Securities and Exchange Commission v. Champion-Cain

District Court, S.D. California·Decided January 24, 2020·No. 3:19-cv-01628·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE Case No.: 3:19-cv-1628-LAB-AHG COMMISSION, 12 ORDER REGARDING PENDING Plaintiff, 13 PROPERTY SALE MOTIONS v. 14 [ECF Nos. 148, 150, 165, 169, 176] GINA CHAMPION-CAIN AND ANI 15 DEVELOPMENT, LLC, 16 Defendants, and 17

18 AMERICAN NATIONAL 19 INVESTMENTS, INC., 20 Relief Defendant. 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 The Court has recounted the procedural background of this case in several other 3 orders and will not rehash it in its entirety herein. See ECF Nos. 54, 162, 163, 166. Relevant 4 here, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) brought this action against 5 Defendants Gina Champion-Cain and ANI Development, LLC, and Relief Defendant 6 American National Investments, Inc., on August 28, 2019, alleging Defendants engaged in 7 a liquor license escrow scheme that purportedly defrauded lenders and investors out of 8 more than $120 million. Upon a stipulated joint motion by the parties, the Court established 9 an equity receivership and appointed Krista Freitag as a permanent Receiver of Defendant 10 ANI Development, LLC and Relief Defendant American National Investments, Inc. on 11 September 3, 2019. ECF No. 6 (“the Appointment Order”). In the Appointment Order, the 12 Court authorized the Receiver to take control over all funds and assets owned, managed, 13 or in the possession or control of the receivership entities. See id. at 14-16. The receivership 14 assets include all premises owned, leased, occupied, or otherwise controlled by the 15 receivership entities. Id. at 14. 16 On December 11, 2019, Chief Judge Burns granted the parties’ Joint Motion (ECF 17 No. 156) to give limited consent to the undersigned to hear and directly decide all motions 18 filed in this action to approve sales of receivership assets. ECF No. 160. See also 28 U.S.C. 19 § 636(c); CivLR 72.1(g). Pursuant to the grant of consent, the Court set a hearing on all 20 then-pending property motions for January 24, 2020. ECF No. 164. Further, the Court set 21 a briefing schedule dictating that any additional property sale motions related to 22 receivership assets that the Receiver filed by December 27, 2019 would be addressed at the 23 January 24th hearing. Id. The Court also set response and reply deadlines on any such 24 motions for January 10 and January 17, 2020, respectively. Id. Finally, the Court ordered 25 the Receiver to file proposed uniform sale procedures to govern all future property sale 26 motions in this action, which the Receiver did by the deadline of January 3, 2020, and 27 permitted objections to her proposal to be filed by January 10, 2020. Id.; ECF No. 195. 28 1 Adopting in part the Receiver’s proposal, the Court issued an order establishing uniform 2 sale procedures on January 22, 2020. ECF No. 219. 3 In addition to the two pending property sale motions the Receiver had already filed 4 when the Court set its briefing schedule for the January 24, 2020 hearing, the Receiver 5 filed three more property sale motions by the deadline of December 27, 2019. These 6 motions include: 7 (1) the Receiver’s Motion for (A) Approval of Sale of Real Property Located at 805 8 Brighton Court; and (B) Authority to Pay Broker’s Commission (ECF No. 148) (“the 9 Brighton Court Motion”); 10 (2) the Receiver’s Motion for Authority to (A) Engage Licensed Auctioneer, (B) 11 Utilize Liquor License Broker to Sell Liquor Licenses, and (C) Sell Personal Property 12 (ECF No. 150) (“the Auctioneer Motion”); 13 (3) the Receiver’s Motion for (A) Approval of Sale of Rancho Mirage Property; 14 and (B) Authority to Pay Broker’s Commission (ECF No. 165) (“the Rancho Mirage 15 Motion”); 16 (4) a Joint Motion for Approval of Sale of Personal Property and Liquor License 17 Associated with the Restaurant Formerly Known