1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 EASTERN DIVISION 11 SCOTT FAULKNER, ) Case No. 5:24-cv-01250-ODW-JDE ) 12 Plaintiff, ) ) ORDER ACCEPTING FINDINGS 13 v. ) AND RECOMMENDATION OF ) 14 COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE, et al., ) UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE ) JUDGE ) 15 Defendants. ) 16 ) 17 Under 28 U.S.C. § 636, the Court has reviewed the records on file, 18 including the operative Second Amended Complaint filed by Scott Faulkner 19 (“Plaintiff”) (Dkt. 12, “SAC”), the Report and Recommendation of the 20 Magistrate Judge (Dkt. 14, “Report”), and the Objections to the Report filed 21 by Plaintiff on May 5, 2025 (Dkt. 15, “Objections” or “Obj.”). Further, the 22 Court has engaged in a de novo review of those portions of the Report to 23 which objections have been made. 24 Among other recommended findings, the Report recommends that the 25 Fourteenth Amendment claim against Lt. Hatfield, Cpt. Rodriguez, and Sgt. 26 Dominguez be dismissed with prejudice, in part, because Plaintiff alleged these 27 defendants denied grievances and/or appeals based on the Riverside County 28 Sheriff’s Department’s (“RCSD”) administrative segregation (“Adseg”) policy, 1 but Plaintiff failed to allege facts plausibly suggesting that these defendants had 2 any control over this policy or could have granted the relief Plaintiff sought. 3 Report at 13-15. In his Objections, Plaintiff alleges that based on his experience 4 as “a former Riverside County Sheriff Deputy,” he “has first hand knowledge 5 that policies” include clauses “allowing supervisors to alter policy” and permit 6 “exceptions” “for specific needs,” and as such, Lt. Hatfield, Cpt. Rodriguez, 7 and Sgt. Dominguez “could have provided the relief sought.” Obj. at 6, 13. 8 The Court has the discretion, but is not required, to consider factual allegations 9 and arguments presented for the first time in a party’s objections to a 10 magistrate judge’s recommendation. See Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1208 11 (9th Cir. 2012); United States v. Howell, 231 F.3d 615, 621 (9th Cir. 2000). 12 The Court elects to consider Plaintiff’s additional arguments and rejects them. 13 First, these allegations are contradicted by the allegations in the SAC 14 that RCSD’s Adseg policy requires the restraints, searches, and deprivations on 15 all Adseg inmates regardless of the reason for segregation and without specific 16 application to Plaintiff, a contention on which Plaintiff’s Monell1 claim against 17 the County of Riverside was based. SAC at 14. Second, even if the Court were 18 to consider these allegations, Plaintiff has not stated a Fourteenth Amendment 19 claim against these defendants. Plaintiff’s claim against Lt. Hatfield, Cpt. 20 Rodriguez, and Sgt. Dominguez is premised on the denial of an administrative 21 grievance and subsequent appeals, copies of which Plaintiff reproduced and 22 attached to the SAC. The grievance at issue stated: 23 Since my arrest on 4/25/21, I have been held in administrative 24 segregation. I have been excluded from the liberties you provide to 25 other inmates. I am subjected to extra restraints when not alone, and 26 have been subjected to strip/visual cavity searches when transported. 27
28 1 Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 1 This is due to your policy for Ad-seg inmates. However, since my 2 classification is for my safety, I should not be subjected to things that 3 are for those who pose a security threat to others. I respectfully 4 request a change to policy, allowing for something akin to a 5 classification of “Non-disciplinary Segregation” where I am not 6 subject to the restrictions placed on other Ad-seg inmates. I also 7 request financial compensation for the liberty deprivations and 8 excessive restraints for the duration of my detainment. 