McGHEE, Justice.
This matter is before us on a pleading we treat as a petition to review the action of the State Board of Bar Examiners in denying the application of Rudolph Schware to take the examination for admission to practice law in this state.
In December, 1953, the petitioner applied for leave to take the bar examination in February, 1954. He was advised by letter that he would be entitled to do so. When he presented himself for examination he was interviewed by the Board of Bar Examiners. No transcript was made of this interview, but at its close the following action was taken by the board:
“No. 1309, Rudolph Schware. It is moved by Board Member Frank Andrews that the application of Rudolph Schware to take the bar examination be denied for the reason that, taking into consideration the use of aliases by the applicant, his former connection with subversive organizations, and his record of arrests, he has failed to satisfy the Board as to the requisite moral character for admission to the Bar of New Mexico. Whereupon said motion is duly seconded by Board Member Ross L. Malone, and unanimously passed.”
A second hearing was held before the board on July 16, 1954, and transcript made thereof. At the conclusion of this hearing the board was of the unanimous opinion the former determination should stand.
It is agreed by all that this court has plenary jurisdiction to review the decision of the board. In re Gibson, 1931, 35 N.M. 550, 4 P.2d 643; In re Royall, 1928, 33 N.M. 386, 268 P. 570. In such review this court is not limited by appellate rules, but the matter is considered originally.
The substance of petitioner’s argument is made under two points, the first of which is: The right to practice law is a property right protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States. Under this point reference is made to the cases of Ex parte Garland, 1866, 4 Wall. 333, 71 U.S. 333, 18 L.Ed. 366, and Cummings v. The State of Missouri, 1866, 4 Wall. 277, 71 U.S. 277, 18 L.Ed. 356. In the latter case it is said:
“ * * * We do not agree with the counsel of Missouri that ‘to punish one is to deprive him of life, liberty, or property, and that to take from him anything less than these is no punishment at all.’ The learned counsel does not use these terms — life, liberty, and property — as comprehending every right known to the law. He does not include under liberty freedom from outrage on the feelings as well as restraints on the person. He does not include under property those estates which one may acquire in professions, though they are often the source of the highest emoluments and honors. The deprivation of any rights, civil or political, previously enjoyed, may be punishment, the circumstances attending and the causes of the deprivation determining this fact. * * * ”
It is not necessary to class membership in the legal profession with ownership of real estate or other tangible article in order to recognize an individual has a right therein. We regard as inutile an attempt to categorize it at all. But, granting that such membership is a species of property, as that word is employed in the Constitution, it does not follow, and we do not take it as contended by petitioner, that the right to its enjoyment is absolute and unfettered by any mode of regulation.
In an annotation in 98 L.Ed. 851, at p. 852, substantive due process in its application to the type of property with which we are here concerned is described in the following language:
“Substantíve due' process of law may be roughly defined as-the constitutional guaranty that no person will be deprived of his life, liberty, or property for arbitrary reasons. Such a deprivation is constitutionally supportable only if the conduct from which the deprivation flows is proscribed by reasonable legislation (that is, legislation the enactment of which is within the scope of legislative authority), reasonably applied (that is, applied for a purpose consonant with the purpose of the legislation itself).”
The board acted under Rule III of the Rules Governing Admission to the Bar of . New Mexico, which provides “that the Board of Bar Examiners may decline to , permit any such applicant to take the (bar) examination when not satisfied of his good moral character.” We do not see how this requirement, which in the same or similar language is universal in this country so far as we kn’ow, Annotation 72 A.L.R. 929, can seriously be challenged as unreasonable.
Judge Cardozo has this to say of the requirement of good moral character upon admission to the bar, and afterward:
“Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A fair private and professional character is one of them. Compliance with that condition is essential at the moment admission; but it is equally essential afterwards. (Citing cases.) Whenever the condition is broken the privilege is lost. To refuse admission to an unworthy applicant is not to punish him for past offenses. The examination into character, like the examination into learning, is merely a test of fitness. * * * ” In re Rouss, 1917, 221 N.Y. 81, 116 N.E. 782, 783.
