Seavy v. State

21 A.D.2d 445, 250 N.Y.S.2d 877, 1964 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3427
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedJune 25, 1964
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 21 A.D.2d 445 (Seavy v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Seavy v. State, 21 A.D.2d 445, 250 N.Y.S.2d 877, 1964 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3427 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1964).

Opinions

Goldman, J.

A 20-year-old mentally retarded but edueable young man with an I. Q. of about 60, while participating in the State’s program of Working Convalescent Care, hereinafter referred to as “ W. C. C.”, pursuant to section 132 of the Mental Hygiene Law,1 allegedly set fire to a barn on claimants’ dairy [447]*447farm. The barn and its contents were destroyed. In August, 1957, the claimants had entered into a placement agreement with the Rome State School, which is operated by the State Department of Mental Hygiene for the care and training of mentally retarded individuals, whereby, after having a discussion of his condition, they accepted custody of the young man as a farm worker. The fire occurred after he had worked on the farm for 11 days during which period he presented no serious behavior problem.

Claimants appeal from a judgment of the Court of Claims which dismissed after trial their claim for damages, which claim was premised on the theory that the State’s agent misrepresented the character of the patient and also that the State was negligent in transferring the young man to the Rome institution. Claimants contend the State represented the boy as reliable, with a clean record, and suitable for farm employment while in fact he had a vicious temper, a record of mental disturbance at State institutions and of pyromaniacal propensities ; also that the State was negligent in not transferring the boy to an institution for defective delinquents under the jurisdiction of the Department of Correction (Mental Hygiene Law, § 135).

The boy, whose mother had been an inmate of Wassaic State School, was himself admitted at the age of 10 in June, 1947 with a psychiatric classification of 61 Mental deficiency. Familial. Mental Status: Moron.” His record at Wassaic indicated that on various occasions he had been disagreeable, sullen, obstreperous, disobedient, with a passive sex problem and yet at other times he was and could be well behaved. He had eloped three times. He suffered burns in February, 1951 after having spilled cleaning fluid on his body, intentionally, according to two fellow patients, and unintentionally according to his own account. He was discharged by transfer to Rome State School, hereinafter referred to as “ Rome ”, on July 19, 1956 with the remark on his record ‘ ‘ Condition unimproved ’ ’. The transfer was made at the request of the Wassaic authorities who were experiencing trouble with a group of boys and had decided that if they were separated and moved to other institutions the situation at Wassaic could be alleviated. One of the doctors at Rome suggested to the boy that he make a fresh start and that, if he behaved himself for a year, he would be given an opportunity to be released on W. C. C. He was placed under the care of a man who had a reputation for successfully handling problem children and during his entire 13 months’ stay at Rome he showed great improvement. His behavior at Rome was [448]*448termed ‘ ‘ excellent ’ In the judgment of those charged with responsibility at Rome, the young man was ready for convalescent status. The assistant director of the school, a specialist in psychiatry for 27 years, testified that it was good medical practice to transfer the boy to community care.

The trial court, from the record before us, was justified in finding that there was no misrepresentation of the history of this mentally retarded lad. Misrepresentation is any manifestation by words or other conduct by one person to another that, under the circumstances, amounts to an assertion not in accordance with the facts (7 Encyc. New York Law, Contracts, § 2101, p. 477 et seq.; Black’s Law Dictionary [4th ed.], p. 1152). No specific representation was made by anyone that the boy would present no problem. On the contrary, one of the claimants testified that the social worker at Rome, one Olin, told claimants that if (emphasis ours) the young man made good at the Seavy home, he would be released within a year. One of the reasons for his transfer from Wassaic, where his record indicated adjustment problems, to Rome, was to obtain vocational training. The record further indicates that the guidance and training at Rome was very beneficial. Based upon his excellent behavior record, he was recommended for W. C. C. He was doing well at his farm job for 10 days when, for some unknown reason, it is claimed he set fire to the barn.2

The boy’s history is devoid of pyromaniacal tendencies. The one incident in the record where he was said to have been discovered at Wassaic with burns on his body, was at least ambiguous and certainly not definitive of any tendency to arson. -A pyromaniae does not have an inclination to self-destruction by fire. Pyromania has been defined as an uncontrollable passion or mania for house-burning (29 Am. Jur., Insane Persons, § 3, p. 142) and as an irresistible impulse to burn or set fire to things (Black’s Law Dictionary [4th ed.], p. 935).

As for the communications between Olin, the social worker at Rome, and the claimants, there is conflicting testimony as to the nature of the discussion concerning the young man’s character. Both the claimant, George Seavy, and the social worker, Olin, were contradicted by other testimony. Accordingly, an issue of credibility arose. Although the testimony is [449]*449conflicting in various respects there is no doubt as to the correctness of the court’s finding that the claimants were aware of the boy’s retardation and there is evidence to support the finding that the claimants were informed of his presence as a patient at Wassaic and of his quick temper and disagreeable behavior at Wassaic. However, it had been medically established at Rome after 13 months of observation that the young man was suitable and qualified for W. C. 0. This was a judgment made by experts whose competence has not been challenged and who were well qualified to make such a determination. That judgment having been made, the institution’s representative was under no duty to disclose the details of the entire past history of the lad unless there was some deficiency which could foreseeably lead to particular misconduct. It should be noted that the misbehavior pattern of Wassaic was absent at Rome and on the farm. His relationship with those on the farm was good and he apparently continued his progress which was evident at Rome. The arson incident was unrelated to any previous behavior pattern and was unforeseeable. Under such circumstances, the State is not liable (Excelsior Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. State of New York, 296 N. Y. 40).

The Rome School was under no duty voluntarily to disclose the boy’s unhappy record at Wassaic, once the authorities determined from his record at Rome that he had made a good recovery and was, in their judgment, qualified for W. C. 0. as a part of his rehabilitative treatment. True, there was a duty not to misrepresent and the Trial Judge, supported by sufficient proof to that effect, found there was no misrepresentation. Full disclosure of the details of past history of all patients would defeat the very purpose of the convalescent care program because the early history of all feeble-minded or morons would reveal that most of these unfortunate people have unattractive records, in many instances because of the impact of institutional environment which the open-door policy is attempting to avoid.

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Bluebook (online)
21 A.D.2d 445, 250 N.Y.S.2d 877, 1964 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3427, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/seavy-v-state-nyappdiv-1964.