Sean Donahue v. Department of Labor

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedJuly 19, 2022
DocketPH-3330-17-0031-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Sean Donahue v. Department of Labor (Sean Donahue v. Department of Labor) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sean Donahue v. Department of Labor, (Miss. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

SEAN M. DONAHUE, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, PH-3330-17-0031-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, DATE: July 19, 2022 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Sean M. Donahue, Hazleton, Pennsylvania, pro se.

Jennifer L. Bluer, Esquire, Richard T. Buchanan, Esquire, and Anthony D. DiBacco, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Member Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which denied his request for corrective action under the Veterans Employment Opportunities Act of 1998 (VEOA). Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error af fected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 ( 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113.

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW ¶2 The following facts, as further detailed in the initial decision, are not in dispute. The appellant applied for a GS-11 Workforce Program Specialist vacancy in the agency’s Employment and Training Administration. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 40, Initial Decision (ID) at 2. Among other things, his application recognized the appellant’s entitlement to a 5 -point veterans’ preference. Id. ¶3 The agency used the category rating method during its selection process. ID at 5; see 5 U.S.C. § 3319. Under that method, applicants completed a competency based questionnaire (CBQ), which computer software scored. ID at 5. Based on those scores, applicants were divided into three qualification categories, A, B, and C. Id. Applicants with a 10-point veterans’ preference were automatically placed atop category A, regardless of their CBQ score. Id. Applicants with a 5-point veterans’ preference remained in the category assigned by virtue of their CBQ score, but were placed atop of that category. Id. 3

¶4 Of the 156 applicants for the Workforce Program Specialist vacancy, 2 were entitled to a 10-point veterans’ preference and were, therefore, placed atop category A. ID at 5-6. The appellant’s CBQ score resulted in his placement within category C, and his 5-point veterans’ preference resulted in his placement atop of that category. ID at 6. The agency ultimately selected one of the candidates with the 10-point veterans’ preference to fill its vacancy. Id. ¶5 The appellant filed a complaint with the agency, alleging that , by not selecting him, it had violated VEOA. ID at 2. The agency’s Veterans’ Employment and Training Service investigated and found no such violation. ID at 2-3. The appellant then filed the instant VEOA appeal. ID at 3. ¶6 After holding the requested hearing, the administrative judge issued an initial decision denying the appellant’s request for corrective action. ID at 1. First, he found no merit to the appellant’s claim that category rating is only appropriate in the context of scientific vacancies. ID at 6 -7. Next, the administrative judge concluded that the agency applied category rating properly. ID at 7-8. Finally, he found that the appellant’s remaining arguments, such as his disagreement with how effective the CBQ was at measuring an applicant’s preparedness for a vacancy, did not show a VEOA violation. ID at 8 -9. The appellant has filed a petition for review. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. The agency has filed a response, and the appellant has replied. PFR File, Tabs 3-4. ¶7 The Board has jurisdiction over two types of VEOA claims: (1) the denial of a right to compete; and (2) the violation of a statute or regulation relating to veterans’ preference. See 5 U.S.C. § 3330a(a)(1)(A) (veterans’ preference claims); 5 U.S.C. §§ 3330a(a)(1)(B), 3304(f)(1) (right-to-compete claims); see generally Piirainen v. Department of the Army, 122 M.S.P.R. 194, ¶ 8 (2015) (analyzing a VEOA claim to determine under which theory it belonged). Here, the appellant has not alleged that he was denied the right to compete, nor is there 4

anything in the record to suggest that he was. Accordingly, the administrative judge properly considered his as a veterans’ preference claim. ID at 6. ¶8 To prevail on the merits of a claim that the agency violated his veterans’ preference rights, the appellant must prove by preponderant evidence that (1) he exhausted his remedy with the Department of Labor; (2) he is a preference eligible within the meaning of VEOA; (3) the action at issue took place on or after the October 30, 1998 enactment date of VEOA; and (4) the agency violated his rights under a statute or regulation relating to veterans’ preference. See Lazaro v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 666 F.3d 1316, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (setting forth these elements in terms of the appellant’s lesser jurisdictional burden); Isabella v. Department of State, 106 M.S.P.R. 333, ¶¶ 21-22 (2007) (recognizing that, to prevail on the merits, the appellant must prove these elements by preponderant evidence), aff’d on recons., 109 M.S.P.R. 453 (2008). The administrative judge found that the appellant failed to prove t he final requirement—that the agency violated his rights under a statute or regulation relating to veterans’ preference. ID at 6-9. We agree. ¶9 The appellant reasserts arguments he made before the administrative judge. According to the appellant, the agency’s use of a CBQ to categorize applicants is inadequate because its multiple choice questions limit an applicant’s ability to explain his or her qualifications. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4-5. He further argues that the CBQ allows applicants to answer untruthfully. Id. at 5.

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Sean Donahue v. Department of Labor, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sean-donahue-v-department-of-labor-mspb-2022.