School Committee of Springfield v. Board of Education

319 N.E.2d 427, 366 Mass. 315, 1974 Mass. LEXIS 725

Opinions

Tauro, C.J.

On May 1, 1974, an opinion was issued in which we affirmed an opinion and order of the State board of education (board) which directed the school committee of Springfield (school committee) to implement immediately a plan designed to achieve racial balance in the schools of Springfield by the opening of the 1974-1975 school year. School Comm. of Springfield v. Board of Educ. 365 Mass. 215 (1974).¹ We remanded the cases to the jurisdiction of the single justice of this court who, on May 15, entered a final decree after rescript requiring timely compliance with the board’s opinion and order. On July 26, the Governor signed into law St. 1974, c. 636, an act which in §§ 1-6 amended the racial imbalance law.² Citing the new statute, the school committee, on August 2, filed in the county court a motion to vacate the final decree after rescript on the ground that the board no longer had statutory authority to require the use of various means to achieve racial balance which are included in its plan. A single justice of this court reserved and reported the case without decision to the full court. Because of the importance of the legal issues involved, an extraordinary summer session of the full court was scheduled, briefs were received from all interested parties and oral arguments were heard on August 22,1974. In view of the then imminent opening of the Springfield schools, an early disposition of these proceedings was essential. Thus, on August 22, after due deliberation, the full court entered an order without an accompanying opinion. In so doing, the court denied the school committee’s motion to vacate and reaffirmed all orders and decrees which had been entered in the case either by the full court or by a single justice thereof. In this opinion we now state the reasons underlying that order.³

This is the third time we have been called upon to intercede in the lengthy struggle to implement the racial imbalance law in Springfield. Although the history of that struggle is described in detail in our two earlier opinions,⁴ nevertheless we deem it necessary on this occasion to review once again the historical context in which this case arises.

The original racial imbalance act, enacted in 1965,⁵ declared the policy of the Commonwealth to be “to encourage all school committees to adopt as educational objectives the promotion of racial balance and the correction of existing racial imbalance in the public schools.” G. L. c. 71, § 37C. In broad outline, the statute required local school committees to adopt plans for the elimination of any racial imbalance existing in their schools. Whenever a local school committee failed to adopt an acceptable plan of its own and refused to adopt recommendations of the board, the board was empowered to require the implementation of a plan which it deemed satisfactory. § 37D. The statute contained no limitations on the devices for achieving racial balance (e.g. redistricting, busing) which the board may direct local school committees to utilize. There was express provision for judicial review of the actions and orders of the board. § 37D.

Since the passage of the racial imbalance act there have at all times been at least five elementary schools in Springfield which are racially imbalanced within the meaning of the statute.⁶ (An additional elementary school and a junior high school which were found to be racially imbalanced in 1965 were subsequently closed by the school committee.) Between 1966 and 1969 the school committee submitted and the board approved three separate plans for the elimination of racial imbalance in Springfield’s schools. Those plans relied on school construction and on open enrollment programs as the principal means to achieve racial balance.

By the fall of 1970, however, it was clear that no substantial progress toward balancing the five imbalanced elementary schools had been made. In January of 1971, therefore, the board ordered the withholding of State school aid from Springfield until the school committee submitted an acceptable short-term plan to achieve racial balance. Although a compromise between the board and the school committee caused the State aid to be released to Springfield in February, the board again ordered State aid withheld in May, 1971, after the school committee had declined to adopt any one of three short-term plans which had been prepared by the Springfield school department. The school committee then brought a bill for judicial review of the board’s actions (G. L. c. 15, § 1J).

In Springfield I, 362 Mass. 417 (1972),⁷ this court held that the board had acted improperly and prematurely in ordering the withholding of State aid and we ordered that the funds be released to Springfield. In addition, however, we made clear our lack of approval of the school committee’s “performance ... or perhaps lack of performance” in implementing the racial imbalance law, and we stated that: “Inasmuch as Springfield has failed to achieve racial balance in its elementary school system in the period since 1965, we think it is reasonable to require that the school committee, with appropriate assistance from the board, develop short-term measures consistent with G. L. c. 71, § 37D, which will achieve racial balance in all city schools by September, 1973.” Id. at 444. The case was remanded to the Superior Court with instructions to ensure the filing and implementation of a short-term balance plan.

