Seaquist v. Dayton

2023 Ohio 4563

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: December 15, 2023
• Docket: 29821
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as Seaquist v. Dayton, 2023-Ohio-4563.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY

KYLE SEAQUIST : : Appellant : C.A. No. 29821 : v. : Trial Court Case No. 2022 CV 4341 : CITY OF DAYTON, et al. : (Civil Appeal from Common Pleas : Court) Appellees : :

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OPINION

Rendered on December 15, 2023

DAVID M. DUWEL, Attorney for Appellant

NORMA M. DICKENS, Attorney for Appellee

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HUFFMAN, J.

{¶ 1} Kyle Seaquist appeals from the trial court’s judgment affirming the City of

Dayton Civil Service Board’s decision to uphold Seaquist’s termination for disciplinary

reasons. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

{¶ 2} Seaquist started working for the City of Dayton in the water department on -2-

February 8, 2015. In 2020, Seaquist transferred to the City’s Department of Aviation,

where he served as Construction Electrician at the Dayton International Airport.

{¶ 3} At the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, the City implemented several

health and safety policies for worker protection. On August 9, 2021, the City issued a new

iteration of Personnel Policy 13.04 in compliance with the Centers for Disease Control

and Prevention’s (CDC) revised guidance on mask-wearing. Personnel Policy 13.04 (“the

Policy”) contained a mask policy provision (“the mask policy”), which provided, in part,

that all City employees, regardless of their vaccination status, were required to wear a

mask that covered their nose and mouth at all times while on duty, albeit with a few

exceptions. The Policy also encouraged all employees to receive the COVID-19

vaccination and addressed the City’s weekly virus testing requirements for any employee

who declined to receive a COVID-19 vaccination.

{¶ 4} Seaquist opposed receiving the COVID-19 vaccine and wearing a mask.

Consequently, he sought an exemption hearing regarding the Policy, which was held on

August 24, 2021. When Seaquist arrived at City Hall for his exemption hearing, he was

spotted not wearing a mask by Ken Couch, the director of human resources, who advised

Seaquist to go to the human resources office and obtain a mask, which Seaquist did not

do. Shortly thereafter, when Seaquist arrived at the hearing room still not wearing a mask,

Dawn Manuel, the hearing officer, observed Seaquist not wearing a mask and gave him

one to wear. Rather than wear the mask properly across his nose and mouth, Seaquist

put the mask around his ears and under his chin. When Manuel repeatedly asked

Seaquist to wear the mask in accordance with the City’s mask policy, he refused. As a -3-

result, his exemption hearing was adjourned, and he was sent home for the day.

{¶ 5} The next day, on August 25, 2021, Seaquist was offered the opportunity at a

show cause hearing conducted over Zoom to demonstrate why he should be permitted

to return to work after his repeated refusal to comply with the mask policy. After confirming

that he did not intend to comply with the mask policy, Seaquist was advised that he was

not permitted to return to work without wearing a mask and, because he was unable to

return to work, he was given the opportunity to use his personal accrued paid leave during

his absence. Seaquist refused to use his personal leave for his absence from work due

to his mask non-compliance and was advised that, by doing so, he would be deemed

absent without leave (AWOL), subjecting him to future discipline, up to and including

termination. Thereafter, Seaquist never returned to work.

{¶ 6} In September 2021, as part of its formal disciplinary process, the City

charged Seaquist with violating Rule 13 of the Civil Service Rules and Regulations of the

City of Dayton. Specifically, he was charged in Count I with conduct unbecoming an

employee in public service, insubordination, violation of any lawful or reasonable

regulations or orders made or given by a superior, and violation of any enacted or

promulgated statute, ordinance, rule, policy, regulation or other law and in Count II with

absence without leave or failure to return from leave. With respect to the first charge, the

City alleged that, on August 24, 2021, Seaquist failed to follow a direct order given to him

by Ken Couch to obtain a mask from the human resources department and wear it while

in City Hall, as required by the City’s mask policy. The City also alleged that Seaquist

failed to follow a direct order given to him by Dawn Manuel to adjust his mask to properly -4-

cover his nose and mouth during his exemption hearing in City Hall, as also required by

the City’s mask policy. The second charge arose from Seaquist being placed on unpaid

leave due to his refusal to wear a mask and his decision to remain on unpaid leave rather

than to use his accrued leave, rendering him AWOL.

{¶ 7} A hearing regarding the charges against Seaquist was held on October 21,

2021, during which Seaquist denied the charges. The Director of the Department of

Aviation found Seaquist guilty of the charges and ordered Seaquist’s termination of

employment on October 28, 2021.

{¶ 8} Seaquist appealed his employment discharge, and an appeal hearing was

held before the City of Dayton Civil Service Board (“the “Board”) on May 19, 2022. In its

decision, the Board stated that a mandatory mask policy was a common component in a

plan to stem the spread of the COVID-19 virus among most employers, including federal,

state, and local governments, and that such safety precautions were terms of employment

that, if broken, could justify termination of employment except in limited circumstances,

such as medical or religious reasons preventing a worker from wearing a mask. The

Board explained that Seaquist had not asserted a medical or religious reason to challenge

the Policy but, rather, displayed conduct that was tantamount to having said “I don’t like

your rules and/or I really don’t want to work here.” The Board reasoned that employers

have a basic right to devise and enforce nondiscriminatory work rules, especially those

pertaining to health and safety in the workplace, and specifically that government

employers have the authority to enforce regulations on their employees’ conduct

designed to protect health, safety, and welfare of the public and the employees -5-

themselves. Based on this reasoning, the Board concluded that Seaquist had been guilty

of committing infractions that justified his employment discharge, thereby affirming the

Director’s decision to terminate him.

{¶ 9} Thereafter, Seaquist filed his notice of administrative appeal in the trial court,

asserting that the decision of the Board was unjust, unreasonable, not supported by the

facts, and contrary to law. The trial court affirmed the order of the Board, finding that the

City’s decision to place Seaquist in AWOL status and to later discharge him was

supported by reliable, substantial, and probative evidence and was in accordance with

law. Seaquist appeals.

II. Assignments of Error

{¶ 10} Seaquist asserts the following two assignments of error:

The trial court erred when it found that the Board’s Order in respect

to Charge I and the two specifications was supported by reliable, probative,

and substantial evidence.

The trial court erred when it failed to determine whether Charge II

was substantiated by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence.

{¶ 11} The suspension, demotion, or removal of civil servants is governed by R.C.

124.34. Lamanna v. City of Dayton, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28136, 2019-Ohio-1260,

¶ 13. In cases of removal of an employee for disciplinary reasons, “either the appointing

authority or the officer or employee may appeal from the decision of the state personnel

board of review or the commission, and any such appeal shall be to the court of common

pleas in accordance with section 119.12 of the Revised Code.” R.C. 124.34(B). -6-

{¶ 12} Pursuant to 119.12(B)(4), appeals under R.C. 124.34(B) from a decision of

the state personnel board of review shall be taken to the court of common pleas of the

county in which the appointing authority is located. “Any party desiring to appeal shall file

a notice of appeal with the agency setting forth the order appealed from and stating that

the agency’s order is not supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and

is not in accordance with law.” R.C. 119.12(D).

{¶ 13} Generally, in the hearing of an administrative appeal, the trial court is

confined to the record as certified to it by the agency. R.C. 119.12(L). The trial court may

affirm the order of the agency complained of in the appeal if it finds, upon consideration

of the entire record and any additional evidence the court has admitted, that the order is

supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and is in accordance with law.

R.C. 119.12(N). In the absence of this finding, the trial court may reverse, vacate, or

modify the order or make such other ruling as is supported by reliable, probative, and

substantial evidence and is in accordance with law. Id.

{¶ 14} The trial court’s judgment shall be final and conclusive unless reversed,

vacated, or modified on appeal. R.C. 119.12(O). “These appeals may be taken either by

the party or the agency, shall proceed as in the case of appeals in civil actions, and shall

be pursuant to the Rules of Appellate Procedure and, to the extent not in conflict with

those rules, Chapter 2505. of the Revised Code.” Id.

{¶ 15} “While the determination to be made by the court of common pleas is based

on whether there is reliable, probative and substantial evidence to support the board’s

finding, the standard of review to be applied by this court is whether the court of common -7-

pleas abused its discretion in making that determination.” (Citations omitted.) Swigart v.

Kent State Univ., 11th Dist. Portage No. 2004-P-0037, 2005-Ohio-2258, ¶ 22,

quoting Kennedy v. Marion Corr. Inst., 69 Ohio St.3d 20, 21-22, 630 N.E.2d 324 (1994).

“Under an abuse-of-discretion standard, a lower court decision will not be reversed for

mere error, but only when the court’s decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or

unconscionable.” Lamanna, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28136, 2019-Ohio-1260, at ¶ 17,

quoting Morrow v. Becker, 138 Ohio St.3d 11, 2013-Ohio-4542, 3 N.E.3d 144, ¶ 9. “If

there is some competent, credible evidence to support the trial court’s decision, there is

no abuse of discretion.” Id., quoting Middendorf v. Middendorf, 82 Ohio St.3d 397, 401,

696 N.E.2d 575 (1998).

{¶ 16} We will consider both of Seaquist’s assignments of error together. In his first

assignment of error, Seaquist asserts that Ken Couch and Dawn Manuel, who gave him

orders to wear a mask at his exemption hearing, were not his superiors as human

resources personnel, and thus he was not bound to follow their orders. For those reasons,

Seaquist argues that he could not be terminated for insubordination as indicated in the

charges against him, and thus the trial court erred in affirming the Director’s decision to

terminate him. In his second assignment of error, Seaquist argues that the trial court erred

when it failed to sufficiently analyze his argument with respect to the AWOL charge. We

disagree.

{¶ 17} The trial court noted that the City adopted Personnel Policy 13.04 based on

directions from the CDC related to preventing the spread of the COVID-19 virus, which

generally required that all employees wear a mask covering the nose and mouth. The trial -8-

court explained that Seaquist was charged with violating the mask-safety rules and was

subsequently discharged from his employment with the City because he adamantly

refused to wear a mask, even at his exemption hearing after multiple requests were made.

The trial court further explained that, even after Seaquist’s refusal to wear a mask at his

exemption hearing, Seaquist was provided a show cause hearing with proper notice,

where it was confirmed that Seaquist did not intend to follow the mask policy, and he was

placed on leave for refusing to follow the policy. Seaquist then refused to use his accrued

leave for his absence and was advised that, in doing so, he would be placed in AWOL

status, which could subject him to further discipline, up to an including termination. Finally,

the trial court stated that Seaquist did not contest that he had failed to comply with the

mask policy and did not deny that he was on duty when he appeared without a mask in

violation of the Policy at the exemption hearing while on paid administrative leave. Based

on its review of the entire record, the trial court concluded that there were sufficient

grounds for terminating Seaquist’s employment because he ignored directions to wear a

mask pursuant to the mask policy by the very City employees who were providing him

with an opportunity for an exemption hearing and then failed to show cause as to why he

should be permitted to return to work when he adamantly refused to wear a mask.

{¶ 18} In this case, there were clear instances of insubordination when Seaquist

actively ignored and refused to comply with the mask policy both before and then during

his exemption hearing despite numerous requests by the hearing officer for him to wear

a mask. Additionally, the other examples of Seaquist’s conduct unbecoming an employee,

violations of the mask policy, and refusal to use his accrued leave and consequential -9-

AWOL status, when taken as a whole, supported termination, as the trial court

determined. Our review of the trial court’s decision is limited to examining the record and

determining whether its decision was supported by reliable, probative, and substantial

evidence. Based on the record before us, we conclude that the trial court’s decision

upholding the decision of the Board was supported by a preponderance of substantial,

reliable, and probative evidence. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the trial

court erred and abused its discretion in affirming the Board’s decision upholding the

Director’s termination of Seaquist for disciplinary reasons.

III. Conclusion

{¶ 19} The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

WELBAUM, P.J. and TUCKER, J., concur.