Scott Mark Lair v. Robert L. Horn

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedApril 25, 2002
Docket13-00-00759-CV
StatusPublished

This text of Scott Mark Lair v. Robert L. Horn (Scott Mark Lair v. Robert L. Horn) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Scott Mark Lair v. Robert L. Horn, (Tex. Ct. App. 2002).

Opinion

                                   NUMBER 13-00-759-CV

                             COURT OF APPEALS

                   THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                                CORPUS CHRISTI

SCOTT MARK LAIR,                                                           Appellant,

                                                   v.

ROBERT L. HORN, ET AL.,                                           Appellees.

         On appeal from the 36th District Court of Bee County, Texas.

                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

                    Before Justices Dorsey, Yañez, and Rodriguez

                                   Opinion by Justice Yañez


Appellant, Scott Mark Lair, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals an order granting summary judgment in favor of three officers employed by the Bee County Sheriff=s Department, Robert L. Horn, Ronnie Olivarez, Dan Caddell, and A[unnamed] others.@ Appellant sued appellees, alleging breach of a bailment contract arising out of the officers= seizure of his property, including certain firearms and ammunition.  The property was seized in connection with appellant=s arrest for domestic family violence and subsequent conviction for federal firearms violations.

As this is a memorandum opinion not designated for publication and the parties are familiar with the facts, we will not recite them here.  See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.

In his first issue, appellant contends: (1) the officers lacked authority under the state constitution to remove the property from his home; and (2) the State failed to provide him adequate notice of forfeiture proceedings.  In his second issue, appellant contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment prior to the completion of discovery.  We affirm.

Standard of Review


In a traditional summary judgment proceeding, the standard of review on appeal is whether the successful movant at the trial level carried the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that judgment should be granted as a matter of law.  M. D. Anderson v. Willrich, 28 S.W.3d 22, 23 (Tex. 2000); Am. Tobacco Co., Inc. v. Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d 420, 425 (Tex. 1997); Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., Inc., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548 (Tex. 1985).  This burden may be satisfied by conclusively establishing all elements of an affirmative defense.  See Wornick Co. v. Casas, 856 S.W.2d 732, 733 (Tex. 1993); City of Pharr v. Ruiz, 944 S.W.2d 709, 712 (Tex. App.BCorpus Christi 1997, no writ).  In resolving the issue of whether the movant has carried this burden, all evidence favorable to the non-movant must be taken as true and all reasonable inferences, including any doubts, must be resolved in the non-movant's favor.  Willrich, 28 S.W.3d at 23-24; Nixon, 690 S.W.2d at 548-49; Noriega v. Mireles, 925 S.W.2d 261, 266 (Tex. App.BCorpus Christi 1996, writ denied).  When the defendant is the movant and submits summary judgment evidence disproving at least one essential element of each of the plaintiff's causes of action, then summary judgment should be granted.  Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d at 425; Science Spectrum, Inc. v. Martinez, 941 S.W.2d 910, 911 (Tex. 1997).

  If a summary judgment is granted generally, without specifying the reason, it will be upheld if any ground in the motion for summary judgment can be sustained.  Bradley v. State ex rel. White, 990 S.W.2d 245, 247 (Tex. 1999) (citing Star-Telegram, Inc. v. Doe, 915 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tex. 1995)); Weakly v. East, 900 S.W.2d 755, 758 (Tex. App.BCorpus Christi 1995, writ denied). 

Appellees argue, in their motion for summary judgment and on appeal, that they are entitled to summary judgment on the following grounds: (1) they are entitled to official immunity becaus

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Related

Wornick Co. v. Casas
856 S.W.2d 732 (Texas Supreme Court, 1993)
Soto v. Sea-Road International, Inc.
942 S.W.2d 67 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1997)
Weakly v. East
900 S.W.2d 755 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1995)
M.D. Anderson Hospital & Tumor Institute v. Willrich
28 S.W.3d 22 (Texas Supreme Court, 2000)
International Freight Forwarding, Inc. v. American Flange
993 S.W.2d 262 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1999)
Noriega v. Mireles
925 S.W.2d 261 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1996)
Science Spectrum, Inc. v. Martinez
941 S.W.2d 910 (Texas Supreme Court, 1997)
Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co.
690 S.W.2d 546 (Texas Supreme Court, 1985)
American Tobacco Co., Inc. v. Grinnell
951 S.W.2d 420 (Texas Supreme Court, 1997)
Bradley v. State Ex Rel. White
990 S.W.2d 245 (Texas Supreme Court, 1999)
In the Interest of A.D.E.
880 S.W.2d 241 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1994)
City of Pharr v. Ruiz
944 S.W.2d 709 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1997)
Star-Telegram, Inc. v. Doe
915 S.W.2d 471 (Texas Supreme Court, 1996)
Lopez v. City of Dallas
696 F. Supp. 240 (N.D. Texas, 1988)

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Bluebook (online)
Scott Mark Lair v. Robert L. Horn, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/scott-mark-lair-v-robert-l-horn-texapp-2002.