The cases are numerous, too, which hold that by asking admission into the legal profession an applicant places his good moral character directly in issue and bears the burden of proof as to that issue. Spears v. State Bar, 1930, 211 Cal. 183, 294 P. 697, 72 A.L.R. 923; In re Wells, 1917, 174 Cal. 467, 163 P. 657; Rosencranz v. Tidrington, 1923, 193 Ind. 472, 141 N.E. 58, 28 A.L.R. 1136; In re Weinstein, 1935, 150 Or. 1, 42 P.2d 744.
Thus we are brought up to the controverted, substantial question before us of whether the petitioner has produced proof of his good moral character so as to entitle him to take the examination for membership in the bar of this state, as contended by him under his second point.
An examination of this sort is concerned ultimately with the subjective character of the individual. Character cannot be laid upon a table, so we must resort to two kinds of indirect evidence: First, the pattern of conduct an individual follows, and, second, a consideration of the regard his fellows and associates have for him. This investigatory technique , can, at best, but dimly throw into relief the architecture of character; still, it is all we have. In this particular inquiry the technique leads us through petitioner’s own disclosures to behavior which cannot be severed from a social ideology which now stands athwart so much of the Eastern World dividing men from men — Communism.
The legal status of the Communist Party in the United States is far different today from that which obtained during the years of the Depression and following, when petitioner was a member of it. He calls our attention to the fact that as late as 1948 the Communist Party was a recognized political party and had candidates for the Presidency of the United States every four years up to and- including 1948. We do not overlook the fact that during the years petitioner was a member of the Young Communist League and the Communist Party, from 1932 to 1940, such membership was not unlawful. But that fact does not restrain us from examining his former associations and actions, including his arrests and his use of aliases, and his present attitude toward those matters, as contained in his statements to the board, in order to. arrive at. a conclusion as to his character. As said in American Communications Ass’n v. Douds, 1950, 339 U.S. 382, 411, 70 S.Ct. 674, 690, 94 L.Ed. 925, “the state of a man’s mind must be inferred from the things he says or does.”
It is generally held that an inquiry into character preceding admission to the bar is different from the inquiry had upon proceedings to disbar. This is already exemplified in part by our earlier reference to the rule that an applicant bears the burden •of proof of good character. It is also to be noted in the scope of inquiry. It is said in In re Wells, supra [174 Cal. 467, 163 P. 661]:
“ * * * In a proceeding to disbar an attorney the burden is on the accuser to prove moral turpitude. The requirement on his admission is to prevent the accrediting of untrustworthy persons as fit to receive the confidence attending upon the relation of attorney and client. The inquiry may extend to his general character as well as to particular acts. It is broader in its scope than that in a disbarment proceeding. The court may receive any evidence which tends to show his character for honesty, integrity, and general morality, and may no doubt refuse admission upon proofs that might not establish his guilt of any of the acts declared to be causes for disbarment.”
Similarly, in In re Farmer, 1926, 191 N. C. 235, 131 S.E. 661, 663, we find this statement:
“This 'upright character,’ prescribed by the statute, as a condition precedent to the applicant’s right to receive license to practice law in North Carolina, and of which he must, in addition to other requisites, satisfy the court, includes all the elements necessary to make up such a character. It is something more than an absence of bad character. It is the good name which the applicant has acquired, or should have acquired, through association with his fellows. It means that he must have conducted himself as a man of upright character ordinarily would, should, or does. Such character expresses itself, not in negatives nor in following the line of least resistance, but quite often in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right, and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. * * * ”
Before proceeding to examine the record as to the matters assigned by the board for its refusal to endorse the petitioner, “the use of aliases by the applicant, his former connection with subversive organizations, and his record of arrests”, it should be stated that only one member of this court has looked at the contents of what might be termed the “confidential file”, which contains answers to inquiries which the bar examiners cause to be mailed out regarding applicants who have not theretofore practiced law, the answers being returned to the clerk of this court, who is also the secretary of the Board of Bar Examiners. That member is the Honorable H. A. Kiker. In making this statement the writer and the remainder of the court do not intend that any reflection should be cast upon that justice in his examination of materials not made available to the petitioner. The statement is made for the sole purpose of advising petitioner that, regardless of whether this court has power to examine and rely upon “confidential” information about an applicant for admission to the bar, on which question we make no pronouncement, its members, with the single exception noted, have chosen not to do so. Also, at the oral argument here, and in its response and brief, the board disclaims having based its decision upon such information.