After remand, at a hearing in the Superior Court in November, 1972, the school committee represented that it would file a short-term balance plan with the board by early 1973. In fact, no such plan was filed and in June, 1973, at the board’s request, the Superior Court ordered the school committee to file a balance plan immediately. The school committee’s response to this order was to file a four-page plan which it never approved and which provided for the balancing of only the fifth and sixth grades of the five imbalanced elementary schools.

At that point the board appointed a hearing examiner to conduct hearings on the plan filed by the school committee as well as on a plan prepared by a group of Springfield residents who had intervened in the proceeding and on a plan prepared by the Springfield school department and the Task Force on Racial Imbalance. At the conclusion of the hearings, "which were held during August, 1973, the hearing examiner issued a report in which he recommended adoption of the plan prepared by the school department and the Task Force (the Task Force plan) ,⁸ The board then received written objections to the hearing examiner’s report, heard oral argument, and on October 12,1973, issued an opinion and order in which it rejected the objections to the hearing examiner’s report and ordered the school committee to adopt and implement the Task Force plan. By this time, of course, it was obvious that there was to be no compliance with the September, 1973, deadline which had been set in Springfield I.

The school committee thereupon filed a bill for judicial review challenging the legality of the proceedings before the hearing examiner and the board, and requesting that the board be enjoined from enforcing its opinion and order. The board filed an answer and a counterclaim seeking enforcement of its opinion and order.

While the case was pending, a single justice of this court, in December, 1973, ordered the school committee “forthwith” to submit an implementation plan and proposed modifications for the Task Force plan in accordance with the board’s opinion and order. The school committee appealed from and sought a stay of that order. The stay was denied on January 9, 1974, but by January 28 the school committee still had not complied with the order. On that date, at the board’s request, a single justice of this court amended the earlier order to require compliance by the school committee no later than February 1. The school committee did submit an implementation plan on February 1, which plan the board modified and approved by an order dated February 11. On February 12 the board moved to amend its counterclaim to include a prayer for a preliminary injunction requiring the school committee to implement the Task Force plan in accordance with the implementation schedule. On February 20, after hearing oral argument, a single justice allowed the board’s motion and granted the preliminary injunction.

The case reached the full court and was heard in April, 1974.⁹ As noted above, we issued our opinion on May 1,1974 (Springfield II).10 In that opinion we rejected each of the school committee’s objections to the proceedings before the hearing examiner and the board. We also reviewed the Task Force plan which the board had ordered implemented and held that it conformed to the law in every respect. We therefore concluded that the relief requested by the board’s counterclaim should be granted and we ordered the entry of a decree affirming the board’s opinion and order and requiring compliance therewith by September, 1974. In order that this latest deadline not meet the same fate as the 1973 deadline imposed in the Springfield I case, we ordered that the single justice retain jurisdiction of the cases to ensure implementation of the Task Force plan. On May 15, 1974, a single justice entered the final decree after rescript which is the subject of the present motion to vacate. Between May 15 and the beginning of August, there were no further legal proceedings and, we are told, the school committee was proceeding in accordance with the implementation schedule to put the Task Force plan into operation.¹¹

On July 26 the Governor approved St. 1974, c. 636, declaring it to be an emergency law which should be immediately effective. Chapter 636 works several principal changes in the racial imbalance law.

First, upon certification by the board to a local school committee that racial imbalance exists in schools within that school committee’s jurisdiction, it apparently is no longer incumbent on the school committee immediately to produce a plan to eliminate such imbalance. Amended § 37D requires the preparation of such a plan only after a school committee has received, and been unable to satisfy, a request by a nonwhite student attending a racially imbalanced school who wishes to be transferred to a school in which “racial isolation”¹² exists, or a request by a white student attending a racially isolated school who wishes to be transferred to a racially imbalanced school. In other-words, school committees are not required to devise any racial balance plan until at least one student (or parent) has initiated a request for transfer of the specified type. Even then, no plan is required if the school committee is able to satisfy the particular request for transfer. It is only when transfer requests cannot be satisfied (because of lack of available seats) that a school committee must devise a plan to make such transfers possible.

