Scully v. Hallihan

6 N.E.2d 176, 365 Ill. 185
CourtIllinois Supreme Court
DecidedDecember 10, 1936
DocketNo. 23773. Reversed and remanded.
StatusPublished
Cited by32 cases

This text of 6 N.E.2d 176 (Scully v. Hallihan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Illinois Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Scully v. Hallihan, 6 N.E.2d 176, 365 Ill. 185 (Ill. 1936).

Opinion

Mr. Chief Justice Herrick

delivered the opinion of the court:

The circuit court of Cook county sustained the defendant’s motion to strike (in the nature of a demurrer) the amended complaint filed May 12, 1936, by the plaintiffs Scully, Scalzitti, Centrocchio and DelMonaco, against John J. Hallihan, as director of the Department of Education and Registration, to enjoin the enforcement against them of the act in relation to the regulation of plumbing, hereinafter called the “act of 1935.” (State Bar Stat. 1935, chap. 109a, p. 2425-2431.) The plaintiffs abided. Their amended complaint was dismissed for the want of equity. They bring the record here.

The amended complaint filed on behalf of the plaintiffs and others similarly situated, made, with others, the following allegations:

(1) The four plaintiffs are each residents of Cook county, Illinois, and citizens of the United States. They are, and have been for many years last past, members of a trade known in the plumbing industry as that of “drain-layers,” and have been continuously following that trade within the city of Chicago and other parts of Cook county and desire to continue in such vocation. The first and second plaintiffs are contractors in the trade and the third and fourth are engaged as employees in such trade. There are now seven hundred men, residents of the State, who were prior to July 1, 1935, members of such calling.

(2) The trade embraces the following types of work: (a) The laying and connecting of tile, concrete and other non-metallic piping for a sanitary drainage system within a building; the laying and connecting of all tile, concrete and other non-metallic piping, drain or waste pipes carrying domestic sewage from the foundation walls of a building to the sewer service lateral at the curb or in the street or alley or other disposal terminal holding private or domestic sewage; the installation, repair, maintenance and work upon and in connection with such tile, concrete and other non-metallic piping, drain or waste pipes; (b) the laying and connecting of tile, concrete and other nonmetallic piping in and for main sewers.

(3) The work described in subdivision (b) consists principally of the actual laying of the pipe and connecting the various lengths of such pipes with cement or by other sealing processes. Approximately forty per cent of the work of the trade consists of the class of work described in subdivision (a). Work described in that subdivision of the value of many millions of dollars has been performed for many years last past by members of the trade with the utmost efficiency and without in any way endangering the public health. Plaintiffs and other members of the industry are skilled in the types of work described in subdivisions (a) and (b). There is a well recognized and well defined distinction between the plumber’s trade and the drain-laj^er’s trade. Prior to July 1, 1935, the work described in subdivisions (a) and (b) had never been considered as coming within the scope of the plumbing craft. Members of the latter occupation as such were not by training qualified to do the work described in such subdivisions (a) and (b). The work of the plumber’s trade with reference to sewage systems in the State had been confined generally, to work on metal piping. However, a very small number of sewage systems in this State have been made with metal pipes. A knowledge of the plumber’s trade is not essential to qualify a person as a member of the drain-layer’s trade. The scope of the plumber’s employment embraces many types of work which are entirely foreign to the trade of a drain-layer. There is no distinction between the work described in subdivision (a) and subdivision (b) with reference to the skill required by members of the trade and the protection of the public health. Prior to July 1, 1935, there was no State law in force in Illinois regulating or licensing members of the drain-layer’s trade. Most of the work of that trade was done in the various municipalities under the supervision of the public officials. In the city of Chicago there was, and is now, in force a city ordinance requiring members to pass an examination before following that calling, licensing the business of drain-layers as to the work specified in subdivision (a) and otherwise regulating the labor of said trade. The first and second plaintiffs were on July 1, 1935, and prior thereto, licensed under the city ordinance and the third and fourth held permits thereunder.

We have not undertaken to set out all the averments of the complaint but such portions are set forth above as we deem pertinent to the issues here. The work specified in subdivision (a) is known in the trade as “stub-sewer” work.

