Scott v. Fisher Knitting Mach. Co.

145 F. 915, 76 C.C.A. 447, 1906 U.S. App. LEXIS 4049
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit
DecidedMay 22, 1906
DocketNos. 163-166
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 145 F. 915 (Scott v. Fisher Knitting Mach. Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Scott v. Fisher Knitting Mach. Co., 145 F. 915, 76 C.C.A. 447, 1906 U.S. App. LEXIS 4049 (2d Cir. 1906).

Opinion

TOWNSEND, Circuit Judge.

The art discussed herein relates to knitted fabrics and the machines by which they are produced. The patent in suit covers a machine for producing a heavy knit material, capable of use in making winter undergarments. Its construction is fully explained in the opinion of the court below. -139 Fed. 137.

The claims in suit are as follows:

“(1) A knitting', machine having two sets of needles and cams therefor for producing ribbed fabrics, jacks or loopers, cams and a bed therefor, operated by the driving mechanism of said machine to interlace a supplemental thread with the meshes produced by the said needles* substantially as and for .the purposes set forth. * * * ”
“(3) A circular knitting machine having two sets of needles, needle-cylinder, cam-cylinder, needle-dial, and cam-dial, together with jacks or loopers operatively mounted in grooves of a jack-bed, fastened to the needle-dial, and cams adapted to operate the said jacks or loojiers in conjunction with the said needles, to interlace'a supplemental thread with the meshes produced by the said needles, substantially as and for tlie purposes set forth. * * * ”
“(6) A circular knitting machine having two sets of needles , and means for operating the same, a system of loopers or jacks operated hs' cams to interlace a supplemental thread with the meshes produced by the said needles, and means for supplying the said loopers with yam, substantially as and for the purposes set forth.
“(7) In a circular rib knitting- machine the combination of two sets of needles, a cylinder, and a dial therefor, a system of loopers or jacks, guided' in slots of the said dial, a bed for said loopers or jacks, and means for operating the said needles and loopers, substantially as and for tbe purposes set forth.”

Beilis was the first to produce “a fleecing ribber” and the new fabric known as “fleece rib.” Machines for producing a fleecy inner face on plain knit fabrics had been known for some 13 years prior to the invention of the patent in suit. Ribbed goods had been fleeced by carding the body threads. But plain knit fabrics were inelastic, and carding the body threads weakened the garment. The demand for a fabric which would obviate these objections is indicated by the commercial success of complainants’ and defendants’ manufactures. That the construction of a machine capable of producing such a fabric was not obvious appears from the 31 prior patents introduced by defendants,' no one of which showed a solution of the problem, and fronr the inability of defendants’ experts to construct from the prior art any practical fleecing ribber, or to satisfactorily indicate, how the prior structures could be so adapted as to produce a fleece rib, without radical and substantial modifications, involving the exercise of invention, and by .the further very significant facts that the Scott patents, Nos. 577,788 and 577,789, for rib knitting machines, applied for prior to the issue of the Beilis patent, proceeded upon a theory, and were constructed upon a plan, radically different from the suggestions furnished by the prior art as testified to by defendants’ experts, and that, after the Beilis disclosures, Scott abandoned his former construction, followed Beilis, and finally secured a half interest in the Beilis patent.

The only prior limiting machine material to this discussion is that of the Cooper & Ford, British Patent No. 172, of 1887. But this was a plain nonribbing knitter, provided with' loopers, and if the second set of needles be added thereto in order to make a ribbed fabric, it [917]*917would not operate as a looper at all. The solution of the problem is not accomplished by the introduction of another set of knitting needles into said Cooper & Ford or the prior Sturgess & Hearth machines, because in each of them, as is admitted by defendants’ expert:

“Tlie stretches of supplemental thread which would be exposed on the unribbed fabric would be imbedded and inwrappod within the fabric when made ribbed by the addition of a second set of needles.”

Nor is the solution of the problem furthered by the ribbed fabric machines of the prior art. The closest of them (that of Lecaisne, of 1892), which laid an extra thread in the fabric, need not be discussed, because .it was not enumerated by defendants’ expert in his list of 10 specially pertinent patents, because it is not a looper, and furnishes no suggestion of means for making loops, and because Cooper & Ford in the second patent, chiefly relied on by defendants, abandoned Lecaisne in order to produce a looper. This, therefore, is a case where, so far as concerns machines for making the new fabric, there is no prior art, and, so far as concerns machines for making the old fabrics, they apparently, at most, failed to furnish any suggestion of adaptation to the new purpose, hut, as complainants claim, and there is some evidence to support the claim, their construction would tend to lead the inventor away from, rather than toward, the right path for the attainment of the object sought.

The arguments directed to a limitation of the scope of the patent m suit consist, first, in the following criticisms of its language, in connection with tliat of Beilis’ fabric patent, No. 561,559. His object was to construct “a machine which is capable of producing a ribbed knit fabric with backing,” described in his patent therefor, consisting of “a two-ply rib knit webbing,” or provided with “a backing on the ribbed knit fabric, which may be of a different material from that of which the body of the fabric is composed,” to be introduced “while the latter is being produced.” The result, the production of a “ribbed knit fabric with backing,” was accomplished by means of “jacks or loopers operated to act in conjunction with the needles to interlace a supplemental thread with the meshes composing the body of the ribbed fabric.” “But to produce a backing on such fabric while the .latter is being produced devices must be provided which bring the backing or supplemental thread from the inside of the machine over the needles at certain and predetermined intervals, so that it may be interlaced with the meshes of the fabric as will be hereinafter more fully described,” and the jacks must rise to push the thread “over a needle, to be interlaced with a mesh formed by such needle.” There is no statement in the patent that its object was to construct a machine capable of producing loops to be fleeced.

It is admitted that the machine of the patent in suit makes a fabric described in the Beilis fabric patent as one which can be finished in one operation, and that when so finished it is a completed article, with a substantial backing before it is fleeced, while defendants’ fabric has only floating loops for its backing, and is not a completed article until- it has been fleeced.

[918]*918It is further admitted that there are substantial differences in, the construction and operation of the two machines, and that the construction of defendants’ machine follows in certain details the machines of the prior art.

In the light of these facts we are brought to a consideration of the status and scope of the patent in suit and of the single issue in the case — that of infringement. The criticisms upon the language of the patent itself will first be considered.

■It is objected that there is no reference in the specification to the fact that the object of the invention was to produce a fabric capable of being fleeced.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
145 F. 915, 76 C.C.A. 447, 1906 U.S. App. LEXIS 4049, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/scott-v-fisher-knitting-mach-co-ca2-1906.