Serio v. Hevesi

40 A.D.3d 72, 831 N.Y.S.2d 160
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedMarch 6, 2007
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 40 A.D.3d 72 (Serio v. Hevesi) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Serio v. Hevesi, 40 A.D.3d 72, 831 N.Y.S.2d 160 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2007).

Opinions

OPINION OF THE COURT

Tom, J.P.

At issue on this appeal is the authority of respondent Comptroller to perform an audit of the official accounts and monies under the control of the Liquidation Bureau of the New York State Insurance Department as well as its internal management and procedures. The case is one of first impression involving the respective constitutional and legislative authority of the Comptroller of the State of New York and the Superintendent of the New York State Insurance Department.

By way of background, it is appropriate to observe that the Superintendent of Insurance has two distinct roles—one administrative and public, as the regulator of the insurance industry, and the other judicial and private, as the liquidator or rehabilitator of a distressed insurer. Thus, in his public capacity, the Superintendent oversees the regulation of insurers licensed in the State of New York, while in his private capacity, he acts as a court-appointed receiver on behalf of an insolvent or distressed insurer.

The Superintendent’s private, judicial function is prescribed by Insurance Law article 74, under which he is charged with [74]*74rehabilitating, liquidating and conserving the assets of insolvent insurance companies. This process is managed by the staff of the Insurance Department’s Liquidation Bureau, whose numbers may be augmented by personnel retained from the subject insurance company. Under the statute, Superintendent Serio is granted exclusive authority to apply to the court for an order to either rehabilitate or liquidate the business of a distressed insurer (Insurance Law §§ 7402, 7404).

As rehabilitator or liquidator, the Superintendent manages the estates of insolvent insurers as a fiduciary under the supervision of Supreme Court (Insurance Law § 7403 [a]; § 7405 [a]; § 7407 [a]). Because the insurer is generally in disarray, the Liquidation Bureau undertakes to fulfill the distressed company’s obligations to its policyholders and to protect the interests of creditors for the period of time necessary to rehabilitate or liquidate the business. However, the authority to decide claims against the assets of the insurer remains with the court.

Originally, the liquidation of insurers was treated no differently than the liquidation of corporations generally. A receiver was appointed by the court to marshal the insurer’s assets and to devise a reorganization plan or effect dissolution, subject to court approval. In 1909, reform legislation was enacted, entrusting the role of receiver exclusively to the Superintendent of Insurance.

The 1909 legislation added Insurance Law § 63 (L 1909, ch 300, § 1, repealed by L 1932, ch 191, § 1, and reenacted as Insurance Law art XI) and 1908 Legislation amended the Banking Law (L 1908, ch 143; see Matter of Union Bank of Brooklyn, 204 NY 313, 316-317 [1912]) to provide

“for the liquidation of insurance companies and banks by substituting liquidation by the Insurance Department or the Banking Department, as the case might be, for liquidation by receivers appointed by the courts . . . Analysis of the provisions of section 63 and of article XI discloses that it was not the legislative intent to substitute the Superintendent of Insurance for the courts in the handling of delinquent insurers but merely to deprive the court of the power to appoint persons other than the Superintendent of Insurance as receiver of such insurers, at the same time continuing the previously existing inherent general jurisdiction of the court” (Matter of Lawyers Mtge. Co., 169 Misc 802, 826-827 [1938] [citations omitted], affd 256 App Div 974 [1939]).

[75]*75An insurance company is considered to be insolvent when

“the superintendent finds from a financial statement or report on examination that [it] is unable to pay its outstanding lawful obligations as they mature in the regular course of business, as shown by an excess of required reserves and other liabilities over admitted assets, or by its not having sufficient assets to reinsure all outstanding risks with other solvent authorized assuming insurers after paying all accrued claims owed” (Insurance Law § 1309 [a]).

An order of liquidation directs the Superintendent to take possession of the property of the insurer, title to which vests, by operation of law, in the Superintendent (Insurance Law § 7405 [b]). However, the Superintendent may dispose of the insurer’s assets only with the approval of the court (Insurance Law § 7428); distribution of such assets must both comply with statutory claim priorities and conform to the direction of the court (Insurance Law § 7434). Approved claims under policies issued by the insolvent insurer are paid out of a security fund (Insurance Law §§ 7603, 7604) financed from payments made by insurers under a prescribed statutory formula (Insurance Law § 7603 [b]; § 7604 [b]). Because payments from a security fund are limited to claims arising out of insurance policies, the approved claims of creditors are paid out of the assets of the insolvent insurer.

This special proceeding was precipitated by the Comptroller’s service of subpoenas on the Superintendent and eight employees of the Liquidation Bureau seeking their testimony concerning all official accounts and moneys under their control, as well as the books and records required to be maintained with regard to abandoned property reports filed with the Comptroller.1 The Comptroller proposes to examine every aspect of the liquidation [76]*76and rehabilitation process as well as the Bureau’s internal policies and management. The subpoenas request information concerning insurance companies under the Bureau’s supervision since January 1, 2001, including, inter alia, financial reports, details of the Bureau’s procedures for hiring and compensation of staff, lawyers and consultants, assignment of vehicles and cell phones, the allocation of funds to monthly expenditures and bank account statements. The avowed purpose of these subpoenas is to ascertain whether the financial management and operating practices of the Liquidation Bureau are effective in fulfilling its responsibility to liquidate and settle the affairs of insolvent insurance companies and to establish the accuracy and completeness of abandoned property reports submitted to the Comptroller under the Abandoned Property Law. Petitioner Superintendent objected to the subpoenas and moved to quash them, arguing that the Comptroller lacks the authority to audit the Liquidation Bureau.

In the judgment appealed from, Supreme Court agreed with the Superintendent that the Comptroller has no power to audit the operations of the Liquidation Bureau, granted the application to quash the subpoenas and declared that NY Constitution, article Y § 1, State Finance Law § 111 and Abandoned Property Law § 1412-a neither empower the Comptroller to pre-audit or post-audit the financial management and operations of the Liquidation Bureau nor grant him authority to audit the property of insolvent insurers held by the Superintendent.

This Court concludes that the Comptroller has statutory authority to conduct audits of the Superintendent’s handling of the dissolution or rehabilitation of distressed insurance companies and to review the internal financial controls and management procedures of the Liquidation Bureau. We therefore reverse the order and reinstate the subject subpoenas.

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Bluebook (online)
40 A.D.3d 72, 831 N.Y.S.2d 160, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/serio-v-hevesi-nyappdiv-2007.