Jordan, Judge.
The only question before us is whether the evidence in this case is sufficient to authorize the revocation of a probationary sentence under Code Ann. § 27-2713.
“Probation is granted as a privilege, and not as a matter of right; and the revocation of the probation is punishment for the crime for which the defendant was convicted in the first instance.” Johnson v. State, 214 Ga. 818, 819 (108 SE2d 313); Cross v. Huff, 208 Ga. 392, 396 (67 SE2d 124). Probation of sentence “. . . comes as an act of grace to one convicted of a crime. . .” Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 US 490; 492 (55 SC 818, 79 LE 1566). “The defendant stands convicted; he faces punishment and cannot insist on terms or strike a bargain.” Burns v. United States, 287 US 216, 220 (53 SC 154, 77 LE 266).
This does not mean that the probationer can be made the victim of whim or caprice. Williams v. State, 162 Ga. 327, 328 (133 SE 843); Sparks v. State, 77 Ga. App. 22, 24 (47 SE2d 678); Burns v. United States, 287 US 216, 223, supra. Our statutes (Code Ann. § 27-2713 and former Code § 27-2705) expressly give him the right to notice and a hearing on the question of revoking probation. Johnson v. State, 214 Ga. 818, 819, supra; Balkcom v. Gunn, 206 Ga. 167 (56 SE2d 482). The fail[518]*518ure to afford the probationer such notice and a hearing would render a revocation order void for lack of due process of law. Lester v. Foster, 207 Ga. 596 (63 SE2d 402). However, a hearing on a revocation “. . . is not a trial on a criminal charge . . and the probationer has no right to a trial by jury. Johnson v. State, 214 Ga. 818, 819, supra. It is somewhat like an application for a change of venue, which is “of a civil nature.” See Wilburn v. State, 140 Ga. 138, 140 (78 SE 819).
As to the sufficiency of the evidence to authorize revocation, “. . . the trial judge is not bound by the same rules of evidence as a jury in passing upon the guilt or innocence of the accused in the first instance. It is not necessary that the evidence support the finding beyond a reasonable doubt or even by a preponderance of the evidence. The judge is the trior of the facts. He has a very wide discretion.” (Emphasis supplied). Allen v. State, 78 Ga. App. 526, 528-529 (51 SE2d 571); Price v. State, 91 Ga. App. 381 (2) (85 SE2d 627). This discretion “. . . takes into account the law and the particular circumstances of the case and is directed by the reason and conscience of the judge to a just result.” Sparks v. State, 77 Ga. App. 22, 24, supra. Only “slight evidence” is required. Faulkner v. State, 101 Ga. App. 889 (115 SE2d 393). This court will not interfere with a revocation unless there has been a manifest abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. Waters v. State, 80 Ga. App. 104, 108 (55 SE2d 677); Atkinson v. State, 82 Ga. App. 414, 416 (61 SE2d 212); Harrington v. State, 97 Ga. App. 315, 320 (103 SE2d 126). The reason for flexibility is obvious. The probationer “. . . is still a person convicted of an offense, and the suspension of his sentence remains within the control of the court. The continuance of that control, apparent from the terms of the statute, is essential to the accomplishment of its beneficent purpose, as otherwise probation might be more reluctantly granted, or when granted, might be made the occasion of delays and obstruction which would bring reproach upon the administration of justice.” Burns v. United States, 287 US 216, 222, supra.
The acts of 1962 (Ga. L. 1962, p. 133, Code Ann. § 38-415; Ga. L. 1962, p. 453, Code Ann. § 27-405), cited in the dissenting [519]*519opinion, and the former Code sections which these acts amend, apply to the "testimony of the accused” in “criminal trials.” They are not relevant to the present case because a hearing on a revocation of a probationary sentence is not a criminal trial. Johnson v. State, 214 Ga. 818, 819, supra; Sparks v. State, 77 Ga. App. 22, 23, supra. And it is not necessary to discuss the question whether the trior of fact in a civil or criminal case is bound by testimony of a party witness that is not directly contradicted, for the reason that in a revocation proceeding the trial judge is not bound by the rules of evidence applied in ordinary civil or criminal cases. Allen v. State, 78 Ga. App. 526, 528, supra; 24 CJS 912, 914-916, § 1618 (11).
