HOFFMAN, Presiding Judge.
The Schulers rented a house from Mr. Langdon for $250 per month on a month-to-month basis. After the Schulers failed to make rental payments, Langdon served a ten-day notice to quit upon them on October 2, 1980. On October 22, 1980 Langdon filed suit for rent past due and immediate possession of the real property. The Schu-lers were served with notice of the claim and notice of the hearing on October 29, 1980, but failed to appear. The trial court entered a temporary order for possession of the real estate in favor of Langdon.
The Schulers were served with notice of the ejectment order of October 29, 1980 on that day, notifying them that they were to vacate the premises by October 31, 1980. They were also given notice of the final hearing to be held on November 7, 1980. However, once again, they did not appear for the November 7 hearing and the court entered a default judgment for Langdon in the amount of $914. The damages included $800 in unpaid rent, a $4 fee assessed for [842]*842dumping of trash, $100 for two days of hired labor, a $10 truck fee, and $100 in additional labor by Langdon, for a total of $1,014. A $100 security deposit held by Langdon was applied toward the judgment leaving a balance of $914. The court made a ruling that if the Schulers did not contact Langdon on or before November 17,1980 to retrieve their personal property, the court would consider the property abandoned1 and give Langdon authority to sell what he could to satisfy his judgment.
On November 18 the Schulers petitioned for protection of their personal property pursuant to IC 1971, 34-2-28-1 (1980 Burns Supp.), and on December 11, 1980 the Schu-lers filed a motion to set aside the judgment of November 7, 1980. The hearing was set for December 18, 1980. Both motions were denied on December 23, 1980. However, the court modified its order thus:
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED BY THE COURT that the monetary judgment against defendant in the amount of nine hundred and fourteen dollars ($914.00) plus court costs of twenty two dollars ($22.00) plus interest at the rate of 8% per annum from the date of judgment through the date judgment is paid in full shall stand. The judgment awarding plaintiff possession of any of defendant’s property remaining on plaintiff’s premises is modified to allow the plaintiff to levy against the defendant’s goods that remain on plaintiff’s premises only to the extent that the judgment is satisfied. The Sheriff is directed to remove the defendant’s goods from the plaintiff’s premises and to execute, in accordance with the law, against only those goods that will satisfy the monetary judgment. The Sheriff shall return the property not executed against to the possession of the defendants.
“Clerk is directed to forward a copy of this entry to counsel for the parties.” Record at 29.
The sole issue appearing in Schulers’ motion to correct errors and the only issue presented by this appeal is whether the personal property of a tenant is exempt from execution on a judgment in favor of the landlord.
It should first be noted that Langdon contends the Schulers failed to timely perfect their appeal. Since the Trial Rule 60 motion to set aside the judgment was filed within 60 days of the judgment, he argues it was, in fact, a Trial Rule 59 motion to correct errors. Therefore, the motion to correct errors of February 13, 1981 was not needed, making the filing of the praecipe and the transcript untimely, thus waiving the right to appeal.
This proposition misstates the holdings of this Court in previous opinions. When a TR. 60 motion is filed within 60 days of the judgment, it is true that it may substitute for a motion to correct errors and no other motion to correct errors is required for an appeal unless the trial court alters its judgment. However, a party may file a subsequent motion to correct errors after the TR. 60 motion is ruled upon. Nothing prevents him from doing so. Roberts v. Watson (1977), 172 Ind.App. 108, 359 N.E.2d 615; In [843]*843re Marriage of Robbins (1976), 171 Ind.App. 509, 358 N.E.2d 153.
In the case at hand, the trial court did modify its previous judgment when it ruled on the TR. 60 motion. It is the December 23,1980 ruling on the TR. 60 motion which the Schulers are now appealing. When one motion has been filed and the trial court has altered its findings or judgment, the parties have the discretion to appeal immediately or to file a new motion to correct errors directed to the changed judgment. See Breeze v. Breeze (1981), Ind., 421 N.E.2d 647. In resolving the dilemma of the filing of two TR. 59 motions, our Supreme Court said in the Breeze case:
“Under these circumstances, we hold that TR. 59 takes precedence and that the trial court continues to have jurisdiction of the case for sixty days after a ruling on a motion to correct error when the ruling results in changed findings or judgment. If a second motion to correct error is filed within this sixty-day period, the trial court must make a ruling on this second motion to correct error. All time periods for the purpose of the appellate rules will then start from the time of the trial court’s ruling on the second motion to correct error. If a praecipe was filed after the ruling on the first motion to correct error, no second praecipe is required. However, a praecipe is timely if filed within thirty days of the ruling on the second motion to correct error. A praecipe which was filed earlier will count as if filed from the date of the ruling on the second motion to correct error. The party then has ninety days from the ruling on the second motion to correct error to file the record of the proceedings. This interpretation and holding will provide courts, attorneys and the public with flexible but equitable rules of appellate procedure.” 421 N.E.2d at 650.
Therefore, the Schulers’ filings were timely and none of their rights to appeal were waived.
Langdon raises another contention concerning the mootness of the Schulers’ claim since the balance of their property was returned to them. Suffice it to say, that if a party is entitled to have his property exempted from sale and that property is sold, then the party would be entitled to damages for the loss of that property.
