Schwindling v. State

Supreme Court of Arkansas

Schwindling v. State

602 S.W.2d 639, 269 Ark. 388, 1980 Ark. LEXIS 1535

CourtSupreme Court of Arkansas

DecidedJune 30, 1980

DocketCR 80-71

StatusPublished

Cited by6 cases

This text of 602 S.W.2d 639 (Schwindling v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Schwindling v. State, 602 S.W.2d 639, 269 Ark. 388, 1980 Ark. LEXIS 1535 (Ark. 1980).

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Opinion

Frank Holt, Justice.

The appellant was charged with burglary and theft of property arising out of the theft of a quantity of controlled drugs. See Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 41-2002 and 41-2203 (Repl. 1977). He was convicted of both offenses and sentenced to concurrent terms of 20 years and 10 years, respectively. His only contention for reversal, through present counsel, is that the court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the sole issue raised by the evidence; i.e., the existence of the ordinary defense of self-induced intoxication.

Appellant presents a three-fold argument: (1) the existence of the defense of self-induced intoxication was the sole issue in the trial of the case; (2) self-induced intoxication is a “simple defense” to the crimes charged and the provisions of Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-110 (1) (a) and (3) (c) require that such an instruction be given; and (3) the reasons supporting the “absent request” prohibition against raising the issue on appeal are strongly outweighed by fair trial considerations. Even assuming arguendo that the defense was sufficiently raised by the evidence, the court is not required to give a specific instruction when, as here, none was requested. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-2134 (Repl. 1977); Tyler v. State, 265 Ark. 822, 581 S.W. 2d 328 (1979); and Roberts and Charles v. State, 254 Ark. 39, 491 S.W. 2d 390 (1973). We do not construe § 41-110 (1) (a) and (3) (c) to require the trial court, sua sponte, give an instruction on an ordinary defense, as asserted here. The court instructed the jury that to sustain a burglary charge, the state must prove the appellant “entered . . . with the purpose of committing therein a theft of property,” arid that to sustain a theft charge, the state must prove the appellant “knowingly took . . . unauthorized control over the property of another person with the purpose of depriving the owner thereof.” The jury was clearly instructed on the statutory definitions of the terms “purpose” and “knowingly,” and that the burden was on the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of each offense.

Affirmed.

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Frank Holt, Justice.

The appellant was charged with burglary and theft of property arising out of the theft of a quantity of controlled drugs. See Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 41-2002 and 41-2203 (Repl. 1977). He was convicted of both offenses and sentenced to concurrent terms of 20 years and 10 years, respectively. His only contention for reversal, through present counsel, is that the court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the sole issue raised by the evidence; i.e., the existence of the ordinary defense of self-induced intoxication.

Appellant presents a three-fold argument: (1) the existence of the defense of self-induced intoxication was the sole issue in the trial of the case; (2) self-induced intoxication is a “simple defense” to the crimes charged and the provisions of Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-110 (1) (a) and (3) (c) require that such an instruction be given; and (3) the reasons supporting the “absent request” prohibition against raising the issue on appeal are strongly outweighed by fair trial considerations. Even assuming arguendo that the defense was sufficiently raised by the evidence, the court is not required to give a specific instruction when, as here, none was requested. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-2134 (Repl. 1977); Tyler v. State, 265 Ark. 822, 581 S.W. 2d 328 (1979); and Roberts and Charles v. State, 254 Ark. 39, 491 S.W. 2d 390 (1973). We do not construe § 41-110 (1) (a) and (3) (c) to require the trial court, sua sponte, give an instruction on an ordinary defense, as asserted here. The court instructed the jury that to sustain a burglary charge, the state must prove the appellant “entered . . . with the purpose of committing therein a theft of property,” arid that to sustain a theft charge, the state must prove the appellant “knowingly took . . . unauthorized control over the property of another person with the purpose of depriving the owner thereof.” The jury was clearly instructed on the statutory definitions of the terms “purpose” and “knowingly,” and that the burden was on the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of each offense.

Affirmed.

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602 S.W.2d 639, 269 Ark. 388, 1980 Ark. LEXIS 1535, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/schwindling-v-state-ark-1980.

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