NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 25a0576n.06
Case No. 25-1384
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Dec 11, 2025 ) KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk SCOTT SEDORE, ) Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED v. ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR ) THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF SIRENA LANDFAIR, et al., ) MICHIGAN Defendants-Appellees. ) ) OPINION )
Before: NALBANDIAN, DAVIS, and HERMANDORFER, Circuit Judges.
NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judge. Scott Sedore brought a civil rights action against several
defendants. Sedore lost at trial. And now he appeals, arguing that the district court abused its
discretion by setting unfair and prejudicial time limits on his trial and granting a motion to quash
a trial subpoena. But Sedore ordered only a small portion of the transcript from the four-day trial
to be included in the record on appeal. Because Sedore can’t show that the district court’s alleged
errors were prejudicial with the partial transcript, we affirm.
I.
Sedore, while confined as a Michigan state prisoner at the G. Robert Cotton Correctional
Facility (CCF), sued the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC), two MDOC nurses, and
Dr. Victoria Hallett. He brought First Amendment retaliation claims against the two MDOC
nurses and Hallett, who wasn’t an MDOC employee but was providing medical care at CCF.
Sedore, a wheelchair user, alleged that the three individual defendants placed him in segregated No. 25-1384, Sedore v. Landfair, et al.
housing on the pretext of a risk of self-harm when the actual reason was to retaliate against him
for filing grievances and pursuing litigation over the medical care he’d been receiving. Sedore
also alleged that MDOC violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the
Rehabilitation Act. He claimed that while in segregated housing, he was placed in a cell that was
too small to accommodate his wheelchair. This, he argued, constituted disability discrimination
because MDOC didn’t provide reasonable accommodations for his disability.
On March 15, 2025, three days before the start of trial, Sedore subpoenaed Kim Cargor,
the CCF warden, to demand her attendance at trial. Sedore hoped to elicit testimony from her on
MDOC’s policies and practices regarding disability accommodations. Two days later, Cargor
moved to quash the subpoena. Sedore responded to Cargor’s motion and offered to have Cargor
testify remotely.
The day before trial, the district court clerk emailed the parties notifying them of how much
time they would have to make their case at trial. The court allocated five hours to Sedore, five
hours to MDOC and the nurses (the MDOC Defendants), and five hours to Hallett. Within an hour
of receipt, Sedore responded to the email with a simple “[t]hank you.”
Trial began. And on its second day, the court granted Cargor’s motion to quash the
subpoena. Sedore then filed an emergency motion asking the court to reconsider its time limits
and grant him more time to present his case. But the next day, the court denied that motion.
Shortly after that denial, Sedore rested his case.
The MDOC Defendants and Hallett subsequently moved for judgment as a matter of law.
The court granted Hallett’s motion and dismissed her from the case, but let Sedore’s case against
the MDOC Defendants go to the jury. The jury returned a verdict for the MDOC Defendants on
March 21. And the court entered judgment against Sedore.
2 No. 25-1384, Sedore v. Landfair, et al.
Sedore filed a timely notice of appeal. And on the same day, he filed an application to
waive payment of the appellate filing fee, describing on the first page of the application that he
intended to challenge the district court’s allocation of trial time and granting of Cargor’s motion
to quash.
A few days later, he ordered a partial transcript. The docket entry for this order shows that
he ordered the portion of the trial transcript regarding Cargor’s “request to quash the subpoena”
from March 19, his “request for reconsideration of the trial time” from March 20, and “other
motions and closing argument” from March 21. Dkt. No. 6.
This partial transcript is 51 pages and reflects intermittent moments from the four-day trial.
It includes only Sedore’s closing and rebuttal arguments, the discussions and arguments related to
the court’s decision to quash the Cargor subpoena, its decision to deny Sedore more time, the
defendants’ motions for judgment as a matter of law, and an evidentiary matter not relevant to
Sedore’s appeal.
II.
Sedore asks us to reverse the district court’s judgment and remand for a new trial. He gives
us two reasons to do so. First, he argues that the district court abused its discretion by imposing
unfair and prejudicial time limits for trial and refusing to give him more time mid-trial. Second,
he argues that the court abused its discretion by granting Cargor’s motion to quash. But because
Sedore can’t show that these alleged errors were prejudicial with the partial transcript, we affirm
the district court’s judgment.
