Securities and Exchange Commission v. Davison

CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Florida
DecidedAugust 20, 2025
Docket8:20-cv-00325
StatusUnknown

This text of Securities and Exchange Commission v. Davison (Securities and Exchange Commission v. Davison) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Davison, (M.D. Fla. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TAMPA DIVISION

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,

Plaintiff, v. Case No.: 8:20-cv-325-MSS-NHA BRIAN DAVISON, et al., Defendants. ______________________________________/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS Pending before the Court is the Receiver’s Unopposed Twenty-Second Quarterly Fee Application for Order Awarding Fees and Reimbursement of Costs to Receiver and His Professionals (“Twenty-Second Quarterly Fee Application”). Doc. 1356. The Receiver seeks reimbursement of fees and costs for the period from April 1, 2025 through June 30, 2025. Id. at p. 2. The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) does not oppose the request. For the reasons below, I recommend that the Twenty-Second Quarterly Fee Application be GRANTED. I. Background The SEC brought this action against individual Defendants Brian Davison (“Davison”) and Barry Rybicki (“Rybicki”) (collectively, “Individual Defendants”) and corporate Defendants EquiAlt LLC; EquiAlt Fund, LLC; EquiAlt Fund II, LLC; EquiAlt Fund III, LLC; and EA SIP LLC (collectively,

“Corporate Defendants”), for violations of Sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e(a) and 77e(c); Section 17(a)(2) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a); Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); and Exchange Act

Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5, regarding the alleged operation of a nationwide Ponzi scheme raising more than $170 million from 1,100 investors through fraudulent, unregistered securities offerings. See Compl. (Doc. 1). The SEC further alleged that Defendants 128 E. Davis Blvd, LLC; 310

78th Ave, LLC; 551 3D Ave S, LLC; 604 West Azeele, LLC; 2101 W. Cypress, LLC; 2112 W. Kennedy Blvd, LLC; 5123 E. Broadway Ave, LLC, Blue Waters TI, LLC; BNAZ, LLC; BR Support Services, LLC; Bungalows TI, LLC; Capri Haven, LLC; EA NY, LLC; EquiAlt 519 3rd Ave S., LLC; McDonald Revocable

Living Trust; Silver Sands TI, LLC; and TB Oldest House Est. 1842, LLC (collectively, “Relief Defendants”) all received proceeds of the fraud without any legitimate entitlement to the money. Id. The District Court appointed Burton W. Wiand as the Receiver in this action over the Corporate Defendants, the Relief Defendants, and each of their

subsidiaries, successors, and assigns.1 Doc. 11. The District Judge outlined the Receiver’s duties, the Court’s basis for compensating those duties, and the requirements for the Receiver’s status reports and applications for fees. Doc. 11, ¶¶ 1-12, 16, 28–36. In accordance

with the Court’s directives, the Receiver now submits his Twenty-Second Quarterly Fee Application, seeking compensation for the fees and costs incurred for the performance of his duties as well as the fees and costs incurred by the retained personnel he hired to assist in the performance of such duties.

Doc. 1356. Specifically, the Receiver seeks an award of fees and costs incurred from April 1, 2025 through June 30, 2025, for: (1) the Receiver, in the amount of $48,325.91 (2) Guerra & Partners, P.A. (“G&P”), in the amount of $14,775.00; (3) Johnson, Newlon & DeCort (“JND”), in the amount of

$17,981.73; (4) Jared J. Perez, P.A., in the amount of $5,740.00; (5) Yip Associates, in the amount of $1,274.00; (6) PDR CPAs (“PDR”), in the amount

1 Subsequently, the District Judge granted the Receiver’s motion seeking to expand the Receivership to include EquiAlt Qualified Opportunity Zone Fund, LP (“QOZ”); EquiAlt QOZ Fund GP, LLC; EquiAlt Secured Income Portfolio REIT, Inc. (“REIT”); EquiAlt Holdings LLC (sponsor of the QOZ and REIT); EquiAlt Property Management LLC (property manager of the QOZ and REIT); and EquiAlt Capital Advisors, LLC (manager of day-to-day operations for the QOZ and REIT). Doc. 184. EquiAlt Fund I, LLC was also later added. Doc. 284. of $16,254.11; (7) E-Hounds, Inc. (“E-Hounds”), in the amount of $6,945.00; and (8) Omni Agent Solutions (“Omni”), in the amount of $2,299.61. Doc. 1356, p.

29. The work of each entity warranting the fee is described below. II. Analysis District courts maintain “broad powers and wide discretion to determine relief in an equity receivership.” S.E.C. v. Elliott, 953 F.2d 1560, 1566 (11th

Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). When a receiver reasonably and diligently discharges his or her duties, the receiver is entitled to compensation. Id. at 1577 (citation omitted); see Stuart v. Boulware, 133 U.S. 78, 82 (1890) (“Nor is there any doubt of the power of courts of equity to fix the compensation of their

own receivers. That power results necessarily from the relation which the receiver sustains to the court; and, in the absence of any legislation regula[t]ing the receiver’s salary or compensation, the matter is left entirely to the determination of the court from which he derives his appointment.”).

A receiver must provide “specific and detailed evidence” in support of an application for fees. Norman v. Hous. Auth. of City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1303 (11th Cir. 1988). “Whether a receiver merits a fee is based on the circumstances surrounding the receivership, and results are always relevant.”

Elliott, 953 F.2d at 1577 (citation omitted); see also F.T.C. v. Worldwide Info Servs., Inc., No. 6:14-cv-8-Orl-41DAB, 2015 WL 144389, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 12, 2015) (citation omitted) (noting that courts may consider several factors in determining the reasonableness of a fee award to a receiver, including “(1) the results achieved by the receiver; (2) the ability, reputation and other

professional qualities of the receiver; (3) the size of the estate and its ability to afford the expenses and fees; and (4) the time required to conclude the receivership.”). “[W]here the time or fees claimed seem expanded or there is a lack of documentation or testimonial support the court may make the award

on its own experience.” Norman, 836 F.2d at 1303 (citation omitted). “Where documentation is inadequate, the district court is not relieved of its obligation to award a reasonable fee, but the district court traditionally has had the power to make such an award without the need of further pleadings or an evidentiary

hearing.” Id. (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)). “The most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. A

“reasonable hourly rate” consists of “the prevailing market rate in the relevant legal community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skills, experience, and reputation.” Norman, 836 F.2d at 1299 (citations omitted). In this context, “market rate” means the hourly rate charged in the

local legal market by an attorney with expertise in the relevant area of law who is willing and able to take the case, if indeed such an attorney exists. Am.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Davison, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/securities-and-exchange-commission-v-davison-flmd-2025.