The Schulers assert that they were entitled to the exemption because IC 1971, 34-2-28-1 requires a landlord to exempt personal property of tenants from execution on his judgment. IC 1971, 34-2-28-1 provides:
“Amount of exemption. — The following property of a debtor domiciled in the state of Indiana shall not be liable for levy or sale on execution or any other final process from a court, for any debt growing out of or founded upon a contract express or implied:
(a) Real estate or personal property constituting the personal or family residence of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor, or estates or rights therein or thereto of the value of not more than seven thousand five hundred dollars [$7,500]. The exemption under this subsection shall be individually available to joint debtors concerning property held by them as tenants by the entireties.
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HOFFMAN, Presiding Judge.
The Schulers rented a house from Mr. Langdon for $250 per month on a month-to-month basis. After the Schulers failed to make rental payments, Langdon served a ten-day notice to quit upon them on October 2, 1980. On October 22, 1980 Langdon filed suit for rent past due and immediate possession of the real property. The Schu-lers were served with notice of the claim and notice of the hearing on October 29, 1980, but failed to appear. The trial court entered a temporary order for possession of the real estate in favor of Langdon.
The Schulers were served with notice of the ejectment order of October 29, 1980 on that day, notifying them that they were to vacate the premises by October 31, 1980. They were also given notice of the final hearing to be held on November 7, 1980. However, once again, they did not appear for the November 7 hearing and the court entered a default judgment for Langdon in the amount of $914. The damages included $800 in unpaid rent, a $4 fee assessed for [842]*842dumping of trash, $100 for two days of hired labor, a $10 truck fee, and $100 in additional labor by Langdon, for a total of $1,014. A $100 security deposit held by Langdon was applied toward the judgment leaving a balance of $914. The court made a ruling that if the Schulers did not contact Langdon on or before November 17,1980 to retrieve their personal property, the court would consider the property abandoned1 and give Langdon authority to sell what he could to satisfy his judgment.
On November 18 the Schulers petitioned for protection of their personal property pursuant to IC 1971, 34-2-28-1 (1980 Burns Supp.), and on December 11, 1980 the Schu-lers filed a motion to set aside the judgment of November 7, 1980. The hearing was set for December 18, 1980. Both motions were denied on December 23, 1980. However, the court modified its order thus:
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED BY THE COURT that the monetary judgment against defendant in the amount of nine hundred and fourteen dollars ($914.00) plus court costs of twenty two dollars ($22.00) plus interest at the rate of 8% per annum from the date of judgment through the date judgment is paid in full shall stand. The judgment awarding plaintiff possession of any of defendant’s property remaining on plaintiff’s premises is modified to allow the plaintiff to levy against the defendant’s goods that remain on plaintiff’s premises only to the extent that the judgment is satisfied. The Sheriff is directed to remove the defendant’s goods from the plaintiff’s premises and to execute, in accordance with the law, against only those goods that will satisfy the monetary judgment. The Sheriff shall return the property not executed against to the possession of the defendants.
“Clerk is directed to forward a copy of this entry to counsel for the parties.” Record at 29.
The sole issue appearing in Schulers’ motion to correct errors and the only issue presented by this appeal is whether the personal property of a tenant is exempt from execution on a judgment in favor of the landlord.
It should first be noted that Langdon contends the Schulers failed to timely perfect their appeal. Since the Trial Rule 60 motion to set aside the judgment was filed within 60 days of the judgment, he argues it was, in fact, a Trial Rule 59 motion to correct errors. Therefore, the motion to correct errors of February 13, 1981 was not needed, making the filing of the praecipe and the transcript untimely, thus waiving the right to appeal.
This proposition misstates the holdings of this Court in previous opinions. When a TR. 60 motion is filed within 60 days of the judgment, it is true that it may substitute for a motion to correct errors and no other motion to correct errors is required for an appeal unless the trial court alters its judgment. However, a party may file a subsequent motion to correct errors after the TR. 60 motion is ruled upon. Nothing prevents him from doing so. Roberts v. Watson (1977), 172 Ind.App. 108, 359 N.E.2d 615; In [843]*843re Marriage of Robbins (1976), 171 Ind.App. 509, 358 N.E.2d 153.
In the case at hand, the trial court did modify its previous judgment when it ruled on the TR. 60 motion. It is the December 23,1980 ruling on the TR. 60 motion which the Schulers are now appealing. When one motion has been filed and the trial court has altered its findings or judgment, the parties have the discretion to appeal immediately or to file a new motion to correct errors directed to the changed judgment. See Breeze v. Breeze (1981), Ind., 421 N.E.2d 647. In resolving the dilemma of the filing of two TR. 59 motions, our Supreme Court said in the Breeze case:
“Under these circumstances, we hold that TR. 59 takes precedence and that the trial court continues to have jurisdiction of the case for sixty days after a ruling on a motion to correct error when the ruling results in changed findings or judgment. If a second motion to correct error is filed within this sixty-day period, the trial court must make a ruling on this second motion to correct error. All time periods for the purpose of the appellate rules will then start from the time of the trial court’s ruling on the second motion to correct error. If a praecipe was filed after the ruling on the first motion to correct error, no second praecipe is required. However, a praecipe is timely if filed within thirty days of the ruling on the second motion to correct error. A praecipe which was filed earlier will count as if filed from the date of the ruling on the second motion to correct error. The party then has ninety days from the ruling on the second motion to correct error to file the record of the proceedings. This interpretation and holding will provide courts, attorneys and the public with flexible but equitable rules of appellate procedure.” 421 N.E.2d at 650.
