Secretary of State v. Ingham Circuit Judge

200 N.W.2d 774, 41 Mich. App. 700, 1972 Mich. App. LEXIS 1369

• Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
• Decided: July 3, 1972
• Docket: Docket 13313
• Status: Published

Opinions

Quinn, P. J.

Plaintiffs filed a complaint in this Court seeking a writ of superintending control directed to the circuit judge. A panel of this Court treated the complaint as an application for leave to appeal and granted leave, shortened the time for filing briefs and directed this cause to be submitted at the April 1972 term. (See order of February 22, 1972.) The cause has been submitted as directed.

October 28, 1971, the Secretary of State commenced proceedings under MCLA 257.250; MSA 9.1950 to determine whether the dealer’s license of Jack Dykstra Ford, Inc., should be suspended or revoked. December 8, 1971, Dykstra, Inc., filed its complaint in Ingham Circuit Court seeking a declaration of rights and injunctive relief against the present plaintiffs. On the filing of this complaint, the circuit judge issued a temporary restraining order and an order to show cause restraining the administrative proceedings.

December 9, 1971, the Secretary of State moved to dissolve the temporary restraining order because of lack of jurisdiction and violation of the separation of powers doctrine, among other grounds. The only disposition of this motion in the trial court record is the following sentence in a three sentence opinion of the trial court: "The motion to dismiss the temporary restraining order should be denied”. Under GCR 1963, 820.1(7), we grant the motion to dissolve the temporary restraining order and dismiss Dykstra, Inc’s., complaint because the trial court lacked jurisdiction thereof and because the action of the trial court violated the separation of powers doctrine.

Dykstra, Inc., cannot carry on its business without a license from the Secretary of State, MCLA 257.248; MSA 9.1948. The Secretary of State may suspend or revoke a license on specified statutory grounds, MCLA 257.249; MSA 9.1949. The Secretary of State has the statutory duty to investigate complaints in writing filed with his office, set a date for hearing and give the licensee notice, cause a record to be made of the hearing proceedings and to enter a final order together with his findings, MCLA 257.250; MSA 9.1950. A court of chancery has no jurisdiction to enjoin a hearing that it was the responsibility of the Secretary of State to hold, School District of the City of Royal Oak v State Tenure Commission, 367 Mich 689 (1962). The jurisdiction of the circuit court is limited to the statutory appeal provision of MCLA 257.250(b); MSA 9.1950(b).

State Racing Commissioner v Wayne Circuit Judge, 377 Mich 31, 36 (1966) states:

"It is presumed that the racing commissioner, a public officer, will perform his duties properly [citation omitted], and a court may not with propriety, without violating our principles of separation of governmental powers, Const 1963, art 3, §2, supervise a public official’s contemplated performance of his duties, absent peculiar circumstances, as for example, when an injunctive order is issued to restrain a public official from performing unlawful or unauthorized acts.”

Dykstra, Inc’s., complaint sets forth no peculiar circumstances and the Secretary of State is not performing unlawful or unauthorized acts. He is attempting to do what the statute requires him to do.

Reversed, temporary restraining order dissolved, and complaint dismissed with costs to plaintiffs.

V. J. Brennan, J., concurred.