J-A03045-25
2025 PA Super 109
STEVEN SCHEIBE, AND ELIZABETH : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SCHEIBE, H/W : PENNSYLVANIA : Appellant : : : v. : : : No. 1478 EDA 2024 WOODLOCH RESORT, WOODLOCH : HOSPITALITY, WOODLOCH : MANAGEMENT, LLC, D/B/A : WOODLOCH RESORT, WOODLOCH : GROUNDS RESORT, D/B/A : WOODLOCH RESORT :
Appeal from the Order Entered May 9, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Pike County Civil Division at No(s): 2023-00717
BEFORE: STABILE, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and LANE, J.
OPINION BY LANE, J.: FILED MAY 20, 2025
Steven Scheibe and Elizabeth Scheibe, husband and wife (collectively
“the Scheibes”), appeal from the order granting the motion for judgment on
the pleadings filed by Woodloch Resort and its related entities (collectively
“Woodloch”) and dismissing the action with prejudice based on the filing of
the paecipe for writ of summons beyond the statute of limitations. We vacate
the order and remand for further proceedings.
Based on our disposition, a detailed recitation of the factual history
underlying this matter is unnecessary. Briefly, we note that this negligence
action arises from events that occurred on July 15, 2021, when the Scheibes
were guests at Woodloch’s resort in Hawley, Pennsylvania. While attempting J-A03045-25
to use an inflatable structure and waterslide erected for guest use, Mr. Schiebe
was injured. The Scheibes retained counsel and thereafter elected to pursue
a civil action against Woodloch. On Tuesday, July 11, 2023, six days before
the applicable two-year statute of limitations was due to expire on Monday,
July 17, 2023,1 the Scheibes’ counsel mailed an electronically signed copy of
a praecipe for writ of summons through the United States Postal Service
(“USPS”) Express, one-day delivery, with tracking from a post office in Blue
Bell, Pennsylvania, to the Pike County Prothonotary’s Office in Milford,
Pennsylvania. The USPS tracking information reflects that the praecipe for
writ of summons was delivered to the prothonotary’s office at 4:42 p.m. on
Wednesday, July 12, 2023. However, the prothonotary’s office did not docket
the praecipe on Wednesday, July 12, 2023, nor on Thursday, July 13, 2023,
nor on Friday, July 14, 2023.
Instead, on the morning of Monday, July 17, 2023, which was the date
on which the statute of limitations was set to expire, a clerk from the
prothonotary’s office called the Scheibes’ counsel and stated that the office
was refusing to docket the praecipe because it had an electronic signature and
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1 The two-year statute of limitations applicable to negligence actions commenced on the date of the accident, July 15, 2021, and would ordinarily be set to expire on July 15, 2023. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524(2). However, because July 15, 2023, fell on a Saturday, the Scheibes had until Monday, July 17, 2023, to commence their negligence action against Woodloch. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908 (providing that when a statutory filing deadline falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or holiday, the deadline is extended to the next business day).
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lacked an original signature as required by Pike County Local Rule
205.2(a)(1)(iii) (providing that “[a]ll papers filed shall be endorsed with the
name, address, telephone number, original signature and I.D. number of the
attorney filing it”). Counsel attempted to explain to the prothonotary that the
praecipe and cover letter complied with the relevant Pennsylvania Rules of
Civil Procedure, and also included counsel’s name, address, telephone
number, electronic signature, and identification number. However, the
prothonotary rejected the praecipe and refused to file it based on its non-
conformity to the original signature requirement of local rule 205.2(a)(1)(iii).
Counsel then prepared a hand-signed praecipe which he sent via overnight
mail on July 17, 2023. The hand-signed praecipe was received by the
prothonotary’s office on July 18, 2023, the day after the statute of limitations
expired. The prothonotary then accepted the document for filing based on its
conformity with local rule 205.2(a)(1)(iii). The only difference between the
two praecipes mailed by counsel was the signature, one being electronic and
the other being hand-signed.