Therefore, the Schulers’ filings were timely and none of their rights to appeal were waived.
Langdon raises another contention concerning the mootness of the Schulers’ claim since the balance of their property was returned to them. Suffice it to say, that if a party is entitled to have his property exempted from sale and that property is sold, then the party would be entitled to damages for the loss of that property.
The Schulers assert that they were entitled to the exemption because IC 1971, 34-2-28-1 requires a landlord to exempt personal property of tenants from execution on his judgment. IC 1971, 34-2-28-1 provides:
“Amount of exemption. — The following property of a debtor domiciled in the state of Indiana shall not be liable for levy or sale on execution or any other final process from a court, for any debt growing out of or founded upon a contract express or implied:
(a) Real estate or personal property constituting the personal or family residence of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor, or estates or rights therein or thereto of the value of not more than seven thousand five hundred dollars [$7,500]. The exemption under this subsection shall be individually available to joint debtors concerning property held by them as tenants by the entireties.
(b) Other real estate or tangible personal property of the value of four thousand dollars [$4,000].
(c) Intangible personal property, including choses in action (but excluding debts owing and income owing), of the value of one hundred dollars [$100].
(d) Professionally prescribed health aids for the debtor or a dependent of the debtor.
(e) Any interest the debtor has in real estate held as a tenant by the entireties on the date of the filing of the petition for relief under the bankruptcy code, unless a joint petition for relief is filed by the debtor and spouse, or individual petitions of the debtor and spouse are subsequently consolidated.
“None of the foregoing provisions of this chapter shall apply to any judgment obtained prior to October 1, 1977.
[844]*844“In no event shall the total of all exempted property under subsections (a), (b) and (c) exceed in value ten thousand dollars [$10,000].”
It is clear that as to debts founded upon a contract, personal property is exempted up to the amount set out in the statute. A rental agreement between a landlord and tenant is a contractual relationship. This Court reviewed a case in 1897 which was similar to the one before us now. At that time the Court held:
“If any part of the judgment against the appellant sounds in contract, as against that part appellant might have successfully demanded the exemption of her property from sale, had she first satisfied that part sounding in tort, the amount recovered upon the tort being easily ascertained in this case, and separable from the amount, if any, recovered upon the contract. If the judgment was in such a form as to preclude the possibility of separating one from the other, the rights of the judgment creditor against the judgment debtor would be reduced to the rights he possessed under the contract. Keller v. McMahan, 77 Ind. 62; O’Neil v. Beck, 69 Ind. 239; Menzie v. Anderson, 65 Ind. 239; Ries v. McClatchey, 128 Ind. 125 [27 N.E. 349].” Thomas v. Walmer et al. (1897), 18 Ind.App. 112, at 118, 46 N.E. 695, at 697.
The exemption applies to an action in contract, but not an action in tort. Therefore, the exemption is applicable to the portion of a judgment for rent past due, but not to that portion of the damages resulting from the holding over.2 If the judgment is not divisible, then the entire judgment would be treated as if the action was in contract.
In the case at hand, the judgment was clearly capable of being divided between damages for contract and damages for tort. The trial court itemized the damages in its order to include $700 for rent ($800 minus the $100 security deposit) and $214 in other expenses incurred from the holding over. Therefore, the personal property exemption could be applicable to the $700.
However, in order to preserve this exemption, certain procedures must be undertaken. A review of the record discloses that none of these steps were taken. IC 1971, 34-2-28-11 requires that before a debtor shall receive the benefit of the exemption provided for by the act, he must make out and deliver to the officer holding the execution a schedule of all his property. The evidence shows no schedule of property was given to the sheriff who was ordered to execute the judgment.
The Schulers’ petition for protection simply states (omitting caption):
“The undersigned Defendant herein petitions this Court to protect property rights and exemption rights of the Defendants from attachments and seizures as granted under I.C. 34-2-28-1.”
The pleadings alone are to be considered in determining whether the action is one of tort or contract, since the exemption can only be claimed in actions arising out of contract. Gentry v. Purcell (1882), 84 Ind. 83. This pleading tells nothing. The petition even fails to allege the Schulers are resident householders of the state. See Smith v. Wood et al. (1882), 83 Ind. 522. The right of exemption must be shown. A general allegation of the existence of such a right is not sufficient. Goldthait et al. v. Walker et al. (1893), 134 Ind. 527, 34 N.E. 378.
Therefore, since the Schulers did not preserve their right to the personal property exemption as to the portion of the judgment which was for damages arising out of the contractual relationship, the entire judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
GARRARD, J., concurs.
STATON, J., dissents with opinion.