Sepulveda v. Mann Bros Truck Stop Inc.

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: May 23, 2025
• Docket: 2:24-cv-01863
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RICHARD SEPULVEDA, No. 2:24-cv-1863 DC AC 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 MANN BROS TRUCK STOP INC., 15 Defendant. 16 17 This case is before the court on plaintiff’s motion for default judgment. ECF No. 15. The 18 motion was referred to the undersigned pursuant to E.D. Cal. R. 302(c)(19). The matter was set 19 to be heard on the papers. ECF No. 16. Defendant did not file an opposition or take any action in 20 this case. For the reasons stated below, the court recommends that plaintiff’s motion be granted. 21 I. Relevant Background 22 As stated in his complaint, plaintiff is a person with physical disabilities, including limited 23 ability to walk; he requires the use of a walker. ECF No. 1 at 4. Defendant Mann Bros Truck 24 Stop Inc. is alleged to be the real property owner of the building/parcel located at 1201 South 7th 25 St., Modesto, California (“the Property”). Id. at 4-5. Plaintiff asserts that the Property contains a 26 gas station and mini mart which is a facility open to the public, a place of public accommodation 27 for nonresidential use, and a business establishment. Id. at 5. There is a parking lot on the 28 Property. Id. 1 Plaintiff lives approximately twenty miles from the Property, and visited the Property on 2 or about May 15, 2025, to shop for food and drink. ECF No. 1 at 6. Plaintiff alleges he 3 encountered many accessibility problems. In particular, there was no designated “van accessible” 4 parking space, and no disabled parking space. Id. at 2-3. Plaintiff attempted and was deterred 5 from a second visit on July 1, 2024. Id. Plaintiff was, and continues to be, deterred from visiting 6 the Property because of his awareness that the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, 7 and accommodations were and are unavailable to him due to his physical disabilities. Id. at 6. 8 Plaintiff enjoys the goods and services offered at the Property and will return to the Property once 9 the barriers are removed. Id. 10 On July 4, 2024, plaintiff filed this action alleging violations of the Americans with 11 Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 51- 12 53, and violations of California Health and Safety Code § 19955(a). ECF No. 1. The summons 13 and complaint were timely served on defendant. ECF No. 5. The clerk entered default as to 14 defendant. ECF No. 14. On March 24, 2025, plaintiff moved for default judgment. ECF No. 15. 15 The motion for default judgment was served on defendant. ECF No. 15-3. Defendant did not 16 appear to oppose the motion, and has not otherwise appeared or taken any action in this case. 17 II. Motion 18 Plaintiff moves for default judgment on his claims under the ADA and related California 19 statutes and seeks injunctive relief, statutory damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs. ECF No. 15 at 20 23. 21 III. Analysis 22 A. Legal Standard 23 Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55, default may be entered against a party against whom a 24 judgment for affirmative relief is sought who fails to plead or otherwise defend against the action. 25 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). However, “[a] defendant’s default does not automatically entitle the 26 plaintiff to a court-ordered judgment.” PepsiCo, Inc. v. California Sec. Cans, 238 F. Supp. 2d 27 1172, 1174 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (citing Draper v. Coombs, 792 F.2d 915, 924–25 (9th Cir. 1986)); 28 see Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b) (governing the entry of default judgments). Instead, the decision to 1 grant or deny an application for default judgment lies within the district court’s sound discretion. 2 Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). In making this determination, the court 3 may consider the following factors: 4 (1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of plaintiff’s substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, 5 (4) the sum of money at stake in the action, (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts, (6) whether the default was 6 due to excusable neglect, and (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the 7 merits. 8 Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471–72 (9th Cir. 1986). Default judgments are ordinarily 9 disfavored. Id. at 1472. 10 As a general rule, once default is entered, well-pleaded factual allegations in the operative 11 complaint are taken as true, except for those allegations relating to damages. TeleVideo Sys., Inc. 12 v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917–18 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (citing Geddes v. United Fin. 13 Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam)); see also Fair Hous. of Marin v. Combs, 14 285 F.3d 899, 906 (9th Cir. 2002). Although well-pleaded allegations in the complaint are 15 admitted by a defendant’s failure to respond, “necessary facts not contained in the pleadings, and 16 claims which are legally insufficient, are not established by default.” Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. of N. 17 Am., 980 F.2d 1261, 1267 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Danning v. Lavine, 572 F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th 18 Cir. 1978)); accord DIRECTV, Inc. v. Hoa Huynh, 503 F.3d 847, 854 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[A] 19 defendant is not held to admit facts that are not well-pleaded or to admit conclusions of law”) 20 (citation and quotation marks omitted); Abney v. Alameida, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1235 (S.D. 21 Cal. 2004) (“[A] default judgment may not be entered on a legally insufficient claim.”). 22 B. The Eitel Factors 23 a. Factor One: Possibility of Prejudice to Plaintiff 24 The first Eitel factor considers whether the plaintiff would suffer prejudice if default 25 judgment is not entered, and such potential prejudice to the plaintiff weighs in favor of granting a 26 default judgment. See PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177. Here, plaintiff would suffer 27 prejudice if the court did not enter a default judgment. Absent entry of a default judgment, 28 plaintiff would be without recourse for recovery. Accordingly, the first Eitel factor favors the 1 entry of default judgment. 2 b. Factors Two and Three: Merits of Claims and Sufficiency of Complaint 3 The merits of plaintiff’s substantive claims and the sufficiency of the complaint are 4 considered here together because of the relatedness of the two inquiries. The court must consider 5 whether the allegations in the complaint are sufficient to state a claim that supports the relief 6 sought. See Danning, 572 F.2d at 1388; PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1175. Here, the merits 7 of the claims and sufficiency of the complaint favor entry of default judgment. 8 Plaintiff brings three causes of action: violations of the American’s with Disabilities Act, 9 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. (“ADA”), the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 51-53 10 (“UCR”), and Cal. Health & Safety Code § 19955(a). The merits of each of these claims are 11 assessed below. 12 1. ADA Claim 13 “Title III of the ADA prohibits discrimination in public accommodations....” Kohler v. 14 Bed Bath & Beyond of California, LLC, 780 F.3d 1260, 1263 (9th Cir. 2015). The elements of a 15 Title III claim are: (1) plaintiff is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) the defendant is a 16 private entity that owns, leases, or operates a place of public accommodation; and (3) the plaintiff 17 was discriminated against by the defendant because of plaintiff's disability. 42 U.S.C. § 18 12182(a); Arizona ex rel. Goddard v. Harkins Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 603 F.3d 666, 670 19 (9th Cir. 2010). Discrimination, in this context, includes “a failure to remove architectural 20 barriers ... in existing facilities ... where such removal is readily achievable.” 42 U.S.C. § 21 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv). 22 Plaintiff alleges multiple types of discrimination in this case, all resulting from 23 defendant’s failure to provide adequate accessible parking spaces. First, there was no proper 24 designated disabled-accessible and van-accessible parking space on the shortest accessible route 25 to the main entrance. The lack of a “van accessible” space on such a route violates ADAAG1 26 4.6.2 (1991) (requiring shortest route); 4.1.2(b) (1991) (one in eight, but no less than one, must be 27

28 1 Americans with Disabilities Act Accessibility Guidelines, described more fully infra. 1 “van accessible” as per ADAAG 4.6.4); also ADAS §208, §208.3.1; §502 (requirement for 2 parking space), and §502.3 (requirement for access aisle) (2010 standards). Second, there was no 3 signage for a parking space, in violation of ADAAG 4.6.4 (1991 standards) and ADAAG 502.6 4 (2010 standards). ECF No. 1 at 3. The lack of designated parking for persons with disabilities 5 caused plaintiff difficulties in finding a safe place to park, exit his vehicle, and reach the entrance 6 safely. Id. 7 The facts alleged in plaintiff’s complaint adequately detail the claimed violations, and 8 taken as true, support plaintiff’s ADA claim. The Americans with Disabilities Act Accessibility 9 Guidelines, found in the ADA’s implementing regulations at 28 C.F.R. Part 36 (“ADAAG”) has 10 been held by the Ninth Circuit to provide the “objective contours of the standard that architectural 11 features must not impede disabled individuals’ full and equal enjoyment of accommodations.” 12 Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 945 (9th Cir. 2011). Plaintiff alleges there 13 was no accessible parking space in the parking lot, making it difficult to navigate to the building, 14 in violation of the ADAAG. Id. at 2-3. “Because the ADAAG establishes the technical standards 15 required for “full and equal enjoyment,” if a barrier violating these standards relates to a 16 plaintiff’s disability, it will impair the plaintiff’s full and equal access, which constitutes 17 “discrimination” under the ADA. Chapman, 631 F.3d at 947. Because plaintiff has alleged 18 violations of the ADAAG that relate to his disability, he has properly alleged violations of the 19 ADA. The merits of plaintiff’s case thus favor entry of default judgment. 