UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
AMELIA SCOTT, Case No. 1:24-cv-00425-AKB Plaintiff, INITIAL REVIEW ORDER BY v. SCREENING JUDGE
SHERIFF MATTHEW CLIFFORD; GOVERNOR BRAD LITTLE; and ADA COUNTY COMMISSIONER,
Defendants.
The Clerk of Court conditionally filed Plaintiff Amelia Scott’s Complaint because of Plaintiff’s status as an inmate and in forma pauperis request. A “conditional filing” means that a plaintiff must obtain authorization from the Court to proceed. Upon screening, the Court must dismiss claims that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b). Having reviewed the record, the Court concludes that the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Accordingly, the Court enters the following Order directing Plaintiff to file an amended complaint if Plaintiff intends to proceed. 1. Standards of Law for Screening Complaints A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A complaint fails to state a claim for relief under Rule 8 if the factual assertions in the complaint, taken as true, are insufficient for the reviewing court plausibly “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). To state an actionable claim, a plaintiff must provide “enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest” that the defendant committed the unlawful act, meaning that sufficient facts are pled “to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal [activity].” Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Iqbal, 556 US. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). The Court liberally construes the pleadings to determine whether a case should be dismissed for a failure to plead sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory or for the absence of a cognizable legal theory. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable factual and legal basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989) (discussing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000).
2. Factual Allegations Plaintiff is an inmate currently held in the Ada County Jail. The entire factual basis of Plaintiff’s claims is as follows: Brad Little Governor & Ada County Commissioner received reports of this abuse, Sheriff allowed his staff to knowingly neglect and deprive women inmates in the Ada County Jail of basic human needs and rights. The Sheriff allowed ACJ deputies to deny women underwear and proper clothing. The jail staff blocked access to courts by denying PREA [Prison Rape Elimination Act] victims in ACJ custody access to the federal court clerk, the Canyon County court clerk, the Ada County court clerk, and ACLU, sexual assault coalition, a phone book. The jail tampered with our legal mail & opened our legal mail not in our presence. The jail allowed retaliation for use of the grievance system and failed to protect a woman who reported PREA inside the jail. (Compl., Dkt. 3, at 2) (capitalization regularized). Plaintiff sues Ada County Sheriff Matthew Clifford, Idaho Governor Brad Little, and an unidentified Ada County Commissioner. She seeks injunctive and declaratory relief. (Id.). 3. Discussion Plaintiff’s allegations are overly vague and generalized and, therefore, do not state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The Court will, however, grant Plaintiff twenty-eight (28) days
to amend the Complaint. Any amended complaint should take into consideration the following. A. Section 1983 Claims Plaintiff brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the federal civil rights statute. To state a plausible civil rights claim, a plaintiff must allege a violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute proximately caused by conduct of a person acting under color of state law. Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). A defendant causes a constitutional deprivation within the meaning of § 1983 “if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). That is, jail officials generally are not liable for damages in their individual capacities under
§ 1983 unless they personally participated in the alleged constitutional violations. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677 (“[E]ach Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.”). Section 1983 does not allow for recovery against an employer or principal simply because an employee or agent committed misconduct. Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045. However, “[a] defendant may be held liable as a supervisor under § 1983 ‘if there exists . . . a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.’” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989)). A plaintiff can establish this causal connection by alleging a defendant (1) set in motion a series of acts by others that violated the Constitution, or knowingly refused to terminate a series of such acts, which the supervisor “knew or reasonably should have known would cause others to inflict a constitutional injury”; (2) knowingly failed to act or acted improperly “in the training, supervision, or control of his subordinates”; (3) acquiesced in the constitutional deprivation; or (4) engaged in conduct showing “a reckless or callous indifference
to the rights of others.” Id. at 1205-09 (internal quotation marks omitted). A plaintiff may also seek injunctive relief from officials who have direct responsibility in the area in which the plaintiff seeks relief. See Rounds v. Oregon State Bd. of Higher Educ., 166 F.3d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 1999). A claim that a supervisor or training official failed to adequately train subordinates ordinarily requires that, “in light of the duties assigned to specific officers or employees[,] the need for more or different training [was] so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the [supervisor or training official] can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989). That is, to maintain a failure-to-train claim, a plaintiff must allege facts showing a “pattern of
