Securities and Exchange Commission v. Champion-Cain

District Court, S.D. California·Decided May 8, 2020·No. 3:19-cv-01628·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE Case No.: 3:19-cv-1628-LAB-AHG COMMISSION, 12 ORDER GRANTING RECEIVER’S Plaintiff, 13 MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF v. SALE OF PARKING LOT 14 PROPERTY GINA CHAMPION-CAIN AND ANI 15 DEVELOPMENT, LLC, [ECF No. 293] 16 Defendants, and 17

18 AMERICAN NATIONAL 19 INVESTMENTS, INC., 20 Relief Defendant. 21 22 I. BACKGROUND 23 As described in prior orders, see, e.g., ECF Nos. 54, 162, 163, this is an action 24 brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) against Defendants ANI 25 Development, LLC (“ANI Development”) and Gina Champion-Cain and Relief Defendant 26 American National Investments, Inc. (“ANI Inc.”), alleging violations of federal securities 27 laws based on a purportedly fraudulent liquor license loan scheme. ECF No. 1. 28 1 On September 3, 2019, the Court established an equitable receivership and appointed 2 Krista L. Freitag (“Receiver”) as a permanent receiver of ANI Development and ANI Inc., 3 authorizing her to take control over all funds and assets owned, managed, or in the 4 possession or control of the receivership entities. See ECF No. 6 at 14-16. In that role, the 5 Receiver acts under the control and direction of the Court to facilitate the “orderly and 6 efficient administration of the estate . . . for the benefit of creditors.” SEC v. Hardy, 803 7 F.2d 1034, 1038 (9th Cir. 1986). See also Atl. Tr. Co. v. Chapman, 208 U.S. 360, 370 8 (1908) (explaining that a motion to appoint a receiver to take charge of property is “to the 9 end that the property might be cared for and preserved for all who had or might have an 10 interest in the proceeds of its sale. . . . Immediately upon such appointment and after the 11 qualification of the receiver, the property passed into the custody of the law, and 12 thenceforward its administration was wholly under the control of the court by its officer [], 13 the receiver.”). On December 11, 2019, the presiding judge in this action, Chief Judge 14 Larry A. Burns, granted the parties’ Joint Motion (ECF No. 156) to give limited consent to 15 the undersigned to hear and directly decide all motions filed in this action to approve sales 16 of receivership assets. ECF No. 160. See also 28 U.S.C. § 636(c); CivLR 72.1(g). All 17 property sale motions are set before the undersigned pursuant to that grant of consent. 18 Before the Court is the Receiver’s Motion for Approval of Sale of Parking Lot 19 Property (“Parking Lot Motion”), filed March 30, 2020. ECF No. 293. Responses in 20 opposition to the Parking Lot Motion were due no later than April 17, 2020, and overbids 21 pursuant to the notice and auction process set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2001 were due by April 22 21, 2020. See ECF No. 293-1 at 12; ECF No. 295; ECF No. 308 at 2. 23 In its Order Setting Briefing Schedule on the present motion, the Court noted that 24 “[i]f no opposition is filed by the deadline, and the overbid submission deadline has passed 25 with no overbids, the Court may take the motion under submission without oral argument.” 26 ECF No. 295 at 2. Non-party creditor American National Life Insurance Company of New 27 York (“ANICO”) filed a Response on April 16, 2020. ECF No. 302. However, the 28 Response states that ANICO “does not oppose the relief sought,” subject to certain 1 contingencies discussed in more detail below. Id. at 3. The Receiver did not file a reply. 2 On April 23, 2020, The Receiver reported that no overbids for any of the properties were 3 submitted by the applicable deadlines advertised to the public in accordance with the 4 statutorily mandated notice and overbid process. See ECF No. 308 at 2. 5 Thus, in consideration of the lack of opposition to the relief sought (subject to certain 6 contingencies) and non-receipt of qualified overbids, the Court took the present motions 7 under submission on April 23, 2020 and vacated the April 27, 2020 hearing. ECF No. 315. 8 For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS the Parking Lot Motion (ECF No. 293). 9 II. LEGAL STANDARD 10 “[I]t is a recognized principle of law that the district court has broad powers and 11 wide discretion to determine the appropriate relief in an equity receivership.” SEC v. 12 Lincoln Thrift Ass’n, 577 F.2d 600, 606 (9th Cir. 1978). Where a district court sits in equity, 13 “[u]nless a statute in so many words, or by a necessary and inescapable inference, restricts 14 the court’s jurisdiction in equity, the full scope of that jurisdiction is to be recognized and 15 applied. ‘The great principles of equity, securing complete justice, should not be yielded 16 to light inferences, or doubtful construction.’” Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 17 395, 398 (1946). 18 “[A] district court’s power to supervise an equity receivership and to determine the 19 appropriate action to be taken in the administration of the receivership is extremely broad.” 20 Hardy, 803 F.2d at 1037. As part of this broad discretion, the district court sitting in equity 21 and having custody and control of property “has power to order a sale of the same in its 22 discretion. The power of sale necessarily follows the power to take control of and to 23 preserve property[.]” SEC v. Am. Capital Investments, Inc., 98 F.3d 1133, 1144 (9th Cir. 24 1996), abrogated on other grounds by Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 25 93-94 (1998) (quoting 2 Ralph E. Clark, Treatise on Law & Practice of Receivers § 482 26 (3d ed. 1992)). If the court approves an equitable receiver’s proposed property sale, the 27 sale “does not . . . purport to convey ‘legal’ title, but rather ‘good,’ equitable title enforced 28 1 by an injunction against suit.” Id. (citing 2 Clark, Treatise on Law & Practice of Receivers, 2 §§ 342, 344, 482(a), 487, 489, 491). 3 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2001(a), real property in the possession of an appointed 4 receiver is subject to a public sale process, “upon such terms and conditions as the court 5 directs.” 28 U.S.C. § 2002 further requires that notice be published once a week for at least 6 four weeks prior to the sale in at least one newspaper regularly issued and of general 7 circulation in the county, state, or judicial district where the realty is located.1 The purpose 8 of such notice “is to inform the public of the kind and condition of the property to be sold, 9 the time, the place, and the terms of the sale. It is to secure bidders and prevent the sacrifice 10 of the property.” Breeding Motor Freight Lines v. R.F.C., 172 F.2d 416, 422 (10th Cir. 11 1949). Therefore, the safeguards of notice and opportunity to submit overbids help to 12 ensure that the sale is able to fetch the best price possible, which is consistent with the 13 principle that “a primary purpose of equity receiverships is to promote orderly and efficient 14 administration of the estate by the district court for the benefit of creditors.” Hardy, 803 15 F.2d at 1038. See also United States v. Grable, 25 F.3d 298, 303 (6th Cir.

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