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3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 SERGEY P. KAZAKOV, CASE NO. 2:25-cv-00352-JNW 8 Petitioner, ORDER DECLINING TO ADOPT R&R 9 AND GRANTING PETITION FOR v. WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 10 PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General of 11 the United States, et al.,
12 Respondents. 13 1. INTRODUCTION 14 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) detained Petitioner Sergey 15 Kazakov on October 24, 2023, to attempt to remove him to Russia. On March 14, 16 2024, an Immigration Judge ordered Kazakov removed to Russia, but he remains 17 detained in the United States. On February 25, 2025, he petitioned for a writ of 18 habeas corpus. United States Magistrate Judge Theresa L. Fricke issued a Report 19 and Recommendation (“R&R”) recommending the Court deny the petition. Dkt. 20 No. 20. This matter comes before the Court on Kazakov’s objections to the R&R. 21 After de novo review, the Court DECLINES to adopt the R&R and GRANTS 22 Kazakov’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. 23 1 2. DISCUSSION 2 2.1 Legal standard. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72 allows a party to file written objections to 3 an R&R within fourteen days. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). The objections must be 4 “specific” and relate “to the [R&R’s] proposed findings and recommendations.” Id. 5 “The district judge must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s 6 disposition that has been properly objected to.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). 7 Here, Kazakov objects to the R&R’s finding under Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 8 U.S. 678 (2001), that he failed to show that his removal is not likely to occur in the 9 reasonably foreseeable future. The Court appreciates the Magistrate Judge’s 10 thorough consideration of the record, but on de novo review, the Court finds that 11 Kazakov has met his burden under Zadvydas and that his detention violates due 12 process. Federal courts have authority to grant writs of habeas corpus to any person 13 held “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United 14 States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). A district court’s habeas jurisdiction extends to 15 challenges to immigration-related detention. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 16 (2001). 17 18 2.2 Kazakov’s detention violates due process under Zadvydas. 19 Kazakov argues that his continued detention violates due process because 20 there is no significant likelihood he will be removed in the reasonably foreseeable 21 future. The Court agrees. 22 23 1 When a final order of removal is issued against a noncitizen, they enter a 90- 2 day removal period; the Government detains them during that period to carry out
3 their removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1). ICE may continue to detain noncitizens after 4 the 90-day removal period expires under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). However, in 5 Zadvydas, the Supreme Court held that 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) “does not permit 6 indefinite detention.” 533 U.S. at 689. Rather, it allows detention only for “a 7 period reasonably necessary to bring about that [noncitizen’s] removal from the 8 United States.” Id. “[O]nce removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued
9 detention is no longer authorized by statute.” Id. at 699. 10 The Court established six months as the “presumptively reasonable” period of 11 post-removal-order detention. Id. at 701. After six months, “once the [noncitizen] 12 provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in 13 the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence 14 sufficient to rebut that showing.” Id. “[A]s the period of prior postremoval 15 confinement grows, what counts as the ‘reasonably foreseeable future’ conversely
16 would have to shrink.” Id. The Government’s burden to justify continued detention 17 thus becomes increasingly demanding over time. 18 The R&R relied on Diouf v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 1222, 1233 (9th Cir. 2008), for 19 the proposition that uncertainty about when removal will occur does not establish 20 indefinite detention. But Diouf is distinguishable. There, the sole obstacle to 21 removal was the petitioner’s own litigation—Senegal had already issued travel
22 documents, and ICE had twice arranged departure before Diouf refused to 23 cooperate. Id. at 1226, 1233. Here, the obstacle is the Government’s inability to 1 obtain travel documents from an uncooperative country, which is the scenario 2 Zadvydas addressed.
3 On de novo review, the Court finds that Kazakov has met his burden under 4 Zadvydas. The Government agrees that the presumptively reasonable, six-month 5 detention period expired long ago. Dkt. No. 11 at 6 (Government’s Return). ICE 6 began requesting travel documents from Russia to carry out Kazakov’s removal on 7 May 9, 2024, while he was detained, and it still has not received them. Nor has it 8 received any confirmation that Russia considers Kazakov a Russian citizen.