As the facts before us are the history of a man, they are best stated in narrative form.
The petitioner was born in New York in 1914. His father was a needles trade worker, an immigrant, a poor man and a socialist. Petitioner began work at the age of nine and continued part-time work during his school years. He attended DeWitt Clinton High School in the Bronx, New York, from 1928 to 1932. In 1932, at the age of eighteen, he joined the Young Communist League. This association arose out of the following circumstances, as described by petitioner:
“Well, I was going to High School and a fellow I was playing handball with during school hours when we used to get an hour off told me that he had written a letter to the school newspaper dealing with the question of unemployment in the United States, that the editors of the school paper wanted to publish it but that the faculty adviser refused to allow it to be published and he said that there was a club on the campus which dealt with problems such as that and asked me to attend one of the meetings. Well, I attended one of the meetings of the club and I found out that what he’d told me was true. I thought that freedom of the press was important, I was approximately eighteen years old at the time, and I attended meetings of the club whenever I could, which wasn’t too often. The club ran candidates in the school elections. This was just prior to my graduation and they had a-the platform called for lower prices in the school lunch room and stuff like that and our candidates won the election.
“It was after the election that the principal called all the members of the club into his office and our faculty adviser and told us that because of the way that the campaign had been conducted that we would have to disband the club. Now I know that right after we won the election they lowered the price of a glass of milk in the school lunch .r.opms from -five cents to three cents and other foods correspondingly.
“There were a number of people who belonged to the club who belonged to various political organizations, the main ones were the Young Peoples Socialist League, that had about approximately eight or nine members and there were four who belonged to the Young Communist League. To my dying day I will never forget, we were in the principal’s office and the principal says, you either —you have to disband the club or else stand suspended. And the leader of the Young Peoples Socialist League got up and he said, ‘Seeing as how you put it that way,’ I acquess.’ I never knew what that word meant until I looked it up. He meant to say, T acquiesce.’
“There were five people who refused to disband. Four of them were members of the Young Communist League, and myself. I thought it was wrong for the club to have to disband and it set me to thinking — I’d been raised in the socialist atmosphere — why was it when a test came, you’ve got to realize I was eighteen years at the time — when the test came why was it that the socialists had backed down and the Communists had stood up and I thought and thought and finally my — over the objections of my family — an invitation was given to me to join the Young Communist League and I joined the Young Com- . munist League. It was a iew years later that I joined the Communist party.”
In connection with the refusal to disband the club, petitioner was suspended from school for about three days. •
Petitioner joined the. Communist Party in 1934 at the age of twenty.
In 1933 petitioner was employed in a pocketbook factory in Gloversville, New York. For the first time he used an alias. In his written application to take the bar examination he stated with regard to the alias :
“I wanted to organize the employees into a union. Because a large number of employees were Italian, I was of the opinion that union organization work would be facilitated if I adopted an alias. I used the alias Rudolph de Caprio while employed at this factory. When the workers were organized into a Local Union affiliated with the American Federation of Labor, I left for my home in New York City and resumed use of my real name.”
At the July, 1954, hearing, the petitioner said of the use of this alias:
“A. Well, I worked in Monticello, New York, in a hotel driving as their chauffeur and then when the work slacked — when the hotel closed down for the summer season, on the way into New York there is a town called Gloversville and had a large Italian population and practically all the people working in the factory there were Italians and in order to get a job to earn a living I changed my name from a Jewish to an Italian name and kept the same first name and was able to get a job.
