Opinion
DICKENSON, Justice.
The issue is whether there is sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that defendant “was negligent in failing to have properly designed” the washing machine which it sold to plaintiffs and that such negligence was a proximate cause of the fire which burned plaintiffs’ mobile home. The jury also answered in another portion of the charge that the washing machine was not defectively designed at the time it was manufactured, but there is no point of error urging a conflict in these answers.1
[926]*926Mr. and Mrs. Black bought a Sears Kenmore washer on November 6, 1979. Their mobile home burned on May 10, 1982. They filed suit against Sears, Roebuck and Company, urging several theories of recovery: strict liability under Restatement (Second) Torts sec. 402A; express and implied warranty; common-law negligence; and the Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act. Following a trial by jury, judgment was rendered in favor of Mr. and Mrs. Black on February 25, 1985, for the sum of $12,000 plus prejudgment interest. Sears, Roebuck and Company appeals. We affirm.
The verdict of the jury can be summarized as shown:
1. Sears was engaged in the business of selling washing machines.
2. The washing machine was not defective at the time it left Sears’ possession.
3. No answer required.
4. The washing machine was not defectively designed at the time it was manufactured for Sears.2
5. No answer required.
6. Sears did not represent that its washing machine possessed certain characteristics which it did not in fact possess.
7. Sears did not represent that its washing machine was of a particular standard, quality or grade when it was not of such standard, quality or grade.
8. The washing machine was not unfit for the ordinary purposes for which such machines are used.
9. No answer required.
10. Sears had reason to know the particular purpose for which the washing machine was required.
11. Rudy and Sherry Black relied on the skill or judgment of Sears to furnish a suitable washing machine.
12. The jury refused to find that the washing machine was unfit for the particular purpose for which it was purchased.
12a. No answer required.
13. (a) On the occasion in question Sears was negligent in failing to have properly designed the washing machine, and this negligence was a proximate cause of the occurrence in question. Sears was not negligent in (b) manufacturing or (c) testing the washing machine.
14. $12,000 would fairly and reasonably compensate Rudy and Sherry Black for the loss of actual value to them of their mobile home and its contents.
15. Sherry Black sustained an injury on the occasion in question.
16. The damages for her physical pain and mental anguish, past and future, and her disfigurement, past and future, are “none.”
17. The reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees for plaintiffs’ attorneys are “$2,000” in the trial court and “$0” on appeal.
18. Written notice was given to Sears at least 30 days before suit was filed.
19. The jury refused to find that Sears knowingly engaged in the conduct asked about in Special Issues Nos. 6, 7, 8 and 12. (Negative answers had been given to each of these issues.)
20. The jury refused to find that Sherry Black failed to maintain the necessary safety precautions which a person using ordinary care would have maintained.
21. No answer required.
22. No answer required. (The jury answered anyway, apportioning the fault 55% to Sears and 45% to Sherry Black.)
23. The jury refused to find that Sears was not given a reasonable opportunity to cure the defects in the washing machine.
24. No answer required.
Based upon the jury’s answers to Special Issues Nos. 13(a) and 14, judgment was rendered on the verdict for Rudy and Sher[927]*927ry Black for the sum of $12,000 plus prejudgment interest.
Appellant has briefed nine points of error, all of which relate to Special Issue No. 13(a). In the first six points, appellant argues that the trial court erred: (1) in submitting this issue; (2) in overruling the motion to disregard the answer to this issue; (3) in refusing to grant the motion to disregard the answer to this issue; (4) in overruling the first amended motion for judgment non obstante veredicto; (5) in refusing to grant the first amended motion for judgment non obstante veredicto; and (6) in rendering judgment in favor of appel-lees. Each of these points present “no evidence” challenges to the answer to Special Issue No. 13(a). If sustained, they would result in a reversal of the trial court’s judgment and a rendition of judgment for appellant. The last three points contain appellant’s arguments that the trial court erred: (7) in overruling the motion for new trial; (8) in refusing to grant the motion for new trial; and (9) in rendering judgment due to the insufficiency of the evidence to support the answer to Special Issue No. 13(a). These are “factually insufficient” or “against the great weight” points3 which, if sustained, would result in remanding the cause for a new trial.
