Berg v. Sadler

50 N.W.2d 266, 235 Minn. 214, 1951 Minn. LEXIS 766
CourtSupreme Court of Minnesota
DecidedNovember 30, 1951
Docket35,551
StatusPublished
Cited by24 cases

This text of 50 N.W.2d 266 (Berg v. Sadler) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Minnesota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Berg v. Sadler, 50 N.W.2d 266, 235 Minn. 214, 1951 Minn. LEXIS 766 (Mich. 1951).

Opinion

Thomas Gallagher, Justice.

Certiorari to review an order of the industrial commission denying the petition of Milo C. Berg, employe, for additional compensation. • The award, in addition to authorizing compensation for a healing period of 50 weeks, allowed employe 60 weeks’ compensation for 40 percent permanent partial disability of his left foot and ankle and 112% weeks for 75 percent permanent partial disability of his right foot and ankle.

The award followed the provisions of M. S. A. 176.11, subd. 3 of which fixes compensation for healing at a maximum of 50 weeks, and subd. 3(17) of which provides that for the loss of a foot compensation is payable to a maximum period of 150 weeks. Based thereon, employe’s compensation was computed as follows:

Healing period, 50 weeks at $24 per week................$1,200

40 percent disability for left foot and ankle, 60 weeks at $24 per week............................ 1,440

75 percent disability for right foot and ankle, 112% weeks at $24 per week.......................... 2,700

Total compensation awarded ..........................$5,340

It is employe’s contention that this was erroneous, and that the award should have been based on M. S. A. 1945, § 176.11, subd. 4, 2 which provides:

*216 “For permanent total disability, as defined in subdivision 5, * * * $24.00 per week * * * . * * * during the permanent total disability * * *, but * * * not [to] exceed $10,000 in any case, * # * »

And upon § 176.11, subd. 5, which includes under total disability—

“any other injury which totally incapacitates the employee from working at an occupation which brings him an income * *

Employe asserts that the evidence clearly establishes that he is permanently and totally disabled; therefore, that the award should provide for his continued compensation until the maximum of $10,000 provided by § 176.11, subd. 4, has been paid.

The facts are as follows: On June 4, 1946, employe, while working for respondent Lee Sadler on highway construction between Fairfax and Gibbon, sustained injuries when a dragline ran over both his feet. He was hospitalized for 99 days and was compelled to use crutches for about two months after his discharge from the hospital. The accident resulted in cuts and fractures to his ankles and feet, followed by discoloration, scars, impairment of the circulation in both ankles and legs, with resulting ulcers and permanent deformity of his feet.

There is little variation in the medical testimony as to the percentage of disability to employe’s ankles and feet. Medical experts called by him fixed it at 75 percent functional disability to the right foot and ankle and 50 percent functional disability to the left foot and ankle. Medical testimony submitted by respondents fixed the disability to employe’s right foot and ankle at between 60 and 65 percent, and to his left foot and ankle at between 30 and 40 percent. Such testimony amply supports the referee’s finding of 40 percent permanent partial disability to the left foot and ankle and 75 percent permanent partial disability to the right foot and ankle; and, were it sufficient to consider the respective disabilities described as separate and distinct factors, unrelated one to the other, it is clear that employe’s compensation was properly measured by § 176.11, subd. 3(17).

*217 Employe’s position, however, is that the combined disability of each foot and ankle makes it impossible for him to work at any occupation of any kind for which he has the capacity for performance for more than two or three hours at a time; that thereafter his feet swell and remain painfully swollen throughout the day so that he cannot continue work; and that as a result he cannot procure employment of a permanent and continuous nature; in consequence of which he must be held to have sustained a permanent total disability as defined by § 176.11, subds. 4 and 5, as above set forth.

On the question of permanent total disability, the evidence discloses the following: At the time of the hearing in 1950, employe was 47 years of age and had lived on a farm practically all his life. His formal education did not extend beyond the seventh grade. The only work he was ever qualified to do was either farm or road work. He has been unable to hold a steady job since the accident almost five years ago. The only work he has performed since then has been occasional help to farmers in his neighborhood driving tractors. After being thus engaged for a short time, he experiences great pain, his legs become painfully swollen, and he is required to stop working. This is particularly true whenever he walks or is required to hold his feet in a dependent position. He has sought aid through physical therapy and has attempted to work whenever possible. The maximum he has been able to earn during any year since the accident is between $800 and $400.

Dr. Glen E. Nelson, called by employe, testified that employe is unable to do any work which requires standing on his feet; that they will swell and pain him even when he drives a tractor; that ulcers which developed on his legs were the result of poor circulation caused by the accident; and that in his opinion the condition described is permanent in both legs.

Dr. Edward T. Evans, called on behalf of respondents, testified that employe should gradually improve some, but that he would carry considerable residual disability of both feet and ankles, especially the right; that surgery would not lessen the disability and would be fraught with considerable danger because of the circula *218 tory condition of the leg; that when working his feet swell, and the right foot especially will not tolerate prolonged weight bearing; and that he is not able to walk any distance on uneven ground. The witness testified that in his opinion employe did not have a 100 percent disability, but that he could not hold any employment where he would be required to stand any length of time or to hold his feet in a downward position, such as would be involved in riding a tractor. However, in the opinion of this witness, there was a great deal of work employe could do. He thought that he had the ability to stand for upwards of three hours, but could not stand at a bench; that he could move about; that he could carry on in a particular type of job in which he would be able to sit down from time to time and get off his feet; and that at night the swelling would go down. He was of the further opinion that employe’s condition would not improve, and that his ulcers might recur from time to time.

Dr. Harvey Nelson, also called on behalf of respondents, testified that there would be a tendency toward some improvement for employe as better collateral circulation was set up, but that there would not be much change over his present condition; that the fact that both feet were injured and disabled made his handicap greater than the sum total of the.

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Bluebook (online)
50 N.W.2d 266, 235 Minn. 214, 1951 Minn. LEXIS 766, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/berg-v-sadler-minn-1951.