* * * * *
“Q. Was that the first time that you ever used an alias?
“A. Yes.
“Q. Was the sole purpose for that to gain employment?
“A. Yes.”
From February, 1934, to February, 1937, petitioner lived in Los Angeles, San Pedro, San Francisco and Berkeley, California, where he was employed in shipyard work, as a longshoreman and warehouseman, and part of the time as a seaman. During this period he used the alias Rudolph de Caprio.
During the maritime strike in 1934 petitioner was arrested a number of times and was booked under the alias of Joe Fliari, or Fliori.
Of his use of the alias, Rudolph de Caprio in California, petitioner testified at the hearing before the board:
“Q.' Why did you use the name in the shipyard? A. The same reason, ■I don’t-know of any and I; never did find any Jewish person who is work-ring in the shipyard. . -... .
“Q. Was the use of the name sole■‘ly to obtain employment?-. A.. Yes.
“Q. Was there any intention to de.ceive anyone? A. .No,”
When it was called to petitioner’s attention that he had explained the original use of an alias on the basis that he would be more effective as a labor organizer, in organizing workers of Italian extraction, and that at the hearing he explained the use of aliases as solely for the purpose of obtaining employment, he testified he used the aliases for both reasons.
On his use of the alias Joe Fliari, or Joe Fliori, upon his arrests, and of the circumstances of the arrests, petitioner testified:
“Q. Did you ever on any other occasion use an alias? A. Yes, a number of times, I believe it was two. I have tried to check with the Los Angeles Police Department and madé a trip to California purposely to get the information, because the information was refused to be supplied to me by mail, to find out how many times I’d been arrested in San Pedro, California. I know definitely that I was arrested twice and this was in the course of a strike and while I was’in San Pedro I went through the files of the San Pedro Newspaper and found that there were approximately two to 3,000 people arrested in the course of about 66 days, approximately, over 200 on a charge of suspicion of criminal syndicalism. (Discussion off the record.)
“Q. You were speaking about the arrest of approximately two or 3,000 people during the strikes at San Pedro, California, were you arrested at that time? A. Yes, I — to the best—
“Q. First let’s stay with the name, what name were you working under in the shipyard? A. Rudy DiCaprio.
“Q. And how many times were you arrested during the course of that strike? A. To the best of my knowledge and belief twice.
“Q. At that time it was — ■ A. Criminal syndicalism.
“Q. Is that a state or federal? A. State.
“Q. What is criminal syndicalism, if you know? A. Well, there is a statute which defines criminal syndicalism as a person — as the commission of an act in which somebody attempts to overthrow or subvert the state government, essentially that is what it is.
“Q. Were you ever tried on this charge? A. No, I was never tried on the charge.
“Q. Were the charges dismissed? A. I assume so, I was never brought before a judge, I was kept in jail, I remember one time 72 hours and then released and the second time I remember I was in jail approximately five days and read in the paper on the 3rd day that I’d been released but that I was still in jail but I’d never been brought before a judge and was released.
“Q. And now sticking with the use of names, you have testified that you used the name of DiCaprio at Gloversville, New York, and at San Pedro, did you use any other alias at any time up until 1940? A. Well, as I said, when I was arrested I used the alias of Joe Fliori.
“Q. Was that in connection with employment or just a name that you assumed to give to the police? A. A Name that I assumed to give to the police, I suppose, it is a long time ago, I suppose I thought, well, if the company knew that I’d been arrested it was possible that I wouldn’t be able to go back to work.
“Q. There was no question of your identity with the police since they had you in person? A. No, no.
“Q. They had you regardless of what your name was? A. That is correct.
“Q. And did you obtain any monetary benefit as a result of that name? A. None whatsoever.”
In the Communist Party petitioner used -either the name Rudy DeCaprio or Joe Fliori. He could not recall which one.
In February, 1937, petitioner’s father ■died and he returned to New York. At this time he left the Communist Party. He described this break with the Party as follows :
“Q. You say you left the Communist party in 1940. Would you tell the Committee in your own words the reason why you left.
