Filed 8/26/26 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
SCHURMAN FAMILY COMPANY TIC, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF ALAMEDA COUNTY, A174194 Respondent;
(Alameda County Super. Ct.
PHUOKHAO BOUNXAYSANA et al., No. 22CV008723)
Real Parties in Interest.
Known as the Privette doctrine, a person or entity that hires an independent contractor “is not liable for injuries sustained by the contractor or its workers while on the job” because the “hirer generally delegates to an independent contractor all responsibility for workplace safety.” (Gonzalez v. Mathis (2021) 12 Cal.5th 29, 40 (Gonzalez); see also Privette v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 689, 702 (Privette).) The Privette doctrine extends not just to the party that directly hired the independent contractor but also to those in the “chain of delegation,” such as where “the hirer contracts with another contractor who then subcontracts the work to the independent contractor.” (Tverberg v. Fillner Construction, Inc. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 518, 528–529 (Tverberg).)
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The plaintiff in this case, Phuokhao Bounxaysana, worked for an independent contractor hired by the tenant of a warehouse owned by Schurman Family Company TIC (Schurman). Bounxaysana was seriously injured when he fell through a skylight on the roof of the warehouse while performing work for the hiring tenant.
Bounxaysana sued Schurman, which moved for summary judgment based on the Privette doctrine. The trial court denied Schurman’s motion, reasoning that the Privette doctrine was “inapplicable” to Schurman because it was not a hiring party; rather, Schurman was the tenant’s landlord and thus “not entitled to the protections of the Privette doctrine.” We disagree.
The weight of appellate authority, including that of the California Supreme Court, dictates that Schurman falls within the chain of delegation. Because it is undisputed that the Privette doctrine applied to protect the direct hirer in this case, we conclude that same doctrine also protects Schurman from liability for Bounxaysana’s on the job injuries. Therefore, we reverse the denial of summary judgment.
BACKGROUND
I. Factual Background
Schurman owns a warehouse in Oakland, California. Schurman leased a 12-foot by 12-foot portion of the warehouse’s roof to GTE Mobilnet of California Limited Partnership (Verizon) “for the installation, operation and maintenance of communications equipment” and “antennas.” In addition to the roof space, Verizon also leased a 12-foot by 20-foot portion of the property inside the warehouse and “such additional space” as needed “for the installation, operation and maintenance of wires, cables, conduits and pipes . . . running between and among the Floor Space, Rooftop Space and Antenna Space.”
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The lease provided Verizon (or the local utility provider) with “the right to install such utilities on, over and/or under the Property [as] necessary for [Verizon] to operate its communications facility,” including “the non-exclusive right of ingress and egress . . . over the Property and in and through the Building, on to, over and across the Building rooftop . . . for the purpose of installation, operation and maintenance” of the communications equipment. During the term of the lease, Schurman would be responsible for maintenance of “the structural elements of the Building and the Premises,” such as the foundation, exterior walls, interior load-bearing walls, and common areas, while Verizon would “maintain the non-structural portions of the Premises.”
In March 2018, Verizon (through its affiliate Verizon Sourcing LLC)
entered into a “Cell Site Construction Agreement” with independent contractor L.D. Strobel (Strobel) to act as the general contractor for the cell site installation project at the warehouse. Per the terms of the construction agreement, Strobel would have “ ‘sole and exclusive’ ” control over its workers, including responsibility for their “health and safety,” and would be “solely responsible” for the “means [and] methods” of construction.
On June 22, 2021, Strobel sent Bounxaysana to the warehouse to work on Verizon’s equipment located on the ground floor. At some point, a Verizon technician asked Bounxaysana and his coworker to go onto the roof and check the serial numbers on the radios housed in Verizon’s roof enclosure.
Verizon’s roof enclosure had one access door that was reached by walking along a steel walkway with a handrail on one side and a cable tray (through which cable wires were run) on the other side. The access door was closed with screws and required a screwdriver to open. However, on June 22, Bounxaysana did not bring a screwdriver with him onto the roof. Instead of
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returning to ground level to retrieve one, Bounxaysana attempted to find another way into the enclosure. Bounxaysana left the steel walkway and stepped onto the sloped part of the roof outside the Verizon enclosure where he fell through a skylight and suffered serious injuries as a result. It is uncontested that the portion of the roof that contained the skylight was not part of the section of the roof leased to Verizon.