Before we explain why that’s the case, we’ll address a procedural dispute. Alongside their
merits arguments, the MDOC Defendants and Hallett say Sedore didn’t file a statement of the
issues as required by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(b)(3)(A). So they say we should
3 No. 25-1384, Sedore v. Landfair, et al.
dismiss Sedore’s appeal. Under Rule 10(b)(3)(A), if the appellant orders a partial transcript, then
he must file a statement of the issues he intends to present on appeal within 14 days of filing the
notice of appeal. Fed. R. App. P. 10(b)(3)(A).
Sedore ordered a partial transcript a few days after filing his notice of appeal. So Rule
10(b)(3)(A) obligated him to file a statement of the issues. Though Sedore never filed a statement
of the issues as a standalone document, he argues that he still complied with Rule 10(b)(3)(A) for
two reasons. First, the same day he filed the notice of appeal, Sedore separately filed an application
to waive payment of the appellate filing fee. On the first page of that application, Sedore described
the two issues he intended to raise on appeal. Second, the docket entry for Sedore’s transcript
order describes that he was requesting the parts of the transcript pertaining to the district court’s
decision to quash the subpoena and its decision to deny Sedore’s request for more time.
Courts can find compliance with a procedural rule if the litigant’s action was the
“functional equivalent of what the rule requires.” Coleman v. Shoney’s, Inc., 79 F. App’x 155,
157 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 317 (1988)). And
even if a litigant hasn’t complied with a rule, dismissal isn’t always warranted. Fitts v. Sicker, 232
F. App’x 436, 440 (6th Cir. 2007); Island Creek Coal Co. v. Loc. Union No. 1827 of United Mine
Workers of Am., 568 F.2d 7, 8 (6th Cir. 1977).
Sedore likely did enough to comply with the rule here. And, in any event, dismissal of his
appeal seems unduly harsh even if he didn’t formally comply. Regardless, we don’t need to decide
that now.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 25a0576n.06
Case No. 25-1384
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Dec 11, 2025 ) KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk SCOTT SEDORE, ) Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED v. ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR ) THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF SIRENA LANDFAIR, et al., ) MICHIGAN Defendants-Appellees. ) ) OPINION )
Before: NALBANDIAN, DAVIS, and HERMANDORFER, Circuit Judges.
NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judge. Scott Sedore brought a civil rights action against several
defendants. Sedore lost at trial. And now he appeals, arguing that the district court abused its
discretion by setting unfair and prejudicial time limits on his trial and granting a motion to quash
a trial subpoena. But Sedore ordered only a small portion of the transcript from the four-day trial
to be included in the record on appeal. Because Sedore can’t show that the district court’s alleged
errors were prejudicial with the partial transcript, we affirm.
I.
Sedore, while confined as a Michigan state prisoner at the G. Robert Cotton Correctional
Facility (CCF), sued the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC), two MDOC nurses, and
Dr. Victoria Hallett. He brought First Amendment retaliation claims against the two MDOC
nurses and Hallett, who wasn’t an MDOC employee but was providing medical care at CCF.
Sedore, a wheelchair user, alleged that the three individual defendants placed him in segregated No. 25-1384, Sedore v. Landfair, et al.
housing on the pretext of a risk of self-harm when the actual reason was to retaliate against him
for filing grievances and pursuing litigation over the medical care he’d been receiving. Sedore
also alleged that MDOC violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the
Rehabilitation Act. He claimed that while in segregated housing, he was placed in a cell that was
too small to accommodate his wheelchair. This, he argued, constituted disability discrimination
because MDOC didn’t provide reasonable accommodations for his disability.
On March 15, 2025, three days before the start of trial, Sedore subpoenaed Kim Cargor,
the CCF warden, to demand her attendance at trial. Sedore hoped to elicit testimony from her on
MDOC’s policies and practices regarding disability accommodations. Two days later, Cargor
moved to quash the subpoena. Sedore responded to Cargor’s motion and offered to have Cargor
testify remotely.
