41 F.3d 1272
30 Fed.R.Serv.3d 1491
Eric SCHROEDER, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Pete McDONALD, Branch Administrator; Susan Segawa, Social
Worker; Ron Mico, Social Worker; George W.
Sumner, DPS Director; Roland Leong,
Prison Guard, Defendants-Appellants.
No. 93-15169.
United States Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted Nov. 1, 1993.
Decided Nov. 29, 1994.
Steven S. Michaels, Deputy Atty. Gen., Honolulu, HI, for defendants-appellants.
Eric A. Seitz and Edie A. Feldman, Honolulu, HI, for plaintiff-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Hawai'i.
Before: POOLE, WIGGINS, and T.G. NELSON, Circuit Judges.
WIGGINS, Circuit Judge:
Defendants-appellants appeal the district court's denial in part of their motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff-appellee brought suit under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. The district court found that defendants-appellants were not entitled to qualified immunity with regard to five of plaintiff-appellee's eleven causes of action. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2817-18, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). We find defendants-appellants are not entitled to qualified immunity on two causes of action. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
I. FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS
Plaintiff-appellee, Eric Schroeder, is a state prisoner serving a twenty-year sentence for first-degree robbery and kidnapping. Schroeder filed a pro se, in forma pauperis complaint in district court, alleging eleven causes of action. He is suing state prison officials under Sec. 1983, contending that his First, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated. Defendants-appellants each played some role in transferring Schroeder from a minimum security facility back to the medium security facility where he was originally assigned and had begun serving his sentence. Schroeder seeks compensatory damages of $725,000, punitive damages of $116,000, declaratory relief and equitable relief.
Schroeder primarily alleges that the transfer was in retaliation for his having earlier filed a separate civil rights action against a prison guard. Schroeder further alleges that the transfer was in retaliation for his having complained, in a letter dated January 1, 1991, to defendant McDonald that the minimum security facility was in violation of several state and federal laws regarding the infrastructure and maintenance of prisons. Finally, Schroeder alleges that the transfer was in retaliation for his having mailed a motion to all of the district court judges for the District of Hawaii, asking for injunctive relief to permit him access to the courts while he was incarcerated at the minimum security facility.
Appellants counter that the transfer back to the medium security facility was justified. First, Schroeder committed seven rule violations in only his first sixteen days at the minimum security facility. Second, Schroeder imposed an excessive burden on the correctional staff by constantly demanding access to the law library and continuously requesting legal materials. Third, Schroeder violated his promise not to file grievances or court actions against the staff at the minimum security facility. Fourth, Schroeder had used force or threats of force upon a correctional worker while at the medium security facility, a fact appellants did not know when they accepted Schroeder as a transfer. Finally, Schroeder's custody level did not warrant the transfer from the medium security facility to the minimum security facility in the first place, especially given that he had already committed numerous rule violations while incarcerated at the medium security facility.
Defendants moved for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. A magistrate recommended that defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted. On December 3, 1992, the district court entered an order adopting in part and modifying in part the magistrate's recommendations, 823 F.Supp. 750. Specifically, the district court granted summary judgment to all defendants on six of the eleven causes of action. Furthermore, the district court granted summary judgment to one defendant, but denied summary judgment to the other defendants, on two additional causes of action. Finally, the district court denied defendants summary judgment on the remaining three causes of action. The December 3, 1992, order was never set forth on a separate document. See generally Fed.R.Civ.P. 58.
On December 18, 1992, the district court received and stamped "filed" a motion for reconsideration submitted by Schroeder. Schroeder challenged the district court's grant in part of summary judgment to defendants. On December 30, 1992, while Schroeder's motion for reconsideration was still pending, defendants filed a notice of appeal. Defendants challenge the district court's denial in part of their motion for summary judgment. On January 11, 1993, the district court denied Schroeder's motion for reconsideration.
II. JURISDICTION
At the time defendants filed their notice of appeal, Rule 4(a)(4) plainly stated that a notice of appeal filed during the pendency of a Rule 59 motion "shall have no effect." In Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 61, 103 S.Ct. 400, 403-04, 74 L.Ed.2d 225 (1982) (per curiam), the Supreme Court held that a notice of appeal filed during the pendency of a Rule 59 motion is a nullity. See also Allah v. Superior Court, 871 F.2d 887, 889 (9th Cir.1989). However, Rule 4(a)(4) was amended, effective December 1, 1993, to provide that when a notice is prematurely filed, it shall be in abeyance and become effective upon the date of entry of an order disposing of the Rule 59(e) motion.
