Seashore Club v. Seashore Club Condominium Ass'n

433 A.2d 819, 180 N.J. Super. 81, 1981 N.J. Super. LEXIS 641
CourtNew Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
DecidedMarch 12, 1981
StatusPublished

This text of 433 A.2d 819 (Seashore Club v. Seashore Club Condominium Ass'n) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Seashore Club v. Seashore Club Condominium Ass'n, 433 A.2d 819, 180 N.J. Super. 81, 1981 N.J. Super. LEXIS 641 (N.J. Ct. App. 1981).

Opinion

GRUCCIO, A. J. S. C.

On cross-motions for summary judgment, I am presented with the threshold issue of whether the members of a condominium association have the right, power and authority to amend the condominium by-laws so as to delete plaintiff developer’s right of first refusal to buy a condominium unit upon resale. Both the By-laws under contest herein and the Condominium Act of New Jersey (N.J.S.A. 46:8B-1 et seq.) specifically contemplate such a result.

Before articulating the findings of fact and legal reasoning which support this conclusion, it is necessary to consider the standards which govern summary judgment motions. In Judson v. Peoples Bank and Trust Co. of Westfield, 17 N.J. 67 (1954), the court (at 73) established the scope of the summary judgment procedure, holding in part that “the role of the judge in that procedure is to determine whether there is a genuine issue as to material fact, but not to decide the issue if he finds it to exist.” See, also, R. 4:46-2. In noting that the moving party must clearly sustain its burden “to exclude any reasonable doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact” or show that “palpably” no such issue exists, the court further held that “[a]ll inferences of doubt are drawn against the movant in favor of the opponent of the motion” and that the issues of credibility are to be reserved for the trier of fact. Id. at 74-75. Applying this standard to the present case, I find the following material facts not to be in issue.

Findings of Fact

Raymond Geftman is the developer and sponsor of the Seashore Club of Atlantic City (hereinafter, “developer”), a condominium regime located at 3300 Boardwalk, Atlantic City, New Jersey. Geftman brings this action as president of the Seashore Club.

[83]*83The Seashore Club Condominium Association, Inc. (hereinafter, “association”) is a nonprofit corporation which operates the condominium. By virtue of their ownership of individual units, every unit owner is automatically a member of the Seashore Club Condominium Association, defendant herein.

In accordance with the Condominium Act of New Jersey (N.J. S.A. 46:8B1 et seq.), the developer filed the master deed and accompanying exhibits required to create a condominium regime with the county clerk. The by-laws were included among the exhibits duly filed with the master deed.

Paragraphs 15 and 17 of the master deed are relevant to this litigation and provide as follows:

15. SALE OR LEASE OR OTHER DISPOSITION OF UNITS:

Should the Unit owner (other than the Developer) wish to sell or lease his Unit, he shall, before accepting any offer to sell or lease his Unit, comply with the applicable provisions of the By-laws. Any attempt to sell or lease a Unit except as provided in the By-laws, shall be wholly null and void and shall offer no title or interest whatsoever upon the intended purchaser or lessee.

Paragraph 17 of the master deed provides in pertinent part: 17. METHOD OF AMENDMENT OF MASTER DEED:

This Master Deed may be amended at any regular or special meeting of the unit owners of this Condominium called or convened in accordance with the By-laws, by the affirmative vote of voting members casting not less than three-fourths (5/< ths) of the total vote of the members of the Association.
.. . [Notwithstanding the foregoing, this Master Deed may not be amended without the written approval of the Management Firm under the Management Agreement, as long as the said Management Agreement attached to this Master Deed remains in effect, which said approvals shall not be unreasonably withheld. No Amendment shall change the rights and privileges of the Developer without the Developer’s written approval.

There are no other provisions in the master deed which deal with the sale, lease or other disposition of a unit. Nowhere in the master deed is any reference made to the developer’s right of first refusal. In order to locate any provisions dealing with the sale or lease of a unit or the developer’s right of first refusal, one must follow the mandate contained in the master deed and refer to the applicable provisions of the association’s by-laws.

[84]*84Article VII of the by-laws grants to the developer the right of first refusal. Article XI of the by-laws provides for amendments as follows:

Except as herein otherwise provided, these By-laws may be modified or amended only by the affirmative vote of ninety percent (90%) of all votes which may be cast by Unit Owners at a meeting of Unit Owners duly held for such purpose. To be effective, modifications and amendments must be recorded in the Office of the Register [s/c] of Atlantic County. Insofar as rights are conferred upon the Developer by these By-laws, these By-laws may not be amended or modified (as to those portions only) written [s/c] the consent, in writing, of the Developer, so long as the Developer shall be the owner of ten percent (10%) of the total units.

Since there are no other provisions in the master deed or by-laws relating to the developer’s right of first refusal, or to the modification or amendment of the master deed or by-laws, a procedural history will prove instructive.

Procedural History

The association and its board of trustees scheduled a special meeting of all unit owners to vote on whether the association’s by-laws should be amended so as to eliminate the developer’s right of first refusal. The developer commenced this action for temporary and permanent injunctive relief to prevent the association from (1) filing with the county clerk any amendment to its master deed or by-laws affecting the developer’s rights without his consent, and (2) recording any amendments to the master deed and by-laws as a result of the above-mentioned special meeting convened by the association.

After discussion in chambers, I issued a temporary restraining order granting the relief requested by the developer, which was subsequently extended by consent. At such time, I specifically stated that I would not restrain the association from holding its special meeting to vote on the proposed amendment to the by-laws.

Several days thereafter the association conducted its special meeting. The official membership list consisted of 100 members, and 93 were present at the meeting in person or by proxy. A quorum being present, 90 votes were cast in favor of the [85]*85amendment to the by-laws deleting all references to the developer’s right of first refusal, while three votes were cast against the amendment, representing a 96.7% majority of those present and eligible to vote. Since the developer did not own 10% of the units at the time of the vote, the association did not solicit the developer’s written consent to such an amendment.

The result of the vote occasioned cross-motions for summary judgment. I deferred ruling on these matters pending the discovery of any relevant case law from other jurisdictions, since this matter appears to be one of first impression in New Jersey. Subsequent to the submission of briefs and oral argument on these cross-motions for summary judgment, N.J.S.A. 46:8B-31 and 36 were amended.

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Related

Capitol Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Smith
316 P.2d 252 (Supreme Court of Colorado, 1957)
Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. of Westfield
110 A.2d 24 (Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1954)

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Bluebook (online)
433 A.2d 819, 180 N.J. Super. 81, 1981 N.J. Super. LEXIS 641, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/seashore-club-v-seashore-club-condominium-assn-njsuperctappdiv-1981.