1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 Case No.: 3:23-cv-00259-CSD JAMES EDWARD SCOTT, III, 4 Order Plaintiff 5 Re: ECF No. 39 v. 6 MIKE W. HENLEY, et al., 7 Defendants 8
9 Before the court is Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 39.) Plaintiff 10 has not filed a response. 11 For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motion is granted. 12 I. BACKGROUND 13 When Plaintiff filed this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he was an 14 inmate in the custody of the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDOC). He was subsequently 15 released from prison. The events giving rise to this action took place while Plaintiff was housed 16 at Northern Nevada Correctional Center (NNCC). 17 The court screened Plaintiff’s amended complaint and allowed him to proceed with a 18 claim for lack of procedural due process related to his placement in administrative segregation 19 under the Fourteenth Amendment. 20 Defendants move for summary judgment, arguing Plaintiff failed to exhaust 21 administrative remedies prior to filing this lawsuit, and they are entitled to qualified immunity 22 because there was no constitutional violation. 23 1 II. LEGAL STANDARD 2 The legal standard governing this motion is well settled: a party is entitled to summary 3 judgment when “the movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the 4 movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp.
5 v. Cartrett, 477 U.S. 317, 330 (1986) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). An issue is “genuine” if the 6 evidence would permit a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. 7 Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). A fact is “material” if it could affect the outcome 8 of the case. Id. at 248 (disputes over facts that might affect the outcome will preclude summary 9 judgment, but factual disputes which are irrelevant or unnecessary are not considered). On the 10 other hand, where reasonable minds could differ on the material facts at issue, summary 11 judgment is not appropriate. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. 12 “The purpose of summary judgment is to avoid unnecessary trials when there is no 13 dispute as to the facts before the court.” Northwest Motorcycle Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 18 14 F.3d 1468, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted); see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24 (purpose
15 of summary judgment is "to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims"); Anderson, 477 16 U.S. at 252 (purpose of summary judgment is to determine whether a case "is so one-sided that 17 one party must prevail as a matter of law"). In considering a motion for summary judgment, all 18 reasonable inferences are drawn in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. In re 19 Slatkin, 525 F.3d 805, 810 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted); Kaiser Cement Corp. v. Fischbach 20 & Moore Inc., 793 F.2d 1100, 1103 (9th Cir. 1986). That being said, "if the evidence of the 21 nonmoving party "is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson, 22 477 U.S. at 249-250 (citations omitted). The court's function is not to weigh the evidence and 23 1 determine the truth or to make credibility determinations. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 249, 255; 2 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. 3 In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court applies a burden-shifting analysis. 4 “When the party moving for summary judgment would bear the burden of proof at trial, ‘it must
5 come forward with evidence which would entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went 6 uncontroverted at trial.’… In such a case, the moving party has the initial burden of establishing 7 the absence of a genuine [dispute] of fact on each issue material to its case.” C.A.R. Transp. 8 Brokerage Co. v. Darden Rest., Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal citations 9 omitted). In contrast, when the nonmoving party bears the burden of proving the claim or 10 defense, the moving party can meet its burden in two ways: (1) by presenting evidence to negate 11 an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case; or (2) by demonstrating that the nonmoving 12 party cannot establish an element essential to that party’s case on which that party will have the 13 burden of proof at trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Cartrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25 (1986). 14 If the moving party satisfies its initial burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to
15 establish that a genuine dispute exists as to a material fact. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. 16 Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The opposing party need not establish a genuine 17 dispute of material fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the claimed factual dispute 18 be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of truth at trial.” 19 T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987) 20 (quotation marks and citation omitted). The nonmoving party cannot avoid summary judgment 21 by relying solely on conclusory allegations that are unsupported by factual data. Matsushita, 475 22 U.S. at 587. Instead, the opposition must go beyond the assertions and allegations of the 23 1 pleadings and set forth specific facts by producing competent evidence that shows a genuine 2 dispute of material fact for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. 3 III. DISCUSSION 4 The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) provides that “[n]o action shall be brought
