Selig v. Taliban
Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CHARYN SELIG, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. Case No. 1:23-cv-00236 (TNM)
TALIBAN, a.k.a. Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM ORDER
This Court entered judgment for Plaintiffs on their claims under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2333, finding the Taliban liable for $86,022,627 in damages and the Taliban and Iran jointly and severally liable for $173,545,254, for a total of $259,567,881. Mem. Op., ECF No. 21, at 18. Plaintiffs then filed supplemental briefing requesting attorney’s fees of $21,693,156—25 percent of the damages before trebling—and $22,420.72 in costs. Pls.’ First Supp. Mem., ECF No. 24, at 1. At the Court’s request, Plaintiffs followed up with a second supplemental brief calculating their attorney’s fees under the lodestar method, which amount to $190,990, and requesting costs of $14,270.72. Pls.’ Second Supp. Mem., ECF No. 26, at 12. Finding that nearly $22 million in fees is plainly unreasonable for this default judgment, the Court will award Plaintiffs $197,920 in attorney’s fees and $20 in costs.
I.
Start with attorney’s fees. The Anti-Terrorism Act provides that “[a]ny national of the United States injured in his or her person, property, or business by reason of an act of international terrorism, or his or her estate, survivors, or heirs, may sue therefor . . . and shall recover threefold the damages he or she sustains and the cost of the suit, including attorney’s
fees.” 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a). Attorney’s fees are commonly calculated either via the lodestar method or as a contingency fee. See Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 801–03 (2002). The lodestar method calculates fees based on a reasonable hourly rate multiplied by the number of hours worked, whereas the contingency fee amounts to a percentage of the total damages award.
“[T]he lodestar method today holds sway in federal-court adjudication of disputes over the amount of fees properly shifted to the loser in the litigation.” Id. at 802. District courts have assumed that the lodestar method applies to claims under § 2333. See, e.g., Miller v. Juarez Cartel, 627 F. Supp. 3d 1043, 1047–48 (D.N.D. 2022); Ests. of Ungar & Ungar ex rel. Strachman v. Palestinian Auth., 325 F. Supp. 2d 15, 68 (D.R.I. 2004), aff’d, 402 F.3d 274 (1st Cir. 2005).
Plaintiffs nonetheless urge the Court to award a contingency fee of $21,693,156, i.e., 25 percent of the damages before trebling. Pls.’ Second Supp. Mem. at 1. They cite Gisbrecht in support of that demand. See id. at 5–6. Gisbrecht involved an award of attorney’s fees for a successful social security benefits claimant under 42 U.S.C. § 406, which provides that “the court may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for [an attorney’s] representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of [the favorable] judgment.” 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A); see Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 795. That attorney’s fee is payable “out of, and not in addition to, the amount of [the claimant’s] past-due benefits.” 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). In this setting, the Gisbrecht Court ruled that § 406 does not “override customary attorney-client contingent-fee agreements” but rather “instructs courts to review for reasonableness [the] fees yielded by those agreements.” 535 U.S. at 808–09.
Gisbrecht’s holding does not displace the lodestar method here. After all, Gisbrecht repeatedly recognized the lodestar method as “the guiding light of [courts’] fee-shifting jurisprudence.” Id. at 801 (cleaned up); see also id. at 806 (“Furthermore, we again emphasize, the lodestar method was designed to govern imposition of fees on the losing party.”). In fee- shifting cases, “nothing prevents the attorney for the prevailing party from gaining additional fees, pursuant to contract, from his own client.” Id. Taking their cue from Gisbrecht, courts routinely deploy the lodestar method in fee-shifting contexts. See, e.g., Driscoll v. George Washington Univ., 55 F. Supp. 3d 106, 113 (D.D.C. 2014) (“The lodestar approach has emerged as the prevailing method of fee calculation in fee-shifting cases for good reason.”).
Nor does the statutory language support Plaintiffs’ bid for a contingency fee. By its plain text, the Anti-Terrorism Act is a fee-shifting statute—providing that prevailing plaintiffs “shall recover threefold the damages [they] sustain[] and the cost of the suit, including attorney’s fees.” 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (emphasis added). The conjunctive “and” signals that successful Anti- Terrorism Act plaintiffs recover costs and attorney’s fees from the defendants. Although § 2333(a) does not expressly limit attorney’s fees to a “reasonable” amount as some other statutes do, that absence does not dictate a contingency fee over the lodestar amount. Indeed, Plaintiffs have identified no case in which a court has awarded a contingency fee under § 2333(a), nor is the Court aware of any.
Plaintiffs also point to the Justice for United States Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Act, 34 U.S.C. § 20144, as proof that “Congress has, in effect, already determined that a 25% contingency fee is a reasonable attorneys’ fee in civil counter-terrorism litigation.” Pls.’ First Supp. Mem. at 6. But that statute caps attorney’s fees at 25 percent only for “any payment made under this section.” 34 U.S.C. § 20144(f)(1). It thus applies only to claims “against a foreign
state that was designated as a state sponsor of terrorism.” Id. § 20144(c)(2)(A)(i). Meanwhile, this Court has already determined that the Taliban does not qualify as a foreign state. See Mem. Op. at 7 (“The Taliban is a mere foreign governing entity, not a foreign sovereign.”). Because the Taliban is not a foreign state, § 20144 offers little guidance for this case.
More, § 20144 allows plaintiffs to recover from a fund, not the defendants themselves, see 34 U.S.C. § 20144(d), which further weakens any analogy to the Anti-Terrorism Act’s fee- shifting provision. Ultimately, unlike the statute in Gisbrecht and the Justice for United States Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Act, there is no applicable statutory language suggesting that a 25 percent contingency fee is appropriate here.
Finding no footing in the statute, Plaintiffs pivot to contract. They emphasize that they “are contractually obliged to pay to the Law Firms contingency fees that exceed the 25% requested herein.” Pls.’ First Supp. Mem. at 6. They suggest that it would be reasonable for the Court to “award[] attorney fees in an amount that approximates their contractual liability, and is even substantially below the amounts agreed upon between Plaintiffs and the Law Firms.” Id. But Plaintiffs find no support for this effort to make their contingency contract the touchstone of reasonableness. Quite the opposite: “[T]he reasonableness of the [attorney’s] fees requested is a judgment call which only the Court can make.” Boland v. Hetrick, 277 F. Supp. 3d 112, 118 (D.D.C. 2017) (cleaned up); see also, e.g., Strong v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 137 F.3d 844, 849 (5th Cir. 1998) (“To the contrary, a district court is not bound by the agreement of the parties as to the amount of attorneys’ fees.” (cleaned up)).
Perhaps recognizing the shaky legal ground on which their bid rests, Plaintiffs back off from asking for the full contingency amount, which would “exceed[] 33%” of the damages award. See Pls.’ First Supp. Decl. Ex. A, ECF No. 24-1, ¶ 4. This implicitly shows Plaintiffs
recognize the Court cannot be bound by their continency agreement. In a sense, then, Plaintiffs’ demand for $21,693,156 is modest compared to the more than $28,000,000 that they could obtain under their theory. And if their contract were the sole yardstick, what would stop them from agreeing on a 99% contingency and raking in an $85,000,000 attorney’s fee?
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