violations” that amounts to deliberate indifference. Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 72 (2011). Likewise, “a failure to supervise that is sufficiently inadequate may amount to deliberate indifference” that supports a § 1983 claim, but there generally must be a pattern of violations sufficient to render the need for further supervision obvious. Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). That is, if a supervisory or training official had “knowledge of the unconstitutional conditions” through such a pattern of violations—including knowledge of the “culpable actions of his subordinates”—yet failed to act to remedy those conditions, that official can be said to have acquiesced “in the unconstitutional conduct of his subordinates” such that a causal connection between the supervisor and the constitutional violation is plausible. Starr, 652 F.3d at 1208. A plaintiff cannot simply restate these standards of law in a complaint. Instead, a plaintiff must provide specific facts supporting the elements of each claim and must allege facts showing a causal link between each defendant and Plaintiff’s injury or damage. Alleging “the mere possibility
of misconduct” is not enough. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. i. Conditions-of-Confinement Claims It is unclear whether Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee or a convicted inmate at the time her claims arose. If she was a convicted inmate, then the Eighth Amendment applies. That amendment protects prisoners against cruel and unusual punishment and guarantees the right to minimally adequate conditions of confinement. “[T]he Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, and prisons . . . cannot be free of discomfort.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981). However, though prison conditions may be restrictive—even harsh—without violating the Eighth Amendment, prison officials are required to provide inmates with adequate food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety. Id. at 347-48; Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246
(9th Cir. 1982), abrogated on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). To state a claim under the Eighth Amendment, a prisoner must show that she is (or was) “incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm,” or that she has been deprived of “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities” as a result of the defendants’ actions. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). An Eighth Amendment claim requires the plaintiff to satisfy both (1) an objective standard, “that the deprivation was serious enough to constitute cruel and unusual punishment,” and (2) a subjective standard, that the defendant acted with “deliberate indifference.” Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 2012), overruled in part on other grounds by Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). As for the objective prong of the analysis, “[n]ot every governmental action affecting the interests or well-being of a prisoner is subject to Eighth Amendment scrutiny.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). Rather, the deprivation alleged must be objectively sufficiently harmful
or, in other words, sufficiently “grave” or “serious.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991); see Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319 (“After incarceration, only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.”) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). With respect to the subjective prong of an Eighth Amendment violation, “deliberate indifference entails something more than mere negligence, [but] is satisfied by something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. “To be cruel and unusual punishment, conduct that does not purport to be punishment at all must involve more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner’s interests
or safety.” Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319. To exhibit deliberate indifference, a defendant “must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. “If a [prison official] should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the [official] has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.” Gibson v. Cnty. of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002), overruled on other grounds by Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2016). Moreover, even prison officials who did actually know of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety will not be liable under § 1983 “if they responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844. If an inmate faces a “threat of serious harm or injury” from another inmate, prison officials who act with deliberate indifference to that threat are subject to liability under § 1983. Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833 (“Having
incarcerated persons with demonstrated proclivities for antisocial criminal, and often violent, conduct, having stripped them of virtually every means of self-protection and foreclosed their access to outside aid, the government and its officials are not free to let the state of nature take its course.”) (internal citation and alterations omitted). Deliberate indifference in the context of a failure-to-protect claim does not require that a prison official knew the plaintiff “was especially likely to be assaulted by the specific prisoner who eventually committed the assault.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843. However, the deliberate indifference standard does mean that even an obvious and substantial risk of assault by one inmate against another does not result in liability so long as the defendant official was not subjectively aware of that risk. Id. at 844.
If Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at the time her claims arose, then her conditions-of- confinement claim must be analyzed under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. That Clause prohibits the government from depriving an individual or life, liberty, or property without due process of law. A due process violation occurs when the conditions to which a pretrial detainee is subjected amount to punishment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). Conditions-of-detention claims are analyzed using a standard of “objective deliberate indifference.” Gordon v. Cnty. of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 2018). Under that standard, a detainee must establish the following elements: (i) the defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions under which the plaintiff was confined; (ii) those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious harm; (iii) the defendant did not take reasonable available measures to abate that risk, even though a reasonable official in the circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk involved—making the consequences of the defendant’s conduct obvious; and (iv) by not taking such measures, the defendant caused the plaintiff’s injuries. Id. The application of this standard “will necessarily turn on the facts and circumstances of each particular case.” Id. (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). Although the Court uses an objective standard in evaluating conditions-of-detention claims of pretrial detainees, this standard must not be confused with the objective standard used for evaluating claims of negligence under state law. This is because negligence—the “mere lack of due care” by a governmental official—“does not deprive an individual of life, liberty, or property under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Castro, 833 F.3d at 1071; see also Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986) (stating that negligence and ordinary negligence are not actionable under § 1983, because such actions are not an abuse of governmental power but merely a “failure to measure up to the conduct of a reasonable person”). Therefore, a pretrial detainee complaining of unconstitutional conditions of detention must “prove more than negligence but less than subjective intent—something akin to reckless disregard.” Castro, 833 F.3d at 1071. Plaintiff should keep these standards in mind if she files an amended complaint, and she must clarify whether she was a pretrial detainee or a convicted inmate at the time of the events giving rise to her claims. ii. First Amendment Claims Plaintiff asserts claims under the First Amendment. Compl. at 2. The standard governing inmates’ First Amendment claims was outlined by the United States Supreme Court in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). There, the Court examined the free speech issue in the context of prison officials prohibiting correspondence between inmates residing at different state institutions. The Court held that “when a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Id. at 89. The Turner Court identified four factors to consider when determining whether a prison regulation is valid: (1) whether there is a “rational connection between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it”; (2) whether “there are alternative means of
exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates”; (3) what “impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally”; and (4) whether “ready alternatives” at a “de minimis cost” exist, which “may be evidence that the regulation is not reasonable, but is an exaggerated response to prison concerns.” Id. at 89-93. The Turner analysis appropriately allows prison officials substantial leeway in the management of their prisons because “[s]ubjecting the day-to-day judgments of prison officials to an inflexible strict scrutiny analysis would seriously hamper their ability to anticipate security problems and to adopt innovative solutions to the intractable problems of prison administration.”
Id. at 89. Federal courts must apply the Turner test so as to “accord great deference to prison officials’ assessments of their interests.” Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 331 (9th Cir. 1988). The Turner analysis applies to pretrial detainees. See Bull v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 595 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2010). The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has clarified that, in applying the Turner test to pretrial detainees—who may not be punished—the legitimate penological interests in security and safety apply, but “the penological interests in punishment and rehabilitation may not be applicable outside the prison setting.” Id. at 974 n.10. Therefore, in considering claims of pretrial detainees challenging jail regulations or policies, “courts must defer to the judgment of [jail] officials unless the record contains substantial evidence showing their policies are an unnecessary or unjustified response to problems of jail security.” Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Cnty. of Burlington, 566 U.S. 318, 322-23 (2012). a) Claims of Interference with Legal Mail Inmates enjoy a First Amendment right to send and receive mail. Thornburgh v. Abbott,