In reviewing the no evidence points, we are required to consider only the evidence and inferences which support the jury’s answer. See, e.g., Martinez v. Delta Brands, Inc., 515 S.W.2d 263 at 265 (Tex.1974). In reviewing the factually insufficient or great weight points, we have complied with the test stated by In re King’s Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660 at 661 (Tex.1951), by considering and weighing all of the evidence in the case to see if the answer to Special Issue No. 13(a) is “so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust.”
All nine points of error are overruled. We hold there is evidence, which is both legally and factually sufficient, to support the jury’s answer to Special Issue No. 13(a), and we are unable to say that the answer to that issue is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust.
Both sides used expert witnesses to support their position, and the jury was free to believe one expert’s testimony and to reject that of the other. As appellant’s lawyer said to the jury in his argument:
That means you decide who is telling the truth. You decide which expert you want to believe, and then you go for it.
The unusual aspect of this case is that the jury agreed with appellant’s expert on Special Issue No.
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Opinion
DICKENSON, Justice.
The issue is whether there is sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that defendant “was negligent in failing to have properly designed” the washing machine which it sold to plaintiffs and that such negligence was a proximate cause of the fire which burned plaintiffs’ mobile home. The jury also answered in another portion of the charge that the washing machine was not defectively designed at the time it was manufactured, but there is no point of error urging a conflict in these answers.1
[926]*926Mr. and Mrs. Black bought a Sears Kenmore washer on November 6, 1979. Their mobile home burned on May 10, 1982. They filed suit against Sears, Roebuck and Company, urging several theories of recovery: strict liability under Restatement (Second) Torts sec. 402A; express and implied warranty; common-law negligence; and the Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act. Following a trial by jury, judgment was rendered in favor of Mr. and Mrs. Black on February 25, 1985, for the sum of $12,000 plus prejudgment interest. Sears, Roebuck and Company appeals. We affirm.
The verdict of the jury can be summarized as shown:
1. Sears was engaged in the business of selling washing machines.
2. The washing machine was not defective at the time it left Sears’ possession.
3. No answer required.
4. The washing machine was not defectively designed at the time it was manufactured for Sears.2
5. No answer required.
6. Sears did not represent that its washing machine possessed certain characteristics which it did not in fact possess.
7. Sears did not represent that its washing machine was of a particular standard, quality or grade when it was not of such standard, quality or grade.
8. The washing machine was not unfit for the ordinary purposes for which such machines are used.
9. No answer required.
10. Sears had reason to know the particular purpose for which the washing machine was required.
11. Rudy and Sherry Black relied on the skill or judgment of Sears to furnish a suitable washing machine.
12. The jury refused to find that the washing machine was unfit for the particular purpose for which it was purchased.
12a. No answer required.
13. (a) On the occasion in question Sears was negligent in failing to have properly designed the washing machine, and this negligence was a proximate cause of the occurrence in question. Sears was not negligent in (b) manufacturing or (c) testing the washing machine.
14. $12,000 would fairly and reasonably compensate Rudy and Sherry Black for the loss of actual value to them of their mobile home and its contents.
15. Sherry Black sustained an injury on the occasion in question.
16. The damages for her physical pain and mental anguish, past and future, and her disfigurement, past and future, are “none.”
17. The reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees for plaintiffs’ attorneys are “$2,000” in the trial court and “$0” on appeal.
18. Written notice was given to Sears at least 30 days before suit was filed.
19. The jury refused to find that Sears knowingly engaged in the conduct asked about in Special Issues Nos. 6, 7, 8 and 12. (Negative answers had been given to each of these issues.)
20. The jury refused to find that Sherry Black failed to maintain the necessary safety precautions which a person using ordinary care would have maintained.
21. No answer required.
22. No answer required. (The jury answered anyway, apportioning the fault 55% to Sears and 45% to Sherry Black.)
23. The jury refused to find that Sears was not given a reasonable opportunity to cure the defects in the washing machine.