Second, the statute provides certain financial inducements to local school committees (e.g., 100% State reimbursement of certain transportation costs; substantial State funding of the costs of establishing magnet school facilities). Noteworthy is the provision for payment by the State of $500 into a local “Equal Education Improvement Fund” for each student transfer of the type described above. The local school committees may use such monies for programs to improve the quality of education within their respective jurisdictions. G. L. c. 15, § II, as amended.

Third, and most pertinent to the issue now before us, if it becomes necessary for a school committee to devise a plan to achieve racial balance, the board is required: to provide technical and other assistance in the preparation of the plan; to approve or disapprove whatever plan is devised; to devise and order the implementation of its own plan whenever it is unable to approve a school committee’s plan. Although there is no limitation on the means which a school committee may employ in order to eliminate racial imbalance, the board is strictly limited in terms of the measures which it may require school committees to employ. Any plan ordered by the board “may include any of the following measures, and no others ...: additions to existing school buildings, use of leased or portable facilities, and changes in use of school buildings.” G. L. c. 15, § II, as amended.

Apparently on the basis of these changes in the racial imbalance law, the school committee on August 1 passed two resolutions, one directing that “no further action be taken on the timetable for implementing the... [Task Force plan] without the specific approval of the School Committee,” and the other directing that “the Springfield School System open on September 4, with the same grades and school organization as existed in June....” At the direction of the school committee the superintendent of the Springfield school system notified the State Commissioner of Education of the resolutions which had been adopted.¹³

On August 2 the school committee filed in the county court its motion to vacate the final decree after rescript which had been entered on May 15, 1974. The asserted ground for the motion was that c. 636 had amended the racial imbalance law so as to eliminate the “legal basis” for the board’s opinion and order which the final decree purported to enforce. On the same date a group of children attending the elementary schools of Springfield and their parents moved to intervene in the case. They subsequently filed an “Answer and Counterclaim” to the school committee’s motion to vacate. Subsequently the motion to intervene was allowed by a single justice of this court and the answer and counterclaim were received.¹⁴ The school committee filed an answer to the counterclaim, and the case was then reserved and reported without decision. The full court heard oral argument during a special sitting on August 22 and, as noted at the outset, on the same day issued its decision denying the school committee’s motion to vacate and directing compliance with the earlier final decree, deferring to a later date the filing of an opinion or opinions.

We turn now to the legal issues presented by the motion to vacate.

It is well established that a court has power to modify or change a prior decree due to a change in circumstances, including a change in the applicable law. Sawyer v. Davis, 136 Mass. 239 (1884). State v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co. 18 How. 421 (1855). System Fedn. No. 91, Ry. Employes’ Dept. AFL-CIO v. Wright, 364 U. S. 642 (1961). See Nantucket Exp. Lines, Inc. v. Woods Hole, Martha’s Vineyard & Nantucket S.S. Authy. 350 Mass. 173, 174-175 (1966), cert. den. 384 U. S. 952 (1966). Cf. Royal v. Royal, 324 Mass. 613 (1949). Citing this proposition, the school committee argues that the change in the racial imbalance law accomplished by c. 636 requires that we reconsider the final decree enforcing the board’s opinion and order. Because under the racial imbalance law as amended by c. 636 the measures which the board may order local school committees to adopt include only the use of portable classrooms and the construction of additions to or changes in the use of existing buildings, the school committee contends that the final decree must be vacated because the board no longer has the authority to require the implementation of the Task Force plan, which involves redistricting, transfer of students and busing.