490 U.S. 401, 407 (1989). However, a prison or jail may adopt regulations or practices that impinge on a prisoner’s right to send and receive mail if those regulations are “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. Specific allegations that mail delivery was delayed for an inordinate amount of time are sufficient to state a claim for violation of the First Amendment. Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1432 (7th Cir. 1996). A temporary delay in the delivery of mail resulting from a prison’s security inspection, however, does not violate a prisoner’s First Amendment rights. Crofton v. Roe, 170 F.3d 957, 961 (9th Cir. 1999). Different standards apply to restrictions on inmate mail, depending on whether the mail is considered legal mail or non-legal mail. Mail from the courts, as contrasted to mail from a prisoner’s lawyer, is not legal mail. See Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1094 (9th Cir. 1996), as
amended, 135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998). Because “freedom from censorship is not equivalent to freedom from inspection or perusal,” prison officials have the right to open and to inspect legal mail from attorneys to inmates or from inmates to attorneys. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 576 (1974). However, prison officials may not read an inmate’s legal mail. Nordstrom v. Ryan, 856 F.3d 1265, 1272 (9th Cir. 2017) (Nordstrom II) (First Amendment claim); Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 910-11 (9th Cir. 2014) (Nordstrom I) (Sixth Amendment claim). “[E]ven a single instance of improper reading of a prisoner’s [legal] mail can give rise to a constitutional violation.” Mangiaracina v. Penzone, 849 F.3d 1191, 1197 (9th Cir. 2017) (Sixth Amendment context); see also Hayes v. Idaho Corr. Ctr., 849 F.3d 1204, 1212 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[A] plaintiff need not allege a longstanding practice of violating his First Amendment rights in order to state a claim for relief on a direct liability theory.”). Further, “prisoners have a protected First Amendment interest in having properly marked legal mail opened [and inspected] only in their presence.” Hayes, 849 F.3d at 1211. However, the
negligent opening of a prisoner’s legal mail outside the inmate’s presence does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation and, therefore, does not violate § 1983. Hayes, 849 F.3d at 1218 (“An allegation that prison officials opened a prisoner’s legal mail, without an allegation that the mail was deliberately and not negligently opened, is not sufficient to state a cause of action under § 1983.”) (Bybee, J., concurring); Hayes, 849 F.3d at 1212 (“Hayes has alleged a plausible claim that his protected mail was arbitrarily or capriciously opened outside his presence on two separate occasions.”) (emphasis added); see Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 396 (2015) (“[L]iability for negligently inflicted harm is categorically beneath the threshold of constitutional due process.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Daniels, 474 U.S. at 332. Finally, to
state a colorable First Amendment claim that legal mail was opened outside the presence of an inmate, the plaintiff must allege that the mail was from an attorney and that the mail “was properly marked as ‘legal mail.’” Hayes, 849 F.3d at 1211. b) Retaliation The First Amendment includes the right to be free from retaliation for exercising constitutional rights. An inmate asserting a retaliation claim must show the following: “(1) . . . that a state actor took some adverse action against the inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, . . . that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) [that] the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (footnote omitted). “[B]are allegations” of a retaliatory motive are insufficient to support a retaliation claim. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 n.4 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Wood v. Yordy, 753 F.3d 899, 905 (9th Cir. 2014) (“We have repeatedly held that mere speculation that defendants acted out of retaliation is not sufficient.”). Rather, when analyzing a prison official’s proffered reasons for allegedly retaliatory conduct, the Court must “afford appropriate deference and flexibility” to that
official. Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). Not every retaliatory act taken by an official can be considered an adverse action that chills the exercise of protected speech. The proper inquiry asks whether the official’s action “would chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness from future First Amendment activities.” Mendocino Envt’l Ctr. v. Mendocino Cnty., 192 F.3d 1283, 1300 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). If it would not, then “the retaliatory act is simply de minimis and therefore outside the ambit of constitutional protection.” Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 353 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Morris v. Powell, 449 F.3d 682, 686 (5th Cir. 2006) (“The [de minimis] standard achieves the proper balance between the need to recognize valid retaliation