24. No answer required.
Based upon the jury’s answers to Special Issues Nos. 13(a) and 14, judgment was rendered on the verdict for Rudy and Sher[927]*927ry Black for the sum of $12,000 plus prejudgment interest.
Appellant has briefed nine points of error, all of which relate to Special Issue No. 13(a). In the first six points, appellant argues that the trial court erred: (1) in submitting this issue; (2) in overruling the motion to disregard the answer to this issue; (3) in refusing to grant the motion to disregard the answer to this issue; (4) in overruling the first amended motion for judgment non obstante veredicto; (5) in refusing to grant the first amended motion for judgment non obstante veredicto; and (6) in rendering judgment in favor of appel-lees. Each of these points present “no evidence” challenges to the answer to Special Issue No. 13(a). If sustained, they would result in a reversal of the trial court’s judgment and a rendition of judgment for appellant. The last three points contain appellant’s arguments that the trial court erred: (7) in overruling the motion for new trial; (8) in refusing to grant the motion for new trial; and (9) in rendering judgment due to the insufficiency of the evidence to support the answer to Special Issue No. 13(a). These are “factually insufficient” or “against the great weight” points3 which, if sustained, would result in remanding the cause for a new trial.
In reviewing the no evidence points, we are required to consider only the evidence and inferences which support the jury’s answer. See, e.g., Martinez v. Delta Brands, Inc., 515 S.W.2d 263 at 265 (Tex.1974). In reviewing the factually insufficient or great weight points, we have complied with the test stated by In re King’s Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660 at 661 (Tex.1951), by considering and weighing all of the evidence in the case to see if the answer to Special Issue No. 13(a) is “so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust.”
All nine points of error are overruled. We hold there is evidence, which is both legally and factually sufficient, to support the jury’s answer to Special Issue No. 13(a), and we are unable to say that the answer to that issue is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust.
Both sides used expert witnesses to support their position, and the jury was free to believe one expert’s testimony and to reject that of the other. As appellant’s lawyer said to the jury in his argument:
That means you decide who is telling the truth. You decide which expert you want to believe, and then you go for it.
The unusual aspect of this case is that the jury agreed with appellant’s expert on Special Issue No. 4 by finding that the washing machine was not defectively designed and with appellees’ expert on Special Issue No. 13(a) by finding that appellant was negligent in failing to have properly designed the washing machine. As noted in footnote 1, we are not authorized to find a fatal conflict in these answers because there is no point of error urging that contention. Compare Little Rock Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Dunn, 148 Tex. 197, 222 S.W.2d 985 (1949), with Richter v. Plains National Bank of Lubbock, 487 S.W.2d 704 (Tex.1972).
While appellees’ expert was not a specialist in washing machines, he was an electrical engineer with a doctorate degree in electrical engineering who is on the faculty of a major university. The objections to his testimony went to the weight, rather than to the admissibility, of his opinion. See TEX.R.EVID. 702, 703 and 704. This expert’s opinion was that a faulty electrical contact in the washing machine’s switch led to overheating which caused the fire to occur. He concluded that there was a faulty design because if the switch housing had been metal instead of plastic, the mobile home fire could have been prevented. The jury was free to accept this testimony, and we are not at liberty to disturb the verdict. The jury was not compelled to believe appellant’s expert on all of the is[928]*928sues because they agreed with him on some of the issues. Appellant’s expert testimony was persuasive,4 but it was not conclusive. The fact that Whirlpool Corporation manufactured the washing machine does not insulate Sears from liability. Sears had Whirlpool put the Sears’ brand name on the machine, and Sears sold the machine as a Sears Kenmore washing machine. As noted by the Restatement (Second) Torts sec. 400, one who puts out as its own product a chattel manufactured by another is subject to the same liability as though it were the manufacturer. See, e.g., Maintenance and Equipment Contractors v. John Deere Company, 554 S.W.2d 28 at 32 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, writ dism’d).
Appellees’ prayer for a penalty under TEX.R.CIV.P. 435 or 438 is denied. We do not find that the appeal was taken for delay and without sufficient cause.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.