Seitu v. Polkinghorn
This text of Seitu v. Polkinghorn (Seitu v. Polkinghorn) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
KWASI SEITU, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-01773 (UNA) v. ) ) PHILLIP POLKINGHORN, et al., ) ) Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court for review of Plaintiff’s pro se Complaint (“Compl.”), ECF
No. 1, and Application for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), ECF No. 2. The Court
grants the IFP Application and, for the reasons discussed below, it dismisses this matter without
prejudice.
Plaintiff sues at least ten defendants, including federal and local judges across various
jurisdictions, representatives of Americo Life Insurance, Americo’s attorneys, and District of
Columbia government officials. See Compl. at 1, 3–4. He does not provide addresses for the
Defendants in contravention of D.C. LCvR 5.1(c)(1). At root, Plaintiff takes issue with the
outcome of proceedings and actions taken in a lawsuit that he filed against Americo in the Superior
Court of the District of Columbia, as well as the D.C. Judicial Disabilities and Tenure
Commission’s subsequent dismissal of a grievance that Plaintiff filed against two of the presiding
judges. See id. at 4–6. The Complaint otherwise devolves into ruminations regarding a conspiracy
of wrongdoing orchestrated against him by Defendants and other alleged assorted state and federal
actors, including other unsuccessful lawsuits and grievances that Plaintiff has filed, all of which
spans approximately four decades. See id. at 1–2, 7–13. He demands approximately $40 million
in damages and assorted equitable relief. See id. at 14–15. First, pro se litigants must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Jarrell v.
Tisch, 656 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987), and here, the amended petition fails to comply with
Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a pleading to contain “(1) a short
and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction [and] (2) a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); see Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009); Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 668-71 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The
Rule 8 standard ensures that defendants receive fair notice of the claim being asserted so that they
can prepare a responsive answer and an adequate defense and determine whether the doctrine of
res judicata applies. Brown v. Califano, 75 F.R.D. 497, 498 (D.D.C. 1977). Here, the Complaint
is neither short nor plain, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), the allegations cannot be described as simple,
concise, and direct, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1), and the paragraphs are not limited to a single set
of circumstances, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b).
When, as here, a pleading “contains an untidy assortment of claims that are neither plainly
nor concisely stated, nor meaningfully distinguished from bold conclusions, sharp harangues and
personal comments [,]” it does not fulfill the requirements of Rule 8. Jiggetts v. Dist. of Columbia,
319 F.R.D. 408, 413 (D.D.C. 2017), aff’d sub nom. Cooper v. Dist. of Columbia, No. 17-7021,
2017 WL 5664737 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 1, 2017). And “[a] confused and rambling narrative of charges
and conclusions . . . does not comply with the requirements of Rule 8.” Cheeks v. Fort Myer
Constr. Corp., 71 F. Supp. 3d 163, 169 (D.D.C. 2014) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). Plaintiff’s Complaint falls squarely into this category. Furthermore, the Court finds no
merit in Plaintiff’s assertions that a far-reaching government conspiracy rooted in bias has been
orchestrated against him in multiple forums. Plaintiff, based on speculation only, falsely equates
any unfavorable decision or perceived slight to some sort of nefarious scheme, offering “only ‘a laundry list of wrongful acts and conclusory allegations to support h[is] theory of a conspiracy,’”
and such allegations are patently “‘insufficient to allow the case to go forward.’” Curran v. Holder,
626 F. Supp. 2d 30, 34 (D.D.C. 2009) (dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction as
frivolous) (quoting Richards v. Duke Univ., 480 F. Supp. 2d 222, 233 (D.D.C. 2007)).
Second, what little can be understood is that Plaintiff asks this Court to intervene and grant
relief that would alter and undermine determinations rendered by the D.C. Superior Court, but
federal district courts generally lack jurisdiction to review or otherwise interfere with the decisions
and actions of state courts. See Richardson v. Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals, 83 F.3d 1513,
1514 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (citing Dist. of Columbia v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983), and Rooker
v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923)). Furthermore, this Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s challenge to the dismissal of his grievance by the D.C. Judicial
Disabilities and Tenure Commission. See D.C. Code 11 §15-1521 et seq.
Third, the Defendant judges are immune to suit for damages. Judges are absolutely
immune for “all actions taken in the judge's judicial capacity, unless these actions are taken in the
complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Sindram v. Suda, 986 F.2d 1459, 1460 (D.C. Cir. 1993); see
also Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9 (1991) (acknowledging that a long line of Supreme Court
precedents have found that a “judge is immune from a suit for money damages”); Caldwell v.
Kagan, 865 F. Supp. 2d 35, 42 (D.D.C. 2012) (“Judges have absolute immunity for any actions
taken in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity.”). And “a judge will not be deprived of
immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his
authority.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 13; see also id. at 11 (“[J]udicial immunity is not overcome by
allegations of bad faith or malice.”). For all the above stated reasons, this case is dismissed without prejudice. A separate Order
accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
Date: August 7, 2025 __________/s/_________________ JIA M.
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