First, we must decide whether Schroeder's motion for reconsideration was, in fact, a Rule 59(e) motion. Although Schroeder indicated that he was bringing his motion under Local Rule 220-10 of the District Court for the District of Hawaii, the fact that Schroeder labeled his motion as a local rule motion is not dispositive. See Fuller v. M.G. Jewelry, 950 F.2d 1437, 1441-42 (9th Cir.1991) (holding motion for reconsideration brought pursuant to local rules may be treated as one brought pursuant to Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b)).
We find that Schroeder did, in fact, file a timely Rule 59(e) motion. A "timely filed motion for reconsideration under a local rule is a motion to alter or amend a judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e)." Bestran Corp. v. Eagle Comtronics, Inc., 720 F.2d 1019, 1019 (9th Cir.1983). The motion was timely because Schroeder served it within ten days after entry of judgment. There are two possibilities as to when judgment was entered. Judgment may have been entered on December 3, 1992, the date the district court issued its order. See Carson v. Block, 790 F.2d 562, 564 (7th Cir.) ("[T]he essence of a 'collateral' order is the absence of a final judgment on a separate document."), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1017, 107 S.Ct. 669, 93 L.Ed.2d 721 (1986). Or, judgment may have never been entered because the order was never set forth on a separate document. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 58; Britt v. Whitmire, 956 F.2d 509, 510 (5th Cir.1992) (noting that Rule 58 mandates that a district court's partial grant of summary judgment be set forth on a separate document). Either way, Schroeder filed in a timely manner.
If judgment were entered on December 3, 1992, then Schroeder was required to serve his motion for reconsideration by December 17, 1992, which was the tenth day for serving purposes after the entry of judgment on December 3, 1992. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a). "[A]n incarcerated pro se litigant completes 'service' under Fed.R.Civ.P. 5(b) upon submission to prison authorities for forwarding to the party to be served." Faile v. Upjohn Co., 988 F.2d 985, 988 (9th Cir.1993); see Simmons v. Ghent, 970 F.2d 392, 393 (7th Cir.1992) (holding that the Houston filing rule that an incarcerated pro se litigant files a notice of appeal on the day he delivers it to prison authorities for forwarding to the district court applies equally to other filings, including Rule 59(e) motions); Smith v. Evans, 853 F.2d 155, 161-62 (3d Cir.1988) (holding that the Houston filing rule applies to Rule 59(e) motions). Schroeder submitted his documents to prison authorities for mailing on December 13, 1992. Schroeder was still a pro se litigant at this time. Accordingly, Schroeder served the motion on December 13, 1992, which was within the ten-day period set by Rule 59(e).
If, on the other hand, judgment was never entered because the order was never set forth on a separate document, Schroeder still filed his motion within ten days because the clock never started to run. Therefore, Schroeder necessarily served the motion within the ten-day period set by Rule 59(e).
Accordingly, Schroeder filed a timely Rule 59(e) motion and defendants filed a notice of appeal before the disposition of that motion. Thus, the issue before us is whether defendants' notice of appeal may be resurrected by a retroactive application of the amended version of Rule 4(a)(4). See Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 888 (9th Cir.1994) (applying amended Rule 4(a)(4) retroactively); Leader Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Industrial Indem. Ins. Co., 19 F.3d 444, 445 (9th Cir.1994) (applying amended Rule 4(a)(4) retroactively); Burt v. Ware, 14 F.3d 256, 258 (5th Cir.1994) (holding amended Rule 4(a)(4) applies retroactively unless it would work an injustice) (per curiam).
The Supreme Court has ordered that the amended Rules of Appellate Procedure "shall govern all proceedings in appellate cases [commenced after December 1, 1993] and, insofar as just and practicable, all proceedings in appellate cases then pending." 61 U.S.L.W. 5365 (U.S. Apr. 27, 1993). The defendants' appeal was pending on December 1, 1993; thus, if the application of the 1993 amendment to this case is "just and practicable," we have jurisdiction.
We conclude that retroactive application of the amended provisions of Rule 4(a)(4) is appropriate. See Wallis, 26 F.3d at 888; Leader, 19 F.3d at 445; Burt, 14 F.3d at 258. The parties briefed this case and argued the merits at oral argument, as though the notice of appeal were valid. Schroeder cannot claim prejudice because he did not discover the defect in the filing of the notice of appeal until this court ordered supplemental briefing on the issue of jurisdiction. To allow the parties to proceed to the appeal is just. Further, practicality is no problem. No adjustments in briefing schedules or in calendaring of oral argument were required. Accordingly, we have jurisdiction to consider the appeal.