II. Procedural Background In March 2022, Bounxaysana filed a personal injury action against Verizon and Schurman asserting claims for negligence and premises liability. In April 2025, Schurman moved for summary judgment, asserting that the Privette doctrine precluded any liability against it. The trial court denied the motion in July 2025, ruling the Privette doctrine did not extend to protect landlords like Schurman.1 In September 2025, Schurman filed a petition for writ relief in this court. We requested informal briefing and issued a notice that a writ may issue in the first instance. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1088; Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 180.) After receiving the briefing, we issued an order to show cause, and the parties elected to deem
1 In the same order, the court granted summary judgment in favor of
Verizon based on the Privette doctrine. Bounxaysana did not appeal from that decision/judgment and does not challenge that determination in this writ proceeding. (See Rogness v. English Moss Joint Venturers (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 190, 192, fn. 2 [judgment from order granting motion for summary judgment is appealable]; see also Valentine v. Plum Healthcare Group, LLC (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 1076, 1090, fn. 4 [without a timely notice of appeal, the trial court’s ruling “is the state of the record in this matter and we decide the remaining issues in accordance with that ruling”].)
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their previously filed briefs as their respective return and reply.2 (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.487(b).)
DISCUSSION
In this case, the parties dispute whether the Privette doctrine applies to shield Schurman from liability for Bounxaysana’s personal injury claims. Schurman argues the Privette doctrine applies because it was “within the chain of delegation.” Bounxaysana asserts the doctrine is inapplicable absent a hiring relationship and, in this case, “[i]t is undisputed that Schurman did not hire Verizon or Strobel.” Because this petition comes to us after a ruling on a summary judgment motion and presents a pure question of law, we decide the parties’ dispute de novo. (Buss v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 35, 60 [denial of summary judgment motion reviewed de novo]; Collins v. Diamond Generating Corp. (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 1162, 1173, fn. 5 (Collins) [“arguments concerning the applicability of the Privette doctrine raise a legal issue, so our review . . . is de novo”].)
Under the doctrine of stare decisis, all California state courts are bound to follow opinions of the California Supreme Court (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455) and, although Court of Appeal decisions are binding only upon trial courts, “ ‘we ordinarily follow the decisions of other districts without good reason to disagree.’ ” (Wolfe v. Dublin Unified School Dist. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 126, 137; see also Winns v. Postmates Inc. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 803, 815.) Here, the trial court relied on Ramirez v. PK I Plaza 580 SC LP (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 252, 265 (Ramirez), which, it concluded, “expressly holds that the Privette doctrine
2 Before we issued the order to show cause, counsel for Schurman filed
a notice of new authority, and we permitted letter briefs on the new authority: Andrews v. Wagner (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 766 (Andrews).
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does not apply to landlords.” Because Schurman did not hire Strobel, the trial court understandably determined that “stare decisis dictates that Schurman is not entitled to the protections of the Privette doctrine.” A review of additional authority leads us to disagree with this interpretation.
In Ramirez, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at pages 257–258, the majority reversed summary judgment entered in favor of the owner and operator of a shopping center (Kimco). The plaintiff (Ramirez) was a self-employed independent contractor who was hired by a shopping center tenant to remove an exterior sign from the building. (Id. at p. 257.) Ramirez was injured when he fell through an opening on the roof and sued Kimco under various tort theories. (Id. at p. 259.) The trial court granted summary judgment for Kimco, concluding that Kimco owned no duty of care to Ramirez under the Privette doctrine. (Ramirez, at pp. 259, 265–270.)
Two of our colleagues in Division One of this appellate district disagreed with the trial court, holding that a “bedrock presumption of the Privette doctrine [was] absent” because “Kimco did not hire . . . Ramirez.” (Ramirez, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 265.) One of our colleagues, however, dissented, reasoning that the Privette doctrine should apply “where, as here, a lease requires the lessee to do work on the property that the parties contemplate will be done by an independent contractor” and the lessee hires an independent contractor to do the work contemplated. (Ramirez, at p. 280 (dis. opn. of Banke, J.).) The Ramirez dissent explained that a non-hiring landlord should be entitled to protection under the Privette doctrine where it “is the first link in a ‘contracting chain’ that contemplates, and results in, the hiring of an independent contractor to do the work.” (Ramirez, at p. 280.)
