Appellate Case: 24-6071 Document: 41-1 Date Filed: 12/10/2024 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS December 10, 2024 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court ROMAN V. SERPIK, Article III man,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 24-6071 (D.C. No. 5:23-CV-00988-JD) JILL WEEDON, GINA WEBB, (W.D. Okla.) ANGELA C. MARSEE, MICHELLE K. ROPER, COLBY VAUGHAN, in their individual and official capacities; STATE OF OKLAHOMA,
Defendants - Appellees. _________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT* _________________________________
Before PHILLIPS, CARSON, and FEDERICO, Circuit Judges. _________________________________
*After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 24-6071 Document: 41-1 Date Filed: 12/10/2024 Page: 2
Roman V. Serpik, proceeding pro se,1 appeals from the district court’s
dismissal of his civil rights action. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291, we affirm.
I
In January 2023, Oklahoma State Trooper Colby Vaughan pulled
Mr. Serpik over for failing to stop at a red light. During the traffic stop,
Mr. Serpik refused to provide his driver’s license, name, or birthdate.
Trooper Vaughan arrested him, and he was charged with obstructing an
officer and failure to stop at a red light, in violation of Oklahoma law.
Judges Jill Weedon and Michelle Roper presided over Mr. Serpik’s criminal
proceedings; District Attorney (D.A.) Angela Marsee and Assistant District
Attorney (A.D.A.) Gina Webb prosecuted the case. An Oklahoma state jury
found Mr. Serpik guilty on both charges, and he was sentenced to one year
and ten days in prison, with six months of his sentence suspended.
Mr. Serpik sued Judges Weedon and Roper, D.A. Marsee, A.D.A.
Webb, and Trooper Vaughan in federal district court. His complaint
asserted that the defendants violated his constitutional rights in numerous
ways from the arrest through trial and sentencing.
1 Because Mr. Serpik represents himself, we construe his filings liberally. See Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). 2 Appellate Case: 24-6071 Document: 41-1 Date Filed: 12/10/2024 Page: 3
Judge Weedon moved for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) and, in a separate motion, the rest of the defendants did
the same. On February 12, 2024, the district court granted the motions,
reasoning that Judges Weedon and Roper were entitled to absolute judicial
immunity and that Mr. Serpik’s claims against D.A. Marsee, A.D.A. Webb,
and Trooper Vaughan were frivolous. The order indicated that the court
would not enter judgment until February 22, 2024, “to allow Serpik an
opportunity to follow Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 and Local Civil
Rule 15.1 for any proposed motion for leave to file an amended complaint
and proposed amended complaint that overcomes the deficiencies identified
in this Order.” Suppl. R. at 11.
Mr. Serpik filed two timely motions to amend his complaint, but he
did not attach a proposed amended complaint to either motion. The court
entered judgment on February 22, finding that he failed to comply with
Local Civil Rule 15.1, which requires that proposed amended pleadings be
attached to the motion to amend.
Mr. Serpik filed a motion for reconsideration in which he again sought
leave to amend his complaint. The court denied reconsideration and denied
leave to amend, explaining that it had given him “time to seek an
opportunity to amend his complaint, but he failed to properly do so.” R. at
150.
3 Appellate Case: 24-6071 Document: 41-1 Date Filed: 12/10/2024 Page: 4
II
A
“The district court has discretion when considering whether to allow
a plaintiff to amend its complaint. We will not overturn that decision absent
an abuse of discretion.” TV Commc’ns Network, Inc. v. Turner Network
Television, Inc., 964 F.2d 1022, 1028 (10th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted).
The district court did not abuse its discretion here. The court
explained that it had already afforded Mr. Serpik the opportunity to file an
amended complaint before it entered judgment and that he did not comply
with the applicable rules. This explanation was sufficient. See id. (holding
that refusing leave to amend “without expressing any justification” is an
abuse of discretion, but the district court’s decision will stand “if the denial
rests on articulated reasons”); Castanon v. Cathey, 976 F.3d 1136, 1145
(10th Cir. 2020) (upholding denial of motion to amend based in part on
plaintiff’s failure to comply with a local rule).
B
We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule
12(b)(6). Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009).
Under this standard, we accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations
and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. “To survive a
motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
4 Appellate Case: 24-6071 Document: 41-1 Date Filed: 12/10/2024 Page: 5
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks
omitted). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.
Mr. Serpik raised numerous claims against the judges, including that
Judge Weedon threatened to hold him in contempt when he tried to assert
his rights to freedom of religion and freedom of travel, and that Judge Roper
mishandled the initial appearance for his criminal proceedings.
