JOHN R. BROWN, Chief Judge.
As a rare animal too often neglected and overlooked as aggrieved parties sur[1103]*1103vey the appellate zoo, this case comes to us on an agreed statement, F.R.A.P. 10(d).1 It presents for decision the computation of correct premiums under a retrospective rating plan2 where the Insurer cancels before the expiration of the last year of a three year policy period 3 because of adverse loss experience on the part of the Assured. The trial court held for the Insurer and the Assured appeals. We reverse.
In the quest for the answer the problem comes down to making sense out of non-sense. In more austere language, the problem is interpreting, or more accurately trying to interpret, the specific terms of the cancellation provision of Plan D.4
The facts are extremely simple. The Insurer issued its first policy to Assured on April 3, 1965. On April 3, 1966, Insurer issued a similar renewal policy for another year’s coverage. Because of Assured’s poor loss experience during the first two years of coverage, Insurer decided on April 3, 1967, that it would is[1104]*1104sue a policy effective only until June 15, 1967. By any realistic view of the facts this action must be classed as a cancellation of present and future insurance coverage.
Assured paid the standard premium for this twenty-six months’ coverage. Insurer then determined that the very same loss experience for which it can-celled the insurance warranted it in assessing the 150% maximum additional premium under the Retrospective Premium Endorsement.5
The applicability of Retrospective Premium Plan D in the event of such a cancellation presents the legal issue of contract construction. Assured contends that the relevant contract provisions are ambiguous and, therefore, the general canon of construction for standard form contracts obliges us to construe them against Insurer. American Fidelity and Casualty Co. v. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co., 5 Cir., 1957, 248 F.2d 509; Retona Chemical Corp. v. Globe Indemnity Co., 5 Cir., 1968, 404 F.2d 181; Southeastern Fidelity Insurance Co. v. McDonald, Ga., 1972, 125 Ga.App. 394, 188 S.E.2d 162.
On this work-a-day problem we first must examine the provisions of the insurance policy and Plan D to see whether the language fairly construed the parties’ intentions for this contingency.
Paragraph 5 of Plan D provides that the “cancellation or non-renewal, prior to the end of the three year period of any policy designated in Table I shall be deemed to be cancellation of the retrospective rating plan” (see par. 5 [i], note 4, supra). Assuming that this phrase means what it says, Insurer’s claim to the additional premiums based on the Retrospective Rating Plan up to the date of cancellation cannot stand.
Insurer contends, however, that the phrase merely effectuates a cancellation of the Retrospective Rating Plan for future coverage and does not affect the earned premium to date. It buttresses this contention by emphasizing clause (ii): “and the premium for insurance subject to Plan D for the period such policies have been in force shall be computed in accordance with the other provision of this endorsement” (par. 5 [ii], note 4, supra).
But this hardly helps Insurer. First, if as Insurer contends the “other provision of this endorsement” means the retrospective rating plan, then the entire cancellation clause would read as follows: “The cancellation or non-renewal, prior to the end of the three year period of any policy designated in Table I shall be deemed to be cancellation of the retrospective rating plan, and the premium for insurance subject to Plan D for the period such policies have been in force shall be computed in accordance with the retrospective rating plan.”
That is either ambiguous or question-begging in the sense that it does not provide the answer to just what the retrospective rating plan would then prescribe. And probably what is more important, the argument conveniently ignores that little, simple but often troublesome, portentous “provided”. Provided what?
Provided what? is the key to this case. And it leads us to a decision not reached elsewhere or in the Court below.
Article 5 (note 4, supra) specifically takes care of several situations. In 5(a) the policy deals with cancellations by the [1105]*1105Assured. By the operation of sub-par (1) the minimum retrospective premium is the [i] standard premium for all closed years plus [ii] the short rate standard premium for the period covered in the year of cancellation. The Assured gets no possible benefit from good experience since it must pay the standard premium for closed years and bear the much higher short rate premiums for the incompleted period of cancellation. But as proof that the Plan D is to penalize — and hence discourage cancellation by the Assured — it may even be much worse. Clause (2) fixes maximum retrospective premium as the sum of the audited standard premium, not up to the end of the closed years, but up to the date of cancellation, and the estimated standard premium to the end of the third year.