An initial problem with this argument is that it is not clear from the language of the amending statute itself that the Legislature, by enacting c. 636, had any intention of affecting the operation of racial balance plans which had already been approved by the board and incorporated in final decrees of this court. There is certainly nothing in the wording of the 1974 amendment, taken by itself, which suggests an intention to scrap all the work that has been done in both Springfield and Boston toward ensuring that measures to eliminate racial imbalance would at long last be implemented this September. In addition, it was well known to the Legislature that the racial balance plan adopted for Boston, see Boston III,15 had since been incorporated in a decree of the United States District Court, District of Massachusetts, as the necessary short-term remedy for violations of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution which were found to have occurred in the operation of the Boston school system. Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. 410 (D. Mass. 1974). From the statutory language it would appear unlikely that the Legislature intended to flout that court order by amending the racial imbalance act so as to invalidate the racial balance plan adopted for Boston. If the Legislature did not intend c. 636 to affect the operation of the racial balance plan already adopted for Boston, and since there is no suggestion in the statute that Springfield be treated differently from Boston, it could further be argued that the Legislature did not intend to affect the plan adopted for Springfield.

On the other hand, if c. 636 is viewed against the historical background described in the first part of this opinion and if it is considered with other portions of the imbalance legislation, together with all the opinions of this court, including our advisory opinions, in dealing with the imbalance statute of 1965, a persuasive argument can be made that the clear intent of that statute was to forestall, wherever possible, the immediate implementation of board-ordered racial balance plans which require redistricting or busing of students. It is well known that the board’s orders requiring redistricting and involuntary transfer (i.e., busing) of students are the aspects of the attempts to enforce the racial imbalance law which have aroused the most vociferous opposition. See Opinion of the Justices, 363 Mass. 899,905 (1973); Opinion of the Justices, 365 Mass. 648, 652 (1974). The most conspicuous change in the racial imbalance law which c. 636 accomplishes is the elimination of the board’s power to order busing and redistricting to achieve racial balance. In these circumstances it is a likely inference that c. 636 was in fact intended to short-circuit the implementation of the board-ordered and court-ordered Task Force plan in Springfield, a plan which requires both redistricting and busing. Certainly this intent is suggested by the Governor’s assertion, contained in his statement declaring c.636 to be emergency legislation, that “[i]t is essential that the provisions of this Act take effect immediately in order to permit its orderly administration during the school year which will soon commence.” Although this view of the amendatory statute appears to be the more logical one, we need not so decide at this time.

In any event, regardless of legislative intent (determination of which is often an uncertain exercise), one proposition is clear: in the circumstances of this case, any action taken either by the Legislature or by the school committee of Springfield which would tend to reverse or impede the progress toward the achievement of racial balance in Springfield’s schools would constitute a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and of arts. 1 and 10 of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution. Thus, in so far as c. 636 was intended to forestall the implementation of the Task Force plan in Springfield, it is unconstitutional. Similarly, in so far as the school committee, in reliance on c. 636, attempts to rescind the actions it has previously taken toward full implementation of that plan, it would be acting in an unconstitutional manner. We explain these conclusions.

By July 26,1974, when c. 636 was enacted, the plans for elimination of the racial imbalance which had for nine years existed in five Springfield elementary schools had finally been made. Substantially every action which was necessary to the implementation of the Task Force plan had already been taken:¹⁶ the more than thirty elementary school districts consolidated into six districts; pupil assignments had been completed and notification had been sent to parents; staff assignments and notification thereof had been completed; the safety and transportation plan had been completed; additional vehicles necessary for student transportation had been ordered; community education programs had been conducted. Thus, by the end of July, through the affirmative acts of the school committee, Springfield had in fact achieved a racially balanced school system. Essentially all that remained to be done was to put the students into the classrooms.

In these circumstances any attempt by the Legislature or by the school committee to rescind the present enrollment structure (all elemental schools less than forty per cent nonwhite) and return to the 1973-1974 enrollment structure (five elementary schools between 82% and 95% nonwhite) would constitute resegregation¹⁷ of the previously imbalanced schools, and would thus be an unconstitutional act of de jure segregation.¹⁸ See Keyes v. School Dist. Number One, Denver, Colo. 303 F. Supp 289, 295 (D. Colo. 1969);¹⁹ Bradley v. Milliken, 433 F. 2d 897, 904 (6th Cir. 1970);²⁰ Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd. of Educ. 346 F. Supp 766, 780 (W. D. Mich. 1971), affd. sub nom. Olivers. School Dist. of Kalamazoo, 448 F. 2d 635 (6th Cir. 1971); Martin v. Evansville-Vanderburgh Sch. Corp. of Evansville, 347 F. Supp. 816, 820 (S. D. Ind. 1972).

