Scheifert v. Briegel

63 L.R.A. 296, 96 N.W. 44, 90 Minn. 125, 1903 Minn. LEXIS 640
CourtSupreme Court of Minnesota
DecidedJuly 3, 1903
DocketNos. 13,395, 13,396, 13,397 — (104, 105, 106).
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 63 L.R.A. 296 (Scheifert v. Briegel) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Minnesota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Scheifert v. Briegel, 63 L.R.A. 296, 96 N.W. 44, 90 Minn. 125, 1903 Minn. LEXIS 640 (Mich. 1903).

Opinion

LEWIS, X

Swan Rake, in Sibley county, meandered and nonnavigable, originally contained several hundred acre's, occupying portions of sections 17, 18, 19, and 20, township 112, range 31. For a great many years it has been gradually drying up, and at the time of the commencement of this action was practically dry land, and the various shore owners commenced this proceeding for the purpose of partitioning the bed of *128 the lake. The trial court divided the land in accordance with the plat, Figure i, and for the purpose of division established three central points, C, D, and E, connecting them by center lines, marked upon the plat, i C. E., 2 C. E., and 3 C. E. Having established these center points and center lines, the court divided the land among the several owners by extending the side lines of the several tracts from the point where they crossed the meander line to points C, D, and E, and to points on the center lines as indicated by the plat. Certain of the property owners complain of the .result upon the ground that the division is unequal. Some of them contend for the rule that the dividing lines should radiate to the center of the lake; others insist that it is not practicable to establish a center for division in a lake of this character, but that it was proper to adopt center lines. The lat- • ter, however, are not satisfied with the center lines established by the trial court, but suggest certain modifications, and proposé that, with proper center lines established, the side division lines of the several fractions be extended at right angles to the center lines.

The question presented, then, is, what is the proper method of dividing the bed of the lake under such circumstances?

In Lamprey v. State, 52 Minn. 181, 53 N. W. 1139, it was stated that shore owners take to the center of the lake, but in that case there was under consideration merely the question whether the shore owner was entitled to that portion of .the land exposed between the meander line and the water, which had perceptibly receded, as against a patentee of the land from the United States government, and the question as to what should constitute the center of the lake, and when that method should be varied or strictly applied, was not before the court.

In Shell v. Matteson, 81 Minn, 38, 83 N. W. 491, the only question involved was the constitutionality of Laws 1897, p. 478 (c. 257), and that act was held unconstitutional upon the ground that the riparian owners held title to the center of the lake.

In Hanson v. Rice, 88 Minn. 273, 92 N. W. 982, the inquiry was whether or not one of the owners should be restricted to the full government subdivision in which the fraction of his land was located, and be cut off from the lake by extending the land of an adjoining shore owner. In the discussion of that question, in which the court declined to follow the Wisconsin rule, it was said that each owner was entitled *129 to the land between the shore and the center of the lake. But in that case the meander line as drawn by the government survey was incorrect, and the dispute was in dividing up the land between the meander line and the lake proper.

The rule has long been established that riparian owners upon a stream take to the center of the current. Schurmeier v. St. Paul & Pac. R. Co., 10 Minn. 59 (82); Olson v. Thorndike, 76 Minn. 399, 71 N. W. 399. But we have no knowledge of any attempt to apply this rule to lakes, where there is no inlet or outlet. It would seem reasonable that where a lake is long, and comparatively narrow, it may be treated as a river, and a center line established from one end of the lake to the other, which should be considered the thread of the stream. Such rule could also, dor the same reason, be adopted in case-of irregularly shaped lakes, where there had been an inlet and outlet, and through which there might have been either a real or theoretical current, which would be deemed to be the center line. In such cases the various owners may be said to have purchased their property with a view to the original situation.

In the case before us the evidence does not disclose whether originally, or in times of high water, there was an inlet and an outlet to the lake, nor does it appear whether there is a gradual slope towards the center on all sides of the lake. The theory upon which the court proceeded was that the method adopted accomplished a more equable division among the various owners than any other system, but the manner in which the waters receded from time to time was not taken into account. Because of the irregular shape of the lake, a division made by running the side lines of the various fractions to the center would be unequal, and unjust to the owners of those fractions peculiarly situated, and apparently for this reason the central-point principle of division was rejected. It is apparent that in the method adopted there was an attempt to combine two systems — one running the side lines to the center points of the lake, and the other to run them to center lines, which, theoretically, were the thread or middle of the stream.

The application of the center-line principle to this lake presents very serious difficulties. In the first place, we discover no rule according to which the center lines were established, except that they were run from *130 the three principal points, F, D, and F, Fig. i, to the center point C, as nearly as possible equidistant from the adjacent shore. The question arises at once, what better reason is there for running a center line from F, in the manner indicated, than from the bay in lot n, section 18, or from the bay in lots 8 and 9, section 18? And, if the center line may properly begin at the shore line F, why -should not the center line, D, be extended to the shore at the west line of lot 4, section 20, .and why should not the center line terminating at F be extended ft> the shore between lots 3 and 4, or between 2 and 3 ? It is evident that these lines were drawn and center points located without reference to-any natural condition of the original lake, either in respect to depth, or natural current, and, so far as we are able to see, resulted in arbitrary division without regard to the legal rights of the owners.

There is no doubt that the division must be made according to the principle applicable to accretions or relictions, as noticed in Hanson v. Rice, supra. As before stated, where the shores of a lake are comparatively even, and the lake is either round or long, few difficulties arise in applying one of the principles of division above mentioned; but where the shore line is uneven, and the body of water of an irregular shape, the difficulty comes in avoiding a conflict of different interests.

In the New England states many questions have arisen in reference to the division of lands which have accumulated along the seashore between low and high water mark, and the courts have aimed to establish a principle which would result in giving the riparian owners-an equal division in the accumulated soil. For instance, in Gray v. Deluce, 5 Cush. 9, in dividing the flats which had accumulated in a> c-ove between high and low water, a base line was run across the mouth-of the cove, and parallel lines were drawn at right angles with the baselines from the ends of the division lines of the channel to low-water mark.

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Bluebook (online)
63 L.R.A. 296, 96 N.W. 44, 90 Minn. 125, 1903 Minn. LEXIS 640, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/scheifert-v-briegel-minn-1903.