9 Kazakov maintains that he is not a Russian citizen and is in fact a citizen of the 10 former U.S.S.R., making him stateless and making his removal to Russia unlikely. 11 See Dkt. No. 1 at 3 (“ICE has not been able to effectuate my removal because I am a 12 citizen of the U.S.S.R., a country that no longer exists.”); see also Dkt. No. 12 ¶ 4 13 (noting Petitioner is “a native and citizen of Russia” but also that he entered the 14 United States as an “LA6” “Soviet/ Indochinese parolee”); Dkt. No. 13-2 at 4 15 (emphasis added) (“Kazakov was admitted as a Legal Permanent Resident as a[n]
16 LA6 Parolee adjust Russia.”). But even if Kazakov is a Russian citizen, ICE has 17 officially labeled Russia as “uncooperative” in accepting the return of its nationals, 18 which supports Kazakov’s argument that the Government is not likely to remove 19 him in the reasonably foreseeable future. Dkt. No. 14-1 at 8. 20 Notably, the Government has submitted Declarations from ICE Deportation 21 Officers (“DOs”) highlighting the slow-moving and uncertain process of obtaining
22 travel documents for Kazakov. On April 30, 2025, the Government submitted DO 23 Delano Dumo’s declaration, explaining that the last contact ICE had with Russia 1 about Kazakov’s travel documents request occurred on September 12, 2024. Dkt. 2 No. 12 ¶ 17. Later, at the direction of Magistrate Judge Fricke, the Government
3 submitted a supplemental declaration by DO Cristhian De Castro, describing ICE’s 4 September 12 communication with the Russian Embassy and ICE’s follow-up: 5 On September 12, 2024, the Russian Embassy requested a valid color photograph of the Petitioner, or in the alternative, a copy of his passport. 6 On May 29, 2025, the Petitioner provided copies of an expired passport to ICE to file with the Russian Consulate in pursuit of obtaining his 7 travel document.
8 As of July 23, 2025, the Petitioner’s updated travel document packet, which included a copy of his expired passport, was submitted to the 9 Russian Consulate.
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3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 SERGEY P. KAZAKOV, CASE NO. 2:25-cv-00352-JNW 8 Petitioner, ORDER DECLINING TO ADOPT R&R 9 AND GRANTING PETITION FOR v. WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 10 PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General of 11 the United States, et al.,
12 Respondents. 13 1. INTRODUCTION 14 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) detained Petitioner Sergey 15 Kazakov on October 24, 2023, to attempt to remove him to Russia. On March 14, 16 2024, an Immigration Judge ordered Kazakov removed to Russia, but he remains 17 detained in the United States. On February 25, 2025, he petitioned for a writ of 18 habeas corpus. United States Magistrate Judge Theresa L. Fricke issued a Report 19 and Recommendation (“R&R”) recommending the Court deny the petition. Dkt. 20 No. 20. This matter comes before the Court on Kazakov’s objections to the R&R. 21 After de novo review, the Court DECLINES to adopt the R&R and GRANTS 22 Kazakov’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. 23 1 2. DISCUSSION 2 2.1 Legal standard. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72 allows a party to file written objections to 3 an R&R within fourteen days. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). The objections must be 4 “specific” and relate “to the [R&R’s] proposed findings and recommendations.” Id. 5 “The district judge must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s 6 disposition that has been properly objected to.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). 7 Here, Kazakov objects to the R&R’s finding under Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 8 U.S. 678 (2001), that he failed to show that his removal is not likely to occur in the 9 reasonably foreseeable future. The Court appreciates the Magistrate Judge’s 10 thorough consideration of the record, but on de novo review, the Court finds that 11 Kazakov has met his burden under Zadvydas and that his detention violates due 12 process. Federal courts have authority to grant writs of habeas corpus to any person 13 held “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United 14 States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). A district court’s habeas jurisdiction extends to 15 challenges to immigration-related detention. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 16 (2001). 17 18 2.2 Kazakov’s detention violates due process under Zadvydas. 19 Kazakov argues that his continued detention violates due process because 20 there is no significant likelihood he will be removed in the reasonably foreseeable 21 future. The Court agrees. 22 23 1 When a final order of removal is issued against a noncitizen, they enter a 90- 2 day removal period; the Government detains them during that period to carry out
3 their removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1). ICE may continue to detain noncitizens after 4 the 90-day removal period expires under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). However, in 5 Zadvydas, the Supreme Court held that 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) “does not permit 6 indefinite detention.” 533 U.S. at 689. Rather, it allows detention only for “a 7 period reasonably necessary to bring about that [noncitizen’s] removal from the 8 United States.” Id. “[O]nce removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued
9 detention is no longer authorized by statute.” Id. at 699. 10 The Court established six months as the “presumptively reasonable” period of 11 post-removal-order detention. Id. at 701. After six months, “once the [noncitizen] 12 provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in 13 the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence 14 sufficient to rebut that showing.” Id. “[A]s the period of prior postremoval 15 confinement grows, what counts as the ‘reasonably foreseeable future’ conversely
16 would have to shrink.” Id. The Government’s burden to justify continued detention 17 thus becomes increasingly demanding over time. 18 The R&R relied on Diouf v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 1222, 1233 (9th Cir. 2008), for 19 the proposition that uncertainty about when removal will occur does not establish 20 indefinite detention. But Diouf is distinguishable. There, the sole obstacle to 21 removal was the petitioner’s own litigation—Senegal had already issued travel
22 documents, and ICE had twice arranged departure before Diouf refused to 23 cooperate. Id. at 1226, 1233. Here, the obstacle is the Government’s inability to 1 obtain travel documents from an uncooperative country, which is the scenario 2 Zadvydas addressed.
