S.D. v. Randolph County Department of Human Resources

• Court: Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama
• Decided: March 17, 2023
• Docket: CL-2022-0787
• Status: Published

Opinion

REL: March 17, 2023

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OCTOBER TERM, 2022-2023 _________________________

CL-2022-0787 _________________________

S.D.

v.

Randolph County Department of Human Resources _________________________

CL-2022-0793 _________________________

E.A.D.

Randolph County Department of Human Resources

Appeals from Randolph Juvenile Court (JU-20-14.03) CL-2022-0787 and CL-2022-0793

MOORE, Judge.

In appeal number CL-2022-0787, S.D. ("the mother") appeals from

a judgment entered by the Randolph Juvenile Court ("the juvenile court")

in case number JU-20-14.03, terminating her parental rights to H.D.

("the child"), who was born on September 27, 2012. In appeal number

CL-2022-0793, E.A.D. ("the father") appeals from that same judgment

entered in case number JU-20-14.03 to the extent that it terminated his

parental rights to the child. The mother's and the father's appeals were

consolidated by this court ex mero motu. We reverse the juvenile court's

judgment with respect to both the mother and the father.

Procedural History

The parties have previously appeared before this court. See E.A.D.

v. Randolph Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., [Ms. 2210148, July 22, 2022] ___

So. 3d ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2022). In E.A.D., this court considered appeals

by the mother and the father from the entry of two separate judgments

entered by the juvenile court that had terminated the parental rights of

the mother and the father to the child's siblings, M.D. and C.D. ___ So.

3d at ___. The procedural history of those appeals indicates, among other

2 CL-2022-0787 and CL-2022-0793

things, that, on June 8, 2021, the Randolph County Department of

Human Resources ("DHR") filed separate petitions requesting that the

juvenile court terminate the parental rights of the mother and the father

to M.D. and C.D.; that a trial was conducted on October 21, 2021; that

the juvenile court entered a separate judgment in each case on October

22, 2021, terminating the parental rights of the mother and the father to

M.D. and C.D.; and that the mother and the father had appealed from

those judgments.

Similarly, in case number JU-20-14.03, DHR filed a petition on

June 8, 2021, to terminate the parental rights of the mother and the

father to the child. The trial on the claims in the petition to terminate

the parental rights of the mother and the father to the child was

consolidated with the trial on the claims in DHR's petitions to terminate

the parental rights of the mother and the father to M.D. and C.D., after

which the juvenile court entered a judgment on October 22, 2021,

terminating the parental rights of the mother and the father to the child.

The mother and the father filed separate notices of appeal from that

judgment. The mother's appeal was docketed as appeal number 2210164

3 CL-2022-0787 and CL-2022-0793

and the father's appeal was docketed as appeal number 2210147. This

court dismissed appeal numbers 2210147 and 2210164 based on our

determination that the appeals had been taken from a nonfinal judgment

as a result of the juvenile court's failure to dispose of a motion seeking to

hold the mother in contempt filed by DHR in case number JU-20-14.03.

See E.A.D. v. Randolph Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res. (Nos. 2210147 and

2210164, May 12, 2022). See also A.C. v. C.C., 34 So. 3d 1281, 1286-87

(Ala. Civ. App. 2009) (noting that the pendency of an unadjudicated

contempt motion alleging a party's failure to obey orders entered during

the litigation renders a judgment nonfinal). On June 9, 2022, this court

issued its certificates of judgment in appeal numbers 2210147 and

2210164. On June 16, 2022, the juvenile court entered an order in case

number JU-20-14.03 denying DHR's contempt motion. On June 30, 2022,

the mother and the father timely filed separate notices of appeal to this

court. The juvenile court granted the mother's motion to incorporate the

record on appeal in E.A.D. into these present appeals.1

1This court noted in E.A.D. that the appeals at issue in those appeals had also been consolidated with appeal numbers 2210147 and 4 CL-2022-0787 and CL-2022-0793

Standard of Review

A judgment terminating parental rights must be supported by clear

and convincing evidence, which is " ' "[e]vidence that, when weighed

against evidence in opposition, will produce in the mind of the trier of fact

a firm conviction as to each essential element of the claim and a high

probability as to the correctness of the conclusion." ' " C.O. v. Jefferson

Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 206 So. 3d 621, 627 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016)

(quoting L.M. v. D.D.F., 840 So. 2d 171, 179 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002), quoting

in turn Ala. Code 1975, § 6-11-20(b)(4)).

" '[T]he evidence necessary for appellate affirmance of a judgment based on a factual finding in the context of a case in which the ultimate standard for a factual decision by the trial court is clear and convincing evidence is evidence that a fact-finder reasonably could find to clearly and convincingly … establish the fact sought to be proved.'

"KGS Steel[, Inc. v. McInish], 47 So. 3d [749,] 761 [(Ala. Civ. App. 2006)].

"… [F]or trial courts ruling … in civil cases to which a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard of proof applies, 'the judge must view the evidence presented through the prism of

2210164, but that those appeals had been dismissed by a separate order. ___ So. 3d at ___ n.1. 5 CL-2022-0787 and CL-2022-0793

the substantive evidentiary burden[,]' [Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254 (1986)]; thus, the appellate court must also look through a prism to determine whether there was substantial evidence before the trial court to support a factual finding, based upon the trial court’s weighing of the evidence, that would 'produce in the mind [of the trial court] a firm conviction as to each element of the claim and a high probability as to the correctness of the conclusion.' "

Ex parte McInish, 47 So. 3d 767, 778 (Ala. 2008). This court does not

reweigh the evidence but, rather, determines whether the findings of fact

made by the juvenile court are supported by evidence that the juvenile

court could have found to be clear and convincing. See Ex parte T.V., 971

So. 2d 1, 9 (Ala. 2007). When those findings rest on ore tenus evidence,

this court presumes their correctness. We review the legal conclusions

drawn from the evidence without a presumption of correctness. J.W. v.

