Banghart v. Walsh

171 N.E. 154, 339 Ill. 132
CourtIllinois Supreme Court
DecidedApril 17, 1930
DocketNo. 20077. Reversed and remanded.
StatusPublished
Cited by29 cases

This text of 171 N.E. 154 (Banghart v. Walsh) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Illinois Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Banghart v. Walsh, 171 N.E. 154, 339 Ill. 132 (Ill. 1930).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Dunn

delivered the opinion of the court:

The circuit court of Sangamon county sustained a demurrer to an amended bill filed on November 4, 1929, by Jessie M. Banghart and Frances Kalina against Michael F. Walsh, director of the Department of Registration and Education, to enjoin the enforcement against them, and others similarly situated, of the act of 1909 to regulate the business of barbers, as subsequently amended, including the act of June 25, 1929. (Laws of 1929, p. 189.) The complainants electing to stand by their bill, it was dismissed for want of equity, and they appealed.

The bill, which was filed in behalf of all others similarly situated as well as the complainants, alleged that the complainants were citizens of the United States and residents of Illinois and had been engaged for a number of years as beauty-shop operators and beauty culturists and in cutting women’s hair, incidental to their practice as beauty-shop operators and beauty culturists. The occupation of beauty-shop operator and beauty culturist is engaged in principally by women and is practiced upon the persons of women, and it has been customary for those engaged in it to do all the work incidental to the arrangement and dressing of women’s hair, including cutting and trimming, as a. necessary part of that occupation. The occupation of barber is made up principally of men and is practiced upon the persons of men.

In 1909 the act to regulate the business of barbers was passed. (Laws of 1909, p. 98.) Its twelfth section was: “To shave or trim the beard or cut the hair of any person for hire by the person performing such service or any other person, shall be construed as practicing the occupation of barber within the meaning of this act.” That section was amended in 1923 to read as follows: “To shave or "trim the beard or cut the hair, to give facial and scalp massaging, facial and scalp treatments with oils and creams and other preparations made for this purpose, either by hand or by mechanical appliances, to singe and shampoo the hair or apply any person performing such service or any other person shall be construed as practicing the occupation of barber within the meaning of this act: Provided, however, that nothing contained in this act shall be construed to include so-called beauty shops or hairdressing parlors patronized by women, except as to the cutting of hair.” (Laws of 1923, p. 165.) After this amendment the Department of Registration and Education issued to appellants and other beauty culturists, certificates or licenses which authorized them to cut and trim the hair of their patrons, and licenses were renewed from year to year.

In 1925 an act relating to the practice of beauty culture was passed. (Laws of 1925, p. 174.) Section 2 was as follows: “Any one or any combination of the following practices constitutes the practice of beauty culture when done for cosmetic or beautifying purposes and not for the treatment of disease or of muscular or nervous disorder. The application of cosmetic preparations to the human body by massaging, stroking, kneading, slapping, tapping, stimulating, manipulating, exercising, cleansing, beautifying, or by means of devices, apparatus or appliances; arranging, dressing, marcelling, curling, waving, cleansing, singeing, bleaching, coloring, dyeing, tinting, or otherwise treating by any means the hair of any person. However, the provisions of this act shall not authorize any registered beauty culturist to cut or clip the hair of any person unless he has first obtained a certificate of registration as a barber under the provisions of ‘An act to regulate the pursuit of the business, art and avocation of a barber, and to insure the better qualifications of persons following such business in the State of Illinois.’ Approved June 10, 1909, as amended.” The complainants qualified under this act, paid their fees and are now registered under it.

About June 1, 1929, the complainants applied to the department for a renewal of their licenses to cut and trim hair, but their applications were refused and they were advised that the department had ceased to issue such licenses in 1928, and it would be necessary for them and other beauty-shop operators and beauty culturists to cease cutting and trimming their patrons’ hair until they had qualified as barbers under the Barbers act. This was the first notice the complainants received that the State would attempt to deprive them of a vital, necessary and important part of their business. The defendant, as director of the department, threatened to enforce the Barbers act against the complainants and others similarly situated, construing it as prohibiting them from cutting and trimming hair.

In 1929 the Barbers act was amended by a general revision, and section 12 became section 18, as follows: “To shave or trim the beard or cut the hair, to give facial and scalp massaging, facial and scalp treatments with oils and creams and other preparations made for this purpose, either by hand or by mechanical appliances, to singe and shampoo the hair or apply any makes of hair tonics and to dye the hair of any person for hire by the person performing such service or any other person shall be construed as practicing the occupation of barber within the meaning of this act: Provided, however, that nothing contained in this act shall be construed to include so-called beauty shops or hairdressing parlors patronized by women, except as to the cutting of hair.” (Laws of 1929, p. 189.) Since the amendment of 1929 the defendant, as director of the department, has threatened, and does threaten, appellants and other beauty culturists with arrest and prosecution in the event they continue to cut and trim the hair of their patrons, even though such cutting and trimming are done as an incidental part of arranging or dressing the hair. The complainants are informed and believe that other beauty-shop operators and beauty culturists have been arrested and prosecuted by the defendant for cutting and trimming the hair of their patrons incidental to the work of their occupation of beauty culture.

The Barbers act as amended in 1929, it is alleged, denies the equal protection of the law, in violation of the fourteenth amendment of the constitution of the United States, and confers special privileges, immunities and franchises by special law, in violation of section 22 of article 4 of the constitution of the State; it deprives the complainants and other beauty-shop operators and beauty culturists of their liberty and property without due process of law, in violation of section 2 of article 2 of the constitution of the State and of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States; it is an illegal restriction upon the right of contract; it is ambiguous, uncertain and impossible of enforcement; it interferes with the conduct in Illinois of a legitimate occupation by citizens of other States, and is an unreasonable exercise of the State’s police power.

The bill further alleges that there are more than 15,000 beauty culturists registered in the State under the Beauty Culture act of 1925, most of whom, as the complainants are informed and believe, have been cutting and trimming their patrons’ hair as a necessary part of their occupation for many years. In the event of the enforcement of the Barbers act against them it is estimated that the average income loss would amount to as much as twenty-five per cent of their gross business.

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Bluebook (online)
171 N.E. 154, 339 Ill. 132, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/banghart-v-walsh-ill-1930.