With all due respect to our colleagues in the Ramirez majority, in the absence of California Supreme Court authority limiting the chain of
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delegation to an unbroken sequence of hiring relationships, we will not read such a requirement into the Privette doctrine. Instead, Supreme Court precedent holds that the Privette doctrine’s presumptive delegation of authority occurs not because of a hiring relationship, but rather because independent contractors, unlike traditional employees, control the means and manner in which their work is performed. (Tverberg, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 528 [“unlike a mere employee, [the independent contractor] receives authority to determine how the work is to be performed”]; Sandoval v. Qualcomm Incorporated (2021) 12 Cal.5th 256, 269 (Sandoval) [“independent contractors by definition ordinarily control the manner of their own work” (italics added)].) Accordingly, once the delegation occurs through the hiring of an independent contractor, we can identify no basis for requiring a hiring relationship through every link in the “chain of delegation.” (Tverberg, at p. 529.)
Here, it is undisputed that Verizon hired Strobel as an independent contractor. It is also undisputed that “Strobel was aware of the skylights [i.e., the alleged hazard] prior to the subject incident.”3 Thus, as a matter of law, the duty of workplace safety had been “presumptively delegate[d]” to
3 The parties dispute whether Bounxaysana knew of the hazard (i.e.,
the skylights on the roof), but the relevant inquiry is whether the contractor knew of the hazard, not whether the employee of the independent contractor knew. (Gonzalez, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 45 [“A landowner does not fail to delegate responsibility to the contractor for workplace safety simply because there exists a known hazard on the premises that cannot be readily addressed by the contractor”]; id. at p. 50 [“once the hazard is known to the contractor, the contractor has at its disposal all of the information necessary to determine whether or how the work can be performed safely”]; id. at p. 53 [“a landowner will generally not be liable for an injury to an independent contractor or its workers resulting from a known hazard on the property”]; cf. Kinsman v. Unocal Corp. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 659, 675 (Kinsman) [landowner may be liable for undisclosed, concealed hazard].)
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Strobel.4 (Sandoval, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 269; Gonzalez, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 38.) Indeed, as the trial court found, the Privette doctrine freed Verizon (the hiring party) from any duty of care potentially owed to Bounxaysana.5 The question before us thus becomes whether Schurman falls within Privette’s “chain of delegation” even though it is not a “hirer.” (Tverberg, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 529.) As we discuss, our Supreme Court precedent does not require a hiring-based relationship to maintain the chain of delegation, and the majority of our sister courts have held that Privette doctrine protection can extend to non-hiring entities.
I. California Supreme Court Opinions on the Privette Doctrine The Supreme Court of California first articulated what has become known as the Privette doctrine in 1993, holding that the employee of an independent contractor could not sue the property owner who had hired the independent contractor for work-related injuries under the peculiar risk doctrine. (Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 692, 696.) Basing its decision on
4 Bounxaysana’s briefing to us suggests that Schurman was required
“to make a prima facie case for delegation.” However, as we discuss, our Supreme Court has held that a presumption of delegation arises from the hiring of an independent contractor. (Sandoval, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 269; Tverberg, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 528.) Thus, the undisputed fact that Verizon hired Strobel triggers the presumption of delegation sufficient to shift the burden to Bounxaysana to raise a triable issue of fact. (Alvarez v. Seaside Transportation Services LLC (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 635, 644 [evidence that plaintiff’s employer was independent contractor and that plaintiff was injured on the job “was sufficient to establish that the Privette presumption applied and, therefore, shifted the burden to plaintiff to raise a triable issue of fact”].)
5 As noted above, the trial court’s ruling on Verizon’s motion for
summary judgment is part of the same order as its ruling on Schurman’s motion. Accordingly, it “is the state of the record in this matter and we decide the remaining issues in accordance with that ruling.” (Valentine v. Plum Healthcare Group, LLC, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 1090, fn. 4.)