The school committee and the Attorney General argue that the cited cases are distinguishable. In addition, they assert that, because there has never been a finding of de jure segregation in the Springfield schools (see Springfield II at 232), any action taken pursuant to c. 636 cannot conceivably violate any constitutional provision because under c. 636 the State has not merely taken a neutral stance with respect to the elimination of racial imbalance, which is all that is constitutionally required in the absence of de jure segregation, but in fact has affirmatively moved to eliminate racial imbalance. When viewed in the “historical context” of the Springfield situation, however, it becomes easy to comprehend that any attempt under c. 636 to prevent the operation of the Task Force plan would constitute a significant retreat from the progress toward desegregation that has been made under the pre-amendment law. And the cases make clear that even where steps toward desegregation are made voluntarily rather than pursuant to constitutional mandate any subsequent State action which would cause a return of the preexisting segregation would itself be an act of de jure segregation.²¹ This is especially true where, as in this case, there is a court decree ordering the implementation of such plans.

For example, Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd. of Educ. 346 F. Supp. 766 (W. D. Mich. 1971), affd. sub nom. Oliver v. School Dist. of Kalamazoo, 448 F. 2d 635 (6th Cir. 1971), involved a school system in which five elementary schools had predominantly black enrollments while the system-wide black population was only 17.6%. The local board of education voluntarily had adopted a plan to increase racial integration throughout the school system. After an election, however, the newly elected board voted to rescind the earlier plan and to return to the former status quo. In a suit for a preliminary injunction against the board of education, the court declared that it was “not in a position to rule on whether or not the Board had a constitutional duty to adopt the... [voluntary integration plan] because all of the evidence isn’t in.” Id. at 779-780. The court nevertheless held that the board’s vote purporting to rescind the integration plan was in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and was void. The court enjoined the board from acting on the rescission vote and required the implementation of the integration plan. Id. at 782.

Similarly, Keyes v. School Dist. Number One, Denver, Colo. 303 F. Supp. 279 and 303 F. Supp. 289 (both D. Colo. 1969),²² involved the revocation by a school board of a previously adopted plan to achieve racial balance. After years of study, the Denver school board, in 1969, adopted three resolutions which had the effect of altering existing school attendance districts in such a way as to achieve greater racial balance among the city’s schools. After a school board election, however, and while the school department staff was in the process of implementing the resolutions, the newly constituted school board voted to rescind the resolutions and to return to the old order. The court stated that, although the rescission of the steps taken toward achieving racial balance “was carried out in response to what was called a voter mandate, there can be no gainsaying the purpose and effect of the action as one designed to segregate.” 303 F. Supp. at 285. Characterizing the attempted rescission as “a legislative act which had for its purpose restoration of the old status quo ...,” the court held that the vote rescinding the three resolutions “in and of itself was an act of de jure segregation.” 303 F. Supp. at 295 (1969). A decree was entered enjoining the school board from implementing its rescission vote.²³

In Bradley v. Milliken, 433 F. 2d 897 (6th Cir. 1970), the court declared unconstitutional a statute enacted by the Michigan Legislature which purported to require postponement of the implementation of a redistricting plan which had been adopted voluntarily by the Detroit board of education in order to reduce racial imbalance in the city’s high schools. Even though there had been no finding of de jure segregation in Detroit’s schools, the court held that the statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment by impeding voluntary local efforts to achieve racial balance. Id. at 904.²⁴

In addition to the foregoing, our conclusions in this case are buttressed by a second line of cases which focus on State action which amounts to racial discrimination. These cases spring from the decision of the Supreme Court in Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U. S. 369 (1967).