Though not bound by the rules, we do call attention to liberality extended to the trior of fact in considering matters which go to the credibility of a witness. “The jury can not arbitrarily disregard the evidence of any witness, which is not contradicted or discredited by other evidence or circumstances. The jury should regard the testimony of every witness sworn. They are not obligated to believe it, but it is their duty to give to the evidence of witnesses the weight to which, in their opinion as conscientious men seeking after the truth, they believe it is entitled . . .” Brunswick &c. R. Co. v. Wiggins, 113 Ga. 842, 844 (39 SE 551, 61 LRA 513). (Emphasis supplied.) There is a difference in arbitrarily or capriciously disregarding testimony and in disbelieving it upon a consideration of all circumstances arising from the evidence. There is nothing here to indicate that the defendant’s testimony was disregarded. And see Detwiler v. Cox, 120 Ga. 638 (48 SE 142); Eberhardt v. Bennett, 163 Ga. 796, 805 (137 SE 64); Hancock v. Wilson, 214 Ga. 60 (102 SE2d 551); Jones v. Teasley, 25 Ga. App. 784, 788 (105 SE 46); Neill v. Hill, 32 Ga. App. 381 (2a) (123 SE 30); Fincher v. Harlow, 56 Ga. App. 578 (193 SE 452); McRae v. Wilby, 59 Ga. App. 401, 410 (1 SE2d 77); Caldwell v. Caldwell, 59 Ga. App. 637, 643 (1 SE2d 764); Georgia Highway Exp. v. Sturkie, 62 Ga. App. 741, 747 (9 SE2d 683); Chaffin v. Community Loan &c. Co., 67 Ga. App. 410 (1) (20 SE2d 435); Krasner v. Croswell, 76 Ga. App. 421, 422 (46 SE2d 207). “[W]here the witnesses’ testimony is contradicted by circumstances that can be taken as incompat[520]*520ible with such direct evidence . . . the courts and the juries are not bound to refrain from exercising their own judgments and blindly adopt the statement of a witness or witnesses for the simple reason that no other witness has denied the testimony and that the character of such witness has not been impeached.” Annis v. State, 85 Ga. App. 188, 192 (68 SE2d 473). And see Goldwire v. State, 56 Ga. App. 379 (192 SE 643).
The evidence relied upon by the State in this case created a legal presumption that the defendant was the owner and possessor of non-taxpaid liquor in violation of Code Ann. § 58-1056 (Morgan v. State, 62 Ga. App. 493, 8 SE2d 694). Whether the presumption was rebutted was for the trior of fact. Bryant v. State, 106 Ga. App. 182, 185 (126 SE2d 538). Another circumstance arising from the evidence which tends to contradict the defendant’s testimony was that defendant’s daughter grabbed the liquor, ran to the front yard and poured it out.
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Jordan, Judge.
The only question before us is whether the evidence in this case is sufficient to authorize the revocation of a probationary sentence under Code Ann. § 27-2713.
“Probation is granted as a privilege, and not as a matter of right; and the revocation of the probation is punishment for the crime for which the defendant was convicted in the first instance.” Johnson v. State, 214 Ga. 818, 819 (108 SE2d 313); Cross v. Huff, 208 Ga. 392, 396 (67 SE2d 124). Probation of sentence “. . . comes as an act of grace to one convicted of a crime. . .” Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 US 490; 492 (55 SC 818, 79 LE 1566). “The defendant stands convicted; he faces punishment and cannot insist on terms or strike a bargain.” Burns v. United States, 287 US 216, 220 (53 SC 154, 77 LE 266).
This does not mean that the probationer can be made the victim of whim or caprice. Williams v. State, 162 Ga. 327, 328 (133 SE 843); Sparks v. State, 77 Ga. App. 22, 24 (47 SE2d 678); Burns v. United States, 287 US 216, 223, supra. Our statutes (Code Ann. § 27-2713 and former Code § 27-2705) expressly give him the right to notice and a hearing on the question of revoking probation. Johnson v. State, 214 Ga. 818, 819, supra; Balkcom v. Gunn, 206 Ga. 167 (56 SE2d 482). The fail[518]*518ure to afford the probationer such notice and a hearing would render a revocation order void for lack of due process of law. Lester v. Foster, 207 Ga. 596 (63 SE2d 402). However, a hearing on a revocation “. . . is not a trial on a criminal charge . . and the probationer has no right to a trial by jury. Johnson v. State, 214 Ga. 818, 819, supra. It is somewhat like an application for a change of venue, which is “of a civil nature.” See Wilburn v. State, 140 Ga. 138, 140 (78 SE 819).
As to the sufficiency of the evidence to authorize revocation, “. . . the trial judge is not bound by the same rules of evidence as a jury in passing upon the guilt or innocence of the accused in the first instance. It is not necessary that the evidence support the finding beyond a reasonable doubt or even by a preponderance of the evidence. The judge is the trior of the facts. He has a very wide discretion.” (Emphasis supplied). Allen v. State, 78 Ga. App. 526, 528-529 (51 SE2d 571); Price v. State, 91 Ga. App. 381 (2) (85 SE2d 627). This discretion “. . . takes into account the law and the particular circumstances of the case and is directed by the reason and conscience of the judge to a just result.” Sparks v. State, 77 Ga. App. 22, 24, supra. Only “slight evidence” is required. Faulkner v. State, 101 Ga. App. 889 (115 SE2d 393). This court will not interfere with a revocation unless there has been a manifest abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. Waters v. State, 80 Ga. App. 104, 108 (55 SE2d 677); Atkinson v. State, 82 Ga. App. 414, 416 (61 SE2d 212); Harrington v. State, 97 Ga. App. 315, 320 (103 SE2d 126). The reason for flexibility is obvious. The probationer “. . . is still a person convicted of an offense, and the suspension of his sentence remains within the control of the court. The continuance of that control, apparent from the terms of the statute, is essential to the accomplishment of its beneficent purpose, as otherwise probation might be more reluctantly granted, or when granted, might be made the occasion of delays and obstruction which would bring reproach upon the administration of justice.” Burns v. United States, 287 US 216, 222, supra.