Under this formula Assured can get no benefit from good experience although under the maximum formula just summarized it may have to bear a substantial added burden for bad experience to the extent that (i) its completed experience justified a refund or (ii) the estimated standard premium for the remainder of the policy term exceeded what would be payable either under short rate or actual experience or both.
In short, 5(a) prescribes in detail the consequences in terms of the added costs imposed on a cancelling Assured. For this situation the “provided” makes clause 5 [i] absolute and obliterates almost altogether any operative effect of clause 5 [ii] because it is now clear that it is standard and short rates, actual or estimated, which alone control.6
When it comes to cancellation by Insurer the Provided what? is limited to cancellations for non-payment of premiums by Assured. This is again a powerful stimulant not only to continue coverage but to pay premiums. For the consequence on Assured is the same as 5(a)(2).
Provided what? does not even begin to cover cancellation for bad loss experience. In view of that, there is no proviso to clause 5 [ii] which clearly prescribes that the premium for the period the insurance is effective “shall be computed in accordance with the other provisions of” Plan D. This brings into play paragraph 4 covering computations of premiums on a continuous three year retrospective basis.7
[1106]*1106Under par. 4 the concept of this rating plan (see note 4, supra [from AGS] is that Assured will be allowed to average his experience over the three year period. The computation is remade as each successive year is closed.
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JOHN R. BROWN, Chief Judge.
As a rare animal too often neglected and overlooked as aggrieved parties sur[1103]*1103vey the appellate zoo, this case comes to us on an agreed statement, F.R.A.P. 10(d).1 It presents for decision the computation of correct premiums under a retrospective rating plan2 where the Insurer cancels before the expiration of the last year of a three year policy period 3 because of adverse loss experience on the part of the Assured. The trial court held for the Insurer and the Assured appeals. We reverse.
In the quest for the answer the problem comes down to making sense out of non-sense. In more austere language, the problem is interpreting, or more accurately trying to interpret, the specific terms of the cancellation provision of Plan D.4
The facts are extremely simple. The Insurer issued its first policy to Assured on April 3, 1965. On April 3, 1966, Insurer issued a similar renewal policy for another year’s coverage. Because of Assured’s poor loss experience during the first two years of coverage, Insurer decided on April 3, 1967, that it would is[1104]*1104sue a policy effective only until June 15, 1967. By any realistic view of the facts this action must be classed as a cancellation of present and future insurance coverage.
Assured paid the standard premium for this twenty-six months’ coverage. Insurer then determined that the very same loss experience for which it can-celled the insurance warranted it in assessing the 150% maximum additional premium under the Retrospective Premium Endorsement.5
The applicability of Retrospective Premium Plan D in the event of such a cancellation presents the legal issue of contract construction. Assured contends that the relevant contract provisions are ambiguous and, therefore, the general canon of construction for standard form contracts obliges us to construe them against Insurer. American Fidelity and Casualty Co. v. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co., 5 Cir., 1957, 248 F.2d 509; Retona Chemical Corp. v. Globe Indemnity Co., 5 Cir., 1968, 404 F.2d 181; Southeastern Fidelity Insurance Co. v. McDonald, Ga., 1972, 125 Ga.App. 394, 188 S.E.2d 162.
On this work-a-day problem we first must examine the provisions of the insurance policy and Plan D to see whether the language fairly construed the parties’ intentions for this contingency.
Paragraph 5 of Plan D provides that the “cancellation or non-renewal, prior to the end of the three year period of any policy designated in Table I shall be deemed to be cancellation of the retrospective rating plan” (see par. 5 [i], note 4, supra). Assuming that this phrase means what it says, Insurer’s claim to the additional premiums based on the Retrospective Rating Plan up to the date of cancellation cannot stand.
Insurer contends, however, that the phrase merely effectuates a cancellation of the Retrospective Rating Plan for future coverage and does not affect the earned premium to date. It buttresses this contention by emphasizing clause (ii): “and the premium for insurance subject to Plan D for the period such policies have been in force shall be computed in accordance with the other provision of this endorsement” (par. 5 [ii], note 4, supra).
But this hardly helps Insurer. First, if as Insurer contends the “other provision of this endorsement” means the retrospective rating plan, then the entire cancellation clause would read as follows: “The cancellation or non-renewal, prior to the end of the three year period of any policy designated in Table I shall be deemed to be cancellation of the retrospective rating plan, and the premium for insurance subject to Plan D for the period such policies have been in force shall be computed in accordance with the retrospective rating plan.”