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“policy reasons,” the Supreme Court explained that the employee’s “ ‘exclusive remedy’ ” for the injuries was workers’ compensation, which precluded the employee from holding the independent contractor liable for the same injury. (Id. at pp. 701, 696–698 [workers’ compensation provides the “ ‘exclusive remedy’ ” for the injured worker and “shields the contractor from further liability for the injury”].) Thus, it would be “anomalous” to hold the “nonnegligent” hirer liable “for the . . . injury-causing conduct of the contractor” itself. (Id. at p. 698.) Moreover, permitting additional recovery for injuries covered by workers’ compensation would result in “an unwarranted windfall” to the injured employee. (Id. at pp. 700, 702.)
In Toland v. Sunland Housing Group, Inc. (1998) 18 Cal.4th 253, 256– 257 (Toland), the California Supreme Court subsequently clarified that the Privette doctrine barred all forms of liability based on the peculiar risk doctrine, including where “a person . . . hires an independent contractor to do inherently dangerous work, but . . . fails to provide in the contract or in some other manner that special precautions be taken to avert the peculiar risks of that work.”6 The Supreme Court explained, it would be “illogical and unfair that a landowner or other person who hires an independent contractor should have greater liability for the independent contractor’s negligence towards the
6 In a concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice Werdegar agreed with
Toland’s expansion of Privette’s protection but disagreed with “much of [the majority’s] rationale” and would have created an exception that recognized an unprotected duty of care where “the hirer’s knowledge or control is superior to that of the contractor”—a view that Justice Werdegar reiterated in subsequent opinions. (Toland supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 270–271 (conc. & dis. opn. of Werdegar, J.); see also Camargo v. Tjaarda Dairy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1235, 1245–1246 (conc. & dis. opn. of Werdegar, J.) [“concur[ring] under the compulsion of Toland” but reiterating concerns with “the majority’s blanket approach”].) Because here we consider the distinct concept of delegation, we limit our discussion of Supreme Court cases to the majority opinions.
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contractor’s employees than the independent contractor whose liability is limited to providing workers’ compensation coverage.” (Id. at p. 270.) “For the same reasons,” the Supreme Court next expanded the Privette doctrine to “bar an employee of an independent contractor from bringing a negligent hiring action against the hirer of the contractor.” (Camargo v. Tjaarda Dairy, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 1238, 1244.)
And since Toland, the Supreme Court has recognized only two exceptions to the Privette doctrine. (Hooker v. Department of Transportation (2002) 27 Cal.4th 198, 202 (Hooker); Kinsman, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 664, 671; see also Gonzalez, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 54 [declining to find “a broad third exception to the Privette doctrine”].)
First, in Hooker, the Supreme Court held “that a hirer is liable to an employee of a contractor insofar as a hirer’s exercise of retained control affirmatively contributed to the employee’s injuries.” (Hooker, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 202.) The majority reaffirmed that “ ‘[A] general contractor owes no duty of care to an employee of a subcontractor to prevent or correct unsafe procedures or practices.’ ” (Id. at p. 209.) But the majority recognized that an independent duty arose “when the hirer’s conduct has affirmatively contributed to the injuries of the contractor’s employee.” (Id. at pp. 211–212, fn. omitted.)7
7 In a companion case to Hooker, the Supreme Court similarly held
“that a hirer is liable to an employee of an independent contractor insofar as the hirer’s provision of unsafe equipment affirmatively contributes to the employee’s injury.” (McKown v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 219, 222 (McKown).) For the same reasons discussed in Hooker, a hirer who “negligently furnish[es] unsafe equipment to the contractor[] affirmatively contributes to the injury of an employee of the contractor” and “should be liable to the employee for the consequences of the hirer’s own negligence.” (McKown, at p. 225 [affirming jury verdict against Wal-Mart, which “requested” the contractor use its unsafe forklift].)
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In Kinsman, the California Supreme Court expressed a second exception to the Privette doctrine, permitting premises liability claims against hiring landowners where (1) “the landowner[8] knew, or should have known, of a latent or concealed preexisting hazardous condition on its property,” (2) “the contractor did not know and could not have reasonably discovered this hazardous condition,” and (3) “the landowner failed to warn the contractor about this condition.” (Kinsman, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 664, 671.)