After the pleadings were closed, Woodloch filed a motion for judgment
on the pleadings based on the fact that the praecipe for writ of summons was
not accepted for filing until July 18, 2023, after the statute of limitations had
expired. The trial court conducted a hearing on the motion. On May 9, 2024,
the trial court entered an order granting the motion for judgment on the
pleadings and dismissing the action with prejudice. Therein, the court stated:
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Strict application of the appropriate statute of limitations of two (2) years establishes a deadline to file a suit for injuries sustained on July 15, 2021, on July 15, 2023. The record in this matter reveals that the present matter was commenced by filing of a praecipe for writ of summons filed on July 18, 2023, a total of three (3) days beyond the deadline. We therefore have no choice but to find that the instant matter was not filed within the time prescribed by the applicable statute of limitations . . ..
We note that the [Scheibes] have raised issues regarding acceptance of filings by the prothonotary of Pike County, Pennsylvania, including failure to accept and file documents in accord with the Pennsylvania Rules [of Civil Procedure]. However, this court holds neither authority, nor oversight, over the Office of the Prothonotary of Pike County, Pennsylvania, and the policies and procedures of that office. In strict accord with 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] 5503(a), a matter commences when a document embodying the matter is filed. In this case, the first document embodying the matter was a praecipe for writ of summons filed on July 18, 2023. . . . [This court has] no choice but to find that the praecipe for writ of summons was not timely filed.
Trial Court Order, 5/9/24, at 4-5 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). 2
The Scheibes filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court
denied. The Scheibes thereafter filed a timely notice of appeal, and both they
and the trial court complied with Rule 1925.
The Scheibes raise the following issues for our review:
1. Whether the trial court erred in determining the applicable statute of limitations in this matter ran on Saturday, July 15,
2 In its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, the trial court amended its reasoning as to
the date on which the statute of limitations expired, as follows: “whether we calculated the end date of the statutory period as July 15, 2023[,] or July 17, 2023[,] is irrelevant, as the [Scheibes’] writ of summons was not filed until July 18, 2023, and would have been untimely regardless of which was the operative date.” Trial Court Opinion, 7/22/24, at 1 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
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2023, rather than Monday, July 17, 2023, in accordance with 1 Pa.[C.S.A.] § 1908.
2. Whether the trial court erred in concluding that it held “neither authority, nor oversight, over the Office of the Prothonotary for Pike County, Pennsylvania, and the policies and procedures of that office,” where the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules 205.1, 205.2, and 239) and case law interpreting the same, . . . expressly require the court of common pleas for each county to establish, interpret and enforce the local rules and, relatedly, determine whether such rules conflict with our Rules of Civil Procedure.
3. Whether the trial court erred in applying Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure 76, 205.1, 205.2, and 1023.1, when it concluded that that “the present matter was commenced by filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons filed on July 18, 2023, a total of three (3) days beyond the deadline.” Here, the issue is whether the prothonotary had authority to reject [the Scheibes’] first praecipe for writ of summons received on July 12, 2023—days in advance of the statute of limitations deadline—due to non-compliance with a local rule (i.e., the need for a wet-ink signature) where the pleading otherwise conformed to our Rules of Civil Procedure and, more specifically, Rules 76, 205.1, and 1023.1.
Scheibes’ Brief at 3-4 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
Our standard of review of a ruling on a motion for judgment on the
pleadings is well-settled:
The standard by which a court reviews a request for judgment on the pleadings is limited. A motion for judgment on the pleadings will be granted only where, on the facts averred, the law says with certainty no recovery is possible. As this issue concerns a question of law, our review of the entry of judgment on the pleadings is de novo.
Piehl v. City of Philadelphia, 987 A.2d 146, 154 (Pa. 2009).
Pennsylvania applies a two-year statute of limitations to negligence
claims, such as those underlying this action. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524(2).
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Thus, the Scheibes may maintain their action against Woodloch if the action
was commenced within two years from the date of the accident and alleged
injury on July 15, 2021. However, as explained above, whenever the last day
of a filing deadline falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or on any day made a legal
holiday by the laws of this Commonwealth or of the United States, such day
shall be omitted from the computation, and the filing deadline will be extended
to the next business day. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908; see also Griffin v.
Central Sprinkler Corp., 823 A.2d 191, 197 (Pa. Super. 2003) (holding that
where the two-year statute of limitations expired on a Sunday, the plaintiff
had until the next business day, Monday, to commence the lawsuit). Further,
under Pennsylvania law, the filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons to
commence an action is sufficient to toll the running of the statute of
limitations. See Devine v. Hutt, 863 A.2d 1160, 1167 (Pa. Super. 2004).
