Seibert v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co.

20 L.R.A. 535, 53 N.W. 1134, 52 Minn. 148, 1893 Minn. LEXIS 391
CourtSupreme Court of Minnesota
DecidedJanuary 6, 1893
StatusPublished
Cited by21 cases

This text of 20 L.R.A. 535 (Seibert v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Minnesota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Seibert v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co., 20 L.R.A. 535, 53 N.W. 1134, 52 Minn. 148, 1893 Minn. LEXIS 391 (Mich. 1893).

Opinion

Vanderburgh, J.

This suit is brought to foreclose a certain mortgage executed' by defendant railway company to the Central Trust Company, which Trust Company has been superseded by the appointment of the plaintiff, Henry Seibert, as trustee in its place. The defendants Farmers’ Loan & Trust Company and Central Trust Company are named as trustees in other mortgages executed by the railway company.

The intervener, F. H. Griggs, is the owner of bonds secured by the mortgages executed to the last-named trustees in trust to secure the bondholders holding bonds issued thereunder. In the first three paragraphs, of the complaint in intervention reference is made to its bonds secured by the mortgage held by the Farmers’ Loan & Trust Company as trustee, and. therein is set forth the facts upon which the intervener bases his claim for relief, by way of the foreclosure of that mortgage, on his application and for the benefit of himself and other bondholders. The remainder of his complaint presents the facts upon which he bases a similar claim in respect to his bonds secured by other mortgages executed to the Central Trust^Company.

1. The defendant Farmers’ Loan& Trust Company demurs to that portion of the intervener’s complaint included in the three paragraphs referred to, as containing the plaintiff’s cause of action against it. As this portion of the complaint embraces a statement of all the facts upon which the intervener claims relief against it, we think that the objection that the demurrer is bad, because taken to a part of the complaint only, is not well taken. The court can determine from the issue thus made whether or not the intervener is entitled to any relief against the defendant upon the facts stated.

The intervener alleges: “That in the mortgage or deed of trust executed by the Minneapolis & St. Louis Railway Company to the' Farmers’ Loan & Trust Company, bearing date the 1st day of February, 1877, and securing the twenty-one bonds, and the coupons therefrom, held and owned by intervener, as particularly described in the first division of this intervener’s complaint, it is provided, among other things, in article six thereof, as follows: ‘In case default shall be made in the payment of any of the said coupons, or semiannual interest upon any of the aforesaid bonds, at the time and [153]*153in the manner in the coupons issued therewith, provided the said coupon has been presented, and the payment of the interest therein specified has been demanded, and in case such default shall, continue for the period of four months after the said coupons shall have become due and payable, then and thereupon the principal of all the bonds secured hereby shall become immediately due and payable, anything contained in the said bonds to the contrary notwithstanding.’”

Intervener avers that all of his said described coupons from the bonds in this division referred to have been presented for payment at the agency of the said Minneapolis & St. Louis Railway Company in the city of New York, and the payment o$ the interest therein specified ha^ been demanded, and payment was refused; and all the said coupons have also been presented for payment to the acting treasurer of said Minneapolis & St. Louis Railway Company, at the city of Minneapolis, Minn., and the payment of the interest specified was demanded, and payment was refisid, and default has been made in the payment of all the described coupons from said bonds. He also alleges that, excepting as to the several coupons aforesaid which became due and payable on the 1st day of December, 1891, such default as to the payment of all said coupons has continued for the period óf more than four months from the several dates when they severally became due and payable; wherefore intervener avers that the principal of all the bonds secured by said mortgage or deed of trust in the division referred to has become due and payable and all the bonds secured by the said mortgage are now due and payable; that by article nine of said mortgage it is provided—

“That it shall be the duty of the trustee, upon proper indemnification against costs and expenses, to execute the power of entry or the power of sale by said mortgage granted, or both, to take appropriate proceedings in equity or at law to enforce the rights of the bondholders, in case of any default made by the mortgagee, upon requisition in writing as thereinafter specified, viz.:
“First. If the default be as to either the interest or the principal of any of the bonds aforesaid, such requisition upon the said trustee shall be by holders of not less than twenty-five per centum of the [154]*154said bonds then outstanding; and upon such requisition and indemnification it shall be the duty of the trustee to enforce the rights of the bondholders under these presents by entry, sale, or legal proceedings, as it, being advised by counsel learned in the law, shall' deem most expedient for the interest of all the holders of the said bonds.
“Second., But it is expressly understood that such duty of the trustee shall be at all times subject to the power hereby declared of a majority in interest of the holders of the said bonds by requisition in writing, signed by such majority, to instruct the said trustee to waive such default: provided, however, that no action of the bondholders in waiving such default shall extend or be taken to affect any, subsequent default, or to impair the results arising therefrom.
“And it is hereby further expressly agreed and made binding upon each and every holder of bonds secured hereby that no proceedings at law or in equity shall be taken by any bondholder to foreclose the equity of redemption under this instrument, or to procure a sale of the property covered thereby, independently of the party of the second part, trustee, or its successors in said trust, except after a requisition shall have been made to the said trustee in manner and form as hereinbefore provided, and also until after a refusal of the said trustee to comply with such requisition according to the provisions herein made in respect thereto,”

Intervener submits and claims that the said provisions of article nine of said last-described mortgage are void, in so far as they attempt to deprive the holder of any of the bonds which may have become due by default in payment of the interest coupons, or the holders of any of the past-due coupons, from enforcing the remedy whereby he might have his lien established upon the mortgaged property without the requisition of the holders of not less than twenty-five per centum of the said bonds then outstanding; that said provisions are in fact an attempt to oust the jurisdiction of any court to entertain a complaint by, or give relief to, the holders of less than twenty-five per centum of the outstanding bonds.

The principal question involved in this appeal, therefore, is whether the provisions of article nine above quoted, restraining proceed[155]*155ings for foreclosure on the part of individual bondholders until after the requisition made upon the trustees by a certain proportion of the bondholders as therein provided, and a refusal by him to comply therewith, is valid and obligatory upon the individual bondholders as respects the enforcement of the security.

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Bluebook (online)
20 L.R.A. 535, 53 N.W. 1134, 52 Minn. 148, 1893 Minn. LEXIS 391, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/seibert-v-minneapolis-st-louis-ry-co-minn-1893.