The acts of 1962 (Ga. L. 1962, p. 133, Code Ann. § 38-415; Ga. L. 1962, p. 453, Code Ann. § 27-405), cited in the dissenting [519]*519opinion, and the former Code sections which these acts amend, apply to the "testimony of the accused” in “criminal trials.” They are not relevant to the present case because a hearing on a revocation of a probationary sentence is not a criminal trial. Johnson v. State, 214 Ga. 818, 819, supra; Sparks v. State, 77 Ga. App. 22, 23, supra. And it is not necessary to discuss the question whether the trior of fact in a civil or criminal case is bound by testimony of a party witness that is not directly contradicted, for the reason that in a revocation proceeding the trial judge is not bound by the rules of evidence applied in ordinary civil or criminal cases. Allen v. State, 78 Ga. App. 526, 528, supra; 24 CJS 912, 914-916, § 1618 (11).
Though not bound by the rules, we do call attention to liberality extended to the trior of fact in considering matters which go to the credibility of a witness. “The jury can not arbitrarily disregard the evidence of any witness, which is not contradicted or discredited by other evidence or circumstances. The jury should regard the testimony of every witness sworn. They are not obligated to believe it, but it is their duty to give to the evidence of witnesses the weight to which, in their opinion as conscientious men seeking after the truth, they believe it is entitled . . .” Brunswick &c. R. Co. v. Wiggins, 113 Ga. 842, 844 (39 SE 551, 61 LRA 513). (Emphasis supplied.) There is a difference in arbitrarily or capriciously disregarding testimony and in disbelieving it upon a consideration of all circumstances arising from the evidence. There is nothing here to indicate that the defendant’s testimony was disregarded. And see Detwiler v. Cox, 120 Ga. 638 (48 SE 142); Eberhardt v. Bennett, 163 Ga. 796, 805 (137 SE 64); Hancock v. Wilson, 214 Ga. 60 (102 SE2d 551); Jones v. Teasley, 25 Ga. App. 784, 788 (105 SE 46); Neill v. Hill, 32 Ga. App. 381 (2a) (123 SE 30); Fincher v. Harlow, 56 Ga. App. 578 (193 SE 452); McRae v. Wilby, 59 Ga. App. 401, 410 (1 SE2d 77); Caldwell v. Caldwell, 59 Ga. App. 637, 643 (1 SE2d 764); Georgia Highway Exp. v. Sturkie, 62 Ga. App. 741, 747 (9 SE2d 683); Chaffin v. Community Loan &c. Co., 67 Ga. App. 410 (1) (20 SE2d 435); Krasner v. Croswell, 76 Ga. App. 421, 422 (46 SE2d 207). “[W]here the witnesses’ testimony is contradicted by circumstances that can be taken as incompat[520]*520ible with such direct evidence . . . the courts and the juries are not bound to refrain from exercising their own judgments and blindly adopt the statement of a witness or witnesses for the simple reason that no other witness has denied the testimony and that the character of such witness has not been impeached.” Annis v. State, 85 Ga. App. 188, 192 (68 SE2d 473). And see Goldwire v. State, 56 Ga. App. 379 (192 SE 643).
The evidence relied upon by the State in this case created a legal presumption that the defendant was the owner and possessor of non-taxpaid liquor in violation of Code Ann. § 58-1056 (Morgan v. State, 62 Ga. App. 493, 8 SE2d 694). Whether the presumption was rebutted was for the trior of fact. Bryant v. State, 106 Ga. App. 182, 185 (126 SE2d 538). Another circumstance arising from the evidence which tends to contradict the defendant’s testimony was that defendant’s daughter grabbed the liquor, ran to the front yard and poured it out.
Even under the rules in a civil or a criminal proceeding, the judge would have been at liberty to consider these circumstances, together with the defendant’s interest in the result of the proceeding, his appearance at the time of testifying, his manner of testifying, and the reasonableness or unreasonableness of his testimony, and from these arrive at his own conclusion as to whether the testimony was credible and whether it should be disbelieved.
It is important, too, that we keep in mind that in the instant proceeding the defendant was not on trial to determine whether or not he was guilty of possession of nontax-paid whisky. On that charge he is entitled to have and will have his day in court under all of the rules, rights and privileges prevailing in criminal trials in this State.
Under the rules of law applicable to this type of proceeding and under the record in this case we cannot say that the trial court’s adjudication that the plaintiff in error had violated his probation was a manifest abuse of discretion.
Judgment affirmed.
Bell, Frankum, Hall, Eberhardt and Russell, JJ., concur. Felton, C. J., Carlisle, P. J., and Nichols, P. J., dissent.