3 On de novo review, the Court finds that Kazakov has met his burden under 4 Zadvydas. The Government agrees that the presumptively reasonable, six-month 5 detention period expired long ago. Dkt. No. 11 at 6 (Government’s Return). ICE 6 began requesting travel documents from Russia to carry out Kazakov’s removal on 7 May 9, 2024, while he was detained, and it still has not received them. Nor has it 8 received any confirmation that Russia considers Kazakov a Russian citizen.
9 Kazakov maintains that he is not a Russian citizen and is in fact a citizen of the 10 former U.S.S.R., making him stateless and making his removal to Russia unlikely. 11 See Dkt. No. 1 at 3 (“ICE has not been able to effectuate my removal because I am a 12 citizen of the U.S.S.R., a country that no longer exists.”); see also Dkt. No. 12 ¶ 4 13 (noting Petitioner is “a native and citizen of Russia” but also that he entered the 14 United States as an “LA6” “Soviet/ Indochinese parolee”); Dkt. No. 13-2 at 4 15 (emphasis added) (“Kazakov was admitted as a Legal Permanent Resident as a[n]
16 LA6 Parolee adjust Russia.”). But even if Kazakov is a Russian citizen, ICE has 17 officially labeled Russia as “uncooperative” in accepting the return of its nationals, 18 which supports Kazakov’s argument that the Government is not likely to remove 19 him in the reasonably foreseeable future. Dkt. No. 14-1 at 8. 20 Notably, the Government has submitted Declarations from ICE Deportation 21 Officers (“DOs”) highlighting the slow-moving and uncertain process of obtaining
22 travel documents for Kazakov. On April 30, 2025, the Government submitted DO 23 Delano Dumo’s declaration, explaining that the last contact ICE had with Russia 1 about Kazakov’s travel documents request occurred on September 12, 2024. Dkt. 2 No. 12 ¶ 17. Later, at the direction of Magistrate Judge Fricke, the Government
3 submitted a supplemental declaration by DO Cristhian De Castro, describing ICE’s 4 September 12 communication with the Russian Embassy and ICE’s follow-up: 5 On September 12, 2024, the Russian Embassy requested a valid color photograph of the Petitioner, or in the alternative, a copy of his passport. 6 On May 29, 2025, the Petitioner provided copies of an expired passport to ICE to file with the Russian Consulate in pursuit of obtaining his 7 travel document.