In their first issue, the Scheibes contend that the trial court erred when
it determined that the statute of limitations expired on Saturday, July 15,
2023. The Scheibes argue that pursuant to section 1908, they had until the
following Monday, July 17, 2023, to commence their negligence action
because the statutory two-year filing deadline fell on a weekend.
Based on our review, we conclude that because the two-year statute of
limitations expired on a weekend, here Saturday July 15, 2023, the Scheibes
had until Monday, July 17, 2023, to commence their negligence action against
Woodloch. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908. A similar situation occurred in Griffin,
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where the motor vehicle accident at issue in the litigation occurred on April
18, 1997. Pursuant to section 5524(2), the appellants were required to
institute their civil action no later than April 18, 1999. However, April 18,
1999, fell on a Sunday. Therefore, pursuant to section 1908, appellants were
instead required to commence the action by Monday, April 19, 1999. See
Griffin, 823 A.2d at 200. Likewise, in this case, because the two-year statute
of limitations expired on Saturday, July 15, 2023, the Scheibes had until the
next business day, Monday, July 17, 2023, to commence the instant action.
Thus, the trial court erred when it determined that the Scheibes were required
to file their praecipe for writ of summons by Saturday, July 15, 2023.
We now turn to the Scheibes remaining arguments, which we address
together. With respect to the filing of legal documents, Pennsylvania Rule of
Civil Procedure 205.1 provides, in relevant part, as follows:
Any legal paper not requiring the signature of, or action by, a judge prior to filing may be delivered or mailed to the prothonotary, sheriff or other appropriate officer accompanied by the filing fee, if any. Neither the party nor the party’s attorney need appear personally and present such paper to the officer. The signature of an attorney on a paper constitutes a certification of authorization to file it. . . . A paper sent by mail shall not be deemed filed until received by the appropriate officer.
Pa R.C.P. 205.1. There is no requirement in Rule 205.1 that an attorney must
provide a handwritten signature on a pleading. See id.; see also Pa.R.C.P.
1023.1(b) (requiring only that “[e]very pleading, written motion, and other
paper directed to the court shall be signed by at least one attorney of record
in the attorney’s individual name, or, if the party is not represented by an
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attorney, shall be signed by the party”). Indeed, pursuant to Rule 76, a
“signature” for purposes of a civil action includes a “computer generated
signature” and a “signature created . . . by electronic means” by the signer.
Pa.R.C.P. 76.
Further, in interpreting Rule 205.1, the Griffin Court observed that it
“plainly provides [that] documents mailed to the prothonotary or other office
are deemed filed when ‘received by the appropriate officer.’” Griffin, 823
A.2d at 197 (emphasis in original). The Griffin Court continued, “[c]learly
then, under [Rule] 205.1, a document is filed when received by the
prothonotary, regardless of when it is later time-stamped.” Id.3 This is
because the date on which a legal document is time-stamped or actually filed
by the prothonotary is not necessarily the date on which it was received by
the prothonotary because “there is normally a delay between receipt and time
stamping/formal filing . . ..” Id. As the Griffin Court explained: “[a]s a
matter of necessity, a document arriving at the prothonotary’s office will go
3 In reaching this conclusion, the Griffin Court relied in part on Criss v. Wise,
781 A.2d 1156 (Pa. 2001), wherein our Supreme Court similarly focused upon receipt by the prothonotary’s office in determining the time of filing. See id. at 1159 (holding that “for an appeal from an arbitration award to be deemed timely filed, the prothonotary of the court where the action is pending must receive a notice of appeal within thirty days from the date the prothonotary notes on the docket that the arbitration award has been entered and the parties have been notified of the award”) (emphasis in original). In interpreting Criss, the Griffin Court concluded that, by choosing to place emphasis upon the words “must receive,” our Supreme Court “demonstrate[ed] that the controlling factor is receipt, not time-stamping.” Griffin, 823 A.2d at 198.
