Securities & Exchange Commission v. Miller

744 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103519
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Georgia
DecidedSeptember 30, 2010
DocketCivil Action 1:04-cv-01655
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 744 F. Supp. 2d 1325 (Securities & Exchange Commission v. Miller) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Securities & Exchange Commission v. Miller, 744 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103519 (N.D. Ga. 2010).

Opinion

ORDER and OPINION

JULIE E. CARNES, Chief Judge.

This case is presently before the Court to determine remedies for plaintiff Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) after a jury found John P. Miller (“Miller” or “defendant”) liable for five counts of federal securities fraud. After review of the record and the arguments of the parties, the Court issues: (1) a permanent injunction enjoining defendant (his agents, servants, employees, attorneys, and all persons in active concert or participation with them) from violating Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”); Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) and Rule 10b-5 thereunder; and Section 13(b)(5) of the Exchange Act and Rule 13b2-l thereunder; and enjoining defendant from aiding and abetting violations of Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act and Rules 12b-20 and 13a-13 thereunder and Section 13(b)(2)(A) of the Exchange Act; (2) a civil penalty in the amount of $75,000; and (3) a director and officer bar of five (5) years.

BACKGROUND

I. Background of Master Graphics and Miller’s Margin Accounts

Miller was President, Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”), and Chairman of the Board of Master Graphics, Inc. (“Master Graphics” or “the Company”), a company formed in 1997 and located in Memphis, Tennessee. (Tr. [168] at 68:2-5.)

Starting in June 1997, Master Graphics acquired printing companies throughout the United States that were then consolidated into divisions. (Id. at 74:3-7; 75:9-II. ) Most former owners became employed by Master Graphics as division presidents and retained ownership of the property that housed the printing companies they had owned. Master Graphics then leased the property for the various divisions from the division presidents. Each division’s purchase price was based on financial targets the division presidents had represented they would meet, post-acquisition. (Id. at 76:19-25; 77:8-13.)

The Company completed an initial public offering (“IPO”) of 3.6 million shares of common stock in June 1998 and raised approximately $36 million. (Id. at 75:4-5; 79:1-3, 24-25; 80:3.) At the time of the IPO, Miller had purchased approximately eleven companies; he bought nine more by the end of 1999. (Id. at 75:20-23.) At the time the Company went public, Lance Fair (“Fair”) was the Chief Financial Officer (“CFO”), and Mel Henson (“Henson”) was the Chief Accounting Officer (“CAO”). 1 (Tr. [168] at 92:2-5.)

*1330 Miller owned 4,010,000 shares of stock, thus maintaining a controlling interest in the Company. (Id. at 79:18; 83:10-12.) He kept these shares, which were worth approximately $40 million, in a margin account with Morgan Keegan & Company (“Morgan Keegan”), an investment banking firm that covered the Company. (Id. at 83:14-17.) In 1998, he moved the shares to a brokerage account at Prudential Securities (“Prudential”) and borrowed more than $6 million against them. (Id. at 84:1-5.) Miller testified that he did not specifically remember telling the Board of Directors about this margin loan. (Id. at 87:13-25; 88:1-23.)

II. The Plan

While the Company initially thrived, around April 1999, Miller learned that the Company’s first quarter results would not meet the estimate set by Morgan Keegan, as the majority of divisions had failed to achieve the financial targets they had represented to Master Graphics. (Def.’s Mem. Advising Ct. Materials to Focus on upon Review of Trial Proceedings (“Def.’s Mem.”) [179] at 2; Tr. [168] at 98:9-16.) He was worried that missing the target would trigger a margin call by Prudential, as the stock was trading around $6.00 per share, and he knew that a margin call would occur if the stock price dropped to $4.25 per share. (Pl.’s Resp. to Assist Ct. in Review of Record (“Pl.’s Resp.”) [180] at 9.) He also was concerned about how the numbers would affect a transaction with Heidelberg Equipment (“Heidelberg”), the largest manufacturer of printing equipment in the world, that he hoped would lead to a cash infusion of approximately $12 million. 2 (Tr. [168] at 96:12-17; 97:13-23; 98:20-24.)

Therefore, Miller devised the Salary and Rent Incentive Plan (“the Plan”), a plan to reclassify the rent and salary payments for the first quarter of 1999 as prepaid expenses or receivables that would be repaid by the division presidents unless certain performance targets were met over the subsequent quarters. (Id. at 104:4-25; 107:10-20.) Miller presented the Plan to division presidents and other personnel during a meeting in Atlanta, Georgia on April 22 and 23,1999. (Id.)

According to Miller, the response of the division presidents to this idea was positive, and no one opposed the Plan during the meeting. (Id. at 107:10-20; 108:1-5.) However, several division presidents have contradicted Miller, noting that they expressed negative reactions to the Plan, including the opposition by some to the rent aspect. (See, e.g., Tr. [169] at 314:21; Tr. [175] at 1171:1-8.) Miller did not seek any firm commitments to the Plan from any of the division presidents at the meeting. (S ee, e.g., Tr. [169] at 233:2-5; 315:7-12.)

Over the next two weeks, Miller spoke by phone with the division president of each of the twenty printing companies, and he testified that everyone agreed to the Plan (Tr. [168] at 112:2-24), 3 even though no employees ever made any changes to their contracts in writing regarding payment. (I d. at 126:14-19.) After each purported phone call, Miller would walk down the hall and tell Fair and Henson that the particular division president with whom he had just spoken had agreed to the Plan. (See, e.g., Pl.’s Resp. [180] at 4.)

Before presenting the Plan to the division presidents, Miller had previously discussed it with Fair, and he testified that he *1331 relied on Fair and Henson to get the approval of KPMG, Master Graphics’ auditor, for the Plan. 4 (Tr. [168] at 104:4-9; 113:4-13; 129:16-21.) Also, after Miller allegedly got every division president’s consent, Fair and Henson testified that the division presidents they contacted afterward said they had agreed to the Plan and that no division presidents ever told them that they had not agreed to the Plan. (Tr. [168] at 112:25; 113:1-3; Tr. [169] at 266:11-25; 267:1-25; 268:1-25; 269:1-25; 270:1-2, 7-14; 272:8-21; 418:14-25; 419-424; Tr. [170] at 434:14-25; 435-472; 473:1-20.)

III. Conflicting Testimony About the Plan

While there was no e-mail documentation about any complaints, numerous employees testified at trial that they, in fact, did not agree to the Plan.

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744 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103519, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/securities-exchange-commission-v-miller-gand-2010.