The Privette doctrine continued to evolve, and, in the previously cited case of Tverberg, the Supreme Court coined the phrase the “chain of delegation” to describe its scope of protection. (Tverberg, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 529.) In Tverberg, the employee of an independent contractor hired by a subcontractor attempted to hold the general contractor liable for workplace injuries. (Id. at p. 521.) Our Supreme Court determined that the Privette doctrine shielded the general contractor from liability for the injured employee’s claims. (Tverberg, at pp. 528–529.) “[U]nlike a mere employee,” the Supreme Court reasoned, an independent contractor “receives authority to determine how the work is to be performed and assumes a corresponding responsibility to see that the work is performed safely.” (Id. at p. 528.) “Having assumed responsibility for workplace safety, an independent contractor may not hold a hiring party vicariously liable for injuries resulting from the contractor’s own failure to effectively guard against risks inherent in the contracted work.” (Id. at p. 522.)
8 The Supreme Court used the term “ ‘landowner’ ” broadly “to refer to
either an owner or a possessor of land that owes some kind of duty of care to keep the premises safe.” (Kinsman, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 664, fn. 1.)
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The Supreme Court explained it is the independent contractor who “has authority to determine the manner in which inherently dangerous construction work is to be performed, and thus assumes legal responsibility for carrying out the contracted work, including the taking of workplace safety precautions.” (Tverberg, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 522.) Therefore, it did not matter whether the delegation of authority was “direct, when the hirer has contracted with the independent contractor, or indirect, when the hirer contracts with another contractor who then subcontracts the work to the independent contractor.” (Id. at p. 528.) “Whether direct or indirect, this delegated control over the performance of the work removes the independent contractor from the category of ‘innocent third parties’ deserving of financial protection under the doctrine of peculiar risk.” (Ibid.) Correspondingly, Tverberg concluded that the Privette doctrine precluded liability “for injuries arising from risks inherent in the nature or the location of the hired work over which the independent contractor has, through the chain of delegation, been granted control.” (Tverberg, at pp. 528–529, italics added.)
Our Supreme Court again reinforced the centrality of delegation to the Privette doctrine in SeaBright Ins. Co. v. US Airways, Inc. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 590, 594 (SeaBright): “By hiring an independent contractor, the hirer implicitly delegates to the contractor any tort law duty it owes to the contractor’s employees to ensure the safety of the specific workplace that is the subject of the contract.” (Id. at p. 594, italics omitted.) Rejecting the claim that the duty of care was nondelegable, the Supreme Court held the Privette doctrine recognized “a presumptive delegation of responsibility for workplace safety from the hirer to the independent contractor.” (SeaBright, at pp. 597, 600.)
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In 2021, the Supreme Court issued two decisions further clarifying Privette’s scope. First, in Gonzalez, the court extended Privette protection to hiring landowners “for injuries to an independent contractor or its workers that result from a known hazard on the premises where there were no reasonable safety precautions it could have adopted to avoid or minimize the hazard.” (Gonzalez, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 38.) Again, focusing on presumptive delegation, the Supreme Court explained that once the duty for workplace safety is delegated to the independent contractor, “a landowner owes no duty to the contractor or its workers to remedy a known hazard on the premises or take other measures that might provide protection against the hazard.” (Id. at p. 45, italics added.) Fairness principles also supported this application of the Privette doctrine because “once the hazard is known to the contractor, the contractor has at its disposal all of the information necessary to determine whether or how the work can be performed safely.” (Gonzalez, at p. 50.)
That the same year, in Sandoval, the Supreme Court reaffirmed delegation, or the “actual transfer of control,” as the basis for the Privette doctrine: “When a person or organization hires an independent contractor, the hirer presumptively delegates to the contractor the responsibility to do the work safely.” (Sandoval, supra, 12 Cal.5th at pp. 269–270.) Thus, “If a contract worker becomes injured after that delegation takes place, we presume that the contractor alone—and not the hirer—was responsible for any failure to take reasonable precautions.” (Id. at p. 271.)
These Supreme Court opinions elucidate the following rule: Once the presumptive delegation of authority to an independent contractor occurs, that contractor bears the duty of care for workplace safety, and—absent exceptions inapplicable here, e.g., retention and exercise of control (Hooker)
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or a concealed hazard (Kinsman)9—the Privette doctrine shields all those in the “chain of delegation” from liability. (Sandoval, supra, 12 Cal.5th at pp. 271–272; Gonzalez, supra, 12 Cal.5th at pp. 41–43; Tverberg, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 529.)
