Schmidt Baking Company, Inc. v. Commissioner

107 T.C. No. 16
CourtUnited States Tax Court
DecidedNovember 14, 1996
Docket10458-95
StatusUnknown

This text of 107 T.C. No. 16 (Schmidt Baking Company, Inc. v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Schmidt Baking Company, Inc. v. Commissioner, 107 T.C. No. 16 (tax 1996).

Opinion

107 T.C. No. 16

UNITED STATES TAX COURT

SCHMIDT BAKING COMPANY, INC., Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent

Docket No. 10458-95. Filed November 14, 1996.

P funded its vacation and severance pay obligations to its employees for 1991 by purchasing an irrevocable letter of credit on March 13, 1992. The letter of credit constituted a transfer of an interest in substantially vested property, includable in income of the employees as of that date under sec. 83, I.R.C. P, an accrual basis taxpayer, deducted the amount of the letter of credit on its 1991 return on the basis that it paid the vacation pay within 2-1/2 months of the close of its 1991 taxable year and was therefore entitled to the claimed deduction under sec. 83(h), I.R.C., and sec. 1.83-6(a)(3), Income Tax Regs. R disallowed the deduction on the ground that the letter of credit did not constitute payment to the employees within the 2-1/2 month period with the result that sec. 404(a)(5), I.R.C., and sec. 1.404(b)-1T, Temp. Income Tax Regs., 51 Fed. Reg. 4321 (Feb. 4, 1986), applied and the deduction was not allowable to P for its 1991 taxable year. Held, the letter of credit constituted payment on March 13, 1992, so that sec. 404(a)(5), - 2 -

I.R.C., does not apply, and the deduction for vacation and severance pay is an allowable deduction for P's 1991 taxable year under sec. 83(h), I.R.C., and sec. 1.83-6(a)(3), Income Tax Regs.

Theodore W. Hirsh, Andrea R. Macintosh, and Frances M.

Angelos, for petitioners.

Clare J. Brooks, for respondent.

OPINION

TANNENWALD, Judge: Respondent determined the following

deficiencies in petitioner's Federal income taxes:

Taxable Year Ended Deficiency

Dec. 26, 1987 $ 6,982.00 Dec. 31, 1988 193,182.00 Dec. 28, 1991 2,873.00

After concessions, the sole issue for decision is whether

petitioner may deduct for its 1991 tax year amounts for vacation

and severance pay which accrued in that year, were funded within

2-1/2 months of the end of that year, i.e., March 13, 1992, by

means of an irrevocable letter of credit, and were includable in

the income of the employees as of that date. - 3 -

Background

This case was submitted fully stipulated under Rule 122.1

The stipulation of facts and supplemental stipulation of facts

are incorporated herein by this reference and found accordingly.

Petitioner, an accrual basis taxpayer, is a corporation with

over 1,300 employees that, at the time of the filing of the

petition, had its principal place of business in Baltimore,

Maryland. It filed timely Federal income tax returns for the

years at issue with the Internal Revenue Service Center,

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

Petitioner had in place a vacation plan, whereby vacation

earned in the first year could only be taken between January 1st

and December 31st of the following year. Terminated employees

could get cash for their unused vacation pay with proper notice

to petitioner. Petitioner also had a plan of severance pay in

the event employees were laid off.

On March 13, 1992, petitioner purchased an irrevocable

standby letter of credit in the amount of $2,092,421 representing

accrued 1991 liabilities of $1,773,183 for vacation pay and

$319,238 for severance pay. Petitioner's employees were

designated as the beneficiaries with each employee and the amount

of the accrued benefit to which he or she was entitled separately

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the taxable years in issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. - 4 -

listed.

The letter of credit was secured by petitioner's general

assets, and its employees were named as sole beneficiaries

thereunder. Under this arrangement, if petitioner failed to pay

secured vacation benefits, they would be paid by the issuer of

the letter of credit upon the request of the employees' agent,

petitioner's chief financial officer.

Under applicable bankruptcy law, petitioner's general

creditors had no right with respect to payments under the letter

of credit.

The parties have stipulated that the letter of credit

represented a transfer of substantially vested interests in

property to the employees for purposes of section 83, and that

the fair market value of the interests was includable in the

employees' gross incomes for 1992 as of the date the interests

were transferred.2

On its return, timely filed, for the taxable year ending

December 28, 1991, petitioner deducted all liabilities for

vacation and severance pay accrued during that year that were

listed in the letter of credit, in the amount of $2,092,421. By

way of a net operating loss carryback, petitioner also claimed a

2 Although we recognize that this stipulation represents a conclusion of law that may not be binding upon us, we have found no reason not to utilize it as an element of decision. See Godlewski v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 200, 203 n.5 (1988); Barnette v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1992-595, affd. without published opinion 41 F.3d 667 (11th Cir. 1994). - 5 -

deduction arising from this payment in the taxable year 1988.

Respondent determined that the 1991 deduction, and hence the

carryback to 1988, was not allowable.

Discussion

Resolution of the question before us involves an analysis of

several interrelated statutory and regulatory provisions which

can only be described as a semantical exercise worthy of Judge

Learned Hand's famous commentary on the complexity of the

Internal Revenue Code, a commentary which has acquired added

significance in the years since it was first articulated.3 As a

consequence, we set forth that analysis in order to bring into

focus the precise question that we must decide, namely, whether

the amounts of the accrued vacation and severance pay were "paid"

when the letter of credit was purchased on March 13, 1992.

Statutory Framework

The parties have stipulated that the purchase of the

irrevocable letter of credit was a transfer under section 83,

resulting in includability of the value of the interest

transferred in the income of the employees as of the date of

3 [T]he words of such an act as the Income Tax * * * merely dance before my eyes in a meaningless procession: cross-reference to cross-reference, exception upon exception * * *. * * * at times I cannot help recalling a saying of William James about certain passages of Hegel: that they were no doubt written with a passion of rationality; but that one cannot help wondering whether to the reader they have any significance save that the words are strung together with syntactical correctness. * * * [Hand, "Thomas Walter Swan," 57 Yale L.J. 167, 169 (1947).] - 6 -

transfer, i.e., March 13, 1992. Petitioner claims the deduction

at issue based on section 83(h)4 and section 1.83-6(a)(3), Income

Tax Regs.5 Section 83(h) allows a deduction in the year the

amount of a transfer is included in the employees' income.

Section 1.83-6(a)(3)(first sentence), Income Tax Regs., allows an

accrual basis employer an earlier deduction, "in accordance with

his method of accounting", where there has been a transfer of

"substantially vested" assets to the employee.

4 Sec. 83(h) provides:

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