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unstamped for a variable period of time simply due to the fact that a certain
amount of time will pass before the document is ‘processed’ by employees of
the prothonotary’s office.” Id. Indeed, “[t]he period of delay may depend
upon a myriad of factors, but can undoubtedly range from minutes, to hours
to days, or possibly, in rare situations, weeks.” Id. Importantly, a litigant
has no control over such delays. See id.
Based on these variables, the Griffin Court concluded that a legal
document is deemed to be received, and therefore filed, when it passes
through the doorway of the prothonotary’s office, stating:
Consequently, and employing common understanding to the term “received,” from a theoretical viewpoint, [Rule] 205.1 provides that appellants’ praecipe for summons must be deemed to have been “filed” the moment that it passed through the doorway of the Montgomery County Prothonotary’s Office. The time- stamping of the document is nothing more than a ministerial act following the actual filing of the document.
Id. at 198.
In the wake of Griffin, this Court has focused on the date of receipt of
a document by the prothonotary’s office, and determined that date to be the
date of filing regardless of when the document is later time-stamped or
docketed. See Nagy v. Best Home Servs., 829 A.2d 1166, 1169 (Pa. Super
2003) (applying Griffin and holding that the notice of appeal was filed when
it was received by the prothonotary within the thirty-day appeal period,
notwithstanding the prothonotary’s refusal to accept the notice for filing
because it was unsigned and did not attach a copy of the judgment); see also
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Mariano v. Rhodes, 270 A.3d 521, 528 (Pa. Super. 2022) (applying Griffin
and holding that, for purposes of time computation, a document is filed when
it was received by the prothonotary, notwithstanding that document’s
nonconformity with regular procedure); Cogley v. Duncan, 32 A.3d 1288,
1293 (Pa. Super. 2011) (holding that, “[a]s we stated in Griffin, as long as
the complaint complies with the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, the
date on which the complaint arrives at the prothonotary’s office is the date on
which it is filed, regardless of when it is time-stamped”).
Moreover, pursuant to Rule 205.2, “[n]o pleading or other legal paper
that complies with the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure shall be refused
for filing by the prothonotary based on a requirement of a local rule of civil
procedure or judicial administration . . ..” Pa.R.C.P. 205.2; see also
Mariano, 270 A.3d at 527 (holding that the prothonotary may not reject a
filing based on non-compliance with a local rule when the filing complies with
a statewide rule of civil procedure). Thus, while local courts of common pleas
have the power to formulate and adopt their own rules of practice and
procedure and to enforce them, see Pa.R.C.P. 239, “if [the] local rule conflicts
with a statewide rule of procedure, the local rule is invalid.” Mariano, 270
A.3d at 527 (citation omitted); see also Davison v. John W. Harper, Inc.,
493 A.2d 732, 734-35 (Pa. Super. 1985) (holding that the trial court erred in
dismissing post-trial motions because the moving party did not file an
accompanying order for transcripts of testimony, in violation of local rule).
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Furthermore, while the prothonotary must inspect documents that are
sent for filing to ensure they are in the proper form, the power to reject such
documents is limited to notifying the proper party that the document is
defective so that the defect may be corrected through amendment or
addendum. See Nagy, 829 A.2d at 1170. Permitting the prothonotary to
reject potentially non-conforming legal documents would “confer on the
prothonotary the power to implement the Rules” and make judicial timeliness
determinations. Mariano, 270 A.3d at 529 (quoting Nagy, 829 A.2d at
1170). The prothonotary has no discretion in this matter nor does it act in a
judicial capacity. See Nagy, 829 A.2d at 1169-70 (citation omitted). Instead,
the powers of the prothonotary are “purely ministerial in nature.” Always
Busy Consulting, LLC v. Babford & Co., 247 A.3d 1033, 1041 (Pa. 2021).4
A prothonotary exceeds it authority when it rejects a civil pleading filed within
4 We note that, while our Supreme Court has reaffirmed that a prothonotary’s
powers are purely ministerial in nature, the High Court has recognized that, in limited circumstances, a prothonotary may reject filings where a rule of procedure empowers them to do so with “narrow language that leaves little or no room for independent action or discretionary review by the office of the prothonotary.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 106 A.3d 583, 589 n.9 (Pa. 2014). In so stating, the Williams Court pointed to Rule 910(c) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, which directs the prothonotary of the Supreme Court to reject jurisdictional statements filed with that Court that fail to comply with specific formatting guidelines contained in that rule. See id.; see also Pa.R.A.P. 910(c). However, Rule 910(c) has no bearing on the manner that lower court prothonotaries process a praecipe for writ of summons, as the rule is addressed to the prothonotary of the Supreme Court and pertains only to jurisdictional statements filed with that Court.