In the consideration of the case we assume the correctness of the facts well pleaded in the amended complaint inasmuch as their truth is admitted by the motion to strike.

The plaintiffs charge that the act of 1935 violates several constitutional provisions. It will not be necessary to consider all of them. It is first urged that the act in question runs contrary to section 22 of article 4 of our State constitution, which prohibits the granting of special privileges ; that it offends the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the Federal constitution, and that as applied to the plaintiffs and others similarly situated it is an unreasonable exercise of the police power.

The act relating to plumbers, enacted in 1917, (Smith’s Stat. 1933, chap. 24, p. 483; Cahill’s Stat. 1933, chap. 109a, p. 2142;) did not define either the word “plumber” or “plumbing.” It did not purport to regulate the character of labor set forth in subdivisions (a) and (b) or authorize licenses under that act to follow that calling. Such statute provided for examinations for licensing master plumbers and journeyman plumbers. An examining board was provided for in cities, towns and villages of 10,000 inhabitants or more. An applicant was required to pass such examination as to his qualifications as the board, with the approval of the Department of Registration and Education, might direct. The statute required the examination to be upon the applicant’s practical knowledge of plumbing, house drainage and plumbing ventilation. The fee for a certificate of a master plumber was $50, of a journeyman plumber, one dollar. The certificates were to be renewed annually.

“Plumbing,” as defined in the act of 1935, is divided into three subdivisions, as follows: “(1) All piping, fixtures, appurtenances and appliances for a supply of water for all personal or domestic purposes in and about buildings where a person or persons live, work or assemble. Plumbing as used herein shall also include piping, fixtures, appurtenances and appliances for a sanitary drainage and related ventilation system within a building, and all piping, fixtures, appurtenances and appliances outside a building connecting the building with the source of water supply on the premises or the main in the street, alley or at the curb. (2) All piping, fixtures, appurtenances, appliances, drain or waste pipes carrying domestic sewage from the foundation walls of a building to the sewer service lateral at the curb or in the street or alley or other disposal terminal holding private or domestic sewage.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Johnson v. Department of Professional Regulation
720 N.E.2d 354 (Appellate Court of Illinois, 1999)
People Ex Rel. Lumpkin v. Cassidy
703 N.E.2d 1 (Illinois Supreme Court, 1998)
Consultants & Administrators, Inc. v. Department of Insurance
431 N.E.2d 1306 (Appellate Court of Illinois, 1982)
Pozner v. Mauck
383 N.E.2d 203 (Illinois Supreme Court, 1978)
Finish Line Express, Inc. v. City of Chicago
375 N.E.2d 526 (Appellate Court of Illinois, 1978)
People v. Johnson
369 N.E.2d 898 (Illinois Supreme Court, 1977)
Chicago Title Insurance Co. v. Huff
256 N.W.2d 17 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 1977)
Williams v. City of Chicago
343 N.E.2d 539 (Appellate Court of Illinois, 1976)
Green v. Shama
217 N.W.2d 547 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 1974)
People Ex Rel. Holland Coal Co. v. Isaacs
176 N.E.2d 889 (Illinois Supreme Court, 1961)
United Interchange, Inc. v. Spellacy
136 A.2d 801 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1957)
Turner v. Wright
142 N.E.2d 84 (Illinois Supreme Court, 1957)
Figura v. Cummins
122 N.E.2d 162 (Illinois Supreme Court, 1954)
State v. Finley
64 N.W.2d 769 (Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1954)
People v. Brown
95 N.E.2d 888 (Illinois Supreme Court, 1950)
Sager v. City of Silvis
83 N.E.2d 683 (Illinois Supreme Court, 1949)
People Ex Rel. Barrett v. Thillens
79 N.E.2d 609 (Illinois Supreme Court, 1948)
Stough v. Brach
70 N.E.2d 585 (Illinois Supreme Court, 1946)
Vrooman v. Hawbaker
56 N.E.2d 623 (Illinois Supreme Court, 1944)
Ohio Oil Co. v. Wright
53 N.E.2d 966 (Illinois Supreme Court, 1944)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
6 N.E.2d 176, 365 Ill. 185, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/scully-v-hallihan-ill-1936.