as the Patio on 101 (ECF No. 169) (“the 18 Patio on 101 Motion”), filed by the Receiver, Plaintiff Securities and Exchange 19 Commission (“the SEC”), and Defendant Gina-Champion Cain; and 20 (5) a Joint Motion for Approval of Sale of Personal Property and Liquor License 21 Associated with the Patio on Goldfinch Restaurant (ECF No. 176) (“the Patio on Goldfinch 22 Motion”), filed by the Receiver, the SEC, and Defendant Gina-Champion Cain. 23 No express opposition was filed by any party or interested non-party by the deadline 24 of January 10, 2020. However, interested non-party CalPrivate Bank filed responses to the 25 Auctioneer Motion and the Rancho Mirage Motion on January 8 and January 9, 2020, 26 respectively. ECF Nos. 198, 204. The Court will discuss CalPrivate Bank’s responses in 27 more detail in its Discussion Section. 28 1 The Court held a hearing on all five motions on January 24, 2020. ECF No. 225. 2 Upon review of the relevant briefing and in consideration of the testimony at the hearing, 3 the Court GRANTS all five motions, for the reasons explained more fully below. 4 II. LEGAL STANDARD 5 “[I]t is a recognized principle of law that the district court has broad powers and 6 wide discretion to determine the appropriate relief in an equity receivership.” SEC v. 7 Lincoln Thrift Ass’n, 577 F.2d 600, 606 (9th Cir. 1978). See also SEC v. Hardy, 803 F.2d 8 1034, 1037 (9th Cir. 1986) (“[A] district court’s power to supervise an equity receivership 9 and to determine the appropriate action to be taken in the administration of the receivership 10 is extremely broad.”). 11 Where a district court sits in equity, “[u]nless a statute in so many words, or by a 12 necessary and inescapable inference, restricts the court’s jurisdiction in equity, the full 13 scope of that jurisdiction is to be recognized and applied. ‘The great principles of equity, 14 securing complete justice, should not be yielded to light inferences, or doubtful 15 construction.’” Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946). The Court thus 16 has “inherent equitable authority to issue a variety of ‘ancillary relief’ measures in actions 17 brought by the SEC to enforce the federal securities laws.” SEC v. Wencke, 622 F.2d 1363, 18 1369 (9th Cir. 1980). In recognition of such “inherent equitable authority” of federal 19 district courts, the Ninth Circuit “has repeatedly approved imposition of a receivership in 20 appropriate circumstances.” Id. 21 As part of its wide discretion to direct the appropriate relief in an equity receivership, 22 the district court sitting in equity and having custody and control of property “has power 23 to order a sale of the same in its discretion. The power of sale necessarily follows the power 24 to take control of and to preserve property[.]” SEC v. Am. Capital Investments, Inc., 98 25 F.3d 1133, 1144 (9th Cir. 1996), abrogated on other grounds by Steel Co. v. Citizens for a 26 Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 93-94 (1998) (quoting 2 Ralph E. Clark, Treatise on Law & 27 Practice of Receivers § 482 (3d ed. 1992) (hereinafter “Clark on Receivers”). 28 Consequently, a federal equity receiver “can conduct a judicial sale of real property that is 1 property within their ‘possession and control’ and within the court’s territorial jurisdiction, 2 where all parties of interest have been brought before the court.” Am. Capital Investments, 3 Inc., 98 F.3d at 1145 n.17 (citation omitted). However, if the court approves the sale, such 4 approval does not purport to convey legal title to the buyer; rather, the sale conveys 5 “‘good,’ equitable title enforced by an injunction against suit.” Id. (citing Clark on 6 Receivers §§ 342, 344, 482(a), 487, 489, 491).

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Porter v. Warner Holding Co.
328 U.S. 395 (Supreme Court, 1946)
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment
523 U.S. 83 (Supreme Court, 1998)