not meant to

address revocation at all (and thus plausible that the exception

did not apply). See Sevelitte, 55 F.4th at 83. In other words,

5 To the extent Renee argues that she need only show that the Divorce Agreement is a contract relating to the division of marital assets to establish that the section 2-804(b) exception applies, we reject any such argument. For the exception to apply, the contract must, by its terms, "retain the beneficiary designation." Sevelitte, 55 F.4th at 76 (citing Am. Fam. Life Assurance Co. of Columbus v. Parker, 178 N.E.3d 859, 867 (Mass. 2022)). There were no such terms here.

- 16 - we held that Renee had done enough to proceed to the next phase of

litigation: discovery and dispositive motions. We did not dispense

with Renee's obligation to prove her case.

To reiterate, in Sevelitte we explained that

Paragraph 6's terms were ambiguous, id., because its "phraseology

can support reasonable differences of opinion as to the meaning of

the words employed and obligations undertaken," Bank v. Int'l Bus.

Machs. Corp., 145 F.3d 420, 424 (1st Cir. 1998) (quoting Coll v.

PB Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 50 F.3d 1115, 1122 (1st Cir. 1995)).

More specifically, it was unclear whether Paragraph 6 was intended

to maintain the existence of the policy itself (with the

possibility that, if Joseph cashed in the policy during his life,

Renee would get a share) or to maintain Renee's status as the

beneficiary despite the divorce. Thus, when the case returned to

the district court, the remaining question was whether any evidence

could support either side's understanding of Paragraph 6. Given

the evidence the Estate put forth to support its understanding, in

order to survive summary judgment Renee was obligated to present

some evidence or argument to suggest that she and Joseph intended

to maintain her beneficiary status. As she has not done so, she

cannot prove that she is entitled to the proceeds of the Guardian

Policy.6

6The Estate again argues that Renee cannot show that "the Whole Life Insurance Policy" refers to the Guardian Policy, but we

- 17 - Generally, "if [a] contract's terms are ambiguous,

contract meaning normally becomes a matter for the factfinder, and

summary judgment is appropriate only if the extrinsic evidence

presented about the parties' intended meaning is so one-sided that

no reasonable person could decide to the contrary." Farmers Ins.

Exch. v. RNK, Inc., 632 F.3d 777, 784 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting

Bank, 145 F.3d at 424). As the district court explained, this is

one such case.

Ross's affidavit7 and DeMatteo's report together support

the Estate's position that Renee and Joseph did not intend to

retain Renee's status as the beneficiary of the Guardian Policy.

See id. Those two documents make clear that Renee and Joseph,

through their attorneys, understood that the only way to retain

beneficiary status post-divorce was to explicitly state that

purpose; that the term "full force and effect" had the simple

effect of maintaining the existence of the described policy; and

assume that it does because the outcome would not change: the Estate has demonstrated that even so no jury could conclude that Renee and Joseph intended to retain Renee's beneficiary status under the Guardian Policy. 7 In her brief, Renee suggests that Ross's affidavit was "not discoverable," and, in her reply, she argued for the first time that the affidavit included inadmissible hearsay. Both arguments are waived. United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990) ("[I]ssues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived."); United States v. Toth, 33 F.4th 1, 19 (1st Cir. 2022) ("New arguments . . . may not be made in reply briefs.").

- 18 - that Paragraph 6 had the effect of giving Renee an interest in the

policy proceeds only if Joseph cashed in the policy during his

life. The Estate's evidence also reasonably suggests that Renee's

theory of Paragraph 6's meaning would likely have resulted in the

Divorce Agreement being rejected by the probate court8 and would

have been highly unusual as it would not have secured any

obligation Joseph had under the Divorce Agreement. Finally, Renee

and Joseph intended for Paragraph 6 to only give Renee an interest

in the Guardian Policy if Joseph were to cash the policy in during

his life.

Renee has offered nothing to undermine or contradict the

Estate's position or evidence. Thus, because the record contains

only the Estate's evidence as to Paragraph 6's intended meaning,

no reasonable person could find that Renee and Joseph intended to

save Renee's beneficiary status from revocation. Though Renee

"disputes" Paragraph 6's meaning, that dispute is not genuine as

she has presented no evidence to support her argument. See French

v. Merrill, 15 F.4th 116, 123 (1st Cir. 2021) (At summary judgment,

Renee seeks to undercut DeMatteo's assessment that such a 8

provision would be unfair by pointing to the assessed value of a second home that Joseph retained post-divorce, arguing that Paragraph 6 was meant to balance his retention of the property. Yet, as she conceded during oral argument, she has never submitted any evidence of that home's value. In any event, DeMatteo considered the entire division of assets set out in the Divorce Agreement in reaching her conclusion, and Joseph's retention of the second home is memorialized in the Divorce Agreement.

- 19 - a dispute is genuine when a fact "is disputed such that 'a

reasonable jury could resolve the point in favor of the non-moving

party.'" (quoting Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless

Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 52 (1st Cir. 2000))). Thus, summary judgment

was appropriate.9

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district

court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Estate.

9 Renee also argues that the Divorce Agreement additionally satisfies the court-order exception because the probate court incorporated the Divorce Agreement into the divorce judgment. The district court rejected this argument in a footnote, explaining that Renee had not "articulated any basis for finding that application of the court-order exception would entail different analysis or yield a different result than the contract exception" and that Renee had "effectively waived the opportunity to advance a reasoned argument based on the court-order exception." We agree with the district court's assessment. Even assuming that incorporating the Divorce Agreement into the divorce judgment rendered that agreement a court order for the purposes of section 2-804(b), see Parker, 178 N.E.3d at 867 n.8 (suggesting that separation agreement incorporated into divorce judgment could be considered under court-order exception), the problem remains that the Divorce Agreement does not provide that Renee should remain the beneficiary post-divorce. Thus, we reject this argument.

- 20 -