20 2. The Unruh Act 21 Under California’s Unruh Act, “[a] violation of the right of any individual under the 22 federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990...shall also constitute a violation of this section.” 23 Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f). In addition, the Unruh Act independently prohibits discrimination, if it is 24 done in contravention of Section 51. Cal. Civ. Code § 52(a). Section 52(a) provides for statutory 25 damages of no less than $4,000 for each violation, and attorney’s fees. Id. 26 Because plaintiff has shown that defendant is in violation of Title III of the ADA, 27 specifically, the failure to provide accessible parking, he has also shown that defendant is in 28 violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act. Lentini v. California Ctr. for the Arts, Escondido, 370 1 F.3d 837, 847 (9th Cir. 2004) (“a violation of the ADA is, per se, a violation of the Unruh Act”). 2 Plaintiff is therefore entitled to a default judgment on this claim. 3 3. California Health and Safety Code § 19955(a) and California Civil Rights Act 4 These claims are not analyzed here because plaintiff expressly declined to move for 5 default judgment as to these claims. ECF No. 15 at 8. 6 c. Factor Four: The Sum of Money at Stake in the Action 7 Under this Eitel factor, “the court must consider the amount of money at stake in relation 8 to the seriousness of Defendant’s conduct.” PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1176–77. Plaintiff 9 seeks $8,000.00 in statutory damages, $2,415.00 attorney’s fees, and $1,091.50 in costs. ECF 10 No. 15-1 at 6-9. The complaint offers no information about the defendant’s financial condition, 11 so the court cannot tell if this is a significant amount of money to defendant. However, there is 12 no evidence that defendant took any action after being served with the summons and complaint in 13 order to avoid a judgment of this size. This factor accordingly weighs in favor of a default 14 judgment. 15 d. Factor Five: Possibility of Dispute Concerning Material Facts 16 The facts of this case are relatively straightforward, and plaintiff has provided the court 17 with well-pleaded allegations supporting its claims and affidavits in support of its allegations. 18 Here, the court may assume the truth of well-pleaded facts in the complaint (except as to 19 damages) following the clerk’s entry of default and, thus, there is no likelihood that any genuine 20 issue of material fact exists. See, e.g., Elektra Entm’t Grp. Inc. v. Crawford, 226 F.R.D. 388, 393 21 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (“Because all allegations in a well-pleaded complaint are taken as true after the 22 court clerk enters default judgment, there is no likelihood that any genuine issue of material fact 23 exists.”); accord Philip Morris USA, Inc., 219 F.R.D. at 500; PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d at 24 1177. 25 e. Factor Six: Whether Default Was Due to Excusable Neglect 26 Upon review of the record before the court, there is no indication that the default was the 27 result of excusable neglect. See PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177. Plaintiff served the 28 defendant with the summons and complaint. ECF Nos. 4, 5. Moreover, plaintiff served defendant 1 by mail with notice of its application for default judgment. ECF No. 15-3. Despite ample notice 2 of this lawsuit and plaintiff’s intention to seek a default judgment, defendant failed to defend 3 themselves in this action. Thus, the record supports a conclusion that the defendant has chosen 4 not to defend this action, and not that the default resulted from any excusable neglect. 5 Accordingly, this Eitel factor favors the entry of a default judgment. 6 f. Factor Seven: Policy Favoring Decisions on the Merits 7 “Cases should be decided upon their merits whenever reasonably possible.” Eitel, 782 8 F.2d at 1472. However, district courts have concluded with regularity that this policy, standing 9 alone, is not dispositive, especially where a defendant fails to appear or defend itself in an action. 10 PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177; see also Craigslist, Inc. v. Naturemarket, Inc., 694 F. 11 Supp. 2d 1039, 1061 (N.D. Cal. 2010). Accordingly, although the court is cognizant of the policy 12 favoring decisions on the merits-and consistent with existing policy would prefer that this case be 13 resolved on the merits-that policy does not, by itself, preclude the entry of default judgment. 14 Upon consideration of the Eitel factors, the court concludes that plaintiff is entitled to the 15 entry of default judgment against defendant and makes a recommendation to that effect. What 16 remains is the determination of the amount of damages to which plaintiff is entitled. 17 C. Terms of Judgment 18 Plaintiff requests statutory damages and attorney’s fees under Title III of the ADA and the 19 Unruh Civil Rights Act, along with injunctive relief. 