C.B., 68 So. 3d 878, 879 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011).

6 CL-2022-0787 and CL-2022-0793

Analysis

The mother and the father argue that the juvenile court erred in

terminating their parental rights to the child. A juvenile court may

terminate parental rights only when one of the statutory grounds for

termination has been established and there is no other viable alternative

to termination. See Ex parte Ogle, 516 So. 2d 243 (Ala. 1987). The

judgment at issue in the present appeals is based on the same evidence

that was presented in E.A.D. In E.A.D., this court first considered the

father's argument that the juvenile court had erred in terminating his

parental rights to M.D. and C.D. because "there was not sufficient

evidence, considering his current circumstances, to prove grounds for

termination of his parental rights." ___ So. 3d at ___. In our opinion

reversing the juvenile court's judgments terminating the father's

parental rights to M.D. and C.D., this court stated, in pertinent part:

"We conclude that the facts in these cases are similar to those in H.P. [v. Jefferson County Department of Human Resources, [Ms. 2200467, Oct. 8, 2021] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2021)], A.A. [v. Jefferson County Department of Human Resources, 278 So. 3d 1247, 1249 (Ala. Civ. App. 2018)], and M.G. [v. Etowah County Department of Human Resources, 26 So. 3d 436, 443 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009).] Like the mothers in H.P. and A.A., the father in the present cases had 7 CL-2022-0787 and CL-2022-0793

initially failed to conquer his drug problem despite having access to drug-rehabilitation programs. Although at one point he had achieved sobriety for 30 days, he had relapsed after leaving a sober-living facility. However, the father subsequently completed inpatient and outpatient drug- rehabilitation programs at Rapha House and had been drug- free in the five months leading up to the trial. Although [DHR caseworker Kiera] Simmons testified that DHR was concerned about the possibility of the father's relapsing into drug use, she admitted that he had not tested positive for drugs in the five months preceding the trial and that she had not previously seen the father do well for that length of time. Based on the foregoing evidence, we conclude that, like in H.P., A.A., and M.G., 'DHR produced no evidence indicating that relapse was so likely or imminent that the [father] should have been considered as having a current drug problem that interfered with [his] ability to properly care for the children.' M.G., 26 So. 3d at 443. Moreover, like the mother in M.G., the father in the present cases had housing and employment at the time of the trial. Further, although the father had initially been inconsistent in his visitations with the children, he consistently visited with the children after he had ceased using drugs. It appears that the resolution of the father's drug issues had prompted improvement across the board in the father's life. Based on the foregoing evidence and considering this court's decisions in H.P., A.A., and M.G., we conclude that the juvenile court in the present cases could not have been clearly convinced that the father was 'unable or unwilling to discharge [his] responsibilities to and for the child[ren], or that the conduct or condition of the [father] renders [him] unable to properly care for the child[ren] and that the conduct or condition is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.' § 12-15-319(a)[, Ala. Code 1975]."

E.A.D., ___ So. 3d at ___.

8 CL-2022-0787 and CL-2022-0793

In light of our reversal of the judgments terminating the father's

parental rights to M.D. and C.D., this court also reversed the judgments

terminating the mother's parental rights to M.D. and C.D., with

instructions to the juvenile court "to consider whether placement of [M.D.

and C.D.] with the father would serve as a viable alternative to

termination of the mother's parental rights and any further action

consistent with this opinion." E.A.D., ___ So. 3d at ___.

In the present appeals, the mother and the father both argue that

the judgment terminating their parental rights to the child should be

reversed for the same reasons outlined by this court in E.A.D. DHR

acknowledges, in a letter filed with this court, that the record on appeal

in the present case is substantially the same as the record in E.A.D. and

includes the same trial transcript and evidence that this court considered

in E.A.D.; that the mother and the father assert the same arguments in

the present appeals that they asserted in E.A.D.; and that, given those

assertions and this court's opinion in E.A.D., "there appears to be no

legitimate basis for contending that the [juvenile] court's final order

terminating parental rights to [the child] should be affirmed." We agree.

9 CL-2022-0787 and CL-2022-0793

Because the present appeals rest on the same facts as those that existed

in E.A.D. and this court's analysis in the opinion issued in E.A.D. applies

equally to the arguments asserted by the mother and the father in the

present appeals, we adopt the reasoning in E.A.D. and reverse the

juvenile court's judgment terminating the parental rights of the mother

and the father to the child.

Specifically, we reverse the judgment entered by the juvenile court

on June 16, 2022, which made final the juvenile court's October 22, 2021,

judgment, insofar as it terminates the parental rights of the father to the

child, and we remand the case for further proceedings consistent with

this opinion and this court's reasoning in E.A.D. We also reverse the

June 16, 2022, judgment, which made final the juvenile court's October

22, 2021, judgment, insofar as it terminates the parental rights of the

mother to the child, and we remand the case with instructions to the

juvenile court to consider whether placement of the child with the father

would serve as a viable alternative to termination of the mother's

parental rights, in accordance with this court's discussion in E.A.D. ___

So. 3d at ___.

10 CL-2022-0787 and CL-2022-0793

CL-2022-0787 -- REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH

INSTRUCTIONS.

CL-2022-0793 -- REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH

Thompson, P.J., and Edwards, Hanson, and Fridy, JJ., concur.