Schroeder v. Department of Industry, Labor & Human Relations

168 N.W.2d 144, 43 Wis. 2d 12, 1969 Wisc. LEXIS 948
CourtWisconsin Supreme Court
DecidedJune 3, 1969
Docket266
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 168 N.W.2d 144 (Schroeder v. Department of Industry, Labor & Human Relations) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Wisconsin Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Schroeder v. Department of Industry, Labor & Human Relations, 168 N.W.2d 144, 43 Wis. 2d 12, 1969 Wisc. LEXIS 948 (Wis. 1969).

Opinion

Connor T. Hansen, J.

The sole issue on this appeal is whether there is credible evidence to sustain the ILHR Department’s findings “that the back pain was not caused by her activity in bending and picking up the cores on August 9, 1965, nor by the sum total of her daily employment activities from April 1965 to August 9, 1965; [and] that applicant did not sustain injury arising out of her employment.”

Mrs. Schroeder’s employment duties with the respondent involved handling cores. (The record does not indicate what a core is.) She would bend to pick up four or five cores in her arms from a skid, return to the erect position, and place the cores on her worktable. Four or five cores weigh a total of not more than five pounds. After placing the cores on the worktable she would fill any holes in the cores with mud, bend over and dip one core at a time in a solution in a barrel, arise, shake the core off, move over, bend to place the core on the work *15 table, return to the erect position, and begin the procedure all over. In the course of a day she handled about 400 cores.

On August 9, 1965, Mrs. Sehroeder arrived at work at 7 a. m. and at 8:30 a. m., while bending and picking up cores from the skid, she felt a sharp pain in her lower back area. She went to the company nurse twice but returned to her job and worked the rest of the day.

The next day she informed respondent Motor Castings that she was not feeling well and would not be. at work. She never returned to work. Four days after the accident she saw her doctor, Dr. Dricken. Dr. Dricken had Mrs. Sehroeder enter St. Luke’s hospital thirty-two days after the “accident” (September 11, 1965). At all times that Mrs. Sehroeder was in the hospital she was under the care of Dr. Konstantine S. George, an orthopedic surgeon. She remained in the hospital until October 1st.

Because of unsatisfactory improvement and recurrence of her complaints and symptoms, she was readmitted to the hospital on January 20, 1966. She was given conservative treatment, including traction, but her condition failed to improve. She was then given a myelogram which determined that she had a herniated disc at the L5-S1, and surgery was performed on February 2, 1966. An extruded nucleus pulposus (a disc) was removed and a spinal fusion was performed.

The record reveals that the doctors disagreed on the main issue — was the injury a result of her work?

Dr. Shapiro, an orthopedic surgeon who examined Mrs. Sehroeder for an hour or an hour-and-a-half on May 23, 1967, and took a history and made a physical examination, testified “that the patient’s disability and need for surgery was in no way related to an industrial injury.”

Dr. George, who treated Mrs. Sehroeder for a back disorder in 1961, treated her in September, 1965, when she entered the hospital after the “accident,” and performed the surgery on her in February, 1966, testified “that this so-called incident on that day at work was the *16 cause of her disc injury, which gradually progressed to become a herniation and caused the pressure on the nerve root.” Dr. George indicated that he had no information that would indicate in any manner that her condition resulted from anything other than her employment. He concluded that Mrs. Schroeder has a 15 percent permanent disability to her body.

The appellant contends that there is ample credible evidence by way of Mrs. Schroeder’s own testimony and the testimony and reports of Dr. George to establish that Mrs. Schroeder sustained injury arising out of her employment.

It is not the function of this court to determine reasonable inferences that could have been drawn, but rather to determine whether the findings of fact made by the ILHR Department are supported by credible evidence. Unruh v. Industrial Comm. (1959), 8 Wis. 2d 394, 398, 99 N. W. 2d 182.

In Lewellyn v. ILHR Department (1968), 38 Wis. 2d 43, 51, 52, 155 N. W. 2d 678, a case also dealing with an alleged industrial back injury, the court summarized much of the law as follows:

“ Tf credible evidence exists in support of the commission’s findings, such findings are conclusive. . . .
“ ‘ “The question is not whether there is credible evidence in the record to sustain a finding the commission did not make, but whether there is any credible evidence to sustain the finding the commission did make.” ’ ”
“ Tt is an elementary principle of law that the applicant has the burden of proof in a workmen’s compensation case, and if the evidence before the Industrial Commission is sufficient to raise in the mind of the commission a legitimate doubt as to the existence of facts necessary and essential to establish a claim for compensation, it becomes the duty of the commission to deny the application on the ground that the claimant did not sustain his burden of proof. . . ”

The Lewellyn Case, at pages 58, 59, also provides an appraisal of the factual situations which would deter *17 mine whether or not the particular condition is recoverable:

“(1) If there is a definite ‘breakage’ (a letting go, a structural change, etc., as described by Professor Larson, while the employee is engaged in usual or normal activity on the job, and there is a relationship between the breakage and the effort exerted or motion involved, the injury is compensable regardless of whether or not the employee’s condition was preexisting and regardless of whether or not there is evidence of prior trouble.
“(2) If the employee is engaged in normal exertive activity but there is no definite ‘breakage’ or demonstrable physical change occurring at that time but only a manifestation of a definitely preexisting condition of a progressively deteriorating nature, recovery should be denied even if the manifestation or symptomization of the condition became apparent during normal employment activity. . . .
“(3) If the work activity precipitates, aggravates and accelerates beyond normal progression, a progressively deteriorating or degenerative condition, it is an accident causing injury or disease and the employee should recover even if there is no definite ‘breakage.’ . . .”

In applying these standards, the applicant was obliged to establish that a breakage occurred while she was employed by the defendant which was related to the effort exerted; or that the work activity precipitated, aggravated and accelerated beyond normal progression, a progressively deteriorating or degenerative condition.

In affirming, the circuit court placed particular emphasis on Mrs. Schroeder’s failure to establish when the herniation took place.

Dr. George, testifying on behalf of the applicant, stated that his first examination of her at the hospital in October, 1965, after the “accident” revealed no significant abnormal neurological findings:

“. . . my findings and examination were compatible with a lumbosacral strain and post-traumatic lumbo-sacral synovitis. ...

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Related

Erickson v. Department of Industry, Labor & Human Relations
181 N.W.2d 495 (Wisconsin Supreme Court, 1970)
Pitsch v. Department of Industry, Labor & Human Relations
176 N.W.2d 390 (Wisconsin Supreme Court, 1970)

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Bluebook (online)
168 N.W.2d 144, 43 Wis. 2d 12, 1969 Wisc. LEXIS 948, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/schroeder-v-department-of-industry-labor-human-relations-wis-1969.