“A. Well, I’d left the Communist party once before in 1937, I believe, when my father died. I left California and went back home to New York. I dropped out of the Communist party then and that was the time when I assumed my rightful name and said to myself, why are you ashamed to be known as Rudolph Schware, the son of your father. * * *»
In the years between May of 1937 and January of 1943, petitioner worked for a short time in Chicago, then in Texas at •a vegetable processing plant, then in Indianapolis picking corn. He was intermittently hitch-hiking and looking for work, and finally came to Detroit. He testified as to the time spent in Detroit as ■follows:
“ * * * I was single at the time and the relief that the City of Detroit gave for single men was this place called Fisher Lodge, approximately 2,000, 3,000 people, and food was about as much as the city could afford at that time and I was instrumental in helping to organize an organization in this lodge so that we could get better food and perhaps able to get jobs as a result of that.”
In Detroit he was again approached to rejoin the Communist Party, which he did. He states of this reaffiliation:
“ * * * my disillusionment had been going on and then you had in 1939, I believe it was, you had your Stalin-Hitler pact which began to raise a lot of questions in my mind and then in 1940 I began to see. At that time I was the State Secretary of the Michigan Workers Alliance and I began to see that the Communist party wasn’t interested so much, those beautiful words wasn’t so much that but a struggle for power on the part of a few individuals that they wanted the power and they didn’t care what happened to the other people. Of course, I was a lot older then, I was a lot older then, too, and I’d been questioning and questioning for quite some time and finally I made the events reach the stage where the party organization was trying to say how the organization of which I was the elected secretary should be run, not for the benefit of the organization, that is when I reached-the final decision, you and I part ways and I left.”
Petitioner was arrested in Detroit in 1940 in connection with the Neutrality Act of 1816, when he was engaged in obtaining recruits to oppose Franco’s forces in the Spanish Civil War. He had himself volunteered to go to Spain to fight, but was unsuccessful in' getting passage there. ' He states of this arrest:
“Q. * * * I want to inquire whether or not you knew at that time that you were engaged in these recruiting activities that there was any question as to their legality?
“A. No, I had no knowledge whatever that I was violating a law. There was no. knowledge whatsoever.
“Q. Was the recruiting being conducted openly or surreptitiously?
“A. Quite openly. , Everybody knew I, -myself, and the people in my organization and in the surroundings that I was traveling in at that time, everybody knew, for instance, that I, myself, had volunteered to go to Spain but I had no knowledge whatsoever that I. was breaking any law. Of course, I had read history and known of during the American Revolution people coming over from Europe to help our fight here, before we became a nation.”
The charges under which he was arrested in Detroit were terminated by nolle prosequi filed on behalf of the government.
From 1940 to 1943 the petitioner had scattered employment, working part of the time as a truck driver. He was arrested in 1940 or 1941 in a town in Texas, the náme of which he could not recall, on a charge of “suspicion of transporting a stolen vehicle.” He stated he was driving the car to California for a friend and after being held while the police presumably inquired into the ownership of the car and his right to possession of it, he was released.
In response to a question in petitioner’s written application to take the bar examination asking that he state every residence he had had since he was sixteen years of age, and indicating the name of the city and state, the street address and the period of time by month and year of each separate residence were to be given, petitioner stated that he had had ten different residences during the period March, 1934 to January, 1943, the latter date being the time he was inducted into the United States Army. He lived in California, New York, Illinois, Texas, Michigan and Indiana. He could recall only two street addresses. One was the home of his family in New York where he spent three months in 1937; the other was an address in South Bend, Indiana, where he lived approximately two years.
