Securities & Exchange Commission v. Graham

21 F. Supp. 3d 1300, 2014 WL 1891418, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64953
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Florida
DecidedMay 12, 2014
DocketCase No. 13-10011-CIV-KING
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 21 F. Supp. 3d 1300 (Securities & Exchange Commission v. Graham) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Securities & Exchange Commission v. Graham, 21 F. Supp. 3d 1300, 2014 WL 1891418, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64953 (S.D. Fla. 2014).

Opinion

FINAL ORDER OF DISMISSAL

JAMES LAWRENCE KING, District Judge.

THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon Defendants Fred Davis Clark, Jr. and Cristal Coleman Clark’s Motion for Final Summary Judgment (DE # 60) (“Clarks’ MSJ”), David W. Schwarz’s Motion for Final Summary Judgment (DE # 62) (“Schwarz’s MSJ”), Defendant Ricky Stokes’ Motion for Summary Judgment (DE # 88) (“Stokes’ MSJ”), pro se Defen-' dant Barry J. Graham’s Notice of Joinder in Motions for Summary Judgment (DE # 104) (“Graham’s MSJ”), and Plaintiff Securities and Exchange Commission’s Motion for Summary Judgment Against All Defendants (DE #90) (“SEC’s MSJ”). These Motions are fully briefed or otherwise ripe for ruling.1 The controlling issue [1302]*1302of whether the Court has jurisdiction to determine the claims brought by Plaintiff SEC against the five individual Defendants in this case was the primary focus of oral argument by the parties on March 20, 2014. The Court took the matter under advisement at the conclusion of the hearing,2 and this Order is limited to the determination of that single issue.3 As set forth below, the Court finds that, by operation of the five-year statute of limitations contained at 28 U.S.C. § 2462, it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the SEC’s claims against each of the five defendants in this case, and the Court must therefore . dismiss this case with prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

In this case, the SEC presents the tale of a far-reaching graft perpetrated by defendants upon upwards of 1,400 unsuspecting investors and to the tune of more than $300 million. According to the SEC, defendants directly, and through a vast web of entities collectively known as Cay Clubs Resorts and Marinas (“Cay Clubs”), offered and sold to these investors what were in fact unregistered securities, but under the guise of real estate investments. The defendants’ sales pitches and marketing materials for these unregistered securities were laced with false and misleading statements, purporting, for example, to guarantee immediate returns on investment and provide investors with instant equity and astronomical rates of appreciation. Defendants promised to turn individual investors’ purchase of units in condominium projects nation-wide into the source of great profit and wealth through their expertise in real estate development. Undervalued and decaying apartment complexes would be transformed by defendants’ efforts into five-star luxury resort destinations, guaranteeing unit owners a river of rental income far into the future.

These promises were not kept. Instead, and in Ponzi scheme fashion, any returns [1303]*1303paid to investors came from the funds of later investors. Any wild appreciation was artificially caused by self-dealing and undisclosed insider sales. Defendants eventually abandoned the development projects, and absconded with millions in misappropriated investor funds, leaving the investors with nothing. So the story goes.

The SEC investigated the case for at least seven years. The defendants were each summoned for extensive sworn statements. Former employees of defendants gave sworn statements. Banking and financial records were exhaustively analyzed. Some of the individual investors provided statements and other information to the SEC, while others sued the defendants themselves. But rather than expeditiously, or even promptly, bringing an enforcement action against the alleged fraudsters and peddlers of unregistered securities, the SEC waited.

Cay Clubs was in the real estate development business.4 Defendant Fred Davis Clark (“Clark”) was Cay Clubs’ President and CEO. Defendant Cristal R. Coleman Clark (“Coleman”) was a managing member and registered agent of various Cay Clubs entities as well as a sales agent. Defendant Barry J. Graham (“Graham”) was the Director of Sales. Defendant Ricky Lynn Stokes (“Stokes”), while not directly employed by Cay Clubs, was a star sales agent. And Defendant David W. Schwarz (“Schwarz”) was Cay Clubs’ CFO and Vice President of Operations.

Beginning in July of 2004 — and until some point prior to January 30, 2008 — at seventeen properties from Key Largo, Florida to Las Vegas, Nevada, Cay Clubs offered and sold condominium units to private investors. Defendants marketed Cay Clubs as an investment. Cay Clubs would purchase and renovate aged and abandoned condominium projects using investors’ funds from the purchase of individual units,, and the investors would reap the rewards. Investors were attracted to Cay Clubs not only by the promise of wild appreciation, but also by “The Cay Clubs Concept”: a package of commitments and services which included (1) a guarantee of an immediate return on investment of 15% of the purchase price returned at closing, (2) ensured rental income from Cay Clubs management of the rental of the units. Cay Clubs was the perfect passive investment opportunity. Investors had only to sit back and accumulate wealth from Cay Clubs’ efforts.

First, Cay Clubs offered investors the opportunity to purchase condominium units at undervalued prices. Cay Clubs claimed to be in the position to purchase condominium buildings at below market prices, and could therefore let individual units go- at below market value. This created “instant equity.” In reality, Cay Clubs units were purchased by defendants on an insider basis, artificially inflating the unit value, and then sold to investors for much more than they were actually worth. That the prior sales had been to insiders was not disclosed to the unsuspecting investors. ' Any “instant equity” was based on this artificially inflated value.

Second, was the “leaseback” agreement, which while nominally “optional,” was a [1304]*1304major selling point and was ultimately entered into by between 96 and 99 percent of investors. This was the key to Defendants’ scheme. Under the leaseback program, an investor would, after executing the purchase agreement, lease the unit back to Cay Clubs for a period of one to two years for Cay Clubs exclusive use, purportedly to complete renovations necessary to transform the property into a luxury resort. In exchange for this leaseback, investors would receive 15% of their purchase price at or shortly after closing on the purchase. This attractive feature was advertised as a way for investors to pay their carrying costs for the term of the lease.

Third, Cay Clubs would use investors’ funds and defendants’ real estate development expertise to create a network of luxury resorts with a wide array of luxury amenities. When completed, the modest condominium units originally purchased by the investors would realize significant capital appreciation as part of this new network of resorts.

Fourth, along with renovating the aging condominium buildings themselves, investors who agreed to the leaseback would receive the benefit of Cay Clubs’ renovating the investors units with up to $70,000 worth of new furnishings and fixtures, further increasing the units’ value.

The fifth benefit to investors came in the form of a membership in Cay Clubs Resorts that would give investors themselves access to the luxury amenities at all the resorts. Membership was required with the purchase of a unit, and ranged in price from $5,000 to $35,000.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
21 F. Supp. 3d 1300, 2014 WL 1891418, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64953, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/securities-exchange-commission-v-graham-flsd-2014.