III. DISCUSSION
A. SUMMARY JUDGMENT AFFIDAVIT
Schroeder filed a verified complaint. A verified complaint may be used as an opposing affidavit under Rule 56. McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 197-98 (9th Cir.1987) (per curiam). To function as an opposing affidavit, however, the verified complaint must be based on personal knowledge and set forth specific facts admissible in evidence. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); McElyea, 833 F.2d at 197; Lew v. Kona Hosp., 754 F.2d 1420, 1423 (9th Cir.1985).
Here, Schroeder's verified complaint constituted an opposing affidavit because it was based on Schroeder's personal knowledge of admissible evidence. Schroeder's allegations were not based purely on his belief. See Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc., 944 F.2d 1525, 1529 (9th Cir.1991) (rejecting an affidavit because it was "not based on personal knowledge, but on information and belief"), aff'd, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 1920, 123 L.Ed.2d 611 (1993).
Schroeder demonstrated his personal knowledge by citing two specific instances where correctional staff members at the minimum security facility made statements from which a jury could reasonably infer a retaliatory motive for Schroeder's subsequent transfer. First, Schroeder reported that defendant Segawa was very upset by Schroeder's January 1, 1991, letter to defendant McDonald in which Schroeder complained about the conditions at the minimum security facility. After asking Schroeder why he was complaining, she stated, "I think it was a mistake bringing you to [the minimum security facility]." Complaint at 20-21, pp 71-75.
Second, Schroeder asserted that the Chief of Security at the minimum security facility, John Robelido, visited Schroeder shortly after Schroeder mailed his January 13, 1991, motion for injunctive relief to all district court judges in the District of Hawaii. Robelido asked Schroeder to talk to him before making any further complaints, promising Schroeder that he would work out any problems that may arise. Importantly, however, Robelido also remarked at this time that when the Department of Public Safety asked the minimum security facility to accept Schroeder as a transfer from the medium security facility, the staff at the minimum security facility was aware of Schroeder's reputation as a complainer, but thought that Schroeder only complained through internal channels, filing administrative grievances. Robelido indicated, in essence, that the staff was unpleasantly surprised to discover that Schroeder also complained through external channels, filing complaints and motions with the courts. Complaint at 24-25, pp 87, 89.
Accordingly, we conclude that Schroeder did file an opposing affidavit to defendants' motion for summary judgment. We now turn to the merits of defendants' assertion of qualified immunity.
B. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
We review de novo the district court's denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 871 (9th Cir.1993); Baker v. Racansky, 887 F.2d 183, 185 (9th Cir.1989).
The defense of qualified immunity protects "government officials ... from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). The rule of qualified immunity " 'provides ample support to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.' " Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 494-95, 111 S.Ct. 1934, 1943-44, 114 L.Ed.2d 547 (1991) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986)). "Therefore, regardless of whether the constitutional violation occurred, the officer should prevail if the right asserted by the plaintiff was not 'clearly established' or the officer could have reasonably believed that his particular conduct was lawful." Romero v. Kitsap County, 931 F.2d 624, 627 (9th Cir.1991) (emphasis supplied). Furthermore, "[t]he entitlement is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; ... it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2815-16, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985).
The qualified immunity test requires a two-part analysis: "(1) Was the law governing the official's conduct clearly established? (2) Under that law, could a reasonable officer have believed the conduct was lawful?" Act Up!, 988 F.2d at 871; see also Tribble v. Gardner, 860 F.2d 321, 324 (9th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1075, 109 S.Ct. 2087, 104 L.Ed.2d 650 (1989).
1. Retaliation Claim: Causes of Action # 1, # 4 and # 10
First, the law governing defendants' conduct was clearly established. Specifically, the law clearly established that defendants cannot transfer a prisoner from one correctional institution to another in order to punish the prisoner for exercising his First Amendment right to pursue civil rights litigation in the courts. See Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir.1985). Because the law governing defendants' conduct was clearly established, we must determine whether a reasonable prison official could have believed the conduct was lawful. See Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 871 (9th Cir.1993).
A reasonable prison official could have believed the transfer was lawful if he were advancing a legitimate penological goal and his means were narrowly tailored to achieve that goal. Rizzo, 778 F.2d at 532. Legitimate goals of a correctional institution include the preservation of internal order and discipline and the maintenance of institutional security. Id. Here, Schroeder was disrupting internal discipline. Specifically, Schroeder committed seven rule violations in only his first sixteen days at the minimum security facility.
