Seibert v. City of Columbia

461 S.W.2d 808, 1970 Mo. LEXIS 778

• Court: Supreme Court of Missouri
• Decided: December 14, 1970
• Docket: 55911
• Status: Published

Opinions

HOLMAN, Judge.

Plaintiffs filed this suit attacking the validity of the annexation of seven separate tracts of land by the defendant, City of Columbia. The trial court sustained a motion to dismiss “on the ground that the cause of action set up in plaintiffs’ petition is res judicata.” Plaintiffs have duly appealed. We have jurisdiction because an issue raised by plaintiffs would, if decided, require a construction of constitutional provisions. Although we find it unnecessary to specifically decide that question our jurisdiction remains. Haley v. Horjul, Inc., Mo.Sup., 281 S.W.2d 832.

The dismissal because of res judicata occurred by reason of the following facts: Columbia is a constitutional charter city. At a special election held on October 7, 1969, the voters approved charter amendments extending the corporate limits of the city so as to include seven additional tracts of land. Shortly thereafter a declaratory judgment suit was filed attacking the validity of the annexation. That suit is styled Nigel N. White et al. v. City of Columbia, Mo., 461 S.W.2d 806. The plaintiffs were all residents of the area composing the original city. They based their contentions that the annexation was void entirely upon procedural insufficiencies connected with the passage of the ordinance and the election requirements. Their interest in the controversy was based upon the proposition that since the annexation was void, expenditures by the city in the annexed areas constituted a misuse of public funds. The White case was tried and on January 5, 1970, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of defendant. The plaintiffs appealed that case to this court.

In February 1970 the instant suit was filed. The plaintiffs in this suit are all residents of the annexed areas. In their petition they attack the validity of the annexation on all the grounds asserted in the White case and, in addition, allege that the annexation is void because unreasonable; that the areas are not needed for any purpose and the City will be unable to provide municipal services to them; and that the property in the areas will be subject to tax without reciprocal benefits to the residents. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss which, as indicated, was based primarily upon res judicata. It also filed a motion to strike from the petition those paragraphs which contained allegations raising the same issues which were decided in the White case. The court overruled both motions on May 20, 1970. Thereafter, the regular judge was disqualified upon petition of one of the plaintiffs and this court transferred Judge Cottey to hear this cause. Judge Cottey thereafter set aside the previous order overruling the motion to dismiss and reconsidered same. On July 8, 1970, the trial court, as heretofore indicated, sustained the motion to dismiss.

In White v. City of Columbia, supra, we held that the plaintiffs in that case had no capacity to bring the suit and the judgment in favor of defendant was accordingly affirmed. That decision is applicable to this case and we rule that plaintiffs are precluded from maintaining this action insofar as they seek to attack the validity of the annexation on the ground of procedural insufficiencies connected with the passage of the ordinance and the manner of complying with the election requirements. It should also be apparent that our decision in White has eliminated from this case the issue of res judicata.

We rule, however, that plaintiffs may maintain this action in order to attack the annexation on the ground of reasonableness. That right has been settled by a number of our decisions which are reviewed in State on Inf. of Eagleton v. Champ, Mo.Sup., 393 S.W.2d 516, 531, 532, as follows:

“It has been firmly established in decisions of this court that reasonableness of annexation by a city always is the subject of judicial inquiry. Such judicial review has been provided by the Legislature in certain instances by § 71.015, commonly referred to as the Sawyers Act. However, it has been held that reasonableness of annexation is the subject of such judicial inquiry even in instances in which the Sawyers Act is not applicable. For example, in the case of McDonnell Aircraft Corporation v. City of Berkeley, Mo., 367 S.W.2d 498, the City of Berkeley, a constitutional charter city, claimed that no court could judicially review charter amendments for annexation of territory by a constitutional charter city to which the Sawyers Act was not applicable. That position was rejected by this court which stated, l.c. 502, that ‘[t]he policy of the state in this respect as to all cities is stated in Sec. 71.015 (statutory references are to RSMo and V.A.M.S.) in the requirement “[t]hat such action is reasonable and necessary to the proper development” of the city.’ Subsequently, 1.c. 503, the opinion states: ‘Therefore, our conclusion is that annexation of additional territory is a matter of more than merely municipal affairs and concern and that the reasons for applying the test of unreasonableness amounting to arbitrary, capricious action and abuse of discretion are equally applicable to annexations by constitutional charter cities and those organized under general statutes.’ See also City of Hannibal v. Winchester et al., 391 S.W.2d 279, decided by this court on June 14, 1965, wherein it was held that a charter city may annex unincorporated territory under Art. 6, § 20, 1945 Missouri Constitution ‘subject to a test in the courts of the reasonableness and necessity of its action.’ ”

The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with the views herein expressed.

All concur.