That is either ambiguous or question-begging in the sense that it does not provide the answer to just what the retrospective rating plan would then prescribe. And probably what is more important, the argument conveniently ignores that little, simple but often troublesome, portentous “provided”. Provided what?
Provided what? is the key to this case. And it leads us to a decision not reached elsewhere or in the Court below.
Article 5 (note 4, supra) specifically takes care of several situations. In 5(a) the policy deals with cancellations by the [1105]*1105Assured. By the operation of sub-par (1) the minimum retrospective premium is the [i] standard premium for all closed years plus [ii] the short rate standard premium for the period covered in the year of cancellation. The Assured gets no possible benefit from good experience since it must pay the standard premium for closed years and bear the much higher short rate premiums for the incompleted period of cancellation. But as proof that the Plan D is to penalize — and hence discourage cancellation by the Assured — it may even be much worse. Clause (2) fixes maximum retrospective premium as the sum of the audited standard premium, not up to the end of the closed years, but up to the date of cancellation, and the estimated standard premium to the end of the third year.
Under this formula Assured can get no benefit from good experience although under the maximum formula just summarized it may have to bear a substantial added burden for bad experience to the extent that (i) its completed experience justified a refund or (ii) the estimated standard premium for the remainder of the policy term exceeded what would be payable either under short rate or actual experience or both.
In short, 5(a) prescribes in detail the consequences in terms of the added costs imposed on a cancelling Assured. For this situation the “provided” makes clause 5 [i] absolute and obliterates almost altogether any operative effect of clause 5 [ii] because it is now clear that it is standard and short rates, actual or estimated, which alone control.6
When it comes to cancellation by Insurer the Provided what? is limited to cancellations for non-payment of premiums by Assured. This is again a powerful stimulant not only to continue coverage but to pay premiums. For the consequence on Assured is the same as 5(a)(2).
Provided what? does not even begin to cover cancellation for bad loss experience. In view of that, there is no proviso to clause 5 [ii] which clearly prescribes that the premium for the period the insurance is effective “shall be computed in accordance with the other provisions of” Plan D. This brings into play paragraph 4 covering computations of premiums on a continuous three year retrospective basis.7
[1106]*1106Under par. 4 the concept of this rating plan (see note 4, supra [from AGS] is that Assured will be allowed to average his experience over the three year period. The computation is remade as each successive year is closed. If on the three year basis the loss experience calls for additional premiums, Assured must, up to 150%, pay them. If, on the contrary, loss experience calls for lesser premiums, Insurer must repay them.
Obviously it would be unfair in the absence of clear language to the contrary to allow Insurer to unilaterally cut off the right of Assured to have the benefit under the premium formula of what the post-cancellation experience would have afforded.8
On the other hand there are no equities which would justify affording Assured more benefits than would have been received had Insurer not cancelled. And certainly nothing in the words used in Plan D either require or suggest such a result.
In this way the concept of leveling-off is kept intact. Neither party is prejudiced. Each is required merely to live up to his obligation to pay more or refund depending on loss experience. And it keeps faith with the plain words of clause 5 [ii].
Insurer may make the beguiling argument that allowing cancellation as we do (note 8, supra) this further application of par. 4 of Plan D anomously calls for continuation of the insurance without receipt of premiums. This is not so at all. Assured has no coverage from the date of cancellation. But, in computing the adjusted premium for the period from the attachment of the risk to the time of cancellation Assured’s loss experience for the post-cancellation period has to be taken into account with the pre-cancellation experience.9 What this [1107]*1107really amounts to is an application of the law’s traditional technique used in a variety of situations of determining or measuring consequences for past conduct by subsequent events.
This course seems eminently preferable to following the easy way out of finding an ambiguity and then giving the full break to Assured,10 thus in effect imposing the full burden on Insurer for the cancellation we have held to be permissible. And this is so even though other Courts have taken the ambiguity route to reach opposite results.11
Perhaps we add to the ambiguity12 by not relying on it. But we think we finally make sense of non-sense, interpret the bargain thereby, hold both parties to it and leave to the District Court the task of determining on remand and further proceedings the dollar consequences which this reading requires.13
Reversed and remanded.