8 As of July 23, 2025, the Petitioner’s updated travel document packet, which included a copy of his expired passport, was submitted to the 9 Russian Consulate. Per the most recent response form [sic] HQ-RIO on August 12, 2025, the travel document is currently being reviewed by the 10 Russian Consulate, and the Consulate will inform ICE if anything else is needed in order for it to issue the Petitioner a travel document. 11 Dkt. No. 18 ¶¶ 4–5. DO De Castro’s declaration does not explain why ICE took eight 12 months to get a “valid color photograph” of Kazakov or “in the alternative, a copy of 13 his passport.” Id. ¶ 4. Nor does it address ICE’s designation of Russia as an 14 uncooperative country for removal. 15 Given (1) the length of Kazakov’s post-removal immigration detention as of 16 the date of the R&R, (2) the lack of information about whether or when Russia will 17 issue travel documents for Kazakov, and (3) the fact that Russia is designated as an 18 “uncooperative” country for purposes of removal, the Court finds that Kazakov has 19 met his burden under Zadvydas by showing that there is no good reason to believe 20 that his removal is likely to occur in the reasonably foreseeable future. 21 The Government has not rebutted Kazakov’s showing, especially considering 22 Kazakov’s lengthy ICE detention. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701 (When the period 23 1 of post-removal confinement grows, “what counts as the ‘reasonably foreseeable 2 future’” shrinks.). Instead, DOs Dumo and De Castro each offer the same conclusory
3 assertion: Russia has continued to process travel documents for its citizens. Dkt. 4 Nos. 12 ¶ 18; 18 ¶ 6. “As such,” they say in unison, “DHS has every reason to believe 5 that the government of Russia will ultimately issue one for Petitioner . . . . DHS 6 believes that there is a significant likelihood of Petitioner’s removal in the 7 reasonably foreseeable future.” Dkt. Nos. 12 ¶ 18; 18 ¶ 6. But as this Court has 8 previously found, the fact that a country generally issues travel documents for its
9 citizens says little to nothing about whether that country will accept a particular 10 petitioner for repatriation in the reasonably foreseeable future. Uprety v. Bondi, 11 Case No. 2:25-cv-02443-JNW-MLP, 2026 WL 194227, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 26, 12 2026). The assertion that Russia generally issues travel documents for its citizens, 13 if true, shows at most that “there is at least some possibility” that Russia will accept 14 Kazakov “at some point” if it finds that he is a Russian citizen. Id. (citing Abubaka 15 v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-1889-RSL, 2025 WL 3204369, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 17, 2025)
16 (quoting Nguyen v. Scott, 796 F. Supp. 3d 703, 725 (W.D. Wash. 2025)). But as other 17 courts in this district have found, “[t]hat is not the same as a significant likelihood 18 that [the petitioner] will be accepted in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. 19 (quoting Nguyen, 796 F. Supp. 3d at 725); see also Singh v. Gonzales, 448 F. Supp. 20 2d 1214, 1220 (W.D. Wash. 2006) (Government failed to meet Zadvydas standard on 21 rebuttal because it provided “no substantive indication regarding how or when it
22 expect[ed] to obtain the necessary travel documents” to remove the petitioner). 23 1 Ultimately, the Government fails to provide evidence rebutting Kazakov’s showing 2 under Zadvydas.
3 The Court acknowledges Kazakov’s significant criminal history, including 4 convictions for harassment with a threat to kill, protection order violations 5 involving credible threats of violence, and attempting to elude police. See Dkt. No. 6 12 ¶¶ 5–7. These convictions underlie his removal order and are relevant to the 7 conditions of his release. They do not, however, bear on whether there is a 8 significant likelihood of Kazakov’s removal in the reasonably foreseeable future—
9 which is the only question before the Court under Zadvydas. See 533 U.S. at 699– 10 701. 11 Because there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably 12 foreseeable future, Kazakov’s continued detention is no longer authorized by statute 13 and violates due process. Thus, he must be released. 14 3. CONCLUSION 15 Accordingly, after de novo review on Kazakov’s objections to the R&R (Dkt.
16 No. 21), the Court DECLINES to adopt the R&R (Dkt. No. 20), GRANTS Kazakov’s 17 Petition for writ of habeas corpus (Dkt. No. 1), and ORDERS as follows: 18 1. Respondents must RELEASE Petitioner from custody within FORTY- 19 EIGHT (48) hours of this order, subject to appropriate conditions of 20 release as provided by 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3). 21 2. Within FORTY-EIGHT (48) hours of this order, Respondents must
22 provide the Court with a declaration confirming that Petitioner has 23 1 been released from custody and informing the Court of the date and
9 time of his release.
3 3. Petitioner’s motion for status hearing is DENIED as moot. Dkt. No. 24.
4 5 Dated this 24th day of February, 2026, at 2:25 p.m. ° fase 7 Jamal N. Whitehead United States District Judge 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 ORDER DECLINING TO ADOPT R&R AND GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS