Seaboard Airline R. Co. v. Pan American Petroleum & Transport Co. The Pan Maryland

199 F.2d 761
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedDecember 12, 1952
Docket14179_1
StatusPublished
Cited by21 cases

This text of 199 F.2d 761 (Seaboard Airline R. Co. v. Pan American Petroleum & Transport Co. The Pan Maryland) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Seaboard Airline R. Co. v. Pan American Petroleum & Transport Co. The Pan Maryland, 199 F.2d 761 (5th Cir. 1952).

Opinion

HUTCHESON, Chief Judge.

About 12 o’clock noon on a bright clear day, without the interference of wind, wave, or vessel, the Tanker Pan Maryland, while endeavoring to pass through the Seaboard drawbridge over the Savannah River, struck the bridge at such speed and with such force as to cause serious damage-to it and to the tanker itself.

Libellant, to recover the damage to its bridge, filed two libels, 1 one in rem against the tanker, the other in personam against her owner.

The Pan Maryland and her owner answered denying all the charges of negligence and alleging that she was proceeding properly and on the customary course when, because of the shoaling of the channel existing in the vicinity, and because, of the bridge, she took a sheer, and, the vessel not responding to the rudder, collided with the bridge.

There was a further allegation that the bridge constituted an unreasonable and unlawful obstruction to the free navigation of the river due to inadequate horizontal clearance through the draw span, and that it was because thereof and of the shoaling due to the fault of libellant, and *762 not because of any fault on the part of the vessel, that the collision came about.

Pan American, in a cross-libel containing substantially the same allegations as those which had been set forth in the answer, sued for the damages t!he collision had caused the Pan Maryland.

The consolidated causes coming on for trial, the facts 2 were fully developed, and the district judge, after hearing the argu *763 ments of counsel, concluded and held: that the libellant’s bridge “was an unreasonable obstruction to the free navigation of the Savannah River; that the cause of the accident was the shoaling of the channel and the inadequacy of the span, for both of *764 which the owner of the bridge is responsible;- and that tihe accident was caused by the negligence of the owner of the bridge unmixed with any fault on the part of the ship or those navigating it who acted in accordance with recognized principles of good seamanship”. So holding, he entered an interlocutory decree denying libellant any, and awarding cross-libellant full, recovery. 105 F.Supp. 958.

Complaining that the findings of the district judge are without substantial support in the evidence, indeed contrary to the truth and right of the case, and that the decree denying libellant the recovery it sought while awarding the respondent full damages, is without substantial support in the evidence, libellant is here seeking its reversal. Pointing to the undisputed fact that the bridge was not an unauthorized but an authorized structure, it insists that the damage to it, a completely stationary object, must be held to have been solely caused by the negligence of the Pan Maryland, which, moving under its own power, was so maneuvered as to run under full speed ahead bell, into, and collide with great force, with, the bridge. So pointing, it urges upon us that the evidence demanded a finding that the injury and damage was proximately caused by the negligence of the Pan Maryland without contributing fault on the part of Seaboard, and that the decree should be reversed and a decree entered in this court, or, upon directions, in the court below, awarding libellant full damages and denying cross-libellant’s claim. We agree.

It will serve no useful purpose for us to set the evidence out further than we have already done. It is sufficient to say that while it presents some conflict of view as to the course on which the vessel should have approached the bridge and some conflict of opinion as to what actually caused the collision, it shows with crystal clearness, from the testimony of the pilot himself, that the maneuvering was attended with negligence not only in the orders given leading up to, but particularly in the order for full speed ahead given just before the impact which converted what might have been a mere rubbing or scraping without injury to the bridge or boat into a ramming with great force and disastrous consequences.

Under these circumstances, where the active and effective cause of the collision was the culpably negligent navigation of the vessel, if the bridge had been, as it was not, an unlawful structure, if libellant had been, as it was not, responsible for the shoaling complained of, and the shoaling, as it was not, had been a contributing cause of the injury, the most that appellee could possibly contend for would have been divided damages. Atlee v. Union Packet Co., 21 Wall. 389, 88 U.S. 389, 22 L.Ed. 619; The Baker Bros., 2 Cir., 260 F. 650; 3 U. S. v. Norfolk-Berkley Bridge Corp., D. C., 29 F.2d 115, relied on by appellee.

*765 When, as the record shows to he the case here, the conditions claimed to be unlawful or negligent are entirely passive and have existed for many years to the knowledge of the moving vessel; when, too, the evidence is, as here, uncontradicted that, while these conditions do tend to make the passage more difficult than if they did not exist, a passage can be safely made under the conditions if due care is exercised; there is no basis in the record even for a division of the damages in favor of the actively negligent moving vessel, much less for awarding it full damage. Texas & P. Railway Co. v. Angola Transfer Co., 5 Cir., 18 F.2d 18, 20, where it is stated:

“We think appellant was entitled to rely upon boats passing through the draw navigating carefully and keeping in the middle of the stream, or at least avoiding contact with the piers.”

See also, West India Fruit & S.S. Co. v. Raymond, 5 Cir., 190 F.2d 673, at page 674, where the court said:

“The master of the Parrott had timely notice of the presence of the LevLou and it was his obligation to see to it that his vessel did not pass at such speed that danger would result from her suction or swells and he is responsible for their effects upon innocent vessels. The Hendrick-Hudson, D.C., 163 F. 862, 865, affirmed 2 Cir., 168 F. 1021.
“The fact of injury to the Lev-Lou from swells prima facie establishes the liability of the Parrott. And since she was the moving vessel she must exonerate herself from -blame by showing that it was not in her power to prevent the injury by adopting any practical precautions. Ferryboat Columbia, 1937 A.M.C. 881, 882, 884. This she failed to do.”

That the bridge was an obstruction to the free navigation of the river may not be doubted, for with the bridge not in place the channel would be wider at that point, the going would be easier, and navigation would not be slowed up or made difficult.

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Bluebook (online)
199 F.2d 761, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/seaboard-airline-r-co-v-pan-american-petroleum-transport-co-the-pan-ca5-1952.