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time limits, and such rejection does not affect the timeliness of the document.
See id., 270 A.3d at 530.
The Scheibes contend that the trial court erred by focusing on the date
on which the praecipe was filed or docketed, as opposed to the date on which
it was received by the prothonotary’s office. The Scheibes maintain that the
initial praecipe was filed when it was delivered to the prothonotary on the
afternoon of Wednesday, July 12, 2023, as confirmed by the USPS
documentation. The Scheibes note that the praecipe sat in the prothonotary’s
office for five days, from Wednesday, July 12, 2023, until Monday, July 17,
2023, with no action by the prothonotary. The Scheibes point out that, on the
very day that the statute of limitations was set to expire, the prothonotary
finally acknowledged receipt of the praecipe by telephoning counsel to advise
him that the office refused to file the praecipe because it did not bear an
original signature as required by Pike County Local Rule 205.2(a)(1)(iii). The
Scheibes assert that, at a minimum, the praecipe was deemed filed on
Monday, July 17, 2023, when the prothonotary verbally acknowledged its
receipt of that document. Consequently, the Scheibes argue that the praecipe
was timely filed within the statute of limitations.
The Scheibes additionally assert that the prothonotary had no discretion
to reject the praecipe for filing. The Scheibes note that the only basis for
rejection of that document was the electronic signature. The Scheibes assert
that, pursuant to Rule 76, an electronic signature is acceptable. The Scheibes
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contend that, because the praecipe complied with the statewide Pennsylvania
Rules of Civil Procedure, which do not require an original signature, the
prothonotary had no discretion to reject the filing based on its noncompliance
with a local rule of court. Thus, the Scheibes argue that the prothonotary was
required to accept the praecipe for filing upon its receipt of that document,
and the trial court erred by not deeming the praecipe filed as of the date it
was received.
Based on our review, we conclude that the praecipe was timely filed
upon its receipt by the prothonotary within the statute of limitations. The
Scheibes provided the trial court with evidence and documentation to establish
that the praecipe was delivered to, and therefore received by the
prothonotary, on July 12, 2023. Woodloch does not dispute this fact, and
there is no evidence in the record to contradict it. Although the prothonotary
did not contact counsel until Monday, July 17, 2023, that phone call confirmed
that the prothonotary had, in fact, received the praecipe prior to the expiration
of the statute of limitations. Thus, on the record before us, the praecipe was
timely filed.
We additionally conclude that the prothonotary had no authority to
reject the praecipe for filing on the basis that it lacked an original signature,
as required by local rule 205.2(a)(1)(iii). There is no suggestion in this matter
that the praecipe failed to comply with any statewide Rule of Civil Procedure.
at 1167. See Griffin, 823 A.2d at 202 (holding that, as long as the legal
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document complies with the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, the date
on which the document arrives at the prothonotary’s office is the date on which
it is filed, regardless of when it is time-stamped). Instead, the sole basis for
rejection was the lack of an original signature, as required by the local rule.
Thus, the prothonotary’s rejection of the praecipe was in direction
contravention of Rule 205.2, which provides that “[n]o pleading or other legal
paper that complies with the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure shall be
refused for filing by the prothonotary based on a requirement of a local rule
of civil procedure or judicial administration . . ..” Pa.R.C.P. 205.2. While the
prothonotary could inspect the praecipe for compliance, and inform the
Scheibes of any defect, the prothonotary was still required to accept the
praecipe for filing. See Mariano, 270 A.3d at 529. Therefore, because the
prothonotary should have accepted the praecipe for filing upon its initial
receipt of that document within the statute of limitations, we conclude that
the trial court erred by determining that the praecipe was not timely filed and
by granting Woodloch’s motion for judgment on the pleadings on this basis.
We therefore vacate the order granting the motion for judgment on the
pleadings and remand this matter for further proceedings.
Order vacated. Case remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction
relinquished.
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Date: 5/20/2025
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