claims and the danger of federal courts embroiling themselves in every disciplinary act that occurs in state penal institutions.”) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). A plaintiff asserting a retaliation claim under § 1983 also “must show a causal connection between a defendant’s retaliatory animus and [the plaintiff’s] subsequent injury.” Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 259 (2006) (Bivens action). Retaliatory motivation is not established simply by showing an adverse action by the defendant after protected speech. Instead, the plaintiff must show a nexus between the two. Huskey v. City of San Jose, 204 F.3d 893, 899 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that a retaliation claim cannot rest on “the logical fallacy of post hoc, ergo propter hoc, literally, ‘after this, therefore because of this’”). Therefore, although the timing of an official’s action can constitute circumstantial evidence of retaliation—if, for example, an adverse action was taken shortly after the official learned about an inmate’s exercise of protected conduct—there generally must be something more than mere timing to support an inference of retaliatory intent. Pratt, 65 F.3d at 808. The causal nexus requirement of a retaliation claim is a “but-for” causation test. If the
adverse action would have been taken even without the inmate’s exercise of protected conduct, the plaintiff cannot satisfy the causation element of the retaliation claim. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 260. Finally, even if an inmate proves that exercise of protected conduct was the but-for cause of an adverse action by a prison official, the inmate’s retaliation claim fails so long as that action also reasonably advanced a legitimate penological interest. The government unquestionably has a legitimate interest in maintaining institutional order, safety, and security in its jails and prisons, Rizzo, 778 F.2d at 532, and the “plaintiff bears the burden of pleading and proving the absence of legitimate correctional goals for the conduct of which he complains,” Pratt, 65 F.3d at 806. iii. Access-to-Courts Claims Inmates have a right to access the courts under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. See
Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977). However, because the right of access to the courts is not an “abstract, freestanding right to a law library or legal assistance, an inmate cannot establish relevant actual injury simply by establishing that his prison’s law library or legal assistance program is subpar in some theoretical sense.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996). Although a jail law library “does not provide for meaningful access to the courts if the inmates are not allowed a reasonable amount of time to use the library,” jail officials are constitutionally permitted to impose reasonable regulations regarding the time, place, and manner in which library facilities are used, so that all inmates can access the law library in a secure and orderly manner. Lindquist v. Idaho State Bd. of Corr., 776 F.2d 851, 858 (9th Cir. 1985). To state a viable access-to-courts claim, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that he suffered an actual injury as a result of the defendant’s actions. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 349. Actual injury may be manifest if the alleged denial of access “hindered [the plaintiff’s] efforts to pursue a legal claim,” such as having a complaint dismissed “for failure to satisfy some technical requirement,” or if the plaintiff “suffered arguably actionable harm that he wished to bring before the courts, but
was so stymied by [the defendants’ actions] that he was unable even to file a complaint.” Id. at 351. The Constitution does not require that inmates “be able to conduct generalized research,” nor does it “guarantee inmates the wherewithal to transform themselves into litigating engines.” Id. at 355, 360. Rather, the right of access to the courts requires only that inmates “be able to present their grievances to the courts—a more limited capability that can be produced by a much more limited degree of legal assistance.” Id. at 360 (emphasis added). That is, there is no constitutional right for a prisoner to be able “to litigate effectively once in court.” Id. at 354 (emphasis omitted). Moreover, a plaintiff cannot state an access to courts claim by alleging that a
negligent act by a government official caused the actual injury of which the plaintiff complains. Krug v. Lewis, 852 F.2d 571 (Table), 1988 WL 74699, *1 (9th Cir. July 6, 1988) (unpublished) (“While prisoners have a due process right of access to the courts, the negligent act of a public official does not violate that right.”) (unpublished) (citing Daniels, 474 U.S. at 333). The right of access to the courts is limited and applies only to direct appeals from convictions for which the inmates are incarcerated, habeas petitions, and civil rights actions regarding prison conditions. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 354-55; Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1103 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[P]risoners have a right under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to litigate claims challenging their sentences or the conditions of their confinement to conclusion without active interference by prison officials.”) (emphasis omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Coleman v. Tollefson, 575 U.S. 532 (2015). “Impairment of any other litigating capacity is simply one of the incidental (and perfectly constitutional) consequences of conviction and incarceration.” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 355 (emphasis omitted). Claims of denial of access to the courts may arise from the frustration or hindrance of “a