9 SAC at 56. Sgt. Dominguez denied the grievance, notifying Plaintiff that the 10 “restraints are being used in accordance with policy and procedures.” Id. 11 Plaintiff appealed, reiterating his request for a “policy change,” questioning 12 whether “the extra restraints . . . achieve the goal of protecting [him] from 13 other inmates.” Id. at 57. Lt. Hatfield responded, denying the appeal. After 14 reviewing Plaintiff’s status with the classification unit and confirming he was 15 appropriately classified, Lt. Hatfield concluded the “restraints are being 16 appropriately used during [his] movement in compliance with Department 17 policy.” Id. at 61. Cpt. Rodriguez denied Plaintiff’s second level appeal, 18 concurring with Lt. Hatfield’s findings and concluding the restraints are being 19 used in accordance with policy and that the shackles are being used for the 20 safety and security of the facility, public, staff, and other inmates. Id. at 64. 21 As noted in the Report, to allege governmental action constituted 22 punishment in violation of the Due Process Clause, Plaintiff must show (1) the 23 action caused the detainee to suffer some harm or disability, and (2) the 24 purpose of the governmental action was to punish the detainee. Demery v. 25 Arpaio, 378 F.3d 1020, 1029 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 26 520, 538 (1979)). Absent a showing of an expressed intent to punish, which has 27 not been shown here, this determination generally turns on “‘whether an 28 alternative purpose to which [the restriction] may rationally be connected is 1 assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative 2 purpose assigned [to it].’” Bell, 441 U.S. at 538 (alterations in original) 3 (citation omitted). “[T]he effective management of the detention facility once 4 the individual is confined is a valid objective that may justify imposition of 5 conditions and restrictions of pretrial detention and dispel any inference that 6 such restrictions are intended as punishment.” Id. at 540. 7 Plaintiff sought an exemption to a legitimate security-related policy, 8 requesting not to be subjected to extra restraints when he in the company of 9 others and strip/visual cavity searches when transported. Ensuring security 10 and order at the jail is a permissible nonpunitive objective and “[r]estraints that 11 are reasonably related to the institution’s interest in maintaining jail security do 12 not, without more, constitute unconstitutional punishment.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 13 540, 561. Plaintiff did not argue in his grievance that the restraints or searches 14 were done in an unreasonable manner or that there was a “specific need” 15 warranting an exemption. He merely requested an exemption to standard 16 procedure based on his classification status. However, as Lt. Hatfield noted, 17 the classification unit determined Plaintiff was appropriately classified. See id. 18 at 61. Given his status as a former sheriff’s deputy as well as the classification 19 unit’s assessment, Sgt. Dominguez, Lt. Hatfield, and Cpt. Rodriguez could 20 have reasonably deferred to the classification unit and concluded that Plaintiff 21 posed a risk to institutional security, declining to override policy and the 22 classification unit. Utilizing “extra restraints” when Plaintiff is “not alone” is a 23 reasonable response to legitimate security concerns posed when other detainees 24 or staff are present. Similarly, strip/visual cavity searches when Plaintiff is 25 being transported is not an exaggerated response to genuine security concerns 26 for the smuggling of money, drugs, weapons, and other contraband. See id.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 EASTERN DIVISION 11 SCOTT FAULKNER, ) Case No. 5:24-cv-01250-ODW-JDE ) 12 Plaintiff, ) ) ORDER ACCEPTING FINDINGS 13 v. ) AND RECOMMENDATION OF ) 14 COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE, et al., ) UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE ) JUDGE ) 15 Defendants. ) 16 ) 17 Under 28 U.S.C. § 636, the Court has reviewed the records on file, 18 including the operative Second Amended Complaint filed by Scott Faulkner 19 (“Plaintiff”) (Dkt. 12, “SAC”), the Report and Recommendation of the 20 Magistrate Judge (Dkt. 14, “Report”), and the Objections to the Report filed 21 by Plaintiff on May 5, 2025 (Dkt. 15, “Objections” or “Obj.”). Further, the 22 Court has engaged in a de novo review of those portions of the Report to 23 which objections have been made. 24 Among other recommended findings, the Report recommends that the 25 Fourteenth Amendment claim against Lt. Hatfield, Cpt. Rodriguez, and Sgt. 26 Dominguez be dismissed with prejudice, in part, because Plaintiff alleged these 27 defendants denied grievances and/or appeals based on the Riverside County 28 Sheriff’s Department’s (“RCSD”) administrative segregation (“Adseg”) policy, 1 but Plaintiff failed to allege facts plausibly suggesting that these defendants had 2 any control over this policy or could have granted the relief Plaintiff sought. 