Bounxaysana reads these Supreme Court opinions to imply that a hiring relationship is a “prerequisite” throughout the chain of delegation. But this interpretation fails to recognize that the California Supreme Court has never considered the Privette doctrine outside of the hiring context. (See, e.g., Ramirez, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 279 [“our Supreme Court has never decided—in fact, never considered—whether Privette applies” to a non-hiring lessor].) Thus, we cannot construe our Supreme Court’s opinions as imposing a hiring requirement throughout the chain of delegation when our Supreme Court has never been presented with nor decided that issue. (People v. McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1382, 1390 [“ ‘ “It is axiomatic that language in a judicial opinion is to be understood in accordance with the facts and issues before the court. An opinion is not authority for propositions not considered” ’ ”].) In fact, the Supreme Court’s use of the phrase “chain of delegation” rather than “chain of hiring” suggests it did not intend to create a hiring requirement. (Tverberg, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 529.) And, to the extent the Privette doctrine requires a hiring relationship for the initial delegation of authority, such a delegation occurred here when Verizon hired Strobel as an independent contractor.
9 In opposing Schurman’s summary judgment motion in the trial court,
Bounxaysana did not assert either exception applied, and Bounxaysana does not make any such assertions in this writ proceeding. Accordingly, we neither consider nor decide whether these exceptions apply. (Bains v. Moores (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 445, 455 [“ ‘ “[D]e novo review does not obligate us to cull the record for the benefit of the appellant in order to attempt to uncover the requisite triable issues” ’ ”].)
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In the absence of direct authority from our Supreme Court, California Courts of Appeal have come to different conclusions about whether non- hiring people or entities can fall within the chain of delegation entitled to protection under Privette. We agree with the majority of our fellow district courts that the absence of a hiring relationship does not necessarily preclude Privette’s application. Accordingly, in view of the undisputed facts here, we conclude Schurman falls within the chain of delegation and is shielded from liability under the Privette doctrine. II. California Appellate Court Opinions on the Chain of Delegation Even before our Supreme Court articulated the chain of delegation concept in Tverberg, multiple California appellate courts had used the Privette doctrine to shield non-hiring parties from personal injury claims asserted by independent contractors or their employees.
For example, in Lopez v. University Partners (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1117, 1120–1122 (Lopez), Division One of the Fourth District Court of Appeal applied the Privette doctrine to affirm summary judgment in favor of a landowner (a university) and its tenant that had hired the independent contractor whose employee was injured when a trench being excavated had collapsed. The injured employee of the independent contractor sued both the leasing university and the hiring tenant, but the Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court in concluding that the employee had failed to raise a triable issue of fact because the Privette doctrine applied to shield from liability both the hiring tenant and the non-hiring university. (Lopez, at p. 1125.)
Similarly, in Laico v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 649, 654–655 (Laico), the Sixth District Court of Appeal reversed a jury verdict against a landowner, holding the landowner owed no duty to protect the employee of an affiliated company who had been injured on the job.
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Regarding the Privette doctrine, “even though there [was] no evidence of a hirer-contractor relationship between [the hirer] and [the landowner],” the court determined “that Privette, Toland, and Hooker provide a useful analogy,” because “it would be ‘illogical and unfair’ to impose liability on [the landowner] for an injury attributable to [injured party’s hirer], whose liability is limited by workers’ compensation insurance.” (Laico, at p. 668.) Accordingly, the court held “the policies underlying Privette and its progeny . . . to avoid burdening the party that did not cause the injury” “militate[] against imposing liability on [the landowner].” (Laico, at p. 669.)
Also, in Ruiz v. Herman Weissker, Inc. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 52 (Ruiz), Division One of the Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed summary judgment and applied the Privette doctrine to shield from liability a non-hiring “contract administrator” of a utility company for the injuries of an employee of an independent contractor hired by the utility company. (Ruiz, at pp. 55–56.) Although the contract administrator did not hire the independent contractor, did not have a contractual relationship with the independent contractor, and did not pay the contractor (directly, indirectly, or otherwise), in declining to impose liability, the court found those “factual distinction[s] . . . legally insignificant.” (Id. at p. 62.) Because the injured employee “was engaged in work that posed a special risk of harm and his injuries arose out of work for which [the independent contractor] bore primary responsibility. . . . [I]t would be ‘illogical and unfair’ to impose greater derivative liability on [the non-hiring contract administrator] than the law would impose on [the independent contractor] for its direct negligence.” (Ibid.)