litigating opportunity yet to be gained” (a forward-looking access claim) or from the loss of a suit that now cannot be pursued (a backward-looking access claim). Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 413-15 (2002). A complaint alleging a denial of access to the courts must plausibly allege that the plaintiff suffered, or will suffer, the loss of a past or present litigating opportunity. The plaintiff must assert facts supporting three elements: (1) official acts that frustrated the inmate’s litigation activities; (2) the loss (or expected loss) of a “nonfrivolous” or “arguable” underlying claim that must be set forth in the federal complaint, including the level of detail necessary “as if it were being independently pursued”; and (3) that the remedy sought through the access to courts claim is not otherwise available in another suit that could be brought. Id. at 415-17. “There is, after
all, no point in spending time and money to establish the facts constituting denial of access when a plaintiff would end up just as well off after litigating a simpler case without the denial-of-access element.” Id. at 415. An inmate asserting an access to courts claim must also allege facts showing that the alleged violation of the inmate’s rights was proximately caused by a state actor. Phillips v. Hust, 477 F.3d 1070, 1077 (9th Cir. 2007), vacated on other grounds, Hust v. Phillips, 550 U.S. 1150 (2009); see also Crumpton, 947 F.2d at 1420. The proximate cause analysis focuses on whether it was foreseeable that the state actor’s conduct would result in a deprivation of the prisoner’s right of access to the courts. Phillips, 477 F. 3d at 1077 (citing Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 216 F.3d 764, 784-85 (9th Cir. 2000)). B. Section 1985 and 1986 Claims Section 1985 prohibits conspiracies to interfere with civil rights. To state a claim under Section 1985(2) or (3),1 a plaintiff must allege a racial or class-based discriminatory animus behind
the conspirators’ actions. See Burns v. Cnty. of King, 883 F.2d 819, 821 (9th Cir. 1989); see also A & A Concrete, Inc. v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 676 F.2d 1330, 1333 (9th Cir. 1982) (claims under sections 1985(2) and 1985(3) require the element of class-based animus). Section 1986 provides that persons who negligently fail to prevent a wrongful conspiracy as described in § 1985 may be liable to the party injured. A prerequisite to stating a § 1986 claim is stating a § 1985 claim. McCalden v. California Library Ass’n, 955 F.2d 1214, 1223 (9th Cir. 1990), superseded by rule on other grounds as stated in Harmston v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 627 F.3d 1273 (9th Cir. 2010). Moreover, to state a plausible claim under §§ 1985 and 1986, a plaintiff must offer more than a mere “bare allegation of conspiracy,” and “a conclusory allegation of agreement at some
unidentified point does not supply facts adequate to show illegality.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556- 57 (discussing pleading standards in context of a conspiracy claim under the Sherman Act). C. Claims under the Prison Rape Elimination Act The Prison Rape Elimination Act, 34 U.S.C. § 30302, et seq. (“PREA”), “was enacted to address the problem of rape in prison by creating and applying national standards to prevent,
1 Subsection (1) of 42 U.S.C. § 1985 does not apply, because that section prohibits conspiracies to prevent a federal officer from performing his or her duties. Canlis v. San Joaquin Sheriff's Posse Comitatus, 641 F.2d 711, 717 (9th Cir. 1981) (“[Section 1985’s] protections extend exclusively to the benefit of federal officers.”). detect, and respond to prison rape, and by ensuring compliance of state and federal prisons by conditioning eligibility for federal grant money on compliance with the standards.” Barber v. Cox, No. 1:17-CV-00318-BLW, 2019 WL 454090, at *1 n.1 (D. Idaho Feb. 5, 2019) (unpublished). But PREA does not provide a private right of action enforceable by individual prisoners. Id.; see also Krieg v. Steele, 599 F. App’x 231, 232 (5th Cir. 2015) (unpublished) (collecting cases), cert.
denied, 577 U.S. 898 (2015); see also, e.g., Hill v. Hickman Cnty. Jail, 2015 WL 5009301, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. August 21, 2015) (unpublished) (dismissing PREA claim for lack of private right of action); Montgomery v. Harper, 2014 WL 4104163, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 19, 2014) (unpublished) (“[T]his Court concludes that the PREA creates no private right of action.”); Holloway v. Dep’t of Corr., 2013 WL 628648, at *2 (D. Conn. Feb. 20, 2013) (“There is nothing in the PREA that suggests that Congress intended it to create a private right of action for inmates to sue prison officials for non-compliance of the Act.”). Because there is no private right of action under PREA, these claims are implausible and should be omitted from any amended complaint.