The day before trial, the district court clerk emailed the parties notifying them of how much
time they would have to make their case at trial. The court allocated five hours to Sedore, five
hours to MDOC and the nurses (the MDOC Defendants), and five hours to Hallett. Within an hour
of receipt, Sedore responded to the email with a simple “[t]hank you.”
Trial began. And on its second day, the court granted Cargor’s motion to quash the
subpoena. Sedore then filed an emergency motion asking the court to reconsider its time limits
and grant him more time to present his case. But the next day, the court denied that motion.
Shortly after that denial, Sedore rested his case.
The MDOC Defendants and Hallett subsequently moved for judgment as a matter of law.
The court granted Hallett’s motion and dismissed her from the case, but let Sedore’s case against
the MDOC Defendants go to the jury. The jury returned a verdict for the MDOC Defendants on
March 21. And the court entered judgment against Sedore.
2 No. 25-1384, Sedore v. Landfair, et al.
Sedore filed a timely notice of appeal. And on the same day, he filed an application to
waive payment of the appellate filing fee, describing on the first page of the application that he
intended to challenge the district court’s allocation of trial time and granting of Cargor’s motion
to quash.
A few days later, he ordered a partial transcript. The docket entry for this order shows that
he ordered the portion of the trial transcript regarding Cargor’s “request to quash the subpoena”
from March 19, his “request for reconsideration of the trial time” from March 20, and “other
motions and closing argument” from March 21. Dkt. No. 6.
This partial transcript is 51 pages and reflects intermittent moments from the four-day trial.
It includes only Sedore’s closing and rebuttal arguments, the discussions and arguments related to
the court’s decision to quash the Cargor subpoena, its decision to deny Sedore more time, the
defendants’ motions for judgment as a matter of law, and an evidentiary matter not relevant to
Sedore’s appeal.
II.
Sedore asks us to reverse the district court’s judgment and remand for a new trial. He gives
us two reasons to do so. First, he argues that the district court abused its discretion by imposing
unfair and prejudicial time limits for trial and refusing to give him more time mid-trial. Second,
he argues that the court abused its discretion by granting Cargor’s motion to quash. But because
Sedore can’t show that these alleged errors were prejudicial with the partial transcript, we affirm
the district court’s judgment.
Before we explain why that’s the case, we’ll address a procedural dispute. Alongside their
merits arguments, the MDOC Defendants and Hallett say Sedore didn’t file a statement of the
issues as required by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(b)(3)(A). So they say we should
3 No. 25-1384, Sedore v. Landfair, et al.
dismiss Sedore’s appeal. Under Rule 10(b)(3)(A), if the appellant orders a partial transcript, then
he must file a statement of the issues he intends to present on appeal within 14 days of filing the
notice of appeal. Fed. R. App. P. 10(b)(3)(A).
Sedore ordered a partial transcript a few days after filing his notice of appeal. So Rule
10(b)(3)(A) obligated him to file a statement of the issues. Though Sedore never filed a statement
of the issues as a standalone document, he argues that he still complied with Rule 10(b)(3)(A) for
two reasons. First, the same day he filed the notice of appeal, Sedore separately filed an application
to waive payment of the appellate filing fee. On the first page of that application, Sedore described
the two issues he intended to raise on appeal. Second, the docket entry for Sedore’s transcript
order describes that he was requesting the parts of the transcript pertaining to the district court’s
decision to quash the subpoena and its decision to deny Sedore’s request for more time.
Courts can find compliance with a procedural rule if the litigant’s action was the
“functional equivalent of what the rule requires.” Coleman v. Shoney’s, Inc., 79 F. App’x 155,
157 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 317 (1988)). And
even if a litigant hasn’t complied with a rule, dismissal isn’t always warranted. Fitts v. Sicker, 232
F. App’x 436, 440 (6th Cir. 2007); Island Creek Coal Co. v. Loc. Union No. 1827 of United Mine
Workers of Am., 568 F.2d 7, 8 (6th Cir. 1977).
