Seitu v. Polkinghorn

CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedAugust 7, 2025
DocketCivil Action No. 2025-1773
StatusPublished

This text of Seitu v. Polkinghorn (Seitu v. Polkinghorn) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Seitu v. Polkinghorn, (D.D.C. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

KWASI SEITU, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-01773 (UNA) v. ) ) PHILLIP POLKINGHORN, et al., ) ) Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the Court for review of Plaintiff’s pro se Complaint (“Compl.”), ECF

No. 1, and Application for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), ECF No. 2. The Court

grants the IFP Application and, for the reasons discussed below, it dismisses this matter without

prejudice.

Plaintiff sues at least ten defendants, including federal and local judges across various

jurisdictions, representatives of Americo Life Insurance, Americo’s attorneys, and District of

Columbia government officials. See Compl. at 1, 3–4. He does not provide addresses for the

Defendants in contravention of D.C. LCvR 5.1(c)(1). At root, Plaintiff takes issue with the

outcome of proceedings and actions taken in a lawsuit that he filed against Americo in the Superior

Court of the District of Columbia, as well as the D.C. Judicial Disabilities and Tenure

Commission’s subsequent dismissal of a grievance that Plaintiff filed against two of the presiding

judges. See id. at 4–6. The Complaint otherwise devolves into ruminations regarding a conspiracy

of wrongdoing orchestrated against him by Defendants and other alleged assorted state and federal

actors, including other unsuccessful lawsuits and grievances that Plaintiff has filed, all of which

spans approximately four decades. See id. at 1–2, 7–13. He demands approximately $40 million

in damages and assorted equitable relief. See id. at 14–15. First, pro se litigants must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Jarrell v.

Tisch, 656 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987), and here, the amended petition fails to comply with

Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a pleading to contain “(1) a short

and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction [and] (2) a short and plain statement

of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); see Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009); Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 668-71 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The

Rule 8 standard ensures that defendants receive fair notice of the claim being asserted so that they

can prepare a responsive answer and an adequate defense and determine whether the doctrine of

res judicata applies. Brown v. Califano, 75 F.R.D. 497, 498 (D.D.C. 1977). Here, the Complaint

is neither short nor plain, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), the allegations cannot be described as simple,

concise, and direct, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1), and the paragraphs are not limited to a single set

of circumstances, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b).

When, as here, a pleading “contains an untidy assortment of claims that are neither plainly

nor concisely stated, nor meaningfully distinguished from bold conclusions, sharp harangues and

personal comments [,]” it does not fulfill the requirements of Rule 8. Jiggetts v. Dist. of Columbia,

319 F.R.D. 408, 413 (D.D.C. 2017), aff’d sub nom. Cooper v. Dist. of Columbia, No. 17-7021,

2017 WL 5664737 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 1, 2017). And “[a] confused and rambling narrative of charges

and conclusions . . . does not comply with the requirements of Rule 8.” Cheeks v. Fort Myer

Constr. Corp., 71 F. Supp. 3d 163, 169 (D.D.C. 2014) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted). Plaintiff’s Complaint falls squarely into this category. Furthermore, the Court finds no

merit in Plaintiff’s assertions that a far-reaching government conspiracy rooted in bias has been

orchestrated against him in multiple forums. Plaintiff, based on speculation only, falsely equates

any unfavorable decision or perceived slight to some sort of nefarious scheme, offering “only ‘a laundry list of wrongful acts and conclusory allegations to support h[is] theory of a conspiracy,’”

and such allegations are patently “‘insufficient to allow the case to go forward.’” Curran v. Holder,

626 F. Supp. 2d 30, 34 (D.D.C. 2009) (dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction as

frivolous) (quoting Richards v. Duke Univ., 480 F. Supp. 2d 222, 233 (D.D.C. 2007)).

Second, what little can be understood is that Plaintiff asks this Court to intervene and grant

relief that would alter and undermine determinations rendered by the D.C. Superior Court, but

federal district courts generally lack jurisdiction to review or otherwise interfere with the decisions

and actions of state courts. See Richardson v. Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals, 83 F.3d 1513,

1514 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (citing Dist. of Columbia v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983), and Rooker

v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923)). Furthermore, this Court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s challenge to the dismissal of his grievance by the D.C. Judicial

Disabilities and Tenure Commission. See D.C. Code 11 §15-1521 et seq.

Third, the Defendant judges are immune to suit for damages. Judges are absolutely

immune for “all actions taken in the judge's judicial capacity, unless these actions are taken in the

complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Sindram v. Suda, 986 F.2d 1459, 1460 (D.C. Cir. 1993); see

also Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9 (1991) (acknowledging that a long line of Supreme Court

precedents have found that a “judge is immune from a suit for money damages”); Caldwell v.

Kagan, 865 F. Supp. 2d 35, 42 (D.D.C. 2012) (“Judges have absolute immunity for any actions

taken in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity.”). And “a judge will not be deprived of

immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his

authority.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 13; see also id. at 11 (“[J]udicial immunity is not overcome by

allegations of bad faith or malice.”). For all the above stated reasons, this case is dismissed without prejudice. A separate Order

accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

Date: August 7, 2025 __________/s/_________________ JIA M.

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Related

Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.
263 U.S. 413 (Supreme Court, 1924)
District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman
460 U.S. 462 (Supreme Court, 1983)
Mireles v. Waco
502 U.S. 9 (Supreme Court, 1991)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Ciralsky v. Central Intelligence Agency
355 F.3d 661 (D.C. Circuit, 2004)
Jarrell v. Tisch
656 F. Supp. 237 (District of Columbia, 1987)
Curran v. Holder
626 F. Supp. 2d 30 (District of Columbia, 2009)
Richards v. Duke University
480 F. Supp. 2d 222 (District of Columbia, 2007)
Caldwell v. Kagan
865 F. Supp. 2d 35 (District of Columbia, 2012)
Cheeks v. Fort Myer Construction Corporation
71 F. Supp. 3d 163 (District of Columbia, 2014)
Jiggetts v. District of Columbia
319 F.R.D. 408 (D.C. Circuit, 2017)
Brown v. Califano
75 F.R.D. 497 (District of Columbia, 1977)

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