Securities and Exchange Commission v. Champion-Cain

District Court, S.D. California·Decided May 8, 2020·No. 3:19-cv-01628·Unknown

Opinion

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE Case No.: 3:19-cv-1628-LAB-AHG COMMISSION, ORDER GRANTING RECEIVER’S Plaintiff, MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF v. SALE OF PARKING LOT PROPERTY GINA CHAMPION-CAIN AND ANI DEVELOPMENT, LLC, [ECF No. 293] Defendants, and

AMERICAN NATIONAL Relief Defendant. As described in prior orders, see, e.g., ECF Nos. 54, 162, 163, this is an action brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) against Defendants ANI Development, LLC (“ANI Development”) and Gina Champion-Cain and Relief Defendant American National Investments, Inc. (“ANI Inc.”), alleging violations of federal securities laws based on a purportedly fraudulent liquor license loan scheme. ECF No. 1. On September 3, 2019, the Court established an equitable receivership and appointed Krista L. Freitag (“Receiver”) as a permanent receiver of ANI Development and ANI Inc., authorizing her to take control over all funds and assets owned, managed, or in the possession or control of the receivership entities. See ECF No. 6 at 14-16. In that role, the Receiver acts under the control and direction of the Court to facilitate the “orderly and efficient administration of the estate . . . for the benefit of creditors.” SEC v. Hardy, 803 F.2d 1034, 1038 (9th Cir. 1986). See also Atl. Tr. Co. v. Chapman, 208 U.S. 360, 370 (1908) (explaining that a motion to appoint a receiver to take charge of property is “to the end that the property might be cared for and preserved for all who had or might have an interest in the proceeds of its sale. . . . Immediately upon such appointment and after the qualification of the receiver, the property passed into the custody of the law, and thenceforward its administration was wholly under the control of the court by its officer [], the receiver.”). On December 11, 2019, the presiding judge in this action, Chief Judge Larry A. Burns, granted the parties’ Joint Motion (ECF No. 156) to give limited consent to the undersigned to hear and directly decide all motions filed in this action to approve sales of receivership assets. ECF No. 160. See also 28 U.S.C. § 636(c); CivLR 72.1(g). All property sale motions are set before the undersigned pursuant to that grant of consent. Before the Court is the Receiver’s Motion for Approval of Sale of Parking Lot Property (“Parking Lot Motion”), filed March 30, 2020. ECF No. 293. Responses in opposition to the Parking Lot Motion were due no later than April 17, 2020, and overbids pursuant to the notice and auction process set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2001 were due by April 21, 2020. See ECF No. 293-1 at 12; ECF No. 295; ECF No. 308 at 2. In its Order Setting Briefing Schedule on the present motion, the Court noted that “[i]f no opposition is filed by the deadline, and the overbid submission deadline has passed with no overbids, the Court may take the motion under submission without oral argument.” ECF No. 295 at 2. Non-party creditor American National Life Insurance Company of New York (“ANICO”) filed a Response on April 16, 2020. ECF No. 302. However, the Response states that ANICO “does not oppose the relief sought,” subject to certain contingencies discussed in more detail below. Id. at 3. The Receiver did not file a reply. On April 23, 2020, The Receiver reported that no overbids for any of the properties were submitted by the applicable deadlines advertised to the public in accordance with the statutorily mandated notice and overbid process. See ECF No. 308 at 2. Thus, in consideration of the lack of opposition to the relief sought (subject to certain contingencies) and non-receipt of qualified overbids, the Court took the present motions under submission on April 23, 2020 and vacated the April 27, 2020 hearing. ECF No. 315. For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS the Parking Lot Motion (ECF No. 293). “[I]t is a recognized principle of law that the district court has broad powers and wide discretion to determine the appropriate relief in an equity receivership.” SEC v. Lincoln Thrift Ass’n, 577 F.2d 600, 606 (9th Cir. 1978). Where a district court sits in equity, “[u]nless a statute in so many words, or by a necessary and inescapable inference, restricts the court’s jurisdiction in equity, the full scope of that jurisdiction is to be recognized and applied. ‘The great principles of equity, securing complete justice, should not be yielded to light inferences, or doubtful construction.’” Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946). “[A] district court’s power to supervise an equity receivership and to determine the appropriate action to be taken in the administration of the receivership is extremely broad.” Hardy, 803 F.2d at 1037. As part of this broad discretion, the district court sitting in equity and having custody and control of property “has power to order a sale of the same in its discretion. The power of sale necessarily follows the power to take control of and to preserve property[.]” SEC v. Am. Capital Investments, Inc., 98 F.3d 1133, 1144 (9th Cir. 1996), abrogated on other grounds by Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 93-94 (1998) (quoting 2 Ralph E. Clark, Treatise on Law & Practice of Receivers § 482 (3d ed. 1992)). If the court approves an equitable receiver’s proposed property sale, the sale “does not . . . purport to convey ‘legal’ title, but rather ‘good,’ equitable title enforced by an injunction against suit.” Id. (citing 2 Clark, Treatise on Law & Practice of Receivers, §§ 342, 344, 482(a), 487, 489, 491). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2001(a), real property in the possession of an appointed receiver is subject to a public sale process, “upon such terms and conditions as the court directs.” 28 U.S.C. § 2002 further requires that notice be published once a week for at least four weeks prior to the sale in at least one newspaper regularly issued and of general circulation in the county, state, or judicial district where the realty is located.1 The purpose of such notice “is to inform the public of the kind and condition of the property to be sold, the time, the place, and the terms of the sale. It is to secure bidders and prevent the sacrifice of the property.” Breeding Motor Freight Lines v. R.F.C., 172 F.2d 416, 422 (10th Cir. 1949). Therefore, the safeguards of notice and opportunity to submit overbids help to ensure that the sale is able to fetch the best price possible, which is consistent with the principle that “a primary purpose of equity receiverships is to promote orderly and efficient administration of the estate by the district court for the benefit of creditors.” Hardy, 803 F.2d at 1038. See also United States v. Grable, 25 F.3d 298, 303 (6th Cir. 1994) (noting that “the intent of” the requirement in 28 U.S.C. § 2001 that property be sold in the county in which the land is situated is “to bring a better price at the sale”). A. Background of the Parking Lot Property and Proposed Sale The Parking Lot Property is an approximately 3,004 square foot parking lot located at 38

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