5 with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a 6 prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative 7 remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). An inmate must exhaust his 8 administrative remedies irrespective of the forms of relief sought and offered through 9 administrative avenues. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). 10 The failure to exhaust administrative remedies is "'an affirmative defense the defendant 11 must plead and prove.'" Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Jones v. 12 Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 204, 216 (2007)). Unless the failure to exhaust is clear from the face of the 13 complaint, the defense must be raised in a motion for summary judgment. See id. (overruling in 14 part Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003) which stated that failure to exhaust
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1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 Case No.: 3:23-cv-00259-CSD JAMES EDWARD SCOTT, III, 4 Order Plaintiff 5 Re: ECF No. 39 v. 6 MIKE W. HENLEY, et al., 7 Defendants 8
9 Before the court is Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 39.) Plaintiff 10 has not filed a response. 11 For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motion is granted. 12 I. BACKGROUND 13 When Plaintiff filed this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he was an 14 inmate in the custody of the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDOC). He was subsequently 15 released from prison. The events giving rise to this action took place while Plaintiff was housed 16 at Northern Nevada Correctional Center (NNCC). 17 The court screened Plaintiff’s amended complaint and allowed him to proceed with a 18 claim for lack of procedural due process related to his placement in administrative segregation 19 under the Fourteenth Amendment. 20 Defendants move for summary judgment, arguing Plaintiff failed to exhaust 21 administrative remedies prior to filing this lawsuit, and they are entitled to qualified immunity 22 because there was no constitutional violation. 23 1 II. LEGAL STANDARD 2 The legal standard governing this motion is well settled: a party is entitled to summary 3 judgment when “the movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the 4 movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp.
5 v. Cartrett, 477 U.S. 317, 330 (1986) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). An issue is “genuine” if the 6 evidence would permit a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. 7 Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). A fact is “material” if it could affect the outcome 8 of the case. Id. at 248 (disputes over facts that might affect the outcome will preclude summary 9 judgment, but factual disputes which are irrelevant or unnecessary are not considered). On the 10 other hand, where reasonable minds could differ on the material facts at issue, summary 11 judgment is not appropriate. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. 12 “The purpose of summary judgment is to avoid unnecessary trials when there is no 13 dispute as to the facts before the court.” Northwest Motorcycle Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 18 14 F.3d 1468, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted); see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24 (purpose
15 of summary judgment is "to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims"); Anderson, 477 16 U.S. at 252 (purpose of summary judgment is to determine whether a case "is so one-sided that 17 one party must prevail as a matter of law"). In considering a motion for summary judgment, all 18 reasonable inferences are drawn in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. In re 19 Slatkin, 525 F.3d 805, 810 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted); Kaiser Cement Corp. v. Fischbach 20 & Moore Inc., 793 F.2d 1100, 1103 (9th Cir. 1986). That being said, "if the evidence of the 21 nonmoving party "is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson, 22 477 U.S. at 249-250 (citations omitted). The court's function is not to weigh the evidence and 23 1 determine the truth or to make credibility determinations. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 249, 255; 2 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. 3 In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court applies a burden-shifting analysis. 4 “When the party moving for summary judgment would bear the burden of proof at trial, ‘it must
5 come forward with evidence which would entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went 6 uncontroverted at trial.’… In such a case, the moving party has the initial burden of establishing 7 the absence of a genuine [dispute] of fact on each issue material to its case.” C.A.R. Transp. 8 Brokerage Co. v. Darden Rest., Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal citations 9 omitted). In contrast, when the nonmoving party bears the burden of proving the claim or 10 defense, the moving party can meet its burden in two ways: (1) by presenting evidence to negate 11 an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case; or (2) by demonstrating that the nonmoving 12 party cannot establish an element essential to that party’s case on which that party will have the 13 burden of proof at trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Cartrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25 (1986). 14 If the moving party satisfies its initial burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to