We are not persuaded by Bounxaysana’s attempts to distinguish these cases. Bounxaysana argues Lopez relied on workers’ compensation to deny
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liability instead of the delegation of authority over workplace safety, and Laico applied the Privette doctrine by analogy. But since both cases preceded the Supreme Court’s elucidation of the “chain of delegation” concept in Tverberg, supra, 49 Cal.4th at page 529, Lopez and Laico were simply applying the legal standards articulated at the time. Notably, no Supreme Court opinion has overturned or criticized either Lopez or Laico, and recently, our Supreme Court favorably cited Ruiz for its explanation of the Hooker exception. (Gonzalez, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 47, citing Ruiz, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at pp. 65–66.)
Turning to Bounxaysana’s reliance on Ramirez, its holding increasingly stands alone, and more recent opinions have expressly declined to follow it. (Collins v. Diamond Generating Corp. (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 1162, 1175, fn. 6 (Collins) [Ct. App., Fourth Dist., Div. Three; “respectfully disagree[ing]” with Ramirez’s holding “that Privette only applies to hirers”]; Andrews, supra, 116 Cal.App.5th at p. 773 [Ct. App., Second Dist., Div. Six; reliance on Ramirez was “unavailing” because it was “factually distinguishable”].)
For example, Collins, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at pages 1166–1167, arose from a jury verdict for the surviving family members of a worker that was killed in a power plant explosion. The Court of Appeal reversed because “the trial court prejudicially erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the Privette doctrine and its exceptions.” (Id. at p. 1167.) The Court of Appeal explained it was “undisputed” that the Privette doctrine shielded the hirer from liability, which required consideration of “whether the same is true for . . . a partial indirect owner of [the hiring party].” (Collins, at p. 1176.) Although Collins left the factual question of liability for the jury to decide on remand, its reversal directed the trial court to instruct on the Privette doctrine and the Hooker exception, because the non-hiring partial owner
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could have delegated “any safety-related responsibilities” through the “ ‘chain of delegation’ ” from its subsidiary to the independent contractor. (Collins, at pp. 1176, 1178.)
Likewise, Andrews affirmed summary judgment where the trial court applied the Privette doctrine to shield a homeowner from liability for injuries suffered by the employee of independent contractor hired by the homeowner’s insurance company, not the homeowner. (Andrews, supra, 116 Cal.App.5th at p. 769.) Endorsing the trial court’s rejection of “ ‘the technicality that [the homeowner] was not the one who hired [the independent contractor],’ ” the Court of Appeal explained that the homeowner was the hirer “within the meaning of the [Privette] doctrine.” (Andrews, at pp. 769, 773.) “By paying her insurance carrier for insurance coverage,” the homeowner had “in essence paid for the inspection,” and “by consenting to allow [the independent contractor] to enter her property to carry out the contracted inspection, [the homeowner] has delegated to the independent contractor the responsibility for workplace safety” and therefore was protected from liability. (Id. at p. 773.)
As these appellate decisions have repeatedly declined to limit Privette protection solely to hiring parties, so do we in the absence of any Supreme Court authority imposing such a limitation. It is undisputed that the Verizon-Schurman lease was for the express purpose of allowing Verizon to install, operate, and maintain communications equipment and antennas on the roof. Equipped with access to the roof as permitted by the lease, Verizon hired Strobel to perform the work specifically contemplated by the lease agreement. Strobel’s employee, Bounxaysana, then exercised the discretion afforded to independent contractors about how complete the task that Strobel had been contracted to perform and decided to access Verizon’s roof enclosure
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through a different point than originally contemplated. As such, much like the university’s lease to the hiring tenant in Lopez, Schurman’s lease to Verizon places it directly in the chain of delegation protected by the Privette doctrine that had been triggered by Verizon’s hiring of Strobel. (Lopez, supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1122–1125.)