Another question on petitioner’s application form sought information as to all employments he had had since the age of sixteen years, specifically asking for the time periods of such employment, exact addresses of offices or places where employed and the names and present addresses of all former employers. From March, 1934, to November, 1935, petitioner was employed as a machinist’s helper at Bethlehem Shipbuilding Company, Terminal Island, San Pedro, California. He could not recall the names of his superiors. He left there to join the merchant marine. He then spent five months as a seaman, first on a freighter. He could not recall the name of the ship, but believed he worked for the Calmar Line, making no statement as to the whereabouts of its offices. Then he left that employment to sail on a steam schooner plying the Pacific Coast. He made no statement as to the name of his employer, or otherwise identified the schooner. After that he worked ten months as a longshoreman on the docks in San Francisco, Oakland and Berkeley, California. Then, after a trip to New York at the time of his father’s death he worked in a grocery store for some four months. He could not recall the name of the store or the owner. He worked two months in a vegetable processing plant in Rio Hondo, Texas. He could not recall the name of the plant or the owner.
The application states that from March, 1938 to June, 1940, he was in Detroit working with the Wayne County Workers Alliance and the Michigan Workers Alliance. The offices were located on Grand River Avenue. He gives no names of associates. Upon leaving this work he was unemployed for a while and then became regularly employed as a truck driver in South Bend, Indiana for about two and a half years. One company for which he worked went out of business when the 1942 car production was halted. He gives the name of the company, the owner and the office address of his last employer in South Bend, which corresponds with the period of time for which he had given a residence address as earlier noted. This brought him up to the time when he was inducted into the army.
■ The summation of all this is that for approximately nine years petitipner has provided only one residence address other than the home of his parents in New.York. Over that period he has given only one personal name of an employer, for whom he also gave a completed street • address in South Bend, Indiana, and only the street name for the location of the two Wórkers Alliances he was connected with in Detroit. This adds up to only slightly more than a complete blank. If it were not for the fact that petitioner had such a tenuous existence during those years, his inability to recall with more definiteness the location of his residences and the names and locations of his employers would he entirely void of explanation.
Petitioner was drafted into the Army in January, 1944, and served until 1946, when he was honorably discharged. He lived in South Bend, Indiana from 1946 to 1950, during which time he was self-employed in the sale of Venetian blinds and also attended Western Michigan College.
In 1950 he enrolled in the Law School of the University of New Mexico. He discussed with the dean of that school his former affiliation with the Communist Party. When questioned by one of the bar examiners at the hearing as to whether it had ever occurred to him that his experience and membership in the Communist Party and his activities in that organization would affect him in his ability to be admitted to the bar, he stated:
“A. Well, I’d classify that under the heading of a calculated risk. In other words, we knew that there was a possibility that I would not be permitted to take the exam. On the other hand, we also knew that these are things that took place when I was a young person * * * I was expecting that you gentlemen will say that we have to hold a hearing on your case, Mr. Schware. Frankly that is what I expected.”
Petitioner married in 1944. He has two children. Nine letters which he wrote to his wife while in the armed services in 1944 were offered by him in evidence as corroborative of his claim to be converted from Communism and to be of good moral character. The Rabbi of a synagogue in Albuquerque testified the petitioner was a member of his congregation in good standing, that his children received religious, training.
While in law school petitioner established an anonymous scholarship of $50 a year to be given to needy law students, which he has continued and hopes to continue-indefinitely.
Some seventeen letters from law professors and students and business associates. were introduced into the record stating that petitioner is a person of good moral character, these letters being from persons who. have known the petitioner in New Mexico-
Burdensome though it be to the reader,, there is still more of the record of petitioner’s hearing before the board which must be covered. He testified, on questions by the board members, regarding-his knowledge of Communist aims and methods. This testimony is somewhat extensive and we quote only part of it:
“Q. * * * Is it true or is it not true that a bona fide member of the Communist party recognizes only the Communistic authority as the authority to which he owes all allegiance, is that correct? A. That is correct.
“Q. As a Communist, in other words, a Communist who may be an American citizen, but if he joins the Communist party, his loyalty and allegiance are to the heads of the Communist party in Russia, is that correct? A. Well, I know when I was a member of the Communist party while we looked to Russia as the guiding star, still we considered ourselves American citizens and as a legal political party. Does that answer your question?