In the Reitman case the United States Supreme Court affirmed a decision of the Supreme Court of California (Mulkey v. Reitman, 64 Cal. 2d 529 [1966]) declaring unconstitutional an amendment to the California Constitution (Proposition 14, so called) which purported to forbid any agency of the State from interfering with the “absolute discretion” of any person to sell, lease or rent real estate “to such persons . . . as he . . . chooses.” Analyzing Proposition 14 in light of its historical context and the conditions existing prior to its enactment, the California court concluded that the clear intent behind the amendment was to repeal pro tanto State laws which declared illegal private racial discrimination in real estate transactions. Id. at 534-535. The ultimate effect of Proposition 14, the court noted, would be significant involvement of the State in the encouragement of private discrimination. Id. at 542.

The United States Supreme Court approved of the California court’s analysis based on “ ‘historical context,’ ” “ ‘immediate objective’ ” and “ ‘ultimate effect,’ ” and it affirmed the holding that Proposition 14 did not merely put the State in a constitutionally permissible position of neutrality vis-a-vis private discrimination but in fact provided substantial State encouragement to those acts of private discrimination which the amendment purported to permit. 387 U. S. at 373-379. The court stated: “Here the California court, armed as it was with the knowledge of the facts and circumstances concerning the passage and potential impact of . . . [Proposition 14], and familiar with the milieu in which that provision would operate, has determined that the provision would involve the State in private racial discriminations to an unconstitutional decree. We accept this holding of the California court.” Id. at 378-379. The holding that Proposition 14 violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was thus upheld.

Following the decision in the Reitman case, a three-judge Federal court in New York declared unconstitutional a statute which purported to prohibit State education officials and appointed local school boards from ordering pupil assignments or redistricting for the purpose of achieving racial equality in school attendance.²⁵ Lee v. Nyquist, 318 F. Supp. 710 (W. D. N. Y. 1970), affd. without opinion, 402 U. S. 935 (1971). The court noted that, prior to the enactment of the statute in question, the State education officials “were firmly committed to a policy of eradicating de facto segregation in New York’s public schools, and appointed education officials were actively engaged in directing plans to improve racial balance.” Id. at 716. Such efforts had met with stubborn resistance at the local level. In light of this background, the court found that the clear legislative purpose was “to turn the tables in favor of those recalcitrant local groups” (id. at 717) by preventing the use of certain measures designed to achieve racial balance. The ultimate impact of the challenged statute would be to slow substantially progress toward the achievement of racially balanced schools in the affected localities. Although ultimately relying on other grounds, the court concluded that, in these circumstances, a good case was made out under Reitman v. Mulkey that the statute, “by invidiously discriminating against efforts to achieve racial balance, violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Lee v. Nyquist, supra, 716.

The Justices of this court, too, have relied on the Reitman case as demonstrating the unconstitutionality of the legislation which purported to prohibit the use of mandatory school assignments and busing to achieve racial balance. See Opinion of the Justices, 363 Mass. 899 (1973); Opinion of the Justices, 365 Mass. 648 (1974). In the earlier Opinion of the Justices we stated that a bill which purported both to require the assignment of pupils to the schools nearest their respective homes and to bar transportation of pupils without parental written consent would, if enacted, be unconstitutional. Citing the Supreme Court’s decision in North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U. S. 43 (1971), we noted that “even in situations where there is only de facto segregation, if the State adopts a policy which freezes these de facto conditions by imposing severe limitations on local school officials’ discretionary authority to take effective remedial action, then the State policy constitutes State action serving to continue segregation in the schools and thus ‘significantly encouragejs] and involve[s] the State’ in private racial discrimination. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 [1967]; Lee v. Nyquist, 318 F. Supp. 710, 716 [W. D.N.Y. 1970].” 363 Mass. at 904.

Similarly, in the present case, it is quite clear that the school committee, although not barred by c. 636, will not voluntarily order the redistricting and busing which is integral to the Task Force plan. And from the past efforts in Springfield it is equally clear that racial balance cannot be achieved without such redistricting and busing. Thus, in this setting, by depriving the board of its power to require the use of effective measures for the elimination of racial imbalance, c. 636 is, in effect, “an authorization to discriminate.” Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U. S. at 379. If the school committee at this stage, in reliance on c. 636, attempts to rescind the implementation of the Task Force plan, it would constitute “State action serving to continue segregation in the schools and thus ‘significantly . . . [involve] the State’ in . . . racial discrimination.” Opinion of the Justices, 363 Mass, at 904.