Sedore likely did enough to comply with the rule here. And, in any event, dismissal of his
appeal seems unduly harsh even if he didn’t formally comply. Regardless, we don’t need to decide
that now. Even if dismissal weren’t warranted, Sedore’s appeal fails for a different reason.
Because Sedore ordered such a limited portion of the trial transcript, he can’t succeed on his claims.
We review a district court’s allocation of time at trial and its decision to quash a subpoena
for abuse of discretion. Ross v. Parrot’s Landing, Inc., No. 21-1774, 2022 WL 7367263, at *3
4 No. 25-1384, Sedore v. Landfair, et al.
(6th Cir. Oct. 13, 2022) (citing Sutkiewicz v. Monroe Cnty. Sheriff, 110 F.3d 352, 361 (6th Cir.
1997)); Hill v. Homeward Residential, Inc., 799 F.3d 544, 552 (6th Cir. 2015).1 Even if we believe
that the district court abused its discretion, in a civil case “the party that seeks to have a judgment
set aside because of an erroneous ruling carries the burden of showing that prejudice resulted.”
Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409 (2009) (citation modified); see also Homeward Residential,
799 F.3d at 552; 28 U.S.C. § 2111. And prejudice results when we lack a “fair assurance” that the
outcome of a trial wasn’t affected by the error. Appalachian Reg’l Healthcare, Inc. v. U.S. Nursing
Corp., 68 F.4th 324, 332–33 (6th Cir. 2023). Evaluating prejudice requires “examin[ing] the
proceedings in their entirety.” Beck v. Haik, 377 F.3d 624, 635 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting
Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 762 (1946)), overruled on other grounds by, Adkins v.
Wolever, 554 F.3d 650 (6th Cir. 2009) (en banc).
Because Sedore included only 51 pages of the trial transcript in the record on appeal, he
can’t carry his burden of showing prejudice. See Ramage v. Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro
Gov’t, 520 F. App’x 341, 344–45 (6th Cir. 2013) (“It is the appellant’s duty to order the trial
transcript when it is necessary to a review of the issues she raises for appeal.” (citing Fed. R. App.
P. 10(b))). The 51-page excerpt from the four-day trial includes the discussions related to the
court’s decision to quash the Cargor subpoena, its decision to deny Sedore more time, the
defendants’ motions for judgment as a matter of law, and Sedore’s closing and rebuttal arguments.
But the record on appeal doesn’t include any trial testimony or trial exhibits.
1 We note that Sedore didn’t object when the district court initially set the time limits. But as trial developed, he thought that he needed more time and asked for it. So he didn’t preserve a challenge to the time limits generally. Instead, we’re reviewing only the district court’s denial of Sedore’s mid-trial request for more time.
5 No. 25-1384, Sedore v. Landfair, et al.
So even if we thought that the 51-page partial transcript and other record documents gave
us enough to conclude that the district court abused its discretion for one or both of its challenged
decisions, we wouldn’t be able to evaluate whether any error was prejudicial and warranted retrial.
See, e.g., Bivens v. Zep, Inc., 147 F.4th 635, 651–52 (6th Cir. 2025) (declining to review denial of
motion to compel for abuse of discretion where plaintiff failed to request status conference
transcript); cf. Beck, 377 F.3d at 638, 644–45 (concluding that five errors at trial amounted to
cumulative error warranting reversal and remand under the “fair assurance” test). That’s because
with the record Sedore gave us, we can’t meaningfully review the evidence the parties presented
to the jury. To take just one of Sedore’s claims, he contends that the district court’s decision to
grant Cargor’s motion to quash was prejudicial because Cargor’s testimony was critical to its
“deliberate indifference” theory of MDOC’s alleged ADA violation. Appellant Br. at 27–28. But
was there an evidentiary flaw in Sedore’s case at trial that would assure us that the outcome
would’ve been the same even in the absence of Cargor’s proposed testimony? We don’t know.
So Sedore can’t carry his burden of showing prejudice.
Of course, an appellant’s decision not to order every single page of a trial transcript won’t
necessarily preclude meaningful review in every case. But here, the partial transcript doesn’t
suffice.
III.
For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s judgment.