The district court found that Mr. Serpik failed to state a claim because
“[j]udges have absolute judicial immunity for acts taken in their judicial
capacity,” Suppl. R. at 7, and he had alleged no facts suggesting that the
judges acted outside their judicial capacity or without jurisdiction. The
court therefore dismissed Mr. Serpik’s claims against the judges with
prejudice. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355–57 (1978) (holding
that judges have absolute immunity for acts taken in their judicial
capacity).
On appeal, Mr. Serpik contends that Judges Weedon and Roper were
not entitled to judicial immunity, but he does not explain why. See Nixon v.
City & Cnty.
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Appellate Case: 24-6071 Document: 41-1 Date Filed: 12/10/2024 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS December 10, 2024 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court ROMAN V. SERPIK, Article III man,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 24-6071 (D.C. No. 5:23-CV-00988-JD) JILL WEEDON, GINA WEBB, (W.D. Okla.) ANGELA C. MARSEE, MICHELLE K. ROPER, COLBY VAUGHAN, in their individual and official capacities; STATE OF OKLAHOMA,
Defendants - Appellees. _________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT* _________________________________
Before PHILLIPS, CARSON, and FEDERICO, Circuit Judges. _________________________________
*After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 24-6071 Document: 41-1 Date Filed: 12/10/2024 Page: 2
Roman V. Serpik, proceeding pro se,1 appeals from the district court’s
dismissal of his civil rights action. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291, we affirm.
I
In January 2023, Oklahoma State Trooper Colby Vaughan pulled
Mr. Serpik over for failing to stop at a red light. During the traffic stop,
Mr. Serpik refused to provide his driver’s license, name, or birthdate.
Trooper Vaughan arrested him, and he was charged with obstructing an
officer and failure to stop at a red light, in violation of Oklahoma law.
Judges Jill Weedon and Michelle Roper presided over Mr. Serpik’s criminal
proceedings; District Attorney (D.A.) Angela Marsee and Assistant District
Attorney (A.D.A.) Gina Webb prosecuted the case. An Oklahoma state jury
found Mr. Serpik guilty on both charges, and he was sentenced to one year
and ten days in prison, with six months of his sentence suspended.
Mr. Serpik sued Judges Weedon and Roper, D.A. Marsee, A.D.A.
Webb, and Trooper Vaughan in federal district court. His complaint
asserted that the defendants violated his constitutional rights in numerous
ways from the arrest through trial and sentencing.
1 Because Mr. Serpik represents himself, we construe his filings liberally. See Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). 2 Appellate Case: 24-6071 Document: 41-1 Date Filed: 12/10/2024 Page: 3
Judge Weedon moved for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) and, in a separate motion, the rest of the defendants did
the same. On February 12, 2024, the district court granted the motions,
reasoning that Judges Weedon and Roper were entitled to absolute judicial
immunity and that Mr. Serpik’s claims against D.A. Marsee, A.D.A. Webb,
and Trooper Vaughan were frivolous. The order indicated that the court
would not enter judgment until February 22, 2024, “to allow Serpik an
opportunity to follow Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 and Local Civil
Rule 15.1 for any proposed motion for leave to file an amended complaint
and proposed amended complaint that overcomes the deficiencies identified
in this Order.” Suppl. R. at 11.
Mr. Serpik filed two timely motions to amend his complaint, but he
did not attach a proposed amended complaint to either motion. The court
entered judgment on February 22, finding that he failed to comply with
Local Civil Rule 15.1, which requires that proposed amended pleadings be
attached to the motion to amend.
Mr. Serpik filed a motion for reconsideration in which he again sought
leave to amend his complaint. The court denied reconsideration and denied
leave to amend, explaining that it had given him “time to seek an
opportunity to amend his complaint, but he failed to properly do so.” R. at
150.
3 Appellate Case: 24-6071 Document: 41-1 Date Filed: 12/10/2024 Page: 4
II
A
“The district court has discretion when considering whether to allow
a plaintiff to amend its complaint. We will not overturn that decision absent
an abuse of discretion.” TV Commc’ns Network, Inc. v. Turner Network
Television, Inc., 964 F.2d 1022, 1028 (10th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted).
The district court did not abuse its discretion here. The court
explained that it had already afforded Mr. Serpik the opportunity to file an
amended complaint before it entered judgment and that he did not comply
with the applicable rules. This explanation was sufficient. See id. (holding
that refusing leave to amend “without expressing any justification” is an
abuse of discretion, but the district court’s decision will stand “if the denial
rests on articulated reasons”); Castanon v. Cathey, 976 F.3d 1136, 1145
(10th Cir. 2020) (upholding denial of motion to amend based in part on
plaintiff’s failure to comply with a local rule).
