Scott v. Amlease Corporation

CourtNorth Carolina Industrial Commission
DecidedDecember 14, 1995
DocketI.C. No. 444693
StatusPublished

This text of Scott v. Amlease Corporation (Scott v. Amlease Corporation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering North Carolina Industrial Commission primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Scott v. Amlease Corporation, (N.C. Super. Ct. 1995).

Opinion

The motion of defendant Carolina Risk Managers to join The Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania as a carrier/defendant party to this matter is GRANTED, for the purpose of allowing the defendants to litigate primacy of coverage, and seek orders pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 97-86.1, provided that no payment of compensation otherwise due from present defendants shall be withheld or delayed pending a decision on such issues, and it is so ORDERED.

It is also noted that, according to September 1, 1994 correspondence from Ms. Root, Continental Loss Adjusting Service, as servicing agent for the self-insured employer, paid compensation under the laws of the State of Georgia, and that liable defendants are entitled to seek orders allowing an offset for such payments per the provisions of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-36. The plaintiff testified he received four weekly payments. As this effects the amount of compensation due, it is incumbent on defendants to make any showing at hearing if they wish credit against any resulting award. However, since plaintiff's right to temporary total disability benefits was continuing at the close of the evidence under review, defendants may address a motion to the undersigned for an Order for credit against payments of compensation coming due in the future.

The primary controversy in this case is whether this Commission has jurisdiction of the plaintiff's admittedly compensable injury. The defendant-employer is an "employee leasing" company, and thus a joint employer, along with its clients, of all of its employees — some 5,000 in 28 states — except for an administrative and clerical staff of about 30 people, 25 of whom are located in Charlotte, North Carolina. Its president testified that the Charlotte location is its "corporate office" which "deals with administrative issues for all employees", handling payroll, taxes and contract administration, and houses his personal business offices. Plaintiff resides in South Carolina, applied for this employment initially by contacting one of Amlease's Georgia clients, and was injured while working as a long haul truck driver in Texas.

North Carolina has jurisdiction of an injury occurring outside its borders, when compensable under the definitions of our Act, if the employment contract was made in this State, or if "the employer's principal place of business" is here, or if the employee's principal place of employment is here. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-36. Jurisdiction is non-exclusive, and in fact, as noted above, provision is made for offsetting payments required by other jurisdictions so that the net benefit does not exceed that provided in our Act.

Much of defendants' argument is based on a "Pre-Employment Advisory" given the plaintiff. It declares that plaintiff is entitled to benefits based on the location of either the client/employer or the accident. However, no "contract or agreement . . . rule, regulation or other device" created prior to the injury, even if directly assented to by the employee, can limit the right to benefits provided by the Act. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-6; Loughridge v. Pulpwood Co., 266 N.C. 769, 772 (1966); 147 S.E.2d 213 (1966). While the paper declares that all of the defendant-employer's contracts "are made in North Carolina", it is argued that the contract was actually made in Georgia at the location of the client company, which made the decision to solicit plaintiff's application, and where, after Amlease's Charlotte office notified them that it was "acceptable", the client's personnel "complete[d] [the] hiring process". Plaintiff testified that he applied to the client company, Eastern Flatbed; that its manager told him "that as far as he was concerned that I had the job"; and that then the papers claimant had signed were sent off "to find out if I got hired". The evidence supports the Deputy Commissioner's conclusion that the "last act" necessary to complete the meeting of the minds and creation of the contract was Amlease's acceptance, even if continued employment was subject to plaintiff completing orientation or passing a physical, as well as satisfactory performance of driving duties. See Thomas v.Overland Express, 101 N.C. App. 90, 97, 398 S.E.2d 921 (1990), disc. rev. den., 328 N.C. 576, 403 S.E.2d 522 (1991). Alternatively, as the Deputy Commissioner's findings concerning these facts suggests, to the extent personnel of the client company committed Amlease to an employment contract, they were agents of Amlease.

Plaintiff also has the right to pursue his claim here because "the employer's principal place of business is in this state". N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-36(ii). Defendant argues that plaintiff's connection with this State is tenuous, but that is a judgment for the legislature. The law contemplates that each firm will have a single "principal place of business" (synonymous with "principal office") where executive offices are housed, and "wherein . . . administrative activities are carried on". See, e.g., Crain andDenbo, Inc. v. Harris Harris Construction Co., Inc., 250 N.C. 106,111, 108 S.E.2d 122(1959); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-1-40(17); InRe: Moss Trucking Company, Inc., et. al, 16 N.C. App. 261,191 S.E.2d 919(1972). Its location, when not stipulated, is a question of fact. Nolan v. Blackston Construction Co., 244 N.C. 50,52, 92 S.E.2d 398(1956). The undisputed facts concerning Amlease's Charlotte offices, and the lack of evidence of comparable activity elsewhere, supports the finding that it is the "principal place of business" of Amlease.

Upon review of all of the competent evidence of record with reference to the errors assigned, and finding no good ground to reconsider the evidence, receive further evidence, rehear the parties or their representatives, or amend the award, other than Findings of Fact 2, 3 and 9, Conclusions of Law 2, and Award paragraphs 1 and 4, primarily concerning interest and the unresolved compensation rate question, the Full Commission MODIFIES and AFFIRMS the Opinion and Award of the Deputy Commissioner as follows:

The following were entered into by the parties at the hearing before the Deputy Commissioner as

STIPULATIONS

1. At the time in question defendant-employer was subject to and bound by the provisions of the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act.

2. The employment relationship existed between plaintiff employee and defendant-employer.

3. Defendant-employer was a qualified self-insured, whose claims were administered by Association Risk Management Service Company.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Crain and Denbo, Inc. v. Harris & Harris Const. Co.
108 S.E.2d 122 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1959)
Thomas v. Overland Express, Inc.
398 S.E.2d 921 (Court of Appeals of North Carolina, 1990)
Noland Company v. Laxton Construction Company
92 S.E.2d 398 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1956)
Laughridge v. South Mountain Pulpwood Co.
147 S.E.2d 213 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1966)
In re Moss Trucking Co.
191 S.E.2d 919 (Court of Appeals of North Carolina, 1972)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Scott v. Amlease Corporation, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/scott-v-amlease-corporation-ncworkcompcom-1995.