"Q. Not entirely. Let’s say that I belonged to the Communist party and a directive of whatever nature it may be comes from Russia or at least where I understand is the source of words of wisdom and a certain directive comes out to a true member of the Communist party— A. That is all.
“Q. —am I under obligation, if I am a Communist, to obey that directive? A. That is law and that is probably one of the reasons why the Communist party has been so much repudiated by the American people. We’ve got, just like myself, there have been hundreds of thousands of people who entered the Communist party’s ranks and finally end up asking ourselves questions and starting to question why, why, and then saying to heck with you.
“Q. Well, to get back to this thought that the basic concept of the Communist party is that they — it recognizes no nationalistic lines, that is, if you belong to the Communist party in the United States you arc the same breed of cats as one who belonged to the Communist party in Argentina or whatever that may be? A. That is correct.
“Q. And the belief is that the Communist party as such should be the controlling factor in government, is that right? A. That is the aim eventually.
“Q. All right now, let’s say that I am a member of the Communist Party and I am residing in the United States and you are a member of the Communist party and you are residing in Mexico. Say that a war should break out in which Russia, China, whatever countries might make the alignment, would be on the one side and the United States and other countries, including Mexico, would be opposed, and the directive would come out of Russia to me here and one to you down there to do whatever we could to aid the cause of Communistic forces that were at war with, what they would classify if Russia— A. I have no doubt they would.
“Q. —would issue that directive, if I am a true Communist and that directive would be to blow up the railroad track or something I would be advised to do it, it would be my duty? A. I said I have no doubt.
“Q. All right, if I am a Communist I follow that directive, is that correct? A. Yes.”
Throughout the record of this hearing petitioner asserts that he left the Communist Party because he was disillusioned with its leaders and further that he came to the realization that it was the individual that counted, rather than the all-powerful state advocated by Communism.
There is to us a lack of credibility in petitioner’s testimony as to the extent of his disillusionment with the leaders and the philosophy of Communism, for we find in one of the letters to his wife written in 1944, four years after his break with the Party, which his attorney offered in evidence along with others to show what was in petitioner’s heart during the year they were written, these assertions:
“ * * * The FEPC (Fair Employment Practices Commission) is one of the most important of Roosevelt’s win the war agencies. It has helped to break down the reactionary barrier, that relegated Negroes to the unskilled, most dirty jobs at the lowest wages, in order to allow them to contribute their labor to increasing production for victory. Thousands of them now perform skilled labor in many industries that they never had a chance of entering before Roosevelt established the FEPC.
“White supremacy is a tool of the Southern bourbons to continue in power at the expense of the welfare of the South itself and the nation as a whole. It is on a. par with Hitler’s attempt to delude the German people into believing that they are Aryan supermen.
“You yourself know intimately of the evil: Anti-Semitism. You know that the Jewish people throughout the ages have made important contributions to the cause of progress. Jim-Crow is on a par with Anti-Semitism, anti-Catholicism, anti-Communism. In a democracy one cannot discriminate against a minority. When one does, consciously or unconsciously they are playing Hitler’s game, making use of his favorite tactic to divide us, certainly hot contributing to National Unity which is so important not only for winning the war in the shortest period of time, but also for the winning of a just peace and making this world a better place to live in for all.
"All the above anti’s I mentioned are most dangerous and stupid mistakes for Americans to make. They violate Christian ethics as well as all other ethical principles that recognize the brotherhood of man. To top it all off, consider them immoral.” (Emphasis supplied.)
We cannot believe that the foregoing letter is the letter of a man who four years previously had battled within himself and repudiated Communism as a quest for power by a few, as he declares to have done. No doubt the introduction of this letter by petitioner was inadvertent, but it tells us what was in his heart. He would still the voice of all who would criticize Communism.
There was certainly nothing inadvertent about petitioner’s membership in the Communist Party from 1934 to 1940, when he was twenty to twenty-seven years of age. We agree with the Board of Bar Examiners that these are responsible years. During them his activities were largely connected with the labor movement in this country, as an organizer working out of the Communist Party. We have no reason on the record before us to credit him with a lack of knowledge of the purposes, aims and machinery of that Party in the United States.
