Seguine v. Seguine

3 Trans. App. 308
CourtNew York Court of Appeals
DecidedJune 15, 1867
StatusPublished

This text of 3 Trans. App. 308 (Seguine v. Seguine) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Seguine v. Seguine, 3 Trans. App. 308 (N.Y. 1867).

Opinion

Weight, J.

James S. Seguine, the validity of whose will is the subject of this appeal, died at his residence, at Deep Creek, in the State of Virginia, on the 11th of January, 1860, at the age of about fifty-five years. He was born in the county of Richmond (Staten Island), his family being an ancient one in the county, but from early life had resided and was engaged in business in Virginia. His business was mainly lumbering in the Dismal and other Southern swamps; but in connection therewith he built and owned shares in several vessels employed in the transportation of his lumber and other freight. This business was continued until his death.

He left-an only son, the Appellant, who was a few months old at the death of his mother, in 1838. His other near relatives were a sister, the widow of a Mr. Gruyon, and a brother, Henry L. Seguine.

The brother and sister always resided on Staten Island, as did the son, who was reared in the family of the sister — the deceased, after the death of his wife, never. marrying again, or keeping a domestic establishment. He had lodgings in Virginia, where he spent most of his time, visiting the Horth in the summer season;, and on such occasions, and when north on business, made his-brother’s house, on the island, his home.

The deceased had accumulated an estate, at his decease, of" probably something over $100,000. With the exception of a farim on the island, formerly belonging to his father, purchased by him* in 1858, and fitted up and improved at a cost of some $15,000,,as-a home for -his son, his property was principally personal, con-.[310]*310sisting of money invested in Virginia, and at the North. By his will, executed in May, 1859, some seven months prior to his death, and on his last visit to the North, after giving specific legacies to the amount of $2,000, he gave to his sister, Mrs. Guyon, an annuity of $500; to his son, James Henry Seguine, an annuity of $700, and also an estate for life in the homestead farm purchased for him in 1858, remainder to his son’s children — if no children, to his grandchildren, with a direction to the executors to expend the further sum of $4,000 in improving the farm for the son’s use; and to the brother, Henry L. Seguine, the residue of the estate.

No point is made that the requisite statute formalities, to sustain the execution of the paper as the will of the deceased, were not duly observed; the objection being as to the testamentary capacity of the deceased, and whether the will was, or was not, procured by undue influence of the chief beneficiary. The bulk of the property, it is true, is given to the testator’s brother; and it may be conceded that the will is a will inoflicious, so far as regards his son. But if the son had been wholly disinherited (which he is "not, but a moderate competency given to him), not in favor of the brother, but of parties strangers in blood to the deceased, it would be no ground, of itself, for avoiding the instrument.

The doctrine of inoflicious testaments invoked from the books has no place in our law. A man has a right to make whatever disposition of his property he chooses. If capacity, formal execution, and volition appear, his will, however absurd or unjust, must stand. “ A disposing mind,” says Cresswell, J., in Earl of Sefton v. Hopwood (1 Fos. and Fin. 578) does not mean that a man should' make what other people may think a sensible will, or reasonable will, or a kind will, because, by the law of this country, a man has absolute dominion over his own property; and if he, being in possession of his faculties, thinks fit to make a capricious will, a harsh will, or cruel will, you have no right to interfere ; that would be to make his will for him, and not to allow him to make it.” “ The right of a testator to dispose of his estate,” said Porter, J., in delivering the opinion of this Court in Clapp [311]*311v. Fullerton (34 N. Y. 197), “ depends neither on the justness of his prejudices, nor the soundness of his reasoning. He may do what he will with his own ; and if there be no defect of testamentary capacity, and no undue influence or fraud, the law gives effect to his will, though the provisions are unreasonable and unjust” (Grindall v. Grindall, 4 Hag. Ec. R. 1; Wrench v. Murray, 3 Curt. 623; Butlin v. Barry, 1 Curt. 614; Peck v. Cary, 27 N. Y. 18).

If the deceased, then, possessed the requisite testable capacity, and the instrument was the free emanation of his will, it is valid, and is entitled to probate; and it is incumbent upon us so to adjudge, much as, in another sense, we might be inclined to regard the narrow provision for the son, in view of the deceased’s wealth, as unjust and undutiful.

There are, therefore, but the two questions — was there capacity, and freedom from restraint ?

As to capacity. The evidence as to the general capacity of the deceased is but one way. The case is not a balanced one, but one where the evidence greatly preponderates on that subject. The deceased, as has been stated, had been actively engaged in lumbering in Virginia for over thirty years, and, according to all the testimony, was an unusually shrewd and energetic business man. His mind was clear, vigorous, and strong. He was also a firm man, decided, self-reliant. A witness characterizes him (and this was the tenor of all the proof) as a man of “ great capacity for business, remarkable for his firmness, self-reliance, and tenacity of purpose.” That clearness, solidity, and strength, were the general mental characteristics evinced by him throughout most of his life, is not questioned by the Appellant. But it is insisted that disease and intemperance, within the two years prior to his death, effected a change in his mental condition ; and that when the will was made he was insane, or if not properly insane, was imbecile. The suggestion that insanity existed in any form, or that the testator’s mental faculties were perceptibly impaired at the time of the factum, is wholly unsustained by the proof. On the contrary, the proofs establish the fact that, at that time, his mind was as vigorous and sound as it had ever been. The [312]*312instrument was prepared by Lot C. Clark, Esq., for many years Ms legal adviser in relation to Ms affairs at the North. Mr. Clark was alone with Mm in his room, at his brother’s house, some two or three hours, conversing in respect to Ms property, receiving his instructions, getting his exact views in regard to the provisions of the will, his slaves, and the laws of Virginia and North Carolina as to them, and in drawing the instrument as it was finally executed.

All the directions for drawing it were given by the deceased, without a suggestion from any other person. He exhibited a will which had been made by Mm the year before, and which had been drawn by Judge Metcalf, the Surrogate of the county, and suggested the alterations he desired to make, assigning his reasons therefor. He named as witnesses Dr. Edgar, for many years his attending physician when visiting at the North, and Judge Winant, a friend from boyhood, and requested Mr. Clark himself to sign as a witness.

According to the testimony of Mr. Clark, “he was as clear in mind and faculties as he had ever known Mm; Ms mind was perfectly sound and clear.” Dr. Edgar, long and familiarly acquainted with Ms physical and mental characteristics, constitution, and habits, “ considered .him of sound mind,” and Judge Winant, the other subscribing witness, concurred with them in opinion.

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Related

Peck v. . Cary
27 N.Y. 9 (New York Court of Appeals, 1863)
Clapp v. . Fullerton
34 N.Y. 190 (New York Court of Appeals, 1866)
Gardiner v. Gardiner
34 N.Y. 155 (New York Court of Appeals, 1865)
Carroll v. Norton
3 Bradf. 291 (New York Surrogate's Court, 1855)

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Bluebook (online)
3 Trans. App. 308, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/seguine-v-seguine-ny-1867.