Seglin-Harrison Construction Co. v. State

264 A.D. 466, 35 N.Y.S.2d 940, 1942 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4183
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedJuly 1, 1942
DocketClaim No. 23165
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 264 A.D. 466 (Seglin-Harrison Construction Co. v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Seglin-Harrison Construction Co. v. State, 264 A.D. 466, 35 N.Y.S.2d 940, 1942 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4183 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1942).

Opinion

Sohenck, J.

Appeal is taken by claimants-appellants SeglinHarrison Construction Co., Inc., and Hachmeister-Lind Company from a judgment of the Court of Claims, entered November 13, 1941. On this appeal we are not concerned with the several other claimants whose claims have either been withdrawn or otherwise disposed of.

Seglin-Harrison Construction Co., Inc., entered into a contract with the State of New York on December 30, 1928, for the completion of the State Office Building at Albany, the foundation and [467]*467exterior of the building having been constructed by the Seglin Construction Co., Inc., a corporation affiliated with claimant. The Seglin-Harrison contract called for the completion of the building on December 31, 1929. The work, however, was not accepted by the State until February 25, 1931. HachmeisterLind Company is a subcontractor having charge of the plastering work in the building. The claims of appellants were filed pursuant to chapter 353 of the Laws of 1932, and Seglin-Harrison, the general contractor, and Hachmeister-Lind, the subcontractor, were awarded damages by the Court of Claims for breaches of the contract. ■

The sole question on this appeal is the sufficiency of these awards. The Court of Claims found that serious delays in the completion of the foundation of the building by Seglin Construction Company were due largely to faulty design and that there was active interference, on the part of the State which hindered the work of the appellant contractor and subcontractor for which they should be compensated. However, it would appear from the evidence that the awards were inadequate and that the judgment should be modified by increasing the amounts thereof in conformity with the proof established on the trial.

The Seglin-Harrison contract provided generally for the construction of floor fills, finished floors, partition work, metal work, carpentry and painting and a large amount of carved marble and cast bronze. During the completion of the contract other work was in progress under separate State contracts, including electrical work, installation of sanitary requirements and the installation of elevators. The Seglin Construction Company contract for the foundation and exterior of the building was the subject of litigation in the Court of Claims, where an award was made to that company, as general contractor, and to certain subcontractors, which awards were later modified by this court. (Seglin Construction Co., Inc., v. State of New York, 249 App. Div. 476; affd., 275 N. Y. 527.) While the contract in issue here called for its completion on December 31, 1929, it appears that the work did not commence until March 1, 1929, the last item of which was performed in January, 1931. The final acceptance of the contract was February 25, 1931. It would appear that the work required a period of eleven months in excess of the time provided by the terms of' the contract. The trial court has found the State responsible for a delay of six months and has awarded damages based on that period. Appellant, on the other hand, contends that the evidence establishes a delay period of eleven months, for which the State alone is accountable.

While the court found that there had been many serious delays directly attributable to the State, it also found the appellant [468]*468Seglin-Harrison Company chargeable with the delay caused by that company’s talcing over certain items of work originally included in the Seglin Construction Company contract for the construction of the foundation and exterior of the building. It held that these items deducted from that contract and by Order No. 1 added to the contract here under consideration extended the time necessary to complete the contract. It would appear that this work, which included work on the exterior of the building, was part of various subcontracts under the foundation contract and was performed by subcontractors of the Seglin Construction Company. That work was apparently substantially completed in October, 1929, and the record does not indicate that it interfered with appellant’s completion contract. To the contrary, the chief inspector of the Department of Public Works who was in charge during the period of construction testified that he found no item of work in the breakdown of the order that in his opinion would have interfered with the progress of the work under this completion contract.

We think that by reason of appellant’s uncontradicted proof corroborated by State’s witnesses the trial court erred in finding that the requirements of the order extended the time necessary to complete the contract. It is clear, and the trial court has found, that many acts and omissions on the part of the State resulted in long delays and interference. Among these may be included the State’s failure to deliver the entire building site promptly, which stopped the work of pouring concrete floor fills for three months while it devised a new method for lightening and balancing the fills, thereby effecting practically a complete stoppage of work under the contract, failure to furnish bronze, marble and plastering models, its issuing of numerous orders on contract to correct errors and supply omissions in the original plans and by actually occupy-' ing the building before the work called for by the contract had been completed. The evidence warrants a finding that the delay of approximately eleven months was caused by the acts of omission of the State. The resultant damage would necessarily be the expense which the appellant Seglin-Harrison Construction Co., Inc., incurred during the delay period.

The testimony indicates that expenditures were made in each of eleven months for job overhead totaling $9,631.94; for temporary light and power, a total of $416.82; for temporary toilet protection, $250.10. The judgment heretofore entered should be modified accordingly, with an allowance at the rate found by the trial court for overhead at ten per centum, and for profit at the rate of five per centum, together with interest from February 25, 1931.

[469]*469In the matter of the claim of the Hachmeister-Lind Company, the evidence clearly shows that the work of this appellant was seriously interfered with and delayed by many of the same acts and omissions on the part of the State which caused damage to the Seglin-Harrison Company, and particularly by the loss of use of the elevators and by the occupancy of the building before the completion of the work. The trial court has determined that there is ample evidence to sustain the finding that by reason of the acts and omissions by the State it has suffered loss and damage and has accordingly made an award in what appears to be an arbitrary sum, to wit, $5,000.

From the record it appears that this amount is insufficient to adequately compensate this subcontractor for its loss. The Hachmeister-Lind Company contract called for the furnishing of all labor, apparatus and material necessary to completely install all furring, lathing, bond surfacing and plastering in accordance with certain State specifications. The trial court found that by reason of the acts of the State it was obliged on many occasions to interrupt the orderly course of its various operations. It attempts, however, to minimize said appellant’s damage by reason of the fact that considerable bonded plaster fell from ceilings and that appellant had included in its lathing and plastering labor cost the money expended to replace the same. The State contends that appellant should absorb this additional expense.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Tricon Kent Co. v. Lafarge North America, Inc.
186 P.3d 155 (Colorado Court of Appeals, 2008)
Buckley & Co., Inc. v. State
356 A.2d 56 (New Jersey Superior Court App Division, 1975)
A. E. Ottaviano, Inc. v. State
202 Misc. 532 (New York State Court of Claims, 1952)
D'Angelo v. State
200 Misc. 657 (New York State Court of Claims, 1951)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
264 A.D. 466, 35 N.Y.S.2d 940, 1942 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4183, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/seglin-harrison-construction-co-v-state-nyappdiv-1942.