20 1. Attorney’s Fees 21 Attorney’s fee awards are calculated using the “lodestar” method whereby the hours 22 reasonably spent in the litigation are multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. Ferland v. Conrad 23 Credit Corp., 244 F.3d 1145, 1149 n.4 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curium). The hourly rate is generally 24 calculated “according to the prevailing market rates in the relevant community.” Blum v. 25 Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895, 104 S. Ct. 1541, 79 L. Ed. 2d 891 (1984). It is also the general rule 26 that the court will use the rates of attorneys practicing in the forum district. Gates v. Deukmejian, 27 987 F.2d 1392, 1405 (9th Cir. 1992). 28 Plaintiff requests attorney fees at an hourly rate of $350 for 6.9 hours of work, totaling 1 $2,415.00. ECF No. 15-1 at 4. The undersigned finds the rate and hours billed reasonable. 2 Plaintiff also seeks $1,091.50 in costs and litigation expenses. Id. Section 12205 of the 3 ADA provides that a district court, “in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than 4 the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee, including litigation expenses, and costs.” 42 5 U.S.C. § 12205. The statutory provisions of the ADA provide direct authority for the award of 6 expert witness fees as litigation expenses under the ADA. See Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 7 1039, 1058 (9th Cir. 2002). The costs here include expenses for the court filing fee, costs of 8 service, and costs of obtaining ownership deed information, which are compensable pursuant to 9 42 U.S.C. § 12205 and Lovell, 303 F.3d at 1058. ECF No. 12-4 at 2. Plaintiff’s request for costs 10 in the amount of $1,091.50 litigation costs and expenses is appropriate. 11 Accordingly, the undersigned will recommend that plaintiff be awarded a total of 12 $3,506.50 ($2,415.00 + $1,091.50 = $3,506.50) in attorney’s fees and costs. 13 2. Statutory Damages 14 The Unruh Civil Rights Act provides for, among other things, a minimum statutory 15 damages amount of $4,000 per violation. Cal. Civ. Code § 52(a); Grove v. De La Cruz, 407 F. 16 Supp. 2d 1126, 1133 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (the Unruh Act “provides for statutory damages up to a 17 maximum of three times the actual damages but no less than $4,000 for each instance of 18 discrimination”). Plaintiff asserts that he is entitled to $8,000.00, in statutory damages pursuant 19 to the Cal. Civ. Code § 52(a) for his two attempts to visit the Property. ECF No. 15 at 2. Plaintiff 20 has sufficiently alleged facts indicating that he visited the Property on one occasion and 21 encountered barriers that interfered with his ability to use and enjoy the goods, services, 22 privileges, and accommodations offered each time, and was deterred on another attempted visit. 23 ECF No. 1 at 6. Thus, plaintiff is entitled to $8,000 in statutory damages. Guedoir, 218 F. Supp. 24 3d at 1103. 25 3. Injunctive Relief 26 Plaintiff’s complaint seeks an injunction requiring defendant to make changes and 27 accommodations at the subject facility in a manner that achieves compliance with federal and 28 state regulations. ECF No. 15 at 10-15. As the factual allegations in the complaint are taken as 1 | true, plaintiff is entitled to injunctive relief as requested pursuant to both state and federal law. 2 || See Wander v. Kaus, 304 F.3d 856, 858 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Damages are not recoverable under 3 | Title I of the ADA—only injunctive relief is available for violations of Title III.”). 4 IV. Conclusion 5 For the reasons explained above, it is hereby RECOMMENDED THAT: 6 1. Plaintiff's March 24, 2025 motion for default judgment (ECF No. 15) be GRANTED; 7 2. The court enter judgment against the defendant on the complaint’s claims in the 8 | amount of $11,506.50 (comprising $8,000 in statutory damages and $3,506.50 in attorney’s fees 9 || and costs); 10 3. Defendant be ordered to make changes and accommodations at the subject at the 11 || Property located at or about 1201 South 7th St., Modesto, California, in compliance with the 12 || Americans with Disabilities Act Accessibility Guidelines. 13 4. This case be closed. 14 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 15 || assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within twenty-one days 16 | after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 17 || objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Id.; see also Local Rule 304(b). Such a 18 || document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and 19 || Recommendations.” Any response to the objections shall be filed with the court and served on all 20 || parties within fourteen days after service of the objections. Local Rule 304(d). Failure to file 21 || objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 22 | Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998), as amended on denial of reh’g (Nov. 24, 23 || 1998); Martinez v. YIst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991). 24 || DATED: May 23, 2025 ~ 25 Atter— Llar—e_ ALLISON CLAIRE 26 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 27 28