3 Report at 13-15. In his Objections, Plaintiff alleges that based on his experience 4 as “a former Riverside County Sheriff Deputy,” he “has first hand knowledge 5 that policies” include clauses “allowing supervisors to alter policy” and permit 6 “exceptions” “for specific needs,” and as such, Lt. Hatfield, Cpt. Rodriguez, 7 and Sgt. Dominguez “could have provided the relief sought.” Obj. at 6, 13. 8 The Court has the discretion, but is not required, to consider factual allegations 9 and arguments presented for the first time in a party’s objections to a 10 magistrate judge’s recommendation. See Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1208 11 (9th Cir. 2012); United States v. Howell, 231 F.3d 615, 621 (9th Cir. 2000). 12 The Court elects to consider Plaintiff’s additional arguments and rejects them. 13 First, these allegations are contradicted by the allegations in the SAC 14 that RCSD’s Adseg policy requires the restraints, searches, and deprivations on 15 all Adseg inmates regardless of the reason for segregation and without specific 16 application to Plaintiff, a contention on which Plaintiff’s Monell1 claim against 17 the County of Riverside was based. SAC at 14. Second, even if the Court were 18 to consider these allegations, Plaintiff has not stated a Fourteenth Amendment 19 claim against these defendants. Plaintiff’s claim against Lt. Hatfield, Cpt. 20 Rodriguez, and Sgt. Dominguez is premised on the denial of an administrative 21 grievance and subsequent appeals, copies of which Plaintiff reproduced and 22 attached to the SAC. The grievance at issue stated: 23 Since my arrest on 4/25/21, I have been held in administrative 24 segregation. I have been excluded from the liberties you provide to 25 other inmates. I am subjected to extra restraints when not alone, and 26 have been subjected to strip/visual cavity searches when transported. 27
28 1 Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 1 This is due to your policy for Ad-seg inmates. However, since my 2 classification is for my safety, I should not be subjected to things that 3 are for those who pose a security threat to others. I respectfully 4 request a change to policy, allowing for something akin to a 5 classification of “Non-disciplinary Segregation” where I am not 6 subject to the restrictions placed on other Ad-seg inmates. I also 7 request financial compensation for the liberty deprivations and 8 excessive restraints for the duration of my detainment. 9 SAC at 56. Sgt. Dominguez denied the grievance, notifying Plaintiff that the 10 “restraints are being used in accordance with policy and procedures.” Id. 11 Plaintiff appealed, reiterating his request for a “policy change,” questioning 12 whether “the extra restraints . . . achieve the goal of protecting [him] from 13 other inmates.” Id. at 57. Lt. Hatfield responded, denying the appeal. After 14 reviewing Plaintiff’s status with the classification unit and confirming he was 15 appropriately classified, Lt. Hatfield concluded the “restraints are being 16 appropriately used during [his] movement in compliance with Department 17 policy.” Id. at 61. Cpt. Rodriguez denied Plaintiff’s second level appeal, 18 concurring with Lt. Hatfield’s findings and concluding the restraints are being 19 used in accordance with policy and that the shackles are being used for the 20 safety and security of the facility, public, staff, and other inmates. Id. at 64. 