D. State Law Claims In addition to § 1983 claims, Plaintiff purports to assert state law claims. (See Compl. at 1). However, Plaintiff does not specifically identify any such claims. Moreover, because the Complaint fails to state a federal claim upon which relief may be granted, the Court would decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims in any event. If Plaintiff files an amended complaint, and if the amended complaint identifies and states a plausible state law claim, the Court will reconsider the issue of supplemental jurisdiction. 4. Standards for Amended Complaint If Plaintiff chooses to amend the Complaint, Plaintiff must demonstrate how the actions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of her constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227, 229 (9th Cir. 1980), abrogated on other grounds by Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432 (1991). Plaintiff must also allege a sufficient causal connection between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045; Johnson, 588 F.2d at 743. “Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss” or to survive screening under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of
Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.”) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). In simplified terms, for each defendant, Plaintiff must include in the amended complaint the “who, what, when, where, why, and how” of each allegedly wrongful act that each defendant committed. A pleading is more understandable if it is organized by claim for relief and defendant, rather than asserting a broad set of facts at the beginning of a pleading that are unrelated to a list of defendants elsewhere in the pleading. For each particular constitutional violation against each defendant, Plaintiff must state the
following: (1) the name of the person or entity that caused the alleged deprivation of her constitutional rights; (2) facts showing the defendant is a state actor (such as state employment or a state contract) or a private entity performing a state function; (3) the dates on which the conduct of the defendant allegedly took place; (4) the specific conduct or action Plaintiff alleges is unconstitutional; (5) the particular constitutional provision Plaintiff alleges has been violated; (6) facts alleging that the elements of the violation are met—for example, Plaintiff must allege facts satisfying the elements of a First Amendment, Eighth Amendment, or due process claim; (7) the injury or damages Plaintiff personally suffered; and (8) the particular type of relief Plaintiff is seeking from each defendant. Plaintiff should do the same for each defendant, in turn. For any state law claims, Plaintiff also must set forth facts explaining the “who, what, when, where, why, and how” of each allegedly wrongful act that each defendant committed, showing that plausible facts exist to support the particular state cause of action asserted. Further, any amended complaint must contain all of Plaintiff’s allegations in a single pleading and cannot rely upon, attach, or incorporate by reference other pleadings or documents.
Dist. Idaho Loc. Civ. R. 15.1 (“Any amendment to a pleading, whether filed as a matter of course or upon a motion to amend, must reproduce the entire pleading as amended. The proposed amended pleading must be submitted at the time of filing a motion to amend.”); see also Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[An] amended complaint supersedes the original, the latter being treated thereafter as non-existent.”), overruled in part on other grounds by Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc); Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the district court erred by entering judgment against a party named in the initial complaint, but not in the amended complaint).
Plaintiff must set forth each different factual allegation in a separate, numbered paragraph. The amended complaint must be legibly written or typed in its entirety, and it should be clearly designated as an “Amended Complaint.” Plaintiff’s name and address should be clearly printed at the top left corner of the first page of each document filed with the Court. If Plaintiff files an amended complaint, Plaintiff must also file a “Motion to Review the Amended Complaint.” If Plaintiff does not amend within twenty-eight (28) days, or if the amendment does not comply with Rule 8, this case may be dismissed without further notice. See Knapp v. Hogan, 738 F.3d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 2013) (“When a litigant knowingly and repeatedly refuses to conform his pleadings to the requirements of the Federal Rules, it is reasonable to conclude that the litigant simply cannot state a claim.”). ORDER IT IS ORDERED: 1. The Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Plaintiff has twenty-eight (28) days within which to file an amended complaint as described above. If Plaintiff does so, Plaintiff must file (along with the amended complaint) a Motion to Review the Amended Complaint. Alternatively, Plaintiff may file a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal if Plaintiff no longer intends to pursue this case.” 2. If Plaintiff does not file a timely amended complaint, this case may be dismissed with prejudice and without further notice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, failure to prosecute, or failure to comply with a Court order. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A; Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). 3. Because an amended complaint is required for Plaintiff to proceed, Plaintiff's request for appointment of counsel (contained in the Complaint) is DENIED without prejudice. Plaintiff may renew the request for counsel in an amended complaint. ‘a T DATED: November 15, 2024 SF] Amanda K. Brailsford Giron U.S. District Court Judge
2 A voluntary dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1) is not a dismissal for frivolity, for maliciousness, or for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and, therefore, does not count as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
INITIAL REVIEW ORDER BY SCREENING JUDGE - 20