Schulte v. CH PETERSON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY

153 N.W.2d 130, 278 Minn. 79, 1967 Minn. LEXIS 840
CourtSupreme Court of Minnesota
DecidedSeptember 15, 1967
Docket40460
StatusPublished
Cited by50 cases

This text of 153 N.W.2d 130 (Schulte v. CH PETERSON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Minnesota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Schulte v. CH PETERSON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 153 N.W.2d 130, 278 Minn. 79, 1967 Minn. LEXIS 840 (Mich. 1967).

Opinion

Rogosheske, Justice.

Certiorari to review an award of disability benefits to an employee, Joseph Schulte, by the Industrial Commission.

Schulte, employed by C. H. Peterson Construction Company, sustained an injury to his low back on April 7, 1960, while loading timbers onto a forklift. After a hearing in October 1962, a referee found that the employee was temporarily totally disabled from the date of the injury to the date of hearing, save for 1 week and 4 days of employment between June 16 and August 10, 1960. He further found that “such disability was continuing” at the date of the hearing. Allowing credit for compensation payments voluntarily made, the referee ordered the employer-insurer to pay temporary total disability benefits based on 66% of his weekly earnings of $108 for a period of 129 weeks and 1 day “with compensation to be paid thereafter in accordance with the provisions of the workmen’s compensation act.” Even though there was medical-opinion evidence that the employee’s physical condition had stabilized, no such express finding was made by or requested of the referee. As explained in a memorandum accompanying the findings, the referee treated the claim as one of continuing temporary total disability rather than one of permanent partial disability, as urged by the employer and its insurer. It was strongly recommended that the employee avail himself of vocational rehabilitative training. No appeal was taken from the referee’s determination.

The insurer paid the weekly benefits ordered and 62 weeks of' additional compensation, amounting to a total of 191% weeks. In discontinuing payments on December 19, 1963, the insurer took the position that its liability ceased because the payments made represented the maximum scheduled benefits required by Minn. St. 176.101, subd. 3, *81 of 104 weeks’ healing period plus 8714 weeks for a 25-percent permanent partial disability of the back — the highest estimate of any medical opinion submitted at the October 1962 hearing.

The second claim petition, filed in March 1965 for temporary total and permanent partial disability benefits, was heard in June 1965. The referee again found evidentiary support for temporary disability based on an inability to earn wages. Continuing compensation not to exceed 350 weeks (the maximum period provided by § 176.101, subds. 1 and 2) was awarded on the basis of findings that the employee’s disability was temporary total when he was not employed and temporary partial when he was. Again, despite supporting medical and other evidence that the condition of the employee’s back had stabilized from a medical or physical standpoint, no finding specifying whether there was a permanent partial disability of the back in the physical sense was made or requested.

On appeal to the Industrial Commission the referee’s findings and determination were affirmed, and the employer and insurer requested this review.

The virtually undisputed testimony establishes the following facts. Schulte is about 48 years old and has a high school education. Prior to his injury he had worked as a manual laborer on construction, as a farm-laborer, and as a truckdriver. Following the injury of April 1960, he underwent surgery on his back in November 1960 and had a disc removed. Between the time of his operation and the first hearing, he was not able to find any work except sporadic odd jobs, from which he earned about $50, but he was physically incapable of performing the work satisfactorily on any continuing basis. This resulted from the fact that most forms of physical exertion over a sustained period of time caused him intense pain in his back and left leg.

The nature of Schulte’s back infirmity has been about the same over the last couple of years and is probably caused by the formation of scar tissue in his spine. The nature of his injury, in combination with his age and training, limits very markedly the types of jobs it is possible for him to satisfactorily perform. During the period between the first and second hearings, Schulte was employed only about 50 percent of the time despite *82 his good-faith efforts and unusual determination to secure ánd hold a job.

Between the conclusion of the first hearing in October 1962 and July 1963, Schulte was unemployed. In the spring of 1963 he sought assistance from the State Rehabilitation Department and was interviewed and tested, but was not certified for any training program. He worked at a service station from July 1963 until February 1964, when he was released because of his inability to fill the position adequately. He was, through no lack of effort on his part, unemployed from February 1964 to May 1964. He worked as a maintenance man at a Jesuit retreat house from June 1964 to November 1964, when he was again released since he could not, because of his back injury, adequately do the work. From November 1964 until March 1965, Schulte was again unemployed. In March 1965 he secured a job operating an emery wheel, cleaning sheepskins, and he was still working at it in June 1965 when the second hearing was held. However, at the time of the second hearing it was uncertain whether he would be able to continue in his position permanently. He had not worked at this job very long. His work, like his two prior jobs, tended to aggravate his back injury and intensify the pain. As a result, it was impossible for him to work steadily for a number of hours and his efficiency was less than that of a normal worker. On a substantial number of days the pain in his back was so unbearable that he could not go to work at all. He had not been fired at the time of the second hearing, but he had not been given the normally granted wage increases.

Relators argue that, because the evidence is conclusive that Schulte’s back injury has stabilized and is permanent in the sense that it has been the same for the last 2 years and is never likely to improve, the commission’s decision finding temporary total disability and temporary partial disability must be reversed as a matter of law because the only permissible conclusion is that he is permanently partially disabled.

There is clearly no merit to relators’ contention concerning the commission’s finding a temporary total disability during periods of unemployment, even though we were to accept relators’ assumption that the “record establishes conclusively, as a fact, that the employee’s physical *83 condition of low back and left leg pain and discomfort had, at or around the time of the first hearing in October of 1962, become * * * permanent rather than temporary in nature.” It is well settled that the concept of total disability is not a mere reflection of an employee’s physical condition.

Minn. St. 176.101, subd. 5, defines “total disability” as meaning, among other things, “any other injury which totally incapacitates the employee from working at an occupation which brings him an income.” This court in interpreting this language has formulated the rule that a person is totally disabled if his physical condition, in combination with his age, training, and experience, and the type of work available, in his community, causes him to be unable to secure anything more than sporadic employment resulting in an insubstantial income. 1

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Bluebook (online)
153 N.W.2d 130, 278 Minn. 79, 1967 Minn. LEXIS 840, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/schulte-v-ch-peterson-construction-company-minn-1967.