21 As noted in the Report, to allege governmental action constituted 22 punishment in violation of the Due Process Clause, Plaintiff must show (1) the 23 action caused the detainee to suffer some harm or disability, and (2) the 24 purpose of the governmental action was to punish the detainee. Demery v. 25 Arpaio, 378 F.3d 1020, 1029 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 26 520, 538 (1979)). Absent a showing of an expressed intent to punish, which has 27 not been shown here, this determination generally turns on “‘whether an 28 alternative purpose to which [the restriction] may rationally be connected is 1 assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative 2 purpose assigned [to it].’” Bell, 441 U.S. at 538 (alterations in original) 3 (citation omitted). “[T]he effective management of the detention facility once 4 the individual is confined is a valid objective that may justify imposition of 5 conditions and restrictions of pretrial detention and dispel any inference that 6 such restrictions are intended as punishment.” Id. at 540. 7 Plaintiff sought an exemption to a legitimate security-related policy, 8 requesting not to be subjected to extra restraints when he in the company of 9 others and strip/visual cavity searches when transported. Ensuring security 10 and order at the jail is a permissible nonpunitive objective and “[r]estraints that 11 are reasonably related to the institution’s interest in maintaining jail security do 12 not, without more, constitute unconstitutional punishment.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 13 540, 561. Plaintiff did not argue in his grievance that the restraints or searches 14 were done in an unreasonable manner or that there was a “specific need” 15 warranting an exemption. He merely requested an exemption to standard 16 procedure based on his classification status. However, as Lt. Hatfield noted, 17 the classification unit determined Plaintiff was appropriately classified. See id. 18 at 61. Given his status as a former sheriff’s deputy as well as the classification 19 unit’s assessment, Sgt. Dominguez, Lt. Hatfield, and Cpt. Rodriguez could 20 have reasonably deferred to the classification unit and concluded that Plaintiff 21 posed a risk to institutional security, declining to override policy and the 22 classification unit. Utilizing “extra restraints” when Plaintiff is “not alone” is a 23 reasonable response to legitimate security concerns posed when other detainees 24 or staff are present. Similarly, strip/visual cavity searches when Plaintiff is 25 being transported is not an exaggerated response to genuine security concerns 26 for the smuggling of money, drugs, weapons, and other contraband. See id. at 27 560-61 (finding visual body cavity searches after contact visits with a person 28 from outside the custodial facility does not constitute punishment in violation 1 || of a pretrial detainee’s due process rights). Plaintiff has not shown that Set. 2 || Dominguez, Lt. Hatfield, and Cpt. Rodriguez’s failure to make a “specific 3 ||need” policy change, assuming these defendants had authorization to so, 4 || violated his due process rights. The Court finds that the Report properly found 5 ||that Plaintiff failed to state a Fourteenth Amendment claim against Set. 6 || Dominguez, Lt. Hatfield, and Cpt. Rodriguez. Even if the Court were to 7 ||consider Plaintiff's new arguments, further leave to amend would be futile as 8 || Plaintiff's arguments would not alter this outcome. 9 As noted above, the Court has engaged in a de novo review of those 10 || portions of the Report to which objections have been made, and has 11 considered and rejected the remaining arguments raised by Plaintiff in his 12 || Objections. The Court accepts the findings and recommendation of the 13 || Magistrate Judge. 14 Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 15 (1) the Report and Recommendation is approved and accepted; 16 (2) all claims asserted against Sheriff Bianco, Sgt. Rustad, Dep. 17 Villasenor, Dep. Groves, Cpt. Rodriguez, Sgt. Dominguez, and Lt. 18 Hatfield are dismissed with prejudice, to be reflected in the final 19 judgment in this action; and 20 (3) this action shall proceed only on the Monell and Americans with 21 Disabilities Act claims asserted against the County of Riverside in the 22 operative SAC and no other claim. 23 NO vv 24 Dated: May 14, 2025 Cig 25 oS %6 OTIS D. WRIGHT, II United States District Judge 27 28