The foundation of the Communist “theology” is laid bare in Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion in American Communications Ass’n v. Douds, cited supra, beginning at page 422 of 339 U.S., at page 695 of 70 S.Ct., in the following numbered statements. We omit the exposition which in the opinion follows these statements, in the interest of brevity, but commend a full reading of the entire opinion for a clear and startling picture.
“1. The goal of the Communist Party is to seize powers of government by and for a minority rather than to acquire power through the vote of a free electorate. * * *
“2. The Communist Party alone among American parties past or present is dominated and controlled by a foreign government. * * *
“3. Violent and undemocratic means are the calculated and indispensable methods to attain the Communist Party’s goal. * * *
“4. The Communist Party has sought to gain this leverage and hold on the American population by acquiring control of the labor movement. * * *
“5. Every member of the Communist Party is an agent to execute the Communist program. * * * ” (Italics omitted.)
We believe one who has knowingly given his loyalties to such a program and belief for six to seven years during a period of responsible adulthood is a person of questionable character. We do not think it an exaggeration to say that many have doubtless been denied entry into or expelled from membership in the legal profession for far less serious offenses against ethic.
We think, also, that the conclusion is warranted that petitioner has erased in his own conscience any culpability attaching to the use of aliases upon the bases he thought it necessary to hide his ancestry to secure employment. He does not today appear to us to bear the weight of this deception upon his employers and the police as a dishonesty, but simply as an excusable expedient. Furthermore, he excuses his arrests in California upon the ground that many others were arrested, too. With respect to the arrest in Detroit, for activity in violation of a federal statute, we take it that he regards his work in obtaining recruits for a foreign war as even commendable because he had concluded which side was right.
On the basis of these considerations we must approve the recommendation of the Board of Bar Examiners. This board is comprised of leaders of the legal profession in this state. One of its members is a former district judge, and another is at this time a member of the Board of Governors of the American Bar Association. They are responsible, experienced attorneys. They questioned the petitioner, heard him and observed his demeanor. At a time before the formal hearing before the board, the petitioner wrote a letter to the board asking that he be permitted to appear before this court, but, on May 21, 1954, this request was withdrawn as being premature and was never renewed.
We take no pleasure in the duty we have had to perform, for no man is all good or all bad. The record on which this decision is based came from the petitioner himself, who presently enjoys good repute among his teachers, his fellow students and associates and in his synagogue. But our obligation to the bar of this state knows no compromise. Petitioner has sought an office difficult to obtain and difficult to serve. The oath required of attorneys in New Mexico, based upon § 18-1-9, 1953 Comp., reads as follows:
“I will support the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of New Mexico;
“I will maintain the respect due to Courts of Justice and judicial officers;
“I will not counsel or maintain any suit or proceeding which shall appear to me to be unjust, nor any defense except such as I believe to be honestly debatable under the law of the land;
“I will employ for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to me such means only as (are) consistent with truth and honor, and will never seek to mislead the judge or jury by any artifice or false statement of fact or law;
“I will maintain the confidence and preserve inviolate the secrets of my client, and will accept no compensation in connection with his business except from him or with his knowledge and approval ;
“I will abstain from all offensive personalty, and advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness unless required by the justice of the cause with which I am charged ;
“I will never reject from any consideration personal to myself the cause of the defenseless or oppressed, or delay any man’s cause for lucre or malice.” Rules Governing Admission to the Bar, rule 5, 1953 Comp, following section 18-1-8.
To hold otherwise than we do, we would have to state that the petitioner has proved to us that he is a man of good moral character for the purpose of being given the office of attorney. We do not hold this conviction. Accordingly, it must be ruled that petitioner’s application to take the bar examination of the State of New Mexico is denied.
It is so ordered.
COMPTON, C. J.i and LUJAN and SADLER, JJ., concur. KIKER, J., to file dissenting opinion at later date.