15 establish that a genuine dispute exists as to a material fact. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. 16 Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The opposing party need not establish a genuine 17 dispute of material fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the claimed factual dispute 18 be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of truth at trial.” 19 T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987) 20 (quotation marks and citation omitted). The nonmoving party cannot avoid summary judgment 21 by relying solely on conclusory allegations that are unsupported by factual data. Matsushita, 475 22 U.S. at 587. Instead, the opposition must go beyond the assertions and allegations of the 23 1 pleadings and set forth specific facts by producing competent evidence that shows a genuine 2 dispute of material fact for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. 3 III. DISCUSSION 4 The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) provides that “[n]o action shall be brought
5 with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a 6 prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative 7 remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). An inmate must exhaust his 8 administrative remedies irrespective of the forms of relief sought and offered through 9 administrative avenues. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). 10 The failure to exhaust administrative remedies is "'an affirmative defense the defendant 11 must plead and prove.'" Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Jones v. 12 Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 204, 216 (2007)). Unless the failure to exhaust is clear from the face of the 13 complaint, the defense must be raised in a motion for summary judgment. See id. (overruling in 14 part Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003) which stated that failure to exhaust
15 should be raised in an "unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion"). 16 "If undisputed evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the prisoner shows a failure 17 to exhaust, a defendant is entitled to summary judgment under Rule 56.” Id. at 1168. Once a 18 defendant shows that the plaintiff did not exhaust available administrative remedies, the burden 19 shifts to the plaintiff "to come forward with evidence showing that there is something in his 20 particular case that made the existing and generally available administrative remedies effectively 21 unavailable to him." Id. at 1172 (citing Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 778 n. 5 (9th 22 Cir. 1996)); Draper v. Rosario, 836 F.3d 1072, 1080 (9th Cir. 2016) (inmate plaintiff did not 23 meet his burden when he failed to identify any actions prison staff took that impeded his ability 1 to exhaust his administrative remedies, or otherwise explain why he failed to comply with the 2 administrative remedies process)). The ultimate burden of proof, however, remains with the 3 defendant. Id. 4 Exhaustion cannot be satisfied by filing an untimely or otherwise procedurally infirm
5 grievance, but rather, the PLRA requires “proper exhaustion.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 89 6 (2006). “Proper exhaustion” refers to “using all steps the agency holds out, and doing so 7 properly (so that the agency addresses the issues on the merits).” Id. (emphasis in original) 8 (quoting Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1024 (7th Cir. 2002)). Thus, “[s]ection 1997e(a) 9 requires an inmate not only to pursue every available step of the prison grievance process but 10 also to adhere to the ‘critical procedural rules’ of that process.” Reyes v. Smith, 810 F.3d 654, 11 657 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90). “[I]t is the prison’s requirements, and 12 not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 13 218 (2007). 14 Inmates within NDOC must utilize the grievance process set forth in Administrative
15 Regulation (AR) 740 to exhaust administrative remedies. (See ECF No. 39-6.) AR 740 requires 16 an inmate to pursue a grievance through three levels: informal, first and second levels. (Id.) 17 A review of Plaintiff’s grievance history, attached as Exhibit E to Defendants’ motion for 18 summary judgment, demonstrates that he did not complete a grievance through the second level 19 complaining about the lack of due process related to his placement in administrative segregation. 20 (ECF No. 39-5.) 21 Plaintiff did not oppose the motion for summary judgment to argue that he did exhaust 22 administrative remedies for this claim or that administrative remedies were unavailable. 23 ] Therefore, the court finds Plaintiff failed to properly exhaust administrative remedies 2|| prior to filing his civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 3 IV. CONCLUSION 4 Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing this this crvil nghts 5|| action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Therefore, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment 6]| (ECF No. 39.) is GRANTED and JUDGMENT should be entered in Defendants’ favor. IS SO ORDERED. Dated: July 23, 2025 CS oy Craig S. Denney 10 United States Magistrate Judge 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23