In light of the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the school committee cannot constitutionally follow the course suggested by its resolutions of August 1, 1974, whereby it proposed to scrap the Task Force plan and return to the school structure which existed last year. When the school committee, pursuant to the orders of the board and of this court, proceeded to implement the Task Force plan, it in effect created a new status quo in which every elementary school is racially balanced. If, now that that new status quo has been substantially achieved, either the school committee or the Legislature acts so as to resurrect the preexisting school structure, the resulting racial segregation in the five elementary schools would clearly be State imposed and thus unconstitutional. Events have simply moved too far to permit such a reversion.

Since the school committee must continue to comply with the Task Force plan, as required by the final decree after rescript in the Springfield II case, there is no occasion to modify or vacate that decree.

1

Together with a companion case involving a suit brought by the interveners in the proceedings before the board.

2

G. L. c. 15, §§ 1I-1K, and c. 71, §§ 37C-37D, originally inserted by St. 1965, c. 641, §§ 1,2.

3

In rendering this opinion we note that, in spite of the sharply divergent views which had previously existed between the board and the school committee and among the citizens of Springfield, the responsible and cooperative efforts of all parties have resulted in an orderly and successful implementation of this court’s order in the Springfield public schools.

4

School Comm. of Springfield v. Board of Educ. 362 Mass. 417 (1972) (Springfield I), and School Comm. of Springfield v. Board of Educ. 365 Mass. 215 (1974) (Springfield II).

5

The act was passed in response to a lengthy report prepared by the Advisory Committee on Racial Imbalance and Education and two Task Forces appointed by the board. The conclusions reached in the report were summarized as follows:

“Our conclusions are clear. Racial imbalance represents a serious conflict with the American creed of equal opportunity. It is detrimental to sound education in the following ways:

“It does serious educational damage to Negro children by impairing their confidence, distorting their self-image, and lowering their motivation.

“It does moral damage by encouraging prejudice within children regardless of their color.

“It presents an inaccurate picture of life to both white and Negro children and prepares them inadequately for a multi-racial community, nation, and world.

“It too often produces inferior educational facilities in the predominantly Negro schools.

“It squanders valuable human resources by impairing the opportunities of many Negro children to prepare for the professional and vocational requirements of our technological society.”

Report of the Advisory Committee on Racial Imbalance and Education, Massachusetts State Board of Education, Because It is Right — Educationally, p. 2 (April, 1965).

6

The following table reflects the percentage of nonwhite students enrolled in the five schools each year from 1965 through 1973:

1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973

Brookings 58.8% 65.7% 66.7% 71.7% 74.5% 72.3% 74.9% 75.9% 82.3%

DeBerry 90.9% 91.1% 89.6% 91.4% 92.3% 91.4% 91.3% 91.9% 95.1%

Ells 68.0% 71.3% 73.6% 77.8% 80.5% 87.5% 93.2% 93.0% 95.1%

Homer 58.5% 65.0% 58.6% 65.0% 69.2% 73.9% 74.9% 79.6% 88.1%

Tapley 77.3% 80.3% 83.0% 85.4% 85.2% 86.4% 82.5% 87.3% 88.7%

7

See fn. 4, supra.

8

Briefly, the Task Force plan requires the consolidation of Springfield’s elementary schools into six districts, with each of the imbalanced schools in a separate district. Approximately 28% of the total population of each new district is nonwhite. Approximately 5,800 students are to be transferred pursuant to the plan. The longest distance any student would be bused is roughly five miles.

9

See fn. 1, supra.

10

See fn. 4, supra.

11

During the years of stubborn resistance to the implementation of the racial imbalance law in Springfield, the board was simultaneously struggling with an equally recalcitrant school committee in Boston. See School Comm. of Boston v. Board of Educ. 363 Mass. 20 (1973) (Boston I); School Comm. of Boston v. Board of Educ. 363 Mass. 125 (1973) (Boston II); School Comm. of Boston v. Board of Educ. 364 Mass. 199 (1973) (Boston III). In addition, there were two legislative attempts to circumvent the board’s powers under the racial imbalance law. See Opinion of the Justices, 363 Mass. 899 (1973); Opinion of the Justices, 365 Mass. 648 (1974). The efforts by the board to enforce the racial imbalance law in Boston were followed in June of this year when the United States District Court, District of Massachusetts, ruled that the Boston school system had been operated in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and ordered that plans be implemented immediately to accomplish desegregation of Boston’s schools in September of this year. Morgan v. Hennigan,379 F. Supp.410 (D. Mass. 1974).