B
We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule
12(b)(6). Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009).
Under this standard, we accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations
and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. “To survive a
motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
4 Appellate Case: 24-6071 Document: 41-1 Date Filed: 12/10/2024 Page: 5
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks
omitted). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.
Mr. Serpik raised numerous claims against the judges, including that
Judge Weedon threatened to hold him in contempt when he tried to assert
his rights to freedom of religion and freedom of travel, and that Judge Roper
mishandled the initial appearance for his criminal proceedings.
The district court found that Mr. Serpik failed to state a claim because
“[j]udges have absolute judicial immunity for acts taken in their judicial
capacity,” Suppl. R. at 7, and he had alleged no facts suggesting that the
judges acted outside their judicial capacity or without jurisdiction. The
court therefore dismissed Mr. Serpik’s claims against the judges with
prejudice. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355–57 (1978) (holding
that judges have absolute immunity for acts taken in their judicial
capacity).
On appeal, Mr. Serpik contends that Judges Weedon and Roper were
not entitled to judicial immunity, but he does not explain why. See Nixon v.
City & Cnty. of Denver, 784 F.3d 1364, 1366 (10th Cir. 2015) (“The first task
of an appellant is to explain to us why the district court’s decision was
5 Appellate Case: 24-6071 Document: 41-1 Date Filed: 12/10/2024 Page: 6
wrong.”). Because his argument is unsupported, we decline to consider it.
See Kelley v. City of Albuquerque, 542 F.3d 802, 819 (10th Cir. 2008)
(holding that “perfunctory” allegations of error that “fail to frame and
develop an issue” are insufficient “to invoke appellate review” (alteration
and internal quotation marks omitted)).
Among other things, Mr. Serpik claimed that he did not consent to his
criminal proceedings, his traffic infractions were not crimes, and D.A.
Marsee and A.D.A. Webb charged him under a false name and charged him
with committing a crime that was “made up or false.” R. at 10. He sought
a federal investigation into the use of “official positions in government to
personally attack living man and woman with fictitious contracts without
discovery or full disclosure,” and dismissal of his criminal case “due to
systematic fraud and perjury against PERSONS, men and woman.” Id. at
14.
The district court found Mr. Serpik’s claims against the remaining
defendants bore “the hallmarks of typical sovereign citizen arguments” and
were frivolous. Suppl. R. at 9. It held that his arguments were “not based
on a cognizable legal theory,” and that he failed to allege sufficient facts to
demonstrate his claims were plausible. Id. at 10. Therefore, the court
concluded that Mr. Serpik failed to state a claim against D.A. Marsee,
6 Appellate Case: 24-6071 Document: 41-1 Date Filed: 12/10/2024 Page: 7
A.D.A. Webb, and Trooper Vaughan and dismissed his claims against them
without prejudice.
On appeal, Mr. Serpik argues the district court erred by
mischaracterizing him as a sovereign citizen, when he is a “Sovereign-
freeman.” Opening Br. at 44. He makes myriad conclusory assertions, but
he has not pointed to allegations in the complaint that were sufficient to
state a claim. Thus, the district court properly dismissed Mr. Serpik’s
claims against D.A. Marsee, A.D.A. Webb, and Trooper Vaughan.
C
Mr. Serpik filed a motion to recuse the federal district court judge who
dismissed his complaint. He claims she is biased and prejudiced against
him, improperly identified him as a sovereign citizen when he is not a
member of that group, has a personal relationship with the defendants in
his case, and is protecting the defendants’ criminal acts.
Mr. Serpik’s complaints about the district court judge stem from the
rulings she made against him. But “adverse rulings cannot in themselves
form the appropriate grounds for disqualification.” Green v. Branson, 108
F.3d 1296, 1305 (10th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). And
our review of the record shows the district court carefully considered each
of Mr. Serpik’s filings and issued thoughtful explanatory orders. We detect
no hint of bias against him or partiality to the defendants. Moreover,
7 Appellate Case: 24-6071 Document: 41-1 Date Filed: 12/10/2024 Page: 8
because we affirm the dismissal of Mr. Serpik’s complaint, his motion to
recuse the district court judge is moot.
III
We affirm the district court’s judgment and deny Mr. Serpik’s motion
to recuse the district court judge. We also deny Mr. Serpik’s motion for a
copy of the supplemental record on appeal.
Entered for the Court
Richard E.N. Federico Circuit Judge