Schroeder was also disrupting internal order. Specifically, Schroeder imposed an excessive burden on the correctional staff at the minimum security facility by constantly demanding access to the law library and continuously requesting legal materials. The facility was not adequately staffed to handle such a high volume of requests. See supra note 3. Finally, Schroeder also posed a security problem to the correctional staff at the minimum security facility. Specifically, Schroeder had used force or threats of force upon a correctional worker while at the medium security facility, a fact defendants did not know when they accepted him as a transfer. In addition, Schroeder's custody level did not warrant the transfer from the medium security facility to the minimum security facility in the first place.
Accordingly, we conclude that defendants were advancing legitimate penological goals and their means were narrowly tailored to meet those goals; thus, defendants could have believed the transfer of Schroeder from the minimum correctional facility back to the medium correctional facility was lawful. See Rizzo, 778 F.2d at 532. Consequently, we conclude that defendants are entitled to the defense of qualified immunity with regard to the retaliation claim. Romero, 931 F.2d at 627 ("[R]egardless of whether the constitutional violation occurred, the officer should prevail if ... the officer could have reasonably believed that his particular conduct was lawful.") (emphasis added).
2. Due Process Claim: Cause of Action # 9
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the deprivation of liberty or property without due process of law. A due process claim is cognizable only if there is a recognized liberty or property interest at stake. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2705, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). Therefore, Schroeder must establish that he had either a liberty interest or a property interest sufficient to trigger due process protection.
"An inmate's liberty interests are sufficiently extinguished by his conviction so that the state may change his place of confinement even though the degree of confinement may be different and prison life may be more disagreeable in one institution than in another." Rizzo, 778 F.2d at 530. However, due process protections apply if "there is some guarantee that transfer will not be effected except for misbehavior or some other specified reason." Id.; see also Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 254-55, 103 S.Ct. 1741, 1750, 75 L.Ed.2d 813 (1983) (noting that "a liberty interest may be 'created' by state laws, prison rules, regulations, or practices. State laws that impose substantive criteria which limit or guide the discretion of officials have been held to create a protected liberty interest.") (Marshall, J., dissenting); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 469, 103 S.Ct. 864, 870, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556-57, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2974-75, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974). Thus, we must determine whether defendants were restricted in their ability to transfer Schroeder back to the medium security facility by prison regulations. We conclude that defendants were.
At issue here is Prison Policy Nos. 493.18.01 and .03. Prison Policy No. 493.18.01 provides that an inmate must be classified according to the level of risk he represents. Further, the regulation states that no inmate should be kept at a more secure status than his potential risk dictates. Prison Policy No. 493.18.03 provides a scoring system by which inmates are classified and transfers are determined.
The district court found that Prison Policy No. 493.18 contained "clear substantive predicates" and "mandatory language of the sort required under Dix [v. County of Shasta, 963 F.2d 1296 (9th Cir.1992) ] to create a protectable liberty interest." Specifically, the district court found that Prison Policy No. 493.18 spoke in mandatory terms about how the classification of prisoners should be conducted. We agree. Therefore, we conclude that Schroeder established that he had a liberty interest sufficient to trigger due process protection. We turn then to the two-part qualified immunity test to determine whether defendants are nonetheless entitled to a defense from suit.
First, was the law governing defendants' conduct clearly established? See Act Up!, 988 F.2d at 871. We conclude that it was. Specifically, the law clearly established that defendants must follow mandatory prison regulations. Second, could a reasonable prison official have believed the conduct was lawful? See id. We conclude that a reasonable prison official could not have believed the conduct was lawful. Specifically, when defendants transferred Schroeder back to the medium security facility, Schroeder had a score of 9. Defendants knew that Schroeder had to have a score of 21 to increase his security classification. Thus, defendants acted in complete disregard for clearly established prison regulations.
Accordingly, defendants fail the second part of the qualified immunity test. Consequently, we conclude that defendants are not entitled to the defense of qualified immunity with regard to the due process claim.
3. Emotional Distress Claim: Cause of Action # 11
Schroeder alleges that he suffered emotional and mental trauma as a result of defendants' actions. The federal courts exercise supplemental jurisdiction over this claim because it arises out of the same nucleus of operative fact. The district court found that summary judgment on this claim is inappropriate because other claims are still unresolved. We agree.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm in part and reverse in part. The district court properly found that defendants are not entitled to the defense of qualified immunity with regard to the due process claim. Accordingly, the district court also properly found that summary judgment on the emotional distress claim is inappropriate at this time. The district court erred, however, by finding that defendants are not entitled to the defense of qualified immunity with regard to Schroeder's retaliation claim.
AFFIRMED IN PART and REVERSED IN PART.