12

A “racially isolat[ed]” school is one in which not more than thirty per cent of the pupils are nonwhite. G. L. c. 71, § 37D, as appearing in St. 1974, c. 636, § 5.

13

Although it does not appear on the record, we were assured by counsel at the oral arguments that the school committee subsequently rescinded those two resolutions.

14

During the argument before the full court the interveners were the only parties who opposed the motion to vacate. Although the board issued an opinion and order on August 13 in which it took the position that the motion to vacate should be denied, at oral argument and in the briefs the board was represented by members of the staff of the Attorney General who argued in support of the motion.

15

See fn. 11, supra.

16

Our source of information on the progress of implementation is the implementation schedule, as modified by the board opinion and order of February 11, 1974. The school committee has assured us that it has fully complied with said schedule.

17

Although “segregation” as used in the context of the Fourteenth Amendment cases is not necessarily synonymous with “racial imbalance” within the meaning of the Massachusetts statute, it seems clear in this case that the five Springfield elementary schools have been not only “racially imbalanced” but also “segregated.” The percentage of non white enrollment in each of those schools during the years from 1965 to 1973 is reflected in the table in fn. 6. The percentage of nonwhite enrollment throughout the Springfield school system in 1973 was less than thirty per cent. Cf. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo. 413 U. S. 189, 195-196 (1973), reh. den. 414 U. S. 883 (1973).

18

For a discussion of the distinction between de jure and de facto segregation, see Springfield II, 365 Mass, at 230-233 (1974). See also Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver Colo., supra, at 208; Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U. S. 717 (1974).

19

For further history of the Keyes case seefn. 21, post.

20

For further history of the Bradley case seefn. 24, post.

21

It may be argued that, because de jure segregation involves the “purpose or intent to segregate,” Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo. 413 U. S. 189, 208 (1973) (emphasis in original), any action by the school committee to repeal the Task Force plan would not be unconstitutional because it would be motivated, not by an intent to segregate, but only by an intent to avoid unpopular forced busing of students. The certain consequence of such a repeal, however, would be the resegregation of the five previously imbalanced elementary schools. The school committee must be held to “intend” the certain consequences of its acts. See Keyes v. School Dist. Number One, Denver, Colo. 303 F. Supp. 279, 286 (D. Colo. 1969); 313 F. Supp. 90 (D. Colo. 1970); 445 F. 2d 990 (10th Cir. 1971); affirmed in part and modified in part, 413 U. S. 189 (1973), reh. den. 414 U. S. 883 (1973).

22

See fn.21

23

Subsequently, after a full trial on the merits, the District Court reiterated its holding that the vote of rescission was itself an act of de jure segregation. 313 F. Supp. 61,66-67 (1970). On appeal, neither the Court of Appeals, 445 F. 2d 990 (10th Cir. 1971), nor the Supreme Court, 413 U. S. 189 (1973), reached that issue. For a similar case reaching the same result, but involving a school system which was historically segregated, see Martin v. Evansville-Vanderburgh Sch. Corp. of Evansville, 347 F. Supp. 816 (S. D. Ind. 1972).

24

After several intervening decisions, see 483 F. 2d 945 (6th Cir. 1971), 338 F. Supp. 582 (E. D. Mich. 1971); 484 F. 2d 215 (6th Cir. 1973), this case reached the Supreme Court for resolution of a single question concerning the extent of the remedy ordered by the District Court, 418 U. S. 717 (1974).

25

It is noteworthy that the court in this case struck down the challenged statute in its entirety, even though by its terms the statute did not restrict the authority or discretion of elected local school boards (which are in the vast majority throughout New York) to order assignments or redistricting in order to achieve racial balance.