Schek v. Schek

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Schek v. Schek

49 A.D.3d 625, 856 N.Y.2d 127

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMarch 11, 2008

StatusPublished

Cited by11 cases

This text of 49 A.D.3d 625 (Schek v. Schek) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Schek v. Schek, 49 A.D.3d 625, 856 N.Y.2d 127 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2008).

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Opinion

[626]*626The award of a reasonable attorney’s fee is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court (see Domestic Relations Law § 237 [a]; DeCabrera v Cabrera-Rosete, 70 NY2d 879 [1987]). An award of an attorney’s fee should be based upon, inter alia, the relative financial circumstances of the parties, the relative merits of their positions, and the tactics of a party in unnecessarily prolonging the litigation (see Domestic Relations Law § 237 [a]; DeCabrera v Cabrera-Rosete, 70 NY2d at 881; Levy v Levy, 4 AD3d 398, 398-399 [2004]; Krutyansky v Krutyansky, 289 AD2d 299, 300 [2001]; Morrissey v Morrissey, 259 AD2d 472, 473 [1999]). The fact that the defendant wife has assets is not, by itself, a basis to deny a motion for an attorney’s fee, as she “need not establish indigency as a prerequisite to an award of counsel fees” (Lenczycki v Lenczyeki, 152 AD2d 621, 624-625 [1989]).

In view of the disparity between the incomes and resources of the parties (see Levy v Levy, 4 AD3d 398 [2004]), and the difficulties encountered in obtaining paper discovery from the plaintiff (cf. Griggs v Griggs, 44 AD3d 710, 714 [2007]), the court providently exercised its discretion in awarding the defendant an attorney’s fee in the sum of $60,000. Spolzino, J.P., Florio, Angiolillo and Dickerson, JJ., concur.

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[626]*626The award of a reasonable attorney’s fee is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court (see Domestic Relations Law § 237 [a]; DeCabrera v Cabrera-Rosete, 70 NY2d 879 [1987]). An award of an attorney’s fee should be based upon, inter alia, the relative financial circumstances of the parties, the relative merits of their positions, and the tactics of a party in unnecessarily prolonging the litigation (see Domestic Relations Law § 237 [a]; DeCabrera v Cabrera-Rosete, 70 NY2d at 881; Levy v Levy, 4 AD3d 398, 398-399 [2004]; Krutyansky v Krutyansky, 289 AD2d 299, 300 [2001]; Morrissey v Morrissey, 259 AD2d 472, 473 [1999]). The fact that the defendant wife has assets is not, by itself, a basis to deny a motion for an attorney’s fee, as she “need not establish indigency as a prerequisite to an award of counsel fees” (Lenczycki v Lenczyeki, 152 AD2d 621, 624-625 [1989]).

In view of the disparity between the incomes and resources of the parties (see Levy v Levy, 4 AD3d 398 [2004]), and the difficulties encountered in obtaining paper discovery from the plaintiff (cf. Griggs v Griggs, 44 AD3d 710, 714 [2007]), the court providently exercised its discretion in awarding the defendant an attorney’s fee in the sum of $60,000. Spolzino, J.P., Florio, Angiolillo and Dickerson, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

49 A.D.3d 625, 856 N.Y.2d 127, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/schek-v-schek-nyappdiv-2008.

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