Moreover, recognizing that Schurman falls within the chain of delegation promotes and is consistent with the policy considerations underlying the Privette doctrine and the weight of appellate authority. As fairness principles dictate, it would be anomalous and inequitable to impose greater liability for Bounxaysana’s injuries upon Schurman, the lessor with no control over Bounxaysana’s work, than could be imposed upon either Strobel or Verizon. (Toland, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 266.) And subjecting Schurman to liability on top of workers’ compensation could provide Bounxaysana with the windfall our Supreme Court has cautioned against. (Gonzalez, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 51 [applying the Privette doctrine to “avoid[] the unfair ‘tort damages windfall’ that would result from adopting a rule that allows independent contractors and their workers to obtain tort damages from the landowner while the landowner’s own employees are limited to workers’ compensation”].)
The few cases that have declined to apply the Privette doctrine to nonhirers do not change our conclusion and in fact are consistent with our reasoning. In Gordon v. ARC Manufacturing, Inc. (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 705, a “prospective buyer” hired an independent contractor and professional roofer (Gordon) to inspect the roof of a commercial building the buyer was considering purchasing. (Id. at p. 708.) While inspecting the roof, Gordon fell through a “ ‘camouflaged hole’ ” and sustained injuries. (Id. at pp. 708–709.) Gordon sued the building’s owner and obtained a jury verdict, which was
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affirmed on appeal because “the fundamental problem is that [the property owner] did not hire Gordon” and thus Privette did not compel reversal. (Gordon, at pp. 714, 718–719, 720.) In other words, there was no chain of delegation between the injured independent contractor and the property owner in Gordon, because in selling the property, the defendants had not assigned the work or hired the contractor and thus remained responsible for the building only it had control over. (Id. at p. 713 [“primary assumption of risk does not apply in this case because defendants did not hire or engage Gordon”].) Conversely, here, the lease to Verizon resulted in the hiring of Strobel and Bounxaysana and created an unbroken contractual chain akin to Collins and Andrews. (Collins, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 1166, 1176–1178 [where hirer delegated authority to independent contractor, the Privette doctrine shielded the indirect owner and parent company of the hiring party]; Andrews, supra, 116 Cal.App.5th at pp. 769, 772–774 [delegation of authority through hiring relationship between homeowner’s insurer and independent contractor entitled non-hiring homeowner to protection under Privette].)
Similarly, in Zuniga v. Cherry Avenue Auction, Inc. (2021)
61 Cal.App.5th 980, 983–984, the plaintiffs, a husband and wife, rented space from the defendants at an outdoor swap meet and were injured while setting up their booth; the husband died. The Court of Appeal affirmed the jury verdict for the plaintiffs because “[t]here was no hiring of an independent contractor.” (Id. at p. 991.) Accordingly, there was no delegation of authority to an independent contractor implicating Privette and no chain of delegation stemming therefrom; whereas here, it is undisputed that Verizon delegated authority for workplace safety by hiring Strobel.
In conclusion, where a lease agreement expressly contemplates the use of an independent contractor to perform work, and the tenant subsequently
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hires an independent contractor to perform said work, the non-hiring lessor falls within the chain of delegation and, absent a recognized exception, the Privette doctrine applies to shield the non-hiring lessor from liability for onthe -job injuries sustained by the independent contractor or its employees. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s denial of summary judgment. Because the sole issue in dispute below was whether the Privette doctrine applied, having now concluded that it does, we direct the trial court to enter summary judgment in favor of Schurman.
DISPOSITION
Let a peremptory writ issue directing the trial court to vacate its July 31, 2025 order insofar as it denied summary judgment to Schurman and enter summary judgment in favor of Schurman. In the interests of justice, we decline to award costs. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.493(a)(1)(B).)
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DESAUTELS, J.
We concur:
STEWART, P.J.
RICHMAN, J.
Schurman Family Company TIC v. Alameda County Superior Court; Bounxaysana et al., RPI (A174194)
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Trial Court: Alameda County Superior Court
Trial Judge: Hon. Han N. Tran
Attorneys for Petitioner: Horvitz & Levy LLP Stephen E. Norris Jason R. Litt John B. Sprangers
Bledsoe, Diestel, Treppa & Crane LLP Alison M. Crane Nichole C. Baer
Attorneys for Respondent No Appearance for Respondent
Attorneys for Real Parties in Interest: Arns Davis Law Jonathan E. Davis Zachariah D. Hansen Shounak S. Dharap Juan C. Flores
For Phuokhao Bounxaysana
No appearance for Complete Wireless
No appearance for GTE Mobilnet of California Limited Partnership