Sergey Firsov v. Alaska Airlines, Inc.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 SERGEY FIRSOV, Case No. 25-cv-05487-NW

8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 9 v. DISMISS

10 ALASKA AIRLINES, INC., Re: ECF No. 53 Defendant. 11

12 13 On December 29, 2025, Defendant Alaska Airlines, Inc. filed a motion to dismiss self- 14 represented Plaintiff Sergey Firsov’s complaint. ECF No. 53.1 Having considered the parties’ 15 briefs and the relevant legal authority, the Court concludes oral argument is not required, see N.D. 16 Cal. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b), VACATES the hearing set for March 18, 2026, and GRANTS the motion 17 without leave to amend. 18 I. BACKGROUND 19 On June 30, 2025, Firsov sued Alaska Airlines seeking relief primarily under the Montreal 20 Convention. ECF No. 1 at 5. In addition, Firsov brought state law claims for breach of contract, 21 false advertising, unfair and deceptive business practices under the California Business and 22 Professions Code (“UCL”), unjust enrichment, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and 23 breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Id. at 6-11. Firsov’s grievances stem from 24 allegations that the company violated his rights by refusing to let him board an Alaska Airlines 25 flight without a ticket for his dog, causing Firsov to purchase an additional pet ticket that was 26 never refunded, and failing to finish food and drink service on the flight such that Firsov and his 27 1 dog never received sustenance. See generally id. The Alaska Airlines flight from Los Angeles, 2 California to San Jose, California, was the last leg of a multi-stop international plane trip Firsov 3 took in March 2025. 4 Alaska Airlines timely filed a motion to dismiss Firsov’s complaint for lack of subject 5 matter jurisdiction on December 29, 2025. ECF No. 53. Firsov opposed and Alaska filed a reply 6 in further support of the motion. ECF Nos. 59, 60. 7 II. LEGAL STANDARD 8 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) allows a party to challenge a federal court’s 9 jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint. As the party invoking the jurisdiction of the 10 federal court, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the court has the requisite subject 11 matter jurisdiction to grant the relief requested. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 12 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). If a federal court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it 13 must dismiss the case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); Brooks v. Geico Ins., No. 23-CV-05085-RFL, 14 2023 WL 8852738, *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2023). 15 A complaint will be dismissed if, looking at the complaint in its totality, it appears to lack 16 federal jurisdiction either “facially” or “factually.” Thornhill Publ’g Co., Inc. v. Gen. Tel. & 17 Elecs. Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979); Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 18 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). When a complaint is challenged for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on its 19 face, all material allegations in the complaint will be taken as true and construed in the light most 20 favorable to the plaintiff. Pride v. Correa, 719 F.3d 1130, 1133 (9th Cir. 2013). Thus, a district 21 court resolves a facial attack as it would a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Leite v. Crane 22 Co., 749 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Pride, 719 F.3d at 1133). 23 III. DISCUSSION 24 There are two common ways to establish federal subject matter jurisdiction under statute: 25 (1) diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and (2) federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. 26 § 1331. In this case, Firsov’s complaint indicates that subject matter jurisdiction is satisfied by a 27 1 federal question.2 ECF 1 at 2. “Federal district courts have original federal question jurisdiction 2 of actions ‘arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.’” Sullivan v. First 3 Affiliated Sec., Inc., 813 F.2d 1368, 1371 (9th Cir.) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1331). Generally, under 4 the “well-pleaded complaint rule,” a claim “arises under” federal law only if a federal question 5 appears on the face of Plaintiff’s complaint. See ARCO Environmental Remediation, L.L.C. v. 6 Dep’t of Health & Env’t Quality of Montana, 213 F.3d 1108, 1113 (9th Cir. 2000); see also 7 Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 n.7 (1987) (“[t]he party who brings a suit . . . 8 decide[s] what law he will rely upon”); Franchise Tax Bd. of State of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers 9 Vacation Tr. for S. California, 463 U.S. 1, 27–28 (1983) (“federal courts [have] jurisdiction to 10 hear, originally or by removal from a state court, only those cases in which a well-pleaded 11 complaint establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff’s right 12 to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law”). 13 The specific “federal question” that Firsov asserts is under the Montreal Convention, 14 Article 1, Paragraph 3. ECF 1. The “Montreal Convention” is an international treaty also known 15 as the Convention for Int’l Carriage by Air, S. Treaty Doc. No. 106-45 (May 28, 1999). Alaska 16 argues that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the Montreal Convention does not 17 encompass Firsov’s one-way domestic flight on Alaska, and the complaint lacks allegations 18 demonstrating Alaska “regarded itself as involved in part of a single operation with the other 19 carriers involved in [Firsov’s] travel between Poland and the United States.” ECF No. 53 at 13. 20 In opposition, Firsov argues that “articles 1.3 and 36 of Montreal convention domestic connection 21 with international trip considered single international trip even purchased on separate tickets.” 22

23 2 Firsov’s complaint does not allege facts to support diversity jurisdiction, which requires Plaintiff and Defendant to be citizens of two different states, and an amount in controversy over $75,000. 24 28 U.S.C. § 1332. While the diversity of citizenship requirement may be met here, see ECF No. 1 at 1, Firsov does not allege damages over $75,000, even when liberally considering the damages 25 he specifically alleged in his complaint (i.e., $2500 for the violation, $100 pet fee, $128.30 ticketing fee, $2,079 as the value of the miles Plaintiff used for his own ticket, $22.83 as “10% 26 interest for using Plaintiff’s money”) as well as the other damages he alludes to in the complaint (i.e., the value of Plaintiff’s own food and drinks that he brought on board that should have been 27 provided by the airline). The Court notes that in passing Plaintiff states that Defendant should pay 1 ECF No. 59 at 2 (errors in original). 2 The Montreal Convention applies to “all international carriage of persons, baggage, or 3 cargo performed by aircraft for reward.” Montreal Convention, Art. 1(1). Article 1(3) of the 4 Montreal Convention provides: 5 Carriage to be performed by several successive carriers is deemed, for the purposes of this Convention, to be one undivided carriage if it has 6 been regarded by the parties as a single operation, whether it had been agreed upon under the form of a single contract or of a series of 7 contracts, and it does not lose its international character merely because one contract or a series of contracts is to be performed 8 entirely within the territory of the same State. 9 Article 36 provides in part that where carriage is performed by “successive carriers,” liability is 10 limited to the carrier that “performed the carriage during which the accident or the delay occurred, 11 save in the case where, by express agreement, the first carrier has assumed liability for the whole 12 journey.” Id., Art. 36. 13 Whether a domestic flight is part of international carriage depends on the intent of the 14 parties to enter into an agreement for international carriage. Kruger v. United Air Lines, No. C 06- 15 04907 MHP, 2007 WL 3232443, at *3 (N.D. Cal., Nov. 1, 2007); see also Coyle v. P.T. Garuda 16 Indonesia, 363 F.3d 979, 987 (9th Cir. 2004). Determining intent rests on “objective indications 17 of the parties’ intent.” Kruger, 2007 WL 3232443, at *4; Coyle, 363 F.3d at 989. The analysis 18 begins by analyzing “the objective manifestations of the parties’ intent expressed by the tickets.” 19 Coyle, 363 F.3d at 987; Kruger, 2007 WL 3232443, at *4 (stating that a court’s inquiry begins 20 with the “document of carriage or its equivalents”). 21 Drawing all inferences in Firsov’s favor, as the Court must, the complaint does not allege 22 facts to support a reasonable inference that Alaska regarded itself as part of a single operation with 23 any other air carrier. Instead, the complaint shows the opposite, that Firsov attempted “to 24 purchase a complex round-trip ticket [from] SFO-WAW-YYZ-LAX-SFO on united.com” but 25 ended up “purchas[ing] 4 separate tickets” after payment on united.com failed. ECF No. 1 at 3. 26 These four separate tickets appear to be for travel on four separate air carriers and were purchased 27 on four different days. The first of these tickets involved travel from San Francisco to Warsaw on 1 The air carrier for Firsov’s second ticket, purchased on February 9, 2025, for travel from Warsaw 2 to Toronto is unknown, id. 6-9, but the carrier was not Alaska because Alaska does not fly to or 3 from Warsaw, Poland, Beyer Decl. ¶ 7, ECF No. 53-1. Firsov’s third ticket involved travel on Air 4 Canada from Toronto to Los Angeles, California and was purchased through United on February 5 10, 2025. ECF No. 1-2 at 10-13. Finally, Firsov’s fourth ticket, purchased on February 12, 2025, 6 for travel from Los Angeles to San Jose, California was issued by Alaska for a flight operated by 7 SkyWest Airlines. ECF No. 1-2 at 16-17. 8 The Alaska/SkyWest ticket does not reference any of these other flights. Id. Firsov’s 9 allegation that his “complex round-trip” travel from San Franscico to Warsaw, then Warsaw to 10 Toronto, Toronto to Los Angeles, Los Angeles to San Jose, California on four different air carriers 11 was part of “a single international trip” strains credulity. ECF No. 1 at 2, 4. Instead, “the 12 objective manifestations of the parties’ intent expressed by the tickets,” Coyle, 363 F.3d at 987, 13 demonstrates that the trip was not “regarded by the parties as a single operation,” Montreal 14 Convention, Art. 1(3). Therefore, the complaint fails to plausibly allege a claim under the 15 Montreal Convention. 16 Because Firsov’s claim for violation of the Montreal Convention is the sole basis he 17 advances for federal subject matter jurisdiction, the complaint fails to plausibly allege a basis for 18 the Court to exercise jurisdiction in this action. Absent a viable federal claim, a district court 19 “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . . if . . . the district court has 20 dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28. U.S.C. § 1367(c). “Ordinarily, 21 ‘when the federal-law claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its early stages and only state-law 22 claims remain, the federal court should decline the exercise of jurisdiction.’” Carrillo v. Monterey 23 Mech. Co., No. 24-CV-09202-LJC, 2025 WL 2615064 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2025) (quoting 24 Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343 (1988) (superseded on other grounds by Royal 25 Canin U. S. A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22, 41 (2025)). 26 The Court finds it appropriate to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 27 Firsov’s remaining state law claims, given the early stages of this case. 1 IV. CONCLUSION 2 For the foregoing reasons, Alaska’s motion to dismiss Firsov’s complaint is GRANTED. 3 Firsov’s federal claim for relief under the Montreal Convention is DISMISSED without leave to 4 || amend and the Court DECLINES to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Firsov’s state law 5 claims. The Clerk of Court shall close the file. 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. 7 Dated